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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the role of sector-specific regulators in the rapidly changing 
telecommunications industry. In particular, it studies the access pricing policy which 
provides the optimal balance between static and dynamic efficiency that better reflects 
the changing regulatory goals in a highly variable economic and technological 
environment. Static efficiency concerns the maximization of social welfare by 
intensifying the competition for providing differentiated services (service-based 
competition), whereas dynamic efficiency concerns the maximization of social welfare 
by incentivizing investments in competitive infrastructures (facilities-based competition). 
It is thus obvious that the role of regulators is to facilitate the gradual transition from 
static to dynamic efficiency by influencing the investment and competition outcomes 
through the regulation of the access price. Therefore, there is an interplay between 
regulatory policy and technological development which leads to rapidly changing market 
structures and industry performance. 
The first significant regulatory intervention concerns the migration from a state 
monopoly market to a competitive telecommunications industry which mostly took place 
in 1990s. Obviously, the goal of regulators was to facilitate entry by alternative 
operators in order to achieve static efficiency. The second substantial transition towards 
dynamic efficiency is related to the current regulatory goal of promoting the migration 
from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to service-
based competition over the so-called fibre-based Next Generation Access (NGA) 
networks. This goal aims at providing significant investment incentives without distorting 
the subsequent competition outcomes, and hence, is related to the common trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency. Facilities-based competition is expected to 
resolve such trade-off, which implies that the future regulatory goal concerns the 
migration from service-based to facilities-based competition over NGA networks. The 
aim of this thesis is to model the regulatory intervention in order to derive the access 
pricing policy that achieves the efficiency goals of each migration phase.  
The first chapter of this thesis discusses the background of the past, the present and 
the future state of telecommunications markets and regulation. In particular, it presents 
the economic and technical reasons that necessitate each migration and describes the 
respective regulatory goal in terms of efficiency implications. It is obvious that each 
migration requires a specific access pricing policy in order to achieve the optimal 
balance between static and dynamic efficiency. The three following chapters discuss 
the optimal access pricing policy that achieves the past, the current and the future 
regulatory goals, respectively.  
In particular, the second chapter discusses the optimal access pricing policy that aims 
at promoting static efficiency by facilitating the migration from a state monopoly market 
to a competitive telecommunications industry. In this context, this chapter extensively 
reviews the contributed article studying the access conditions under which an entrant’s 
decision to purchase an essential access input from the incumbent or to make the 
access input itself achieves static efficiency.  
The third chapter discusses the regulatory goal of encouraging investments in NGA 
networks without distorting the subsequent competition outcomes in order to facilitate 
the migration from service-based competition over copper access networks to service-
based competition over NGA networks. In this context, this chapter also extensively 
reviews the contributed articles studying: (i) the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an 
incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal NGA investment level; (ii) the 
impact of geographic price discrimination on a monopolist’s incentives to invest in 
welfare-enhancing NGA investments; and (iii) a monopolist’s incentives to undertake 
the socially optimal geographically differentiated NGA deployment.   
The fourth chapter discusses the regulatory policy which aims at promoting dynamic 
efficiency by facilitating the migration from service-based to facilities-based competition 
over NGA networks. In this context, an innovative approach, which is based on the 
basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), is proposed to provide an 
effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks. 
The last chapter of this thesis concludes the main policy implications drawn from the 
discussion about the past, the present and the future state of telecommunications 
markets and regulation, summarizes the derived research results of the contributed 
research articles and proposes directions for future research. 
 
 
SUBJECT AREA: Telecommunications economics and regulation  
KEYWORDS: access regulation, dynamic efficiency, investment incentives, next 
generation access (NGA) networks, static efficiency 
 ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
Η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή μελετά το ρόλο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών σε μία 
συνεχώς μεταβαλλόμενη τηλεπικοινωνιακή αγορά. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η παρούσα 
διατριβή μελετά τη ρυθμιζόμενη τιμολογιακή πολιτική πρόσβασης στον τοπικό βρόχο 
που οδηγεί στη βέλτιστη αναλογία μεταξύ στατικής και δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας, η 
οποία αντικατοπτρίζει με τον πλέον ικανοποιητικό τρόπο τον εκάστοτε στόχο των 
ρυθμιστικών αρχών σε ένα ευμετάβλητο οικονομικό και τεχνολογικό περιβάλλον. Η 
στατική αποδοτικότητα σχετίζεται με τη μεγιστοποίηση της κοινωνικής ευημερίας μέσω 
της εντατικοποίησης του επιπέδου του ανταγωνισμού για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων 
υπηρεσιών, ενώ η δυναμική αποδοτικότητα σχετίζεται με τη μεγιστοποίηση της 
κοινωνικής ευημερίας μέσω της προώθησης του ανταγωνισμού για επενδύσεις σε 
ανταγωνιστικές υποδομές. Είναι φανερό ότι ο ρόλος των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι να 
διευκολύνουν τη σταδιακή μετάβαση από τη στατική στη δυναμική αποδοτικότητα 
επηρεάζοντας τα επίπεδα επενδύσεων και ανταγωνισμού μέσω της ρύθμισης της τιμής 
πρόσβασης. Επομένως, υπάρχει μια αλληλεπίδραση μεταξύ της ρυθμιστικής πολιτικής 
και της τεχνολογικής ανάπτυξης με αποτέλεσμα τη συνεχή εναλλαγή δομών αγοράς και 
βιομηχανικής απόδοσης.  
Η πρώτη σημαντική ρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην τηλεπικοινωνιακή αγορά σχετίζεται με 
τη μετάβαση από την κρατική μονοπωλιακή αγορά σε μία πιο ανταγωνιστική που έλαβε 
χώρα κυρίως στα τέλη του 1990. Όπως είναι προφανές, ο στόχος των ρυθμιστικών 
αρχών κατά τη συγκεκριμένη μετάβαση ήταν να διευκολύνουν την είσοδο στην αγορά 
εναλλακτικών τηλεπικοινωνιακών παρόχων έτσι ώστε να επιτευχθεί στατική 
αποδοτικότητα. Η δεύτερη ουσιαστική μετάβαση προς τη δυναμική αποδοτικότητα 
σχετίζεται με τον τρέχων στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών να προωθήσουν τη μετάβαση 
από τον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω των χάλκινων 
δικτύων πρόσβασης στον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών 
μέσω των λεγόμενων Δικτύων Πρόσβασης Νέας Γενιάς (NGA), τα οποία 
χρησιμοποιούν κυρίως οπτικές ίνες για τη μετάδοση πληροφοριών. Ο συγκεκριμένος 
στόχος προϋποθέτει την παροχή σημαντικών κινήτρων για επενδύσεις χωρίς να 
διαστρεβλώνεται το επίπεδο ανταγωνισμού και επομένως σχετίζεται με τον 
αντικρουόμενο στόχο της ταυτόχρονης επίτευξης στατικής και δυναμικής 
αποδοτικότητας. Ο ανταγωνισμός για επενδύσεις σε ανταγωνιστικές υποδομές 
αναμένεται να οδηγήσει σε μια τέτοια ταυτόχρονη επίτευξη που σημαίνει ότι ο 
μελλοντικός στόχος των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι η μετάβαση από τον ανταγωνισμό για 
παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω NGA δικτύων σε ανταγωνισμό για 
επενδύσεις σε ανταγωνιστικές NGA υποδομές. Ο στόχος της παρούσας διδακτορικής 
διατριβής είναι να μοντελοποιήσει τη ρυθμιστική παρέμβαση για να προσδιορίσει την 
τιμολογιακή πολιτική πρόσβασης που επιτυγχάνει τους στόχους των ρυθμιστικών 
αρχών σε όρους αποδοτικότητας σε κάθε μεταβατική περίοδο.  
Το πρώτο κεφάλαιο της διατριβής αναλύει την τηλεπικοινωνιακή αγορά και το ρόλο των 
ρυθμιστικών αρχών κατά το παρελθόν, το παρόν και το μέλλον. Παρουσιάζονται οι 
οικονομικοί και οι τεχνολογικοί λόγοι που υπαγορεύουν την κάθε μετάβαση και 
περιγράφονται οι αντίστοιχοι στόχοι των ρυθμιστικών αρχών σε όρους αποδοτικότητας. 
Αυτό συνεπάγεται ότι κάθε μεταβατική περίοδος απαιτεί μια συγκεκριμένη ρυθμιστική 
πολιτική πρόσβασης έτσι ώστε να επιτευχθεί η εκάστοτε κατάλληλη ισορροπία μεταξύ 
στατικής και δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας. Τα τρία επόμενα κεφάλαια που ακολουθούν 
περιγράφουν τη βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική πολιτική που επιτυγχάνει τον παρελθοντικό, τον 
τρέχων και τον μελλοντικό, αντίστοιχα, στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών. 
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, το δεύτερο κεφάλαιο περιγράφει τη βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική πολιτική που 
στοχεύει στην προώθηση της στατικής αποδοτικότητας μέσω της μετάβασης από την 
πρώην κρατική μονοπωλιακή τηλεπικοινωνιακή αγορά σε μία πιο ανταγωνιστική αγορά. 
Επίσης, αναλύεται εκτενώς η συνεισφορά της παρούσας διατριβής στο συγκεκριμένο 
ρυθμιστικό πλαίσιο μέσω ενός άρθρου που εξετάζει τις συνθήκες πρόσβασης κάτω από 
τις οποίες η απόφαση ενός εναλλακτικού παρόχου να νοικιάσει το δίκτυο πρόσβασης 
του πρώην κρατικού (κατεστημένου) παρόχου ή να χρησιμοποιήσει τις ιδιόκτητες 
δικτυακές υποδομές επιτυγχάνει στατική αποδοτικότητα. 
Το τρίτο κεφάλαιο αναλύει το στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών να  ενθαρρύνουν τις 
επενδύσεις σε NGA δίκτυα χωρίς να διαστρεβλώσουν το επίπεδο ανταγωνισμού 
προωθώντας τη μετάβαση από τον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων 
υπηρεσιών μέσω των χάλκινων δικτύων πρόσβασης στον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή 
διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω NGA δικτύων. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, αναλύεται 
εκτενώς η συνεισφορά της παρούσας διατριβής μέσω των άρθρων που εξετάζουν: (i) 
την επίδραση της ρυθμιστικής αβεβαιότητας στα κίνητρα ενός κατεστημένου παρόχου 
να αναλάβει το κοινωνικά επιθυμητό επίπεδο επένδυσης σε NGA δίκτυα, (ii) την 
επίδραση της γεωγραφικά διαφοροποιημένης τιμολόγησης των υπηρεσιών λιανικής στα 
κίνητρα ενός μονοπωλητή να επενδύσει σε NGA υποδομές που αυξάνουν την 
κοινωνική ευημερία, και (iii) τα κίνητρα ενός μονοπωλητή να αναπτύξει το κοινωνικά 
βέλτιστο γεωγραφικά διαφοροποιημένο (σε όρους ποιότητας) NGA δίκτυο. 
Το τέταρτο κεφάλαιο περιγράφει τη βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική πολιτική που στοχεύει στην 
επίτευξη δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας μέσω της προώθησης της μετάβασης από τον 
ανταγωνισμό για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω NGA δικτύων σε 
ανταγωνισμό για επενδύσεις σε ανταγωνιστικές NGA υποδομές. Μέσα σε αυτό το 
πλαίσιο, προτάθηκε μία ολοκληρωμένη προσέγγιση που αντιπροσωπεύει ένα 
αποτελεσματικό μεταβατικό μονοπάτι προς την επίτευξη του ανταγωνισμού για 
επενδύσεις σε ανταγωνιστικές NGA υποδομές. Η καινοτομία της συγκεκριμένης 
προσέγγισης έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι βασίζεται στην εφαρμογή των βασικών αρχών 
ενός αμιγώς χρηματοοικονομικού εργαλείου, των Credit Default Swaps, στην 
τηλεπικοινωνιακή αγορά. 
Το τελευταίο κεφάλαιο συνοψίζει τις κύριες ρυθμιστικές προεκτάσεις που εξάγονται από 
τη συζήτηση σχετικά με το παρελθόν, το παρόν και το μέλλον των τηλεπικοινωνιακών 
αγορών και της ρυθμιστικής πολιτικής, παρουσιάζει συνοπτικά τα εξαγόμενα 
αποτελέσματα από τη συνεισφορά της παρούσας διατριβής μέσω των άρθρων που 
συνεισφέρουν στη σχετική βιβλιογραφία και δίνει τις κατευθυντήριες γραμμές για 
μελλοντική έρευνα.   
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κινούμενου στόχου». Μοναχική, γιατί τα όσα βιώνεις δε μπορούν να γίνουν κατανοητά 
από τον όποιο περίγυρό σου, όσο πρόθυμοι και αν είναι οι άνθρωποι που σε αγαπούν 
και νοιάζονται πραγματικά για εσένα˙ δοκιμασία, γιατί η εναλλαγή συναισθημάτων είναι 
τόσο έντονη και γρήγορη που η συγκέντρωση στο στόχο φαντάζει πράξη άξια 
θαυμασμού˙ κινούμενος στόχος, γιατί σε ένα τόσο ευμετάβλητο οικονομικό και 
τεχνολογικό περιβάλλον, ο στόχος που έχεις εξ’ αρχής θέσει μετακινείται και 
προσαρμόζεται κάνοντας την επίτευξή του να μοιάζει με σκοτεινό λαβύρινθο. Όσο όμως 
μοναχική κι αν είναι η δοκιμασία για την επίτευξη αυτού του στόχου, υπάρχουν κάποιοι 
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απαιτούνται για να ικανοποιήσω τις προσωπικές μου φιλοδοξίες. Όμως, ότι πιο 
σημαντικό μου έχουν χαρίσει είναι η στάση ζωής απέναντι σε οτιδήποτε θεωρείται 
μοναδικό και αληθινό. Μου έμαθαν να αγωνίζομαι για την αλήθεια και τη γνώση, 
στοιχεία απαραίτητα για τη συνεισφορά στην αυθεντικότητα της επιστήμης. Ελπίζω να 
σας κάνω περήφανους κάθε μέρα. 
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μου χαρίσανε και που ήταν δίπλα μου καθ’ όλη τη διάρκεια της εκπόνησης της 
διδακτορικής μου διατριβής θυσιάζοντας μεγάλο μέρος από τον προσωπικό τους 
ελεύθερο χρόνο. Ένα μεγάλο ευχαριστώ στους Καθηγητές Ν.Βέττα και Ι.Κατσουλάκο, 
δύο από τους πλέον δραστήριους ερευνητικά οικονομολόγους, που μου έκαναν την τιμή 
να είναι μέλη της επταμελούς εξεταστικής επιτροπής της διατριβής μου. Επίσης, θα 
ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τον Επίκουρο Καθηγητή Ε.Αθανασίου για το ήθος που μου 
δίδαξε και την προθυμία του να παρέχει τις συμβουλές του κάθε φορά που μου ήταν 
απαραίτητες. Τέλος, το πιο μεγάλο ευχαριστώ στον Άνθρωπο, Φίλο και Καθηγητή μου, 
Δημήτρη Βαρουτά, που μοιραστήκαμε τις χαρές, τις λύπες, τα χαμόγελα και τις 
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 ΣΥΝΟΠΤΙΚΗ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΗΣ 
Ένα τηλεπικοινωνιακό δίκτυο αποτελείται από δύο μεγάλα υποδίκτυα, τα οποία είναι σε 
άμεση αλληλεπίδραση για την παροχή των τηλεπικοινωνιακών υπηρεσιών στους 
τελικούς χρήστες. Το πρώτο αφορά το δίκτυο κορμού, το οποίο ενώνει τα αστικά κέντρα 
ενός τηλεπικοινωνιακού παρόχου μεταξύ τους, ενώ το δεύτερο αφορά το δίκτυο 
πρόσβασης, το οποίο ενώνει τις τερματικές οικιακές συσκευές με το πλησιέστερο αστικό 
κέντρο. Σε ολόκληρο τον αναπτυγμένο κόσμο, τα τηλεπικοινωνιακά δίκτυα 
αναπτύχθηκαν με κρατικές δαπάνες και αποτελούνταν εξ’ ολοκλήρου από χάλκινα 
καλώδια τα οποία επέτρεπαν την παροχή υπηρεσιών φωνής. Επομένως, τόσο η 
ιδιοκτησία του δικτύου όσο και η παροχή τηλεπικοινωνιακών υπηρεσιών ασκούνταν 
από κρατικούς φορείς.  
Η απελευθέρωση της αγοράς τηλεπικοινωνιών και η ιδιωτικοποίηση των 
τηλεπικοινωνιακών παρόχων που έλαβε χώρα στις ΗΠΑ και στη Μεγάλη Βρετανία στις 
αρχές τις δεκαετίας του 1980 και στην υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη στα τέλη της δεκαετίας του 
1990, ήταν αποτέλεσμα της επικρατούσας αντίληψης ότι ο ανταγωνισμός οδηγεί σε 
βελτίωση της κοινωνικής ευημερίας σε σχέση με το μονοπώλιο. Το μείζον πρόβλημα 
που προέκυψε κατά την μετάβαση από την πρώην μονοπωλιακή αγορά σε μία 
ολιγοπωλιακή ήταν οι τεράστιες ασυμμετρίες μεταξύ του πρώην κρατικού μονοπωλητή/ 
κατεστημένου παρόχου (incumbent) και των δυνητικών νεοεισερχόμενων παρόχων 
(new entrants). Η κύρια ασυμμετρία αφορούσε την ιδιοκτησία του δικτύου, καθώς οι 
νεοεισερχόμενοι πάροχοι θα έπρεπε να επενδύσουν σε ιδιόκτητες δικτυακές υποδομές 
ή να ζητήσουν πρόσβαση σε αυτές του κατεστημένου παρόχου. Στην πρώτη 
περίπτωση, οι νεοεισερχόμενοι πάροχοι θα έπρεπε να αναπτύξουν ιδιόκτητα δίκτυα 
κορμού και πρόσβασης. Παρόλα αυτά, η ανάπτυξη δικτύων πρόσβασης είναι εξαιρετικά 
κοστοβόρα και πολλές φορές μη κοινωνικά επιθυμητή επειδή εμφανίζει χαρακτηριστικά 
φυσικού μονοπωλίου λόγω των σημαντικών οικονομιών πυκνότητας που ενέχουν. Στη 
δεύτερη περίπτωση, ο κατεστημένος πάροχος θα μπορούσε να απαιτήσει ένα 
εξαιρετικά υψηλό τίμημα για την ενοικίαση των υποδομών του έτσι ώστε να διατηρήσει 
τη μονοπωλιακή του θέση. Για τους παραπάνω λόγους, η λύση που προτάθηκε ήταν η 
υποχρεωτική ενοικίαση του δικτύου πρόσβασης στους εναλλακτικούς παρόχους σε 
ρυθμιζόμενες από την εκάστοτε Εθνική Ρυθμιστική Αρχή (ΕΡΑ) τηλεπικοινωνιών τιμές. 
Η συγκεκριμένη ρυθμιστική πρακτική είναι ευρέως γνωστή ως αδεσμοποίητη πρόσβαση 
στον τοπικό βρόχο (Local Loop Unbundling – LLU). 
Παρόλα αυτά, οι συνθήκες κάτω από τις οποίες θα εφαρμοζόταν η μετάβαση από το 
μονοπώλιο στο ολιγοπώλιο οδήγησε σε μία έντονη διαμάχη με κεντρικό περιεχόμενο τη 
βέλτιστη τιμή πρόσβασης που θα εξυπηρετούσε τους στόχους των ρυθμιστικών αρχών. 
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, οι κύριοι στόχοι κάθε ρυθμιστικής παρέμβασης είναι να: (i) επιτύχει 
στατική αποδοτικότητα (static efficiency) που συνεπάγεται μεγαλύτερο πλεόνασμα 
καταναλωτή μέσω χαμηλότερων τιμών και καλύτερης ποιότητας υπηρεσιών, και (ii) την 
επίτευξη δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας (dynamic efficiency) που συνεπάγεται οικονομική 
μεγέθυνση και καινοτομία μέσω παροχής κινήτρων για την ανάληψη του κοινωνικά 
βέλτιστου ύψους επενδύσεων σε προηγμένες δικτυακές υποδομές.  
Η στατική αποδοτικότητα σχετίζεται με τη μείωση της ισχύος του κατεστημένου 
παρόχου έτσι ώστε να προωθηθεί η είσοδος εναλλακτικών παρόχων στην αγορά και να 
εντατικοποιηθεί ο μεταξύ τους ανταγωνισμός για παροχή καλύτερων και (οριζοντίως) 
διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών (service-based competition). Αυτού του είδους ο 
ανταγωνισμός προωθεί τόσο τη βέλτιστη χρησιμοποίηση των πόρων (productive 
efficiency) όσο και τη βέλτιστη κατανομή τους στην κοινωνία (allocative efficiency), 
προωθώντας έτσι την επίτευξη στατικής αποδοτικότητας. Αντίθετα, η δυναμική 
αποδοτικότητα σχετίζεται με τον μακροπρόθεσμο στόχο της ρυθμιστικής πολιτικής για 
την ενθάρρυνση των παρόχων να επενδύσουν σε ανταγωνιστικές δικτυακές υποδομές 
που θα οδηγήσει σε έναν αέναο ανταγωνισμό για παροχή καινοτόμων και ποιοτικά 
διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών (facilities-based competition). Αυτού του είδους ο 
ανταγωνισμός μεγιστοποιεί τα οφέλη για τον καταναλωτή καθώς οδηγεί σε 
μεγιστοποίηση της κοινωνικής ευημερίας, μεγιστοποίηση της οικονομικής ανάπτυξης 
και ελαχιστοποίηση του κόστους παραγωγής. Καθίσταται έτσι σαφές ότι η επίτευξη τόσο 
στατικής όσο και δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας μπορεί να είναι ένας εφικτός στόχος 
μακροπρόθεσμα. Βραχυπρόθεσμα όμως, η προώθηση της εισόδου αποδοτικών 
παρόχων στην αγορά μέσω της LLU ρυθμιστικής πρακτικής δημιουργεί μια αρνητική 
συσχέτιση μεταξύ των δύο βασικών στόχων της ρυθμιστικής πολιτικής.  
Κατά τη δημιουργία ενός ανταγωνιστικού περιβάλλοντος ήταν αναμενόμενο η 
ρυθμιστική πολιτική να επικεντρωθεί στην προώθηση του service-based competition, 
καθώς η προώθηση του facilities-based competition είναι ένας μακροπρόθεσμος 
στόχος που προϋποθέτει μια ισχυρή πελατειακή βάση για τους νεοεισερχόμενους 
παρόχους. Η τιμολογιακή πολιτική που εφαρμόστηκε ήταν η επιβολή κοστοστρεφών 
τιμών πρόσβασης (cost-based access prices), δηλαδή η τιμή πρόσβασης ορίστηκε ίση 
με το οριακό κόστος της παροχής πρόσβασης. Εκτός από την απλότητα της 
συγκεκριμένης τιμολογιακής πολιτικής, το κύριο επιχείρημα υπέρ της κοστοστρεφούς 
τιμολόγησης ήταν ότι παρέχει στους νεοεισερχόμενους παρόχους τα κατάλληλα κίνητρα 
για να λάβουν την productively efficient απόφαση σχετικά με την ενοικίαση του δικτύου 
πρόσβασης από τον κατεστημένο πάροχο ή τη χρησιμοποίηση ιδιόκτητων υποδομών 
πρόσβασης (make-or-buy decision). Όντως, η σχετική βιβλιογραφία συμπεραίνει ότι 
ενώ το μοντέλο ανταγωνισμού που περιγράφει τη δομή της αγοράς διαδραματίζει 
σημαντικό ρόλο στην αποτελεσματικότητα της τιμής πρόσβασης να οδηγήσει έναν 
νεοεισερχόμενο πάροχο να λάβει τη make-or-buy απόφαση που βελτιστοποιεί τη 
χρησιμοποίηση των πόρων, η κοστοστρεφής τιμολόγηση οδηγεί πάντα στην 
παραγωγικά βέλτιστη make-or-buy απόφαση ανεξαρτήτως του μοντέλου ανταγωνισμού. 
Παρόλα αυτά, είναι ευρέως γνωστό από τη σχετική βιβλιογραφία ότι η βέλτιστη 
χρησιμοποίηση των πόρων δεν συνεπάγεται απαραίτητα και τη βέλτιστη κατανομή 
τους. Με άλλα λόγια, η βέλτιστη χρησιμοποίηση των πόρων είναι απαραίτητη, αλλά όχι 
και ικανή, συνθήκη για την επίτευξη στατικής αποδοτικότητας. Η παρούσα διδακτορική 
διατριβή συνεισφέρει στη βιβλιογραφία που εξετάζει τη βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική πολιτική 
που επιτυγχάνει τον παρελθοντικό στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών να επιτύχουν στατική 
αποδοτικότητα κατά τη μετάβαση από την πρώην μονοπωλιακή αγορά σε μια 
ανταγωνιστική αγορά για την παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών. Συγκεκριμένα, η 
παρούσα διατριβή εξετάζει τον αντίκτυπο της δομής της αγοράς στην 
αποτελεσματικότητα της τιμής πρόσβασης να οδηγήσει έναν νεοεισερχόμενο πάροχο 
να λάβει τη make-or-buy απόφαση που βελτιστοποιεί όχι μόνο τη χρησιμοποίηση αλλά 
και τη κατανομή των πόρων, δηλαδή οδηγεί σε στατική αποδοτικότητα. Το κύριο 
συμπέρασμα από τη συγκεκριμένη μελέτη είναι ότι η τιμή πρόσβασης που οδηγεί έναν 
νεοεισερχόμενο πάροχο να λάβει την make-or-buy απόφαση που βελτιστοποιεί τη 
χρησιμοποίηση των πόρων, μπορεί να οδηγήσει και σε βελτιστοποίηση της κατανομής 
τους αναλόγως το μοντέλο ανταγωνισμού που περιγράφει τη δομή της αγοράς. Παρόλα 
αυτά, η κοστοστρεφής τιμολόγηση οδηγεί πάντα σε make-or-buy αποφάσεις που 
επιτυγχάνουν στατική αποδοτικότητα.  
Η παραπάνω ανάλυση αποδεικνύει ότι η επιλογή των ΕΡΑ να υποχρεώσουν τον 
κατεστημένο πάροχο να παρέχει στους αντίστοιχους νεοεισερχόμενους πρόσβαση στο 
δίκτυό του σε κοστοστρεφείς τιμές επιτυγχάνει τον παρελθοντικό βραχυπρόθεσμό 
στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών κατά τη μετάβαση από το πρώην κρατικό μονοπώλιο σε 
ανταγωνισμό για την παροχή υπηρεσιών. Παράλληλα με την απελευθέρωση της 
αγοράς των τηλεπικοινωνιών, η τεχνολογική πρόοδος οδήγησε στη σταδιακή μετάβαση 
 από την αναλογική στη ψηφιακή μετάδοση πληροφοριών. Στην πραγματικότητα, τόσο 
οι κατεστημένοι όσο και οι εναλλακτικοί πάροχοι δημιούργησαν ένα δίκτυο κορμού 
βασισμένο σε οπτικές ίνες, οπότε και έγινε τεχνικά και εμπορικά διαθέσιμη η παροχή 
ευρυζωνικής πρόσβασης στο διαδίκτυο σε συνδυασμό με την παροχή υπηρεσιών 
φωνής. Η μεγάλη απήχηση του διαδικτύου και η συνεχώς αυξανόμενη ζήτηση για 
υπηρεσίες που απαιτούν μεγαλύτερες ταχύτητες σύνδεσης στο διαδίκτυο, και επομένως 
μεγαλύτερο εύρος ζώνης, έχουν καταστήσει το χάλκινο δίκτυο πρόσβασης αδύνατο να 
εξυπηρετήσει την αυξανόμενη ζήτηση, καθώς τα χάλκινα δίκτυα έχουν περιορισμένες 
δυνατότητες σε εύρος ζώνης. Για αυτόν το λόγο οι τηλεπικοινωνιακοί πάροχοι έχουν 
στρέψει το ενδιαφέρον τους στη δημιουργία Δικτύων Πρόσβασης Νέας Γενιάς (NGA) 
που σχετίζονται με την μερική ή ολική αντικατάσταση του χάλκινου δικτύου πρόσβασης 
από οπτικά στοιχεία. Είναι φανερό ότι όσο μεγαλύτερο μέρος του χάλκινου δικτύου 
πρόσβασης αντικαθίσταται από οπτικά στοιχεία, τόσο μεγαλύτερες είναι οι εν δυνάμει 
προσφερόμενες ευρυζωνικές ταχύτητες πρόσβασης στο διαδίκτυο. Ταυτόχρονα, και οι 
εθνικές κυβερνήσεις έχουν στρέψει το ενδιαφέρον τους στις επενδύσεις σε NGA δίκτυα, 
καθώς έχει αποδειχθεί εμπειρικά ότι οι επενδύσεις σε τηλεπικοινωνιακές υποδομές 
οδηγούν σε οικονομική ανάπτυξη και δημιουργία θέσεων εργασίας. Τις παραπάνω 
θέσεις ασπάζεται και η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή δηλώνοντας ότι οι επενδύσεις σε NGA 
δίκτυα δημιουργούν κοινωνικά οφέλη που υπερβαίνουν κατά πολύ τα ιδιωτικά κίνητρα 
ανάπτυξης NGA δικτύων.   
Παρόλα αυτά, οι τηλεπικοινωνιακοί πάροχοι είναι εξαιρετικά επιφυλακτικοί όσον αφορά 
την ανάπτυξη NGA δικτύων λόγω: (i) του εξαιρετικά υψηλού κόστους ανάπτυξης NGA 
δικτύων, (ii) της εξαιρετικά αβέβαιης ζήτησης για τις νέες υπερ-ευρυζωνικές υπηρεσίες 
που θα παρέχονται μέσω των NGA δικτύων, και (iii) της αδυναμίας των ρυθμιστικών 
αρχών να δεσμευτούν για τη μελλοντική τους ρυθμιστική πολιτική σχετικά με την 
πρόσβαση στα NGA δίκτυα. Από τα παραπάνω, καθίσταται σαφές ότι οι ρυθμιστικές 
αρχές διαδραματίζουν έναν πάρα πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο, τόσο στη δημιουργία των 
κατάλληλων κινήτρων για την ανάπτυξη NGA δικτύων, όσο και στην εντατικοποίηση του 
ανταγωνισμού για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών. Επομένως, ο τρέχων 
στόχος των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι να προωθήσουν τον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή 
διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών που θα διατίθενται μέσω των NGA δικτύων.  
Επιστημονικές μελέτες έχουν αποδείξει (τόσο σε θεωρητικό όσο και σε εμπειρικό 
επίπεδο) ότι η κοστοστρεφής τιμολόγηση της πρόσβασης στα NGA δίκτυα δε μπορεί να 
επιτύχει το διπλό στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών της ενθάρρυνσης των επενδύσεων και 
της προώθησης του ανταγωνισμού. Ο λόγος είναι ότι οι κατεστημένοι πάροχοι δεν είναι 
διατεθειμένοι να επενδύσουν σε δικτυακές υποδομές αν γνωρίζουν ότι θα είναι 
υποχρεωμένοι να παρέχουν τις υπηρεσίες τους στους εναλλακτικούς παρόχους σε 
κοστοστρεφείς τιμές, καθώς σε αυτήν την περίπτωση δε θα μπορούν να ανακτήσουν 
την ιδιωτική τους επένδυση. Επίσης, οι εναλλακτικοί πάροχοι δεν είναι διατεθειμένοι να 
επενδύσουν σε NGA δίκτυα γιατί, αν γνωρίζουν ότι θα έχουν πρόσβαση σε 
κοστοστρεφείς τιμές, θα περιμένουν τον κατεστημένο πάροχο να αναπτύξει NGA δίκτυα 
και μετά να ζητήσουν πρόσβαση, αποφεύγοντας έτσι το τεράστιο κόστος της 
επένδυσης. Αυτό πρακτικά σημαίνει ότι οι δύο στόχοι των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι σε 
μεγάλο βαθμό αντικρουόμενοι και σχετίζονται με την αρνητική συσχέτιση μεταξύ 
στατικής και δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας. Για αυτόν το λόγο, η βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική 
πολιτική που πρέπει να εφαρμοστεί για την προώθηση των επενδύσεων και τη 
διασφάλιση ενός ικανοποιητικού επιπέδου ανταγωνισμού συγκαταλέγεται ανάμεσα στα 
πιο επίκαιρα και αμφιλεγόμενα θέματα συζήτησης μεταξύ ακαδημαϊκών, ρυθμιστικών 
αρχών και πολιτικών. 
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η αδυναμία της κοστοστρεφούς τιμολόγησης να εκπληρώσει το διττό 
στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών έχει στρέψει το ερευνητικό ενδιαφέρον στην ανεύρεση 
νέων ρυθμιστικών πρακτικών που θα επιτυγχάνουν καλύτερα αποτελέσματα σε όρους 
επενδύσεων και ανταγωνισμού από την υποχρεωτική παροχή πρόσβασης σε 
κοστοστρεφείς τιμές. Επομένως, η απόκλιση από τις ρυθμιστικές πρακτικές που 
εφαρμόστηκαν κατά τη μετάβαση από το μονοπώλιο στον ανταγωνισμό μπορεί να 
πάρει τρεις διαφορετικές μορφές: 
 Απόκλιση σε όρους τιμολογιακής πολιτικής πρόσβασης, δηλαδή απόκλιση από τις 
κοστοστρεφείς τιμές. Είναι φανερό ότι όσο μεγαλύτερη η τιμή πρόσβασης, τόσο 
μεγαλύτερα τα κίνητρα για ανάληψη επενδύσεων, αλλά και μεγαλύτερη η 
στρέβλωση της αγοράς σε όρους ανταγωνισμού. Για αυτό το λόγο, η Ευρωπαϊκή 
Επιτροπή συστήνει την παροχή πρόσβασης σε NGA δίκτυα σε τιμές κόστους 
προσαυξημένες κατά ένα ποσοστό που θα αποζημιώνει τον επενδυτή για όλους 
τους κινδύνους που ενέχουν οι επενδύσεις σε NGA δίκτυα και μπορούν να 
ποσοτικοποιηθούν.  
 Απόκλιση σε όρους ρυθμιστικού καθεστώτος, δηλαδή απόκλιση από το καθεστώς 
παροχής υποχρεωτικής πρόσβασης. Τα εναλλακτικά ρυθμιστικά καθεστώτα που 
έχουν προταθεί αφορούν: (i) τη μη επιβολή υποχρεωτικής πρόσβασης (regulatory 
forbearance), (ii) τη μη επιβολή υποχρεωτικής πρόσβασης για ένα χρονικό διάστημα 
και έπειτα την επιβολή πρόσβασης σε ρυθμιζόμενες τιμές (regulatory holidays), και 
(iii) την επιβολή πρόσβασης σε ρυθμιζόμενες τιμές για ένα χρονικό διάστημα και 
έπειτα τη μη επιβολή υποχρεωτικής πρόσβασης (sunset clauses).  
 Απόκλιση σε όρους δομής της τιμής πρόσβασης, δηλαδή απόκλιση από την ανά 
χρήση τιμή πρόσβασης, επιβάλλοντας μία τιμή πρόσβασης που θα αποτελείται από 
ένα σταθερό και ένα μεταβλητό (ανά χρήση) μέρος.  
Η σχετική βιβλιογραφία εξετάζει την αποτελεσματικότητα των παραπάνω αποκλίσεων 
στα κίνητρα για επενδύσεις σε NGA δίκτυα και στην επίτευξη ενός ανταγωνιστικού 
περιβάλλοντος προς όφελος των καταναλωτών. Το βασικό συμπέρασμα που εξάγεται 
από τις αντίστοιχες μελέτες είναι ότι δεν υπάρχει μια ομόφωνη άποψη σχετικά με το 
ποια ρυθμιστική πολιτική μπορεί να οδηγήσει στην ανάληψη του κοινωνικά βέλτιστου 
ύψους επενδύσεων (δηλαδή να επιτυγχάνει στατική και δυναμική αποδοτικότητα), 
καθώς τα αποτελέσματα επηρεάζονται σε μεγάλο βαθμό από το κόστος της επένδυσης 
και την επίδραση των επενδύσεων στην προθυμία των καταναλωτών να αγοράζουν τις 
νέες υπερ-ευρυζωνικές υπηρεσίες.  
Η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή συνεισφέρει στη σχετική βιβλιογραφία που εξετάζει 
τον αντίκτυπο των δύο πρώτων αποκλίσεων στο στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών να 
ενθαρρύνουν τις επενδύσεις σε NGA δίκτυα και να προωθήσουν τον ανταγωνισμό προς 
όφελος της κοινωνίας. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, οι μελέτες που εξετάζουν την επίπτωση από 
την απόκλιση από τις κοστοστρεφείς τιμές στις επενδύσεις και στην κοινωνική ευημερία 
θεωρούν ότι η τιμή πρόσβασης σχετίζεται θετικά με το ύψος της επένδυσης. Αυτό 
πρακτικά σημαίνει ότι όσο μεγαλύτερη η αναβάθμιση του δικτύου πρόσβασης ή/και όσο 
γεωγραφικά εκτενέστερο είναι το NGA δίκτυο τόσο μεγαλύτερη η αποζημίωσή που 
λαμβάνει ο επενδυτής μέσω της τιμής πρόσβασης για τον κίνδυνο που αναλαμβάνει. 
Όταν μια τέτοια τιμή πρόσβασης τίθεται από τις ρυθμιστικές αρχές πριν την ανάληψη 
των επενδύσεων θεωρούμε ότι η επένδυση γίνεται υπό ρυθμιστική βεβαιότητα. Αυτή η 
θεώρηση δεν είναι αρκετά ρεαλιστική καθώς οι ρυθμιστικές αρχές δε μπορούν να 
δεσμευτούν σε μια ρυθμιστική πολιτική για χρονικό διάστημα ίσο με τον κύκλο ζωής των 
NGA δικτύων. Για αυτόν το λόγο, ένα μεγάλο μέρος της βιβλιογραφίας θεωρεί ότι οι 
τιμές πρόσβασης που είναι εξαρτώμενες από το ύψος της επένδυσης τίθενται σε ισχύ 
μετά την ανάπτυξη των NGA δικτύων. Αν και αυτές οι μελέτες θεωρούν ότι η επένδυση 
γίνεται υπό ρυθμιστική αβεβαιότητα, υποθέτουν ότι ο ρυθμιστής θα θέσει την 
αναμενόμενη τιμή πρόσβασης που είναι σε συνάρτηση με το ύψος της επένδυσης. 
 Αντίθετα με αυτές τις μελέτες, η παρούσα διατριβή μοντελοποιεί το γεγονός ότι οι 
ρυθμιστικές αρχές έχουν σημαντικά κίνητρα να αποκλίνουν από την εξαρτώμενη από 
την επένδυση τιμή πρόσβασης όταν θα έχει πλέον δημιουργηθεί το NGA δίκτυο και 
επομένως να θέσουν την τιμή πρόσβασης που μεγιστοποιεί την κοινωνική ευημερία. 
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η παρούσα διατριβή υποθέτει ότι οι ρυθμιστικές αρχές θα θέσουν την 
εξαρτώμενη από την επένδυση τιμή πρόσβασης με μία συγκεκριμένη πιθανότητα ή θα 
θέσουν την τιμή πρόσβασης ίση με το κόστος παροχής της πρόσβασης με τη 
συμπληρωματική πιθανότητα. Τα αποτελέσματα έδειξαν ότι όταν το κόστος της 
επένδυσης είναι σχετικά μικρό σε σχέση με τη θετική επίδραση της επένδυσης στη 
ζήτηση για τις νέες υπηρεσίες, ο επενδυτής υποεπενδύει σε σχέση με το κοινωνικά 
επιθυμητό επίπεδο επένδυσης. Αντίθετα, στη πιο ρεαλιστική περίπτωση όπου η θετική 
επίδραση της επένδυσης στη ζήτηση για τις νέες υπηρεσίες είναι μικρή σε σχέση με το 
κόστος της επένδυσης, ο επενδυτής μπορεί να υποεπενδύει ή να υπερεπενδύει 
ανάλογα με την πιθανότητα επιβολής της κοστοστρεφούς τιμολόγησης. Το κύριο 
συμπέρασμα από την παρούσα μελέτη είναι ότι η επίτευξη του κοινωνικά βέλτιστου 
επιπέδου επενδύσεων δεν εξαρτάται μόνο από τις επικρατούσες συνθήκες ζήτησης και 
κόστους, αλλά και από τη ρυθμιστική αβεβαιότητα. 
Επιπροσθέτως, η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή συνεισφέρει στη βιβλιογραφία που 
εξετάζει την επίδραση της μη υποχρεωτικής ρύθμισης στις επενδύσεις και στην 
κοινωνική ευημερία. Όπως είναι αναμενόμενο, η μη υποχρεωτική ρύθμιση μεγιστοποιεί 
τα κίνητρα για ανάληψη επενδύσεων, αλλά έχει αρνητικές επιπτώσεις στον 
ανταγωνισμό και κατ’ επέκταση στην κοινωνική ευημερία. Η παρούσα διατριβή 
συγκρίνει τα κίνητρα ενός μονοπωλητή NGA υπηρεσιών να επεκτείνει το NGA δίκτυό 
του στις λιγότερο πυκνοκατοικημένες περιοχές κάτω από το καθεστώς της ενιαίας και 
της διακριτής τιμολόγησης των NGA υπηρεσιών λιανικής. Παρατηρείται ότι τα κίνητρα 
του μονοπωλητή να επεκτείνει την επένδυσή του στις λιγότερο πυκνοκατοικημένες 
περιοχές είναι μεγαλύτερα υπό το καθεστώς της διακριτής τιμολόγησης, ενώ το 
συγκεκριμένο καθεστώς οδηγεί και σε μεγαλύτερο επίπεδο κοινωνικής ευημερίας όταν 
το κόστος της επένδυσης δεν είναι εξαιρετικά μικρό. Επομένως, σε αυτήν την 
περίπτωση, οι ΕΡΑ θα πρέπει να επιτρέπουν στον μονοπωλητή να θέτει διαφορετικές 
τιμές λιανικής σε κάθε γεωγραφική περιοχή καθώς αυτή η πολιτική ενθαρρύνει τόσο τις 
επενδύσεις όσο και την κοινωνική ευημερία. Στην αντίθετη περίπτωση, η ενιαία 
τιμολόγηση θα πρέπει να επιβληθεί για να αμβλύνει τις αρνητικές συνέπειες της μη 
ρύθμισης στην κοινωνική ευημερία. 
Όλες οι μελέτες που έχουν προαναφερθεί (τόσο οι υπάρχουσες όσο και της παρούσας 
διατριβής) θεωρούν ότι οι επενδύσεις σε NGA δίκτυα αφορούν είτε την ποιότητα των 
NGA δικτύων, είτε τη γεωγραφική κάλυψη αυτών. Στην πρώτη περίπτωση, η 
γεωγραφική κάλυψη είναι εξωγενώς οριζόμενη και επομένως ο επενδυτής αποφασίζει 
το μέρος του δικτύου πρόσβασης που θα αντικατασταθεί από οπτικά στοιχεία, καθώς 
και την αρχιτεκτονική υλοποίησης, δηλαδή αποφασίζει την ποιότητα του NGA δικτύου 
που σχετίζεται με την παρεχόμενη ταχύτητα πρόσβασης στο διαδίκτυο. Στη δεύτερη 
περίπτωση, η ποιότητα του NGA δικτύου είναι εξωγενώς οριζόμενη και επομένως ο 
επενδυτής αποφασίζει σε ποιες περιοχές θα εγκαταστήσει τη συγκεκριμένη ποιότητα 
δικτύου, δηλαδή τη γεωγραφική κάλυψη του NGA δικτύου. Στην πραγματικότητα όμως, 
η απόφαση για επένδυση σε NGA δίκτυα είναι μια διδιάστατη απόφαση που αφορά 
τόσο την παρεχόμενη ποιότητα, όσο και τη γεωγραφική κάλυψη. Αυτό συνεπάγεται ότι 
ο επενδυτής αποφασίζει την ποιότητα των NGA δικτύων που θα αναπτύξει σε κάθε 
γεωγραφική περιοχή.  
Η παρούσα διατριβή μοντελοποιεί το παραπάνω γεγονός για να εξετάσει αν η ανάπτυξη 
ενός γεωγραφικά διαφοροποιημένου NGA δικτύου οδηγεί στην κοινωνικά βέλτιστη 
επενδυτική απόφαση. Παρατηρείται ότι ένας μονοπωλητής υποεπενδύει σε σχέση με τη 
κοινωνικά βέλτιστη παρεχόμενη ποιότητα σε κάθε γεωγραφική περιοχή, ενώ είναι 
διατεθειμένος να επενδύσει σε όλες τις γεωγραφικές περιοχές, αν και στις λιγότερο 
πυκνοκατοικημένες το μέρος του χάλκινου δικτύου πρόσβασης που αντικαθίσταται από 
οπτικές ίνες είναι αμελητέο. Τα συγκεκριμένα αποτελέσματα είναι συγκρίσιμα με τους 
στόχους της Ψηφιακής Ατζέντας για την Ευρώπη καθώς οι συγκεκριμένοι στόχοι 
αναφέρονται τόσο στις παρεχόμενες ευρυζωνικές ταχύτητες, όσο και στη γεωγραφική 
κάλυψη. Η παρούσα μελέτη έδειξε ότι η παροχή ταχυτήτων τουλάχιστον 30Mbps σε 
όλους τους Ευρωπαίους πολίτες το 2020 είναι ένας εφικτός στόχος όταν η ζήτηση για 
τις αντίστοιχες υπηρεσίες είναι αρκετά ελαστική, ενώ η παροχή 100Mbps στο 50% των 
Ευρωπαϊκών νοικοκυριών το 2020 δεν είναι εφικτός στόχος.  
Το κύριο συμπέρασμα που προκύπτει από την έως τώρα ανάλυση είναι ότι η μετάβαση 
από τον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω των χάλκινων 
δικτύων στον ανταγωνισμό για παροχή διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω των NGA 
δικτύων είναι μία πολύπλοκη διαδικασία όπου ο ρόλος των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι 
αναμφίβολα σημαντικός, αλλά η βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική πολιτική βρίσκεται υπό συνεχή 
συζήτηση και διαμάχη. Άλλωστε ο συγκεκριμένος στόχος των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι 
ένα ενδιάμεσο στάδιο προς την επίτευξη δυναμικής αποτελεσματικότητας όπου κάθε 
πάροχος θα κατέχει τις δικές του ιδιόκτητες NGA υποδομές και επομένως ο 
ανταγωνισμός θα στηρίζεται στις υποδομές και όχι στις υπηρεσίες. Αυτός ο τύπος του 
ανταγωνισμού αναμένεται να οδηγήσει σε έναν αέναο ανταγωνισμό για παροχή 
καινοτόμων και ποιοτικά διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω επενδύσεων σε 
καινοτόμες υποδομές, όπου η ρυθμιστική παρέμβαση δε θα είναι πλέον απαραίτητη. 
Αυτή η κατάσταση περιγράφει τον μελλοντικό στόχο των ΕΡΑ.  
Η σχετική βιβλιογραφία προτείνει την εφαρμογή της λεγόμενης «σκάλας των 
επενδύσεων» (“ladder of investment”). Η συγκεκριμένη πολιτική βασίζεται στο γεγονός 
ότι ένας εναλλακτικός πάροχος θα αναπτύξει σταδιακά ένα NGA δίκτυο επενδύοντας 
στα λιγότερο αναπαραγώγιμα δικτυακά στοιχεία όταν αποκτήσει ένα αρκετά μεγάλο 
μερίδιο αγοράς. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι σταδιακά θα έχει την ανάγκη να χρησιμοποιεί όλο και 
λιγότερα δικτυακά στοιχεία του παρόχου/επενδυτή σε NGA δίκτυα. Η ladder of 
investment θεώρηση προτείνει η τιμή πρόσβασης στα περισσότερο αναπαραγώγιμα 
στοιχεία να αυξάνεται καθώς ο εναλλακτικός πάροχος αποκτά όλο και μεγαλύτερο 
μερίδιο αγοράς, έτσι ώστε να έχει τα κατάλληλα κίνητρα να επενδύσει στα λιγότερο 
αναπαραγώγιμα δικτυακά στοιχεία. Με αυτόν τον τρόπο θα επιτευχθεί η σταδιακή 
εγκαθίδρυση του ανταγωνισμού για επενδύσεις σε δικτυακές υποδομές. Παρόλο που η 
συγκεκριμένη πρακτική έχει προταθεί από τη Σύσταση της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής για 
την πρόσβαση σε NGA δίκτυα και έχει εφαρμοστεί από αρκετές ΕΡΑ, τόσο θεωρητικές 
όσο και εμπειρικές μελέτες έχουν ασκήσει δριμεία κριτική στη συγκεκριμένη πρακτική 
κυρίως για την αποτελεσματικότητά της να εκπληρώσει το σκοπό της. Όμως, τόσο η 
ladder of investment πρακτική όσο και οι μελέτες που της ασκούν κριτική, εστιάζουν την 
έρευνά τους μόνο στα κίνητρα των εναλλακτικών παρόχων να επενδύσουν σε 
ιδιόκτητες NGA υποδομές, θεωρώντας ότι υπάρχει κάποιος πάροχος (κυρίως ο 
κατεστημένος) ο οποίος έχει ήδη αναπτύξει ένα NGA δίκτυο.  
Στην πραγματικότητα όμως οι ρυθμιστικές αποφάσεις που αφορούν την επίτευξη του 
παρόντος και του μελλοντικού στόχου των ρυθμιστικών αρχών είναι αλληλένδετες 
καθώς η ρυθμιστική πολιτική που πρόκειται να εφαρμοστεί για να ενισχύσει τα κίνητρα 
των εναλλακτικών παρόχων να αναπτύξουν ιδιόκτητες δικτυακές υποδομές επηρεάζουν 
την απόφαση του αρχικού επενδυτή να επενδύσει σε NGA δίκτυα. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η 
μετάβαση από τα δίκτυα πρόβασης χαλκού σε αυτά των οπτικών ινών, που 
αντιπροσωπεύει το σημερινό στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών, γίνεται ακόμα πιο 
περίπλοκη.  
 Η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή προτείνει μία ολοκληρωμένη προσέγγιση που 
λαμβάνει υπόψη τη συσχέτιση μεταξύ του παρόντος και του μελλοντικού στόχου των 
ρυθμιστικών αρχών. Συγκεκριμένα, η προτεινόμενη προσέγγιση στηρίζεται στις βασικές 
αρχές των Credit Default Swap (CDS) συμβολαίων που χρησιμοποιούνται κατά κόρον 
στις χρηματοοικονομικές αγορές. Αρχικά, μία ΕΡΑ δεσμεύεται να αποζημιώσει έναν 
επενδυτή σε NGA δίκτυα για το μέρος της επένδυσης που δε θα έχει ανακτηθεί έπειτα 
από ένα προκαθορισμένο και αμοιβαία συμφωνημένο χρονικό διάστημα. Η ανάκτηση 
της επένδυσης είναι άμεσα συνυφασμένη με τη διείσδυση των NGA υπηρεσιών. Ως 
αντάλλαγμα, ο επενδυτής κάνει περιοδικές καταβολές στην ΕΡΑ ανάλογα με το μη 
ανακτηθέν μέρος της επένδυσης και την πιθανότητα μη ανάκτησης αυτού. Όμως, η ΕΡΑ 
επιλέγει να αφαιρέσει το συγκεκριμένο ποσό από τις αναμενόμενες συνολικές 
πληρωμές που κάνει (σε αυτό το προκαθορισμένο διάστημα) ο εναλλακτικός πάροχος 
στον επενδυτή για να έχει πρόσβαση στο NGA δίκτυο.  
Με βάση αυτές τις αρχές υπολογίζεται μια αρχική τιμή πρόσβασης που θα ισχύει όσο η 
σωρευτική ανάκτηση της επένδυσης δεν αποκλίνει από την αρχικά εκτιμώμενη 
σωρευτική ανάκτηση περισσότερο από ένα προκαθορισμένο και  αμοιβαία 
συμφωνημένο ποσοστό. Σε αντίθετη περίπτωση, η ΕΡΑ αναθεωρεί την τιμή 
πρόσβασης σε συγκεκριμένες χρονικές περιόδους βάσει προκαθορισμένων κανόνων. 
Αποδεικνύεται ότι όταν η επένδυση σε NGA δίκτυα είναι επιτυχής, η αναθεωρημένη τιμή 
πρόσβασης που προκύπτει ενδογενώς αυξάνεται και επομένως ο εναλλακτικός 
πάροχος έχει σημαντικά κίνητρα να ανέβει τη σκάλα των επενδύσεων. Αντίθετα, όταν η 
επένδυση σε NGA δίκτυα είναι λιγότερο επιτυχής από το αναμενόμενο, η 
αναθεωρημένη τιμή πρόσβασης που προκύπτει ενδογενώς μειώνεται και επομένως ο 
εναλλακτικός πάροχος αυξάνει το μερίδιο αγοράς του και τα κέρδη του. Στην πρώτη 
περίπτωση, ο εναλλακτικός πάροχος καθίσταται περισσότερο αποδοτικός 
ανταγωνιστής στην παροχή ποιοτικότερων υπηρεσιών, ενώ στη δεύτερη περίπτωση, ο 
εναλλακτικός πάροχος καθίσταται περισσότερο αποδοτικός ανταγωνιστής στην παροχή 
(οριζοντίως) διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών. Στην πράξη, το προτεινόμενο εργαλείο 
προσαρμόζεται έτσι ώστε να υποκινήσει τον κατάλληλο τύπο ανταγωνισμού αναλόγως 
των συνθηκών. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, το προτεινόμενο εργαλείο αναμένεται να οδηγήσει 
σε ανάκτηση όλης της επένδυσης στο τέλος του προκαθορισμένου χρονικού 
διαστήματος.  
Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι η προτεινόμενη προσέγγιση είναι η μόνη στη σχετική 
βιβλιογραφία που λαμβάνει υπόψη όλες τις προτεινόμενες αρχές της Σύστασης της 
Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής για την πρόσβαση σε NGA δίκτυα. Εκτός από τη μεγάλη 
καινοτομία της παρούσας προσέγγισης, η συγκεκριμένη εργασία έχει και ως στόχο την 
υποκίνηση μιας εποικοδομητικής συζήτησης σχετικά με την εφαρμογή της 
προτεινόμενης προσέγγισης από τις ρυθμιστικές αρχές, αλλά και τη χάραξη ενός νέου 
κλάδου της σχετικής βιβλιογραφίας που θα υπερβαίνει τον κλασικό τρόπο θεωρητικής 
μοντελοποίησης των ρυθμιστικών παρεμβάσεων. 
Από όλα τα παραπάνω καθίσταται σαφές ότι η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή 
μοντελοποιεί τη ρυθμιστική παρέμβαση σε κάθε μετάβαση από ένα σημαντικό στάδιο σε 
ένα άλλο κατά την εξέλιξη των τηλεπικοινωνιακών δικτύων. Κάθε μία μετάβαση 
σχετίζεται με έναν μοναδικό στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών που αντιπροσωπεύει μια 
μετάβαση προς την εγκαθίδρυση ενός ανταγωνιστικού περιβάλλοντος όπου η 
ρυθμιστική παρέμβαση δε θα κρίνεται αναγκαία. Σε αυτό το μακροπρόθεσμο 
περιβάλλον, η ταυτόχρονη επίτευξη στατικής και δυναμικής αποδοτικότητας είναι 
εφικτή. Επομένως, η παρούσα διατριβή όχι μόνο περιγράφει το παρελθόν, το παρόν και 
το μέλλον των τηλεπικοινωνιακών δικτύων, αλλά και συνεισφέρει στη μοντελοποίηση 
των ρυθμιστικών παρεμβάσεων που εφαρμόστηκαν ή πρέπει να εφαρμοστούν για να 
διευκολύνουν τη μετάβαση από την πρώην κρατική μονοπωλιακή αγορά στην επίτευξη 
του ανταγωνισμού για παροχή ποιοτικά διαφοροποιημένων υπηρεσιών μέσω των 
επενδύσεων σε ανταγωνιστικές NGA υποδομές. 
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή ανέδειξε ορισμένα χρήσιμα 
συμπεράσματα που είχαν παραβλεφθεί από τις υπάρχουσες μελέτες: 
 Η κοστοστρεφής τιμολόγηση που εφαρμόστηκε από τις ΕΡΑ κατά την 
απελευθέρωση της αγοράς των τηλεπικοινωνιών για την προώθηση του service-
based competition, ήταν η σωστή επιλογή καθώς οδηγεί τον entrant να πάρει την 
“make-or-buy” απόφαση που οδηγεί όχι μόνο σε productive efficiency, αλλά και σε 
allocative efficiency. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η κοστοστρεφής τιμολόγηση επιτυγχάνει τον 
βραχυπρόθεσμο στόχο των ρυθμιστικών αρχών να επιτύχουν static efficiency. 
 Η βέλτιστη ρυθμιστική πολιτική που θα πρέπει να εφαρμοστεί κατά τη μετάβαση 
από τα δίκτυα πρόσβασης χαλκού στα NGA δίκτυα, πρέπει να λαμβάνει υπόψη της 
όχι μόνο τις επικρατούσες συνθήκες σε όρους κόστους και ζήτησης, αλλά και τη 
ρυθμιστική αβεβαιότητα καθώς αποδείχτηκε ότι επηρεάζει άμεσα την επίτευξη του 
παρόντος ρυθμιστικού στόχου για προώθηση της ανάπτυξης του κοινωνικά 
επιθυμητού NGA δικτύου. 
 Στις περιπτώσεις όπου ο επενδύτης δεν έχει την υποχρέωση να παρέχει πρόσβαση 
στο NGA δίκτυό του θα πρέπει να του δίνεται το δικαίωμα να θέτει διαφορετικές 
τιμές στις νέες υπηρεσίες λιανικής ανάλογα με τη γεωγραφική περιοχή που αυτές 
παρέχονται. 
 Η ανάπτυξη NGA δικτύων είναι μία διδιάστατη επενδυτική απόφαση καθώς αφορά 
τόσο την επένδυση σε ποιότητα, όσο και την επένδυση σε γεωγραφική κάλυψη. 
Επομένως, ένας μονοπωλητής έχει σημαντικά κίνητρα να παρέχει 
διαφοροποιημένες υπηρεσίες σε όρους ποιότητας σε διαφορετικές γεωγραφικές 
περιοχές. 
 Η εύρεση της βέλτιστης ρυθμιστικής πολιτικής γίνεται ακόμα πιο περίπλοκη αν 
συνυπολογίσουμε το γεγονός ότι η ρυθμιστική πολιτική που πρόκειται να 
εφαρμοστεί για να ενισχύσει τα κίνητρα των εναλλακτικών παρόχων να αναπτύξουν 
ιδιόκτητες δικτυακές υποδομές επηρεάζουν άμεσα την απόφαση του αρχικού 
επενδυτή να επενδύσει σε NGA δίκτυα. Αυτό συνεπάγεται ότι θα πρέπει να 
αναπτυχθούν πιο εξεζητημένα μοντέλα που θα υπερβαίνουν τον κλασικό τρόπο 
θεωρητικής μοντελοποίησης των ρυθμιστικών παρεμβάσεων.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The telecommunications industry is probably the most rapidly evolving network 
industry since it has undergone extensive changes in recent decades mainly 
motivated by the evolution of new technologies and services, the growing 
importance of telecommunications for national economies and the development 
of international trade in telecommunications services. The goal of this thesis is to 
describe the interplay between the continuously evolving scope of 
telecommunications regulation and technological development which leads to 
rapidly changing market structures in the telecommunications industry. 
Historically, telecommunications networks were deployed using public funds in 
order to facilitate the distance communication between people. In particular, in 
many developed countries nationwide copper networks were built since their 
technology and architecture were optimal for carrying voice traffic on a circuit 
switched basis. In addition, each national government also owned the monopoly 
operator which provided end-users with voice services. Therefore, both network 
operation and service provision were undertaken by the state-owned monopoly 
firm. 
The  liberalization of the telecommunications markets in the United States (US) 
and Britain in the early 1980s and in Europe in the late 1990s was the result of 
the conventional wisdom that competition serves consumers and social welfare 
better than the former state monopoly, both from a short-term perspective, where 
entry and investment decisions are taken as given as well as from a long-term 
perspective, where these are treated as endogenous [1]. In addition, the almost 
simultaneous privatization of the former state-owned monopoly operators (the so-
called “incumbents”) was a political decision that stems from the proposition that 
privately-owned providers are more productively efficient than state-owned 
operators. Therefore, it was expected that liberalization and privatization would 
lead to a level playing field for the privately-owned alternative providers (the so-
called “new-entrants”) which would compete with the former monopolists.  
However, the migration from a state monopoly market to a competitive 
telecommunications industry required the existence of a sector-specific regulator 
for the restructuring process of the telecommunications sector. Indeed, regulation 
can be seen as the implementation dimension that facilitates change. In addition, 
regulatory intervention is best described as a corrective for market failure, having 
as its ultimate goal a sufficiently and sustainable competitive market that requires 
no intervention. Market failure is defined not in terms of specific outcomes, but as 
the failure of the market to generate efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
There are seven basic causes of market failure, of which monopolistic supply is 
predominant in the telecommunications services industry [2]. The reason for such 
market failure lies in the asymmetric nature of the telecommunications markets.  
The most significant source of asymmetry is the fact that the incumbent operators 
have already installed their own networks, whereas new entrants have to build 
new networks from scratch or to lease the incumbents’ networks. In particular, the 
provision of an end-to-end telecommunications service (such as a telephone call 
or an internet communication) almost always requires a combination of a number 
of separate components, such as call origination, transportation and call 
termination. Figure 1 graphically describes the connection between the required 
network elements for the successful provision of an end-to-end 
telecommunications service. 
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Figure 1: Core and Access Networks 
In Figure 1, the local loop represents the link that connects each consumer’s 
premises with the nearest central office. In particular, the local loop is defined as 
the physical twisted metallic pair connecting the network termination point at the 
subscriber’s premises to the main distribution frame (local exchange) or 
equivalent facility in the fixed public telephone network (central office) [3]. The 
sum of these connections consists the access network, whereas the sum of the 
connections between the local exchanges (or central offices) consists the 
core/backbone network. It is obvious that call origination and termination take 
place in the access network, whereas transportation takes place in the 
core/backbone network. 
Therefore, a potential entrant needs to build a bypass access network as well as 
interconnect its central offices. However, it is economically not viable for a new 
entrant to build a bypass access network due to its natural monopoly 
characteristics. According to Armstrong [4], an activity is said to be a natural 
monopoly if it is most cost-effectively carried out by a single firm rather than by 
several. Local loop presents widespread natural monopoly cost conditions due to 
the existence of economies of density, which imply that the per unit cost of 
providing a telecommunications service is decreasing in the population density. In 
addition, the duplication of the access network requires high fixed connection 
costs which are related to the cost of digging new ducts and laying new cables. 
On the contrary, the backbone network does not present natural monopoly 
characteristics, and hence, a new entrant may invest in its own backbone 
network. In conclusion, the local loop can be viewed as an extreme natural 
monopoly for wire-based networks which gives the incumbent the power to 
exclude competitors from the retail (downstream) market. 
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In addition, the incumbent typically enjoys several other advantages over any 
new entrant, such as: (i) the lack or lower quality of added services (e.g. wake-up 
calls, information services, voice mail) of a new provider; (ii) the lack of reliability 
of a new entrant’s network or reputation associated with this reliability; (iii) the 
installed consumer base due to switching; and (iv) the lack of consumer 
information about an entrant’s network [5]. This implies that the deployment of 
alternative access infrastructures, which overcomes the monopoly nature of the 
local loop, was not economically feasible for new entrants not only because of the 
huge fixed cost of such deployment, but also due to the low probability of 
recovering the investment given the non-viable consumer base of the entrants. 
As a result, the only solution for new entrants was to purchase monopolized 
inputs (or essential facilities1) from the incumbent. In other words, new entrants 
required access to the incumbent’s access network in order to supply their 
consumers with their services. However, since the incumbent upstream 
monopolist was also a supplier of the final services, there was the obvious danger 
that this integrated firm would seek to exclude competing providers by setting 
high access prices, thereby raising new entrants’ costs [6]. This fact is widely 
known as “one-way” access problem because the providers of a competitive 
service need to lease essential facilities from the provider of the non-competitive 
service but not vice versa. This type of asymmetry results in the failure of the 
market to generate efficiency in the allocation of resources, and hence, regulatory 
intervention is needed for correcting such distortion. This implies that market 
liberalization did not eliminate the need for regulation, but the regulatory focus 
shifted from the retail to the wholesale market.  
Regulation in such asymmetric markets was claimed to stimulate competition in 
the short-run by allowing the entrants to have access to the metallic local loops of 
the incumbent operators. This form of regulation is widely known as Local Loop 
Unbundling (LLU), which implies that the incumbent’s essential input is, at the 
wholesale level, separated from its overall facilities or operations, in order to allow 
for commercial wholesale supply of this input [7].2 Therefore, unbundling was 
expected to facilitate entry as firms were enabled to join the market without 
having incurred huge fixed and sunk investment costs. However, the introduction 
of competition into the formerly monopolized telecommunications markets led to a 
fierce debate about the terms and conditions on which competitors would have 
unbundled upstream access to the historical operators’ local loop facilities [8]. 
The reason is that regulators should achieve too many goals with only one 
instrument: the determination of the access charge (i.e. the price that new 
entrants should pay to the incumbent in order to have access to its local loop 
facilities). According to [1], the optimal regulatory policy should:  
 require as little information and data from market participants as possible; 
                                                          
1
 The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) defines an 
essential facility as a monopoly-supplied facility, function, process or service that competitors 
require as an input in order to provide telecommunications services and which competitors cannot 
economically or technically duplicate (http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1997%5CDT97-8.htm). 
2
  In fact, there are three alternative forms of unbundling: bitstream access, shared access and full 
LLU. With bitstream access, entrants are restricted to resale the incumbent’s services. With 
shared access, the incumbent remains in control of the copper line, whereas with fully unbundled 
access, the alternative operator obtains full control of the copper line. Hereafter, the term 
“unbundling” will refer to full LLU in order to point out that the entrants have to deploy a 
core/backbone network that interconnects most of the local exchanges (central offices).  
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 keep the costs of regulation to society low and in particular, to avoid an 
overloaded bureaucracy; 
 ensure that regulatory measures are temporary rather than permanent, and 
ultimately superfluous, whenever possible; 
 achieve (static) economic efficiency, with a particular focus on improving 
consumers’ surplus, which is achieved through low prices and high quality; 
 achieve dynamic efficiency so that investment incentives give rise to socially 
optimal investment decisions. 
Although all aims have to be kept in mind when implementing specific policies, 
the level of the access charge directly affects the regulators’ two-fold goal to 
achieve both static and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency concerns the short-
run regulatory goal to reduce the incumbent’s market power in order to enable 
alternative operators (new entrants) to enter the market and compete effectively 
with the incumbent in the downstream market. Unbundling of the local loop 
facilitates entry by allowing new entrants to have the right to use the same 
network as the incumbent. As a result, both incumbent and entrants have 
significant incentives to invest in innovative, differentiated services. Such service-
based competition promotes productive efficiency (i.e. existing assets are utilized 
efficiently) and allocative efficiency (i.e. existing resources are efficiently allocated 
to the economy). Therefore, service-based competition ensures an evolution to a 
self-sustaining pro-competitive market structure in which firms behave in a 
competitive manner, and hence, consumers enjoy the welfare gains from static 
efficiency (lower prices, better quality and extended variety of services).  
On the other hand, dynamic efficiency concerns the long-run goal of access 
regulation to induce the firms to undertake the socially optimal (efficient) 
investment decisions in terms of both timing of investments and the extent of 
network deployment. According to Bourreau and Doğan [9], facilities-based 
competition, which requires investments in new competing infrastructures from 
the incumbents and (especially) entrants, leads to efficient investment decisions 
and adoption of better technologies. In particular, facilities-based competition is 
regarded as the only means to achieve sustainable competition since it creates a 
level playing field between the incumbent and entrants [10–12]. Facilities-based 
competition achieves the full benefits of competition, and hence, consumers 
enjoy the full welfare gains from dynamic efficiency (maximum market growth in 
terms of both volume and value so that markets achieve minimized costs, 
innovative technologies and advanced services). 
Although static and dynamic efficiency are not necessarily mutually exclusive and 
they may coincide in the long run, a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency is a common outcome in the short run. Since the promotion of efficient 
entry is a short-run goal in the transition from state monopoly to private and 
competitive market structures, access regulation should indisputably aim at 
fostering service-based competition. The reason is that the incumbent enjoys 
many advantages over the entrants as well as the deployment of a bypass 
access network is not economically viable for the latter. This implies that 
mandatory unbundling is a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote static 
efficiency since the level of the access price significantly affects the right amount 
of downstream entry and upstream bypass: if the access price is set too low, 
inefficient excessive entry may occur; on the contrary, too high access prices not 
only discourage entrants from joining service-based competition, but also 
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provides the entrants with incentives to build inefficient access facilities in order to 
bypass the incumbent’s network [13].  
In parallel with the liberalization phase, the technological developments in the 
communications and information industry as well as the cost pressure of service-
based competition led networks to evolve towards digital transmission and packet 
switching. In fact, the copper wires, which were interconnecting the central offices 
and constituting the core/backbone network, were gradually replaced by fibre 
optic cables, whereas new modem technologies allowed the convergence of the 
existing twisted copper pair telephone lines into the high-speed (or broadband) 
communications access capability for various services.3  In other words, such 
innovations made available the transmission of high data rates over the existing 
copper access infrastructures. As a result, both incumbent and entrants upgraded 
their own backbone infrastructures in order to provide both voice (or in more 
general terms, narrowband bi-directional real-time transmission) and broadband 
internet connection to their final consumers over the copper access network of 
the incumbent.   
In the last decade the number of internet users as well as the capacity they 
demand has increased dramatically, and hence, all providers in the developed 
world have seen a surge in data traffic conveyed by means of packet switched 
technology. The increasing transmitted volume of data has currently made the 
traditional access copper networks incapable of providing end-users with the 
demanded bandwidth. On the contrary, the transmission capabilities of fibre are 
theoretically unlimited, whereas it also provides high data rates, low loss and low 
distortion. For this reason, the deployment of fibre access infrastructures, the so-
called Next Generation Access (NGA) networks, has received significant interest 
among all operators since they are regarded as the only future proof solution 
capable to handle future demand [14]. It is thus obvious that, today, data 
transmission rather than voice determines network infrastructures [15]. In 
addition, investment in NGA networks has also attracted the interest of national 
governments since higher speed broadband services increase the positive impact 
of broadband on economic growth, productivity at the firm level, employment 
growth and consumers’ welfare [16–19]. However, investment in NGA networks 
not only requires a huge initial fixed cost, but also is mainly sunk once the 
investment has been made. This implies that potential investors are reluctant to 
invest in NGA networks unless they are reimbursed for the risk they incur when 
investing in such networks.   
Perhaps the most challenging task for academics, governments and policy 
makers is to design a regulatory policy that encourages investments in NGA 
networks and promotes sustainable competition. In other words, the current 
regulatory policy focuses on establishing sustainable service-based competition 
over NGA networks, thus improving both static and dynamic efficiency. This 
implies that regulators aim at facilitating the migration from service-based 
competition over copper access networks to service-based competition over NGA 
networks.  
In such cases, the coexistence of static and dynamic efficiency unambiguously 
results in better economic and welfare outcomes. However, a growing number of 
                                                          
3
  The Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) technology is the most pronounced example 
of an efficient modification of the copper access network in order to better utilize the limited 
bandwidth provided by such networks. 
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empirical studies conclude that facilities-based competition has been the main 
driver for broadband diffusion although they do not find a negative relationship 
between service-based competition and broadband diffusion [20–23]. Given that 
broadband penetration positively affects economic growth [24], [25], it can be 
inferred that facilities-based competition creates a superior potential for economic 
growth than does service-based competition. Although these studies focus on the 
broadband access markets, and hence, they mainly assume facilities-based 
competition between the traditional telecommunications access networks (which 
use copper pair cables in the local loop) and the cable TV networks (which use 
different versions of coaxial cables), their results will be probably applied to the 
ultra-fast broadband access over NGA networks. 
Hence, facilities-based competition over NGA networks maximizes the main 
economic and welfare indices since the full benefits stemming from a sustainable 
competition level are achieved. However, given the huge investment cost and the 
uncertainty of NGA investments, it is expected that firms will invest in a sequential 
order rather than simultaneously. As a result, the future goal of the regulatory 
policy should be the provision of sufficient investment incentives that promote 
facilities-based entry in order to foster facilities-based competition over NGA 
networks. In other words, regulators should gradually incentivize the entrants to 
invest in their own access infrastructures once the initial investor has deployed its 
NGA network. 
From the above analysis, it is concluded that there are three distinct phases in 
the evolution of the telecommunications markets which directly affect the optimal 
mixture of regulatory policy. These phases are: (i) the migration from a state 
monopoly market to a competitive telecommunications industry; (ii) the migration 
from service-based competition over copper access networks to service-based 
competition over NGA networks; and (iii) the migration from service-based to 
facilities-based competition over NGA networks. It is obvious that a different 
regulatory policy is required to be implemented in each migration phase in order 
to fulfill the desirable investment and competition outcomes of each phase.  
In fact, each regulatory policy results in a different balance between static and 
dynamic efficiency. The aim of this thesis is to discuss the optimal regulatory 
intervention in each migration phase during the evolution of the 
telecommunications networks. For this reason, the following three chapters study 
the respective regulatory access pricing policy that should be implemented in 
each migration phase in order to achieve the past, the current and the future 
regulatory goal, respectively. In other words, this thesis studies the regulatory 
policies that achieve the required balance between static and dynamic efficiency 
that facilitates each migration.   
In addition, this thesis contributes to each of the three distinct literature branches 
that study the optimal regulatory intervention in each phase of access regulation 
from the liberalization of the broadband markets to the promotion of facilities-
based competition over NGA networks. Figure 2 summarizes the past, the 
present and the future state of telecommunications markets by discriminating 
among the efficiency goals of access regulation in each migration phase and 
allocating the contribution of this thesis to each literature branch.  
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Figure 2: A graphical representation of the thesis 
In particular, the following two articles, which are part of this thesis, study the 
impact of access prices on an entrant’s incentives to undertake the productively 
efficient make-or-buy decision which is also socially optimal. In this case, both 
productive and allocative efficiency is achieved, and hence, efficient entry occurs 
during the migration from a state monopoly market to a competitive 
telecommunications industry. 
 M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “On the social optimality of 
make-or-buy decisions,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 
238–268, Sep. 2012. [26] 
 M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “On the irrelevance of input 
prices from a regulatory perspective,” in 5th International conference on 
competition and regulation (CRESSE), 2-4 July 2010, Chania, Greece. [27] 
Furthermore, the following three articles, which are also part of this thesis, study 
the impact of different features of the economics of NGA networks on an 
incumbent’s incentives to undertake a larger NGA deployment which also 
improves social welfare.  
 M. Tselekounis and D. Varoutas, “Investments in next generation access 
infrastructures under regulatory uncertainty,” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 
37, no. 10, pp. 879–892, Nov. 2013. [28] 
 M. Tselekounis, D. Maniadakis, and D. Varoutas, “NGA investment incentives 
under geographic price discrimination,” in 40th EARIE Conference, 30 August-
1 September 2013, Évora, Portugal. [29] 
 M. Tselekounis, E. Xylogianni, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “Geographically 
differentiated NGA deployment,” accepted in 24th European Regional 
Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS), 20-23 
October 2013, Florence, Italy. [30] 
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Last, the following article, which is part of this thesis as well, proposes an 
innovative approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks.  
 M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas, “A CDS approach to induce facilities-based 
competition over NGA networks,” submitted to Telecommunications Policy 
(under 3rd round revision), 2013. [31] 
The above-mentioned research articles are extensively reviewed in the text and 
are enclosed in Appendix A. The last chapter of this thesis concludes the main 
policy implications drawn from the discussion about the past, the present and the 
future state of the telecommunications markets and regulation, summarizes the 
derived research results of the contributed research articles and proposes 
directions for future research. 
It should be also noted that the research towards the completion of this thesis has 
led to the publication of some additional articles that are not at the centre of the 
literature studying the optimal regulatory intervention in each migration phase 
during the evolution of the telecommunications networks. These research articles 
are enclosed in Appendix B without being reviewed in the text.  
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2. FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITON: PROMOTING STATIC 
EFFICIENCY 
This chapter discusses the role of access prices in the pursuit of regulators to 
facilitate the migration from a state monopoly market to a competitive 
telecommunications industry. As it has been already stated in the introduction 
section, the effectiveness of such migration is closely related to the ability of the 
access prices to trigger the right amount of downstream entry and upstream 
bypass. Therefore, in this migration phase, regulators should aim at achieving the 
short-run goal of local loop unbundling to promote efficient entry. In other words, 
the optimal access pricing policy should achieve static efficiency by promoting 
sustainable service-based competition in the retail market.  
In particular, this chapter initially presents the access pricing policy that promotes 
both productive and allocative efficiency when a break-even constraint for the 
incumbent does not bind (first-best) and when such constraint does bind (second-
best). Afterwards, it justifies the choice of European regulators to set the access 
price at the marginal cost of providing the access and discusses its relationship 
with the second-best access pricing policy. It should be noted that the main 
advantage of cost-based access charges is that they give the correct make-or-
buy signals to entrants when bypass is a possibility. For this reason, the last part 
of this chapter studies the impact of the competitive structure of the market on the 
effectiveness of access prices to induce efficient make-or-buy decisions in terms 
of both productive and allocative efficiency.   
  
2.1 The first-best and the second-best access pricing policies 
Consider a simple framework in which there is one vertically integrated incumbent 
and a non-integrated entrant that requires access to the incumbent’s access 
infrastructures in order to compete with the incumbent in the downstream market. 
In this case, the regulator has to determine the access price that achieves static 
efficiency. 
The benchmark situation is analytically provided by Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers 
[6] and Valletti and Estache [32]. It is shown that a benevolent regulator, which 
aims at maximizing social welfare (i.e. the unweighted sum of consumer surplus 
and industry profits), has to set all prices (including access) to marginal costs. 
This implies that the profit margin of the incumbent in both upstream and 
downstream markets is zero since the access price is set at the marginal cost of 
providing the access and the retail price at the marginal cost of supplying the final 
product to consumers. As a result, the socially optimal (first-best) pricing policy 
achieves allocative efficiency since retail prices are driven towards marginal cost 
and enhances productive efficiency since the access is priced at cost.  
However, it is obvious that such an access pricing policy leaves the incumbent 
with zero profits. This implies that when the incumbent incurs significant fixed 
costs in the provision of the access to the entrant, the first-best policy leads the 
incumbent to have a loss. In fact, the incumbent’s access facilities can be used to 
supply several final services, and hence, an entrant’s request for access also 
incurs joint and common costs to the incumbent. Therefore, the regulators should 
compensate the incumbents for such fixed costs through the access price. This 
means that access seekers should contribute to the compensation of the 
incumbent for the fixed costs related to the access provision. The literature has 
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come up with different answers to this problem, according to the set of objectives 
pursued by the regulator and to the number of regulatory tools being at the 
regulator’s disposal [33].     
Concerning the benchmark situation in this case, it is shown by [6] and [32] that 
the optimal theoretical access charge that maximizes social welfare subject to a 
break-even constraint for the incumbent (second-best) is: 
Access price = Marginal Cost of providing the access + Ramsey term 
As a result, when there are fixed costs that should be covered in order to avoid 
the incumbent from making negative profits, the access price should include an 
access markup over the related marginal cost. The Ramsey term is inversely 
proportional to the price elasticity of the demand for the final service, which 
implies that customers of services that are not price sensitive are required to 
contribute more to such recovery. It is thus obvious that every consumer 
contributes to the recovery of fixed costs. Hence, like the benchmark situation in 
the first-best access pricing policy, the optimal access prices are also derived 
together with the prices of the final goods.  
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that in practice Ramsey pricing principles are 
not often heeded for regulated retail tariffs, and access charges are left to correct 
for the various resulting retail distortions [33]. In addition, the Ramsey charges 
entail some specific drawbacks that make their practical implementation almost 
impossible. Initially, there are some political and legal concerns. For example, the 
incumbent may price discriminate among different downstream firms according to 
the elasticities of demand of the services they supply. Of course, such 
discrimination raises antitrust concerns. However, the most significant argument 
against the use of Ramsey charges is the complexity of the derived access 
markup formula which requires the knowledge of the different elasticities of 
demand. For these reasons, policy makers implement simpler ways to determine 
access charges, such as the cost-based access regulation. 
 
2.2 Cost-based access regulation 
According to Armstrong [33], the chief benefits of cost-based access charges are 
two-fold. First, there is no need for information about the demand for the final 
services. In particular, the only information needed is the cost of providing the 
access which is needed for all reasonable access pricing policies. Second, cost-
based access regulation is the only access pricing policy that gives the correct 
make-or-buy signals to entrants when bypass is a possibility. A third (less 
significant) benefit of such prices is that they are fair and non-discriminatory. This 
means that under cost-based regulation different entrants will not be offered 
different wholesale terms by the incumbent. In conclusion, cost-based access 
regulation is appropriate when access charges do not need to perform the 
additional role of correcting for distortions in the incumbent’s retail tariff.   
In practice, both in the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU) a light 
regulation with unregulated retail prices combined with ex ante regulation of the 
upstream access component has become dominant. The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 [34] passed by US Congress and administered by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the European Commission’s (EC) 
Regulation on Local Loop Unbundling [3] mandated unbundled access to the 
metallic local loops of incumbent operators at cost-based prices. 
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However, there are many factors that affect the measurement of the cost of 
providing the access. The first methodological factor is the cost base employed. 
In particular, assets may be valued at Historic Costs (HC) or Current Costs (CC). 
The second methodological factor is the cost standard used. There are several 
cost standards, such as Marginal Cost (MC), Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC), 
Long Run Average Incremental Cost (LRAIC), Total Service Long Run 
Incremental Cost (TSLRIC), Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC), 
Fully Distributed/Allocated Cost (FDC) and Stand-Alone Cost (SAC). Last, the 
methodology or tool used to calculate costs is another source which leads to 
differences in cost measurement. In fact, the two most widely used cost models 
are the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. It is thus obvious that 
different combinations of cost bases, cost standards and costing approaches 
result in completely different calculations of the cost of providing the access.4  
The European Commission indicated the LRAIC as the preferred costing 
methodology, which is a TSLRIC-type approach. On the other hand, the FCC 
adopted the TERLIC to implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 
building block of both cost standards is LRIC, which reflects the incremental costs 
that arise in the long run with a specific increment in volume of production. 
Therefore, both LRAIC and TELRIC are forward-looking approaches in the sense 
that they estimate the costs of rebuilding specific element of network using 
current technology and best available performance standards. For this reason, it 
is said that LRIC-type approaches are based on the costs of an efficient firm. In 
addition, both LRAIC and TELRIC are based on incremental costs, which equal 
marginal costs for small output changes but may differ substantially from marginal 
costs if they include large output changes up to entire services. Incremental cost 
pricing is relevant for entry decisions, whereas marginal cost pricing is relevant 
for decisions to expand output [35].   
Although incremental cost access pricing encourages efficient entry, it does not 
include any service-specific fixed cost or joint and common/shared costs. 
Therefore, prices based solely on LRIC are generally considered to be too low 
and to not sufficiently compensate the incumbent for any additional costs resulted 
from the entrant terminating and originating its traffic on the incumbent’s network. 
For this reason, the European Commission adopted the LRAIC costing 
methodology in which the term “average” implies a policy decision to define the 
increment as the total service. Hence, LRAIC includes the service-specific fixed 
costs. On the contrary, the FCC adopted the TELRIC costing methodology which 
allows the allocation of certain joint and common costs that do not vary with the 
presence or absence of the element in question. It should be also noted that 
many European regulators adopted access pricing based on incremental cost 
with limited markups that account for an allocated part of joint and common costs. 
The rationale of this policy is similar to that of the second-best access pricing 
policy: the incumbent should break even. The difference is that although 
regulators generally set uniform markups to promote competition, the application 
of Ramsey principles suggests that a non-uniform markup may be more 
economically efficient [35].      
In conclusion, the short-run goal of mandating unbundled access to the local 
loops of the incumbent at cost-based prices (regardless of the particular 
methodology employed to calculate such cost) was to promote efficient entry by 
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  An excellent definition of the cost bases, the cost standards and the costing approaches used in 
telecommunications is provided by [97]. 
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alternative operators. Indeed, cost-based access regulation has led to improved 
service-based competition in many European countries5, and hence, they do not 
need to perform the additional role of correcting for distortions in the incumbent’s 
retail tariff. As a result, it seems that consumers enjoy the welfare gains from 
static efficiency (i.e. existing assets were used efficiently and prices were driven 
towards marginal cost). 
However, this expectation lacks of theoretical justification since academic 
research has focused on studying the impact of access prices on an entrant’s 
incentives to undertake the productively efficient make-or-buy decision. The 
following papers, which are part of this thesis, contribute to the related literature 
by studying the conditions under which (cost-based) access prices induce the 
entrant to undertake the efficient make-or-buy decision in terms of both 
productive and allocative efficiency.   
 M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “On the social optimality of 
make-or-buy decisions,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 
238–268, Sep. 2012. [26] 
 M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “On the irrelevance of input 
prices from a regulatory perspective,” in 5th International conference on 
competition and regulation (CRESSE), 2-4 July 2010, Chania, Greece. [27] 
These papers are enclosed in Appendix A and reviewed in the next section which 
surveys the literature that studies the impact of access prices on an entrant’s 
incentives to undertake the efficient make-or-buy decision. 
 
2.3 On the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions 
Many economists argue that cost-based access prices encourage the right 
amount of entry, and hence, lead to service-based competition in the downstream 
market which, in turn, results in lower prices, higher quality and higher social 
welfare. On the contrary, Sappington [36] shows that input (or access) prices are 
irrelevant for an entrant’s decision to make or buy an input required for 
downstream production when the competition between the providers in the 
downstream market is described by the standard Hotelling model. According to 
Sappington, the reason for this striking result is that previous studies fail to take 
into account the impact of a new entrant’s make-or-buy decision on subsequent 
retail price competition. When the incumbent sells an upstream input to the new 
entrant, the incumbent faces an opportunity cost of expanding its retail output. 
The incorporation of this opportunity cost into the incumbent’s total cost makes 
the incumbent act as if its upstream cost of production were equal to the specified 
input price. Therefore, regardless of the input price, the entrant will choose to buy 
(respectively, make) the upstream input whenever the incumbent (respectively, 
entrant) has an innate upstream cost advantage. Therefore, the entrant’s decision 
always minimizes industry costs and ensures efficient entry and utilization of the 
telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, the entrant always undertakes the 
productively efficient make-or-buy decision. 
In addition, Tselekounis, Varoutas and Martakos [27] complement the work of 
Sappington by studying the effectiveness of input prices on inducing the entrant 
                                                          
5
  For example, the market share of the Greek incumbent operator (OTE) has declined from 100% 
in 2001 to 44.2% in the end of 2011, whereas the wholesale price for full unbundling has declined 
from 12.6€/month in 2002 to 9.1€/month in the end of 2011. (source: [98], [99])  
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to undertake the socially optimal make-or-buy decision. They show that input 
prices do not have an impact on social welfare. The reason is that a marginal 
increase (decrease) in the input price causes a unit increase (decrease) in the 
incumbent’s profits and a unit decrease (increase) in consumer surplus. As social 
welfare is the unweighted sum of industry profits and consumer surplus, it is thus 
not affected by a marginal change in input prices. Therefore, input prices are 
irrelevant not only for the entrant’s productively efficient make-or-buy decision, 
but also for the regulator’s goal to maximize social welfare. In particular, they 
show that regardless of the established price of the upstream input, the entrant’s 
decision to buy (respectively, make) the upstream input from the incumbent is 
socially optimal when the incumbent (respectively, entrant) is the least-cost 
supplier of the input. As a result, in the equilibrium of the Hotelling model, the 
entrant undertakes the efficient make-or-buy decision in terms of both productive 
and allocative efficiency regardless of the regulated input price. 
However, these results are found to be strongly dependent on the particular 
model of downstream competition. In particular, Gayle and Weisman [37] 
consider the impact of input prices on the entrant’s incentives to undertake the 
productively efficient make-or-buy decision under alternative downstream 
interactions. They show that input prices are not necessarily irrelevant in the 
Bertrand vertical differentiation model and are not irrelevant in the Cournot model. 
In addition, cost-based input prices always result in the productively efficient 
outcome. This implies that any departure from cost-based input prices may distort 
the efficiency of the entrant’s make-or-buy decision. 
Tselekounis, Varoutas and Martakos [26] study the robustness of the result 
concerning the irrelevance of input prices to the entrant’s incentives to undertake 
the productively and allocatively efficient make-or-buy decision when the 
downstream competition is not characterized by the Hotelling model but 
downstream interactions are better described by the Cournot or the Bertrand 
vertical differentiation competition model. They find that the social optimality of 
the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is affected by two crucial factors: (i) the 
particular level of the price of the upstream input; and (ii) the cost differential 
between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s unit costs of producing the upstream 
input. For this reason, they obtain the range of input prices and upstream cost 
differential that induce the entrant to undertake the socially desirable decision. 
They conclude that the entrant’s productively efficient make-or-buy decision is 
socially optimal for the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the 
efficient decision in the case of Cournot competition and is not necessarily 
socially optimal in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model.  
It is thus obvious that the particular model that describes the competition in the 
downstream market as well as each provider’s efficiency in producing the 
upstream input have a significant impact on the social optimality of the entrant’s 
(efficient) make-or-buy decision. This implies that regulators should have perfect 
information about each provider’s unit cost of producing the upstream input and 
the way that the two providers compete in the downstream market in order to 
draw their optimal access pricing policy. However, when the only goal of 
regulators is to achieve static efficiency, they should simply set the input prices at 
the incumbent’s marginal cost of producing the upstream input since the results 
of [26] show that regardless of the type of competition, cost-based access prices 
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lead the entrant to undertake the productively efficient make-or-buy decision 
which is also socially optimal.6  
 
2.4 Summary 
Chapter 2 presented the access pricing policy that facilitates the migration from a 
state monopoly market to a competitive telecommunications industry. This implies 
that such optimal (first-best) access pricing policy encourages the right amount of 
downstream entry and upstream bypass leading to service-based competition 
over copper access networks (i.e. achieves static efficiency). In addition, it 
showed that the first-best policy is not feasible in practice, and hence, it 
discussed alternative regulatory policies that improve static efficiency. Particular 
attention was paid to cost-based access prices since they were chosen by many 
regulators in the US and in the EU. The main reason for such choice was the fact 
that pricing the access at cost gives the correct make-or-buy signals to entrants. 
Indeed, the related literature concludes that although the particular model that 
describes the competition in the downstream market has a significant impact on 
the social optimality of the entrant’s productively efficient make-or-buy decision, it 
does not affect the ability of cost-based access prices to induce the entrant to 
undertake the make-or-buy decision which achieves both productive (i.e. 
minimization of industry costs) and allocative efficiency (i.e. maximization of 
social welfare). Therefore, cost-based access prices fulfilled the past regulatory 
goal of promoting service-based competition over copper access networks.  
However, the introduction section made it clear that both technical and economic 
reasons call for investments in NGA networks. This implies that the current goal 
of regulatory agencies is to encourage investments in NGA networks without 
distorting the subsequent competition outcomes. The next chapter discusses the 
optimal access pricing policy that promotes the current two-fold regulatory goal.   
                                                          
6
 With the exception of an extreme case in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model where the 
incumbent is much more efficient than the entrant in providing the access. 
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3. FROM COPPER TO FIBRE: PROMOTING SERVICE-BASED 
COMPETITION OVER NGA NETWORKS 
This chapter discusses the role of regulators during the migration from copper 
access networks to fibre-based access networks. In particular, this chapter 
discusses the current goal of regulators to provide firms with significant incentives 
to invest in NGA networks without distorting the subsequent competition level.  
After making a short introduction to the main technological aspects of NGA 
networks, this chapter presents the economics of NGA which conclude that cost-
based access prices promote efficient entry and sustainable service-based 
competition within one network but discourage both incumbents and entrants to 
invest in new access infrastructures. This fact reflects the standard trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency. For this reason a short analysis 
concerning the economic rationale for deviating from cost-based regulation with 
regard to NGA is made.  
The most prominent example of such deviation is the regulatory framework 
proposed by the EC Recommendation on regulated access to NGA [38] which is 
critically reviewed in this chapter. In addition, this chapter surveys the literature 
that studies the efficiency and other performance implications of new regulatory 
approaches that depart from the main principles governing the regulation of the 
copper access networks (i.e. permanent regulation of the access at usage cost-
based prices). This means that such departure may concern the regulatory 
regime employed (i.e. non-permanent regulation) and/or the characteristics of the 
access pricing formula (i.e. non-usage-based or non-cost-based access prices).  
However, the regulators have significant incentives to deviate from an access 
policy that encourages private investment incentives by implementing the access 
policy that promotes competition once the deployment of the NGA network has 
been made. This thesis models the fact that the regulator might deviate from an 
access pricing rule that compensates the incumbent for the NGA investment risks 
through an investment-contingent access price and instead set the access price 
at the marginal cost of providing the access. Therefore, the impact of regulatory 
uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal 
investments in NGA infrastructures is examined.   
Nevertheless, particular attention has received the implementation of the 
“regulatory holidays” access regime, under which the investor is not imposed to 
any regulatory constraints for a pre-determined period of time. The reason for 
such particular attention is the implementation of “access holidays” in the US 
broadband markets and the dispute between the German government and the 
European Commission (EC) about the power of national legislation (which 
envisioned the provision of “access holidays” to the German incumbent operator) 
to limit the discretionary powers of the national regulator in its exclusive right to 
assess whether markets should be regulated or not under EU rules [39]. 
Obviously, such a regulatory policy provides significant investment incentives but 
also ambiguous outcomes in terms of social welfare. This thesis contributes to 
the debate about the effectiveness of “regulatory holidays” in providing efficient 
outcomes by studying: (i) the impact of geographic price discrimination on an 
unregulated monopolist’s incentives to deploy a larger NGA network and on the 
subsequent social welfare outcomes; and (ii) the optimal decision of an 
unregulated operator to deploy different quality NGA technologies in geographic 
areas which differ in their population density.  
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3.1 A short introduction to NGA networks 
According to the EC Recommendation [38], NGA networks means wired access 
networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are 
capable of delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics 
(such as higher throughput) as compared to those provided over already existing 
copper networks. In most cases NGAs are the result of an upgrade of an already 
existing copper or coaxial access network. 
This general definition implies that fibre optics can replace any part of the copper 
local loop. However, technical restrictions considerably limit the available NGA 
architectures. Depending on the part of the copper wire being replaced, there are 
certain NGA architectures, the most common of which are: (i) Fiber-to-the-Curb 
(FTTC); and (ii) Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH). 
Regarding the FTTC architecture, the path from the service provider’s central 
office to the intermediate node (street cabinet) that serves an entire neighborhood 
exclusively consists of optical fibre. The access of each end-user up to the switch 
of the street cabinet is realized using the standard copper cables used for the 
PSTN network and Very High Speed DSL (VDSL) technology over copper cables. 
Depending on both technology and distance, end-users experience symmetric or 
asymmetric data rates of up 100Mbps according to the copper length. 
The FTTC architecture provides the incumbent with the advantage of connecting 
its subscribers to existing copper cable infrastructure in the first mile. Additionally, 
it has lower capital requirements since the NGA investment is done only in part of 
the access network. However, it has limited time frame since there is a need for 
capacity doubling every two years. 
According to the FTTH architecture, the path from the service provider’s central 
office to the end user exclusively consists of optical fibre. The fibre is terminated 
inside the home or the workplace of the end-user. Therefore, each device at the 
subscriber premises is connected through a dedicated optical fibre to a switch 
port located at the central office or to the optical splitter which, in turn, is 
connected to the central office via a single feeder fibre.  
Three FTTH technologies are mature enough to use in an NGA investment. The 
choice of each technology depends on the type of the transmitted service, the 
infrastructure cost, the existing infrastructure and future plans towards new 
technologies. 
 Gigabit Passive Optical Network (GPON). In GPON scenario a first 
aggregation switch is located in the cabinet between the central office and the 
user premises. In passive optical networks, each customer is connected to the 
optical network via a passive optical splitter. 
 Point-to-Point (P2P). Active Ethernet, also known as Ethernet Switched 
Optical Network (ESON) or Point to Point (P2P) network provides a dedicated 
optical fibre from the outdoor active equipment to each end-user. 
 Point-to-Point Ethernet (P2PE). In P2PE scenario a first aggregation switch 
is located in the cabinet between the central office and the user premises. The 
architecture is similar to the one of GPON with the difference that there is 
active equipment in the cabinet.  
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Figure 3: Different NGA architectures (source: [40]) 
 
3.2 The economics of NGA 
This section makes a short introduction to some specific economic aspects of 
NGA investments which should be taken into account during the assessment of 
the level of access prices that encourage the migration from service-based 
competition over copper access networks to service-based competition over NGA 
networks.  
 
3.2.1 The riskiness of NGA investments 
Investments in NGA networks not only require a high initial fixed cost, but also 
are mainly sunk once they have been made. This implies that there are many 
factors influencing the riskiness of an NGA investment project, the most 
significant of which are [38], [41], [42]: 
 Demand uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is related to the uncertainty 
about future demand for the new fibre-based services. In particular, it includes 
the uncertainty about: (i) the penetration of the customer base; (ii) the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the new fibre-based services; (iii) market 
dynamics and the evolving competitive situation, such as the degree of 
infrastructure-based and/or cable competition; and (iv) the market shares of 
the investor and the access seekers.  
It is obvious that the higher the penetration of the potential customer base, the 
higher the profitability of the investment becomes. Moreover, if the penetration 
does not reach the critical mass that is required for the creation of the new 
fibre-based services market, the NGA investment may not even be profitable 
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at all. In addition, intense facilities-based competition due to the existence of 
competing network platforms, such as cable networks, increases the risk of 
both penetration and investor’s market share. Furthermore, the co-existence 
of a remaining copper network DSL platform and a new fibre NGA platform 
increases the risk of the future demand for the new fibre-based services. In 
particular, the higher the migration period from copper-based services towards 
NGA-based services, the higher the risk of the penetration of the new NGA-
based services. Last but not least, although it is expected that the willingness 
to pay for the new services will be higher than for the existing ones (since the 
former offer improved characteristics, such as better quality and higher data 
rate), it is doubtful that this increase in consumers’ willingness to pay will be 
sufficient for recovering the investment cost. 
 Regulatory uncertainty. According to [38], regulatory certainty is a key to 
promoting efficient investments by all operators. Applying a consistent 
regulatory approach over time is important to give investors confidence for the 
design of their business plans. Regulatory certainty is provided by fixing the 
principles of tariff regulation for the whole period of the economic lifecycle of 
an NGA investment. However, regulatory certainty bears the risk of erroneous 
intervention stemming from the argument that a regulator’s initial assessment 
may be mistaken. In fact, it is socially not optimal for the regulator to make ex 
ante commitments for an unreasonably long regulatory period [42]. Therefore, 
in providing greater regulatory certainty the regulator has to make another 
trade-off between the positive effects of greater certainty on investment 
incentives and possible negative effects of erroneous intervention on welfare 
[43]. As a result, regulatory uncertainty is related to the regulator’s limited 
ability to make ex ante credible commitments. In order to mitigate the 
regulatory uncertainty associated with periodical market reviews, National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) should clarify to the greatest extent possible 
how foreseeable changes in market circumstances might affect remedies. 
 Systematic risks. Systematic risk is the variability in outcome caused by 
macro-economic or economy wide events. This type of uncertainty includes 
the macro-economic uncertainty relating to the general development of the 
whole economy and the changes in exchange and interest rates as well as the 
uncertainty related to technological progress and the costs of deployment. 
Considering the significance of the factors affecting the riskiness of an NGA 
investment project, we would acknowledge the reasons that make potential 
investors reluctant to invest in NGA networks unless they are reimbursed for the 
risk they incur when investing in such networks. It is thus expected that cost-
based access prices will not provide potential investors with incentives to deploy 
NGA networks since, under this regime, the investors bear the whole risks of the 
NGA deployment. The next section reviews the literature that studies the impact 
of cost-based access prices on promoting investment in network upgrade in order 
to assess whether such expected negative relationship is scientifically proven.  
 
3.2.2 Cost-based regulation of access to NGA networks 
A significant part of the literature studying the relationship between access 
regulation and investment in network upgrade tries to develop theoretical and 
empirical models in order to assess the impact of cost-based access prices on 
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promoting both static and dynamic efficiency.7 Although a cost-based access 
pricing policy is clearly beneficial in the short term, Jorde, Sidak and Teece [44] 
provides a detailed economic analysis to show that mandatory unbundling at 
cost-based prices, such as those based on TELRIC methodology, cannot serve 
as a stepping stone from service-based to facilities-based competition because it 
distorts the investment decisions of both incumbents and entrants. In particular, 
the incumbents are adversely affected to upgrade existing facilities or to invest in 
new ones, whereas the entrants are encouraged to deviate from the socially 
optimal level of investment and entry. Therefore, when firms invest under 
regulatory certainty (i.e. the regulator sets the access price prior to the investment 
decisions), cost-based access prices achieve static efficiency but fail to promote 
dynamic efficiency. 
However, when firms consider that the regulator cannot make ex ante credible 
commitments, which implies that they invest prior to the regulation of the access 
(i.e. under regulatory uncertainty), they expect that the regulator will set the 
welfare-maximizing policy (i.e. cost-based access prices) once the NGA network 
has been in place [45]. In a such non-commitment setting, Foros [46] studies the 
impact of cost-based access regulation on an incumbent’s incentives to invest in 
network quality in the presence of spillover effects. He shows that cost-based 
access prices discourage the incumbent to invest in network quality unless it is 
much more efficient than its rivals in the downstream market. In the latter case, it 
may use overinvestment as an alternative foreclosure tool. In addition, Kotakorpi 
[47] points out that, under cost-based regulation, the incumbent underinvests in 
relation to the socially optimal level.  
Although most theoretical studies conclude that unbundling of the local loop at 
usage (forward-looking) cost-based prices has a negative impact on an 
incumbent’s incentives to invest in new infrastructures, empirical studies provide 
mixed results. A significant part of these empirical findings use data from the US 
market in which the access prices are set according to the TELRIC methodology. 
Ford and Spiwak [48] analyze the 2002 and 2003 local loop rates in order to 
show that access prices based on TELRIC are associated with increased 
availability of broadband services and increased availability of competitive 
broadband services. Thus, such an unbundling policy dampens neither 
broadband availability nor incumbent’s investment incentives. Willig [49] uses US 
annual data over the 1992-2002 period and finds that that the elasticity of an 
incumbent’s investment with respect to TELRIC prices is such that a 1% 
reduction in TELRIC prices may be expected to lead to an increase in 
incumbent’s investment of between 2.1% and 2.9%. Hence, these studies 
support that low access prices incentivize incumbents to invest in network 
upgrade in order to protect their market shares. 
Many other empirical studies argue that mandatory unbundling distorts the 
incumbents’ incentives to invest. Chang, Koski and Majumdar [50] use annual US 
data from 1994 through 1998 to show that lower access prices provide the US 
incumbents with disincentives to invest. In addition, Ingraham and Sidak [51] 
study the daily returns of the three largest US incumbents (BellSouth, SBC 
Communications, and Verizon) from January 1996 to December 2002. Their 
empirical findings support that mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices has 
decreased the US incumbents’ incentives to invest in their own networks. Actual 
                                                          
7
  See Cambini and Jiang [100] for an excellent review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the relationship between broadband investment and regulation. 
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data from five countries (the USA, the UK, New Zealand, Canada and Germany) 
over the 1993-2003 period show that mandatory unbundling of the local loop 
leads the incumbents to decrease their capital expenditures [52].  
Contrary to previous results, Friederiszick, Grajek, and Röller [53] use a 
comprehensive panel data set (180 fixed-line operators in 25 European countries 
observed from December 1997 to December 2006) and find that incumbents’ 
investments in network upgrade are relatively indifferent to the unbundling policy 
that boosts entry by alternative operators. However, Grajek and Röller [54] using 
almost the same data set show that when the econometric model accommodates 
the strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments as well as an 
endogenous treatment of regulation, then it results in a significant negative effect 
on the incumbents’ incentives to invest in network upgrade. In a more recent 
study, Garrone and Zaccagnino [55] carry out an empirical analysis on a sample 
of incumbents from 27 OECD countries (1993-2008 period) and show that 
mandatory unbundling that boosts service-based competition reduces the 
incumbent’s incentives to invest unless a certain degree of rivalry has already 
emerged in the markets. 
As Jung, Gayle and Lehman [56] point out, although an incumbent’s incentives to 
invest is positively related to the entrants’ market shares and negatively to the 
absolute number of entrants, this competitive effect becomes weaker in a 
dynamic framework. Therefore it is uncertain whether competition spurred by 
mandatory unbundling encourages investments in new infrastructures by the 
incumbents. However, the impact of such unbundling policy on the entrants’ 
incentives to invest in alternative access infrastructures in order to be facilities-
based competitors is unambiguously negative.  
Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller [53] also assess the impact of unbundling on the 
entrant’s investments in alternative infrastructures. They find that entry regulation 
provides entrants with disincentives to invest since they show that entrants would 
more than double their infrastructure over 5 years if they had no regulated access 
to the incumbents’ local loops. Grajek and Röller [54] use almost the same 
comprehensive data set to confirm that easier access pushes entrants towards 
service-based competition even if the econometric model accommodates the 
strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments as well as an 
endogenous treatment of regulation. According to Valletti [8], the reason for such 
negative relationship between an access policy that promotes efficient entry and 
the entrant’s incentives to invest in alternative access networks is that potential 
entrants, who can free-ride on the incumbent’s network, will wait for the 
incumbent to invest in access infrastructures and then seek access.  
The main conclusion from the above analysis is that an access pricing policy that 
boosts efficient entry and promotes service-based competition within one network 
(such as cost-based access prices) not only discourages incumbents and, 
especially, entrants to invest in new facilities, but also results in a substantial 
deviation from the socially desirable outcomes in terms of network deployment 
and timing of investments, implying significant losses in dynamic efficiency [23].  
The next section discusses the conditions under which a deviation from 
regulating the NGA access at usage cost-based prices is socially optimal in the 
sense that it may mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency.  
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3.2.3 The economic rationale for deviating from cost-based regulation 
According to the EC [38] “the EU single market for electronic communications 
services, and in particular the development of very high-speed broadband 
services, is key to creating economic growth and achieving the goals of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. The fundamental role of telecommunications and 
broadband deployment in terms of EU investment, job creation and overall 
economic recovery was notably highlighted by the European Council”. In addition, 
referring to work undertaken by the OECD [57], the EC [58] states that “the cost 
savings in just four sectors of economy (transport, health, electricity and 
education) would justify the construction of a national FTTH network”. It is thus 
obvious that “the social benefits from investment in digital infrastructures by far 
exceed the private incentive for investment” [59]. The reason is that like many 
infrastructure investments, NGA networks may create positive spillover effects 
that are not captured in any individual user’s willingness to pay. This implies a 
clear public policy case for governments to facilitate the roll out of NGA networks 
by reducing the risk for the investor [60].  
Recent empirical studies have tried to quantify the positive impact of investing in 
broadband infrastructures on the main economic and social indices, with the 
research focus shifting towards the impact of higher speed services. Considering 
that broadband penetration may be endogenous to the growth process, Czernich, 
Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann [16] estimate the effect of broadband 
infrastructure investments on economic growth in the panel of OECD countries in 
1996–2007. They find that after a country had introduced broadband, GDP per 
capita was 2.7–3.9% higher on average than before its introduction. In terms of 
subsequent diffusion, an increase in the broadband penetration rate by 10 
percentage points raised annual growth in per capita GDP by 0.9–1.5 percentage 
points. Furthermore, Katz, Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern and Suter [18] estimate the 
impact of broadband infrastructure investments on German employment and 
economic output, following the government’s National Broadband Strategy that 
extends through 2014 and the subsequent ultra-broadband evolution from 2015 
to 2020. They find that a total investment of close to 36 billion euros in broadband 
infrastructures would generate a total of approximately 1 million incremental jobs 
and an additional value added of 33.4 billion euros, while network externalities 
would result in an additional 137.5 billion euros. In total, this results in 170.9 
billion euros of additional GDP (0.60% GDP growth) in Germany.  
The main conclusion of the above analysis is that when there are significant 
social benefits stemming from NGA investments but the private investment 
incentives are weak, the regulator should reduce the investment risk in order to 
encourage the wide deployment of NGA networks. This view is also expressed in 
the Digital Agenda for Europe [61]: “without strong public intervention there is a 
risk of a sub-optimal outcome, with fast broadband networks concentrated in a 
few high-density zones with significant entry costs and high prices. The spill-over 
benefits created by such networks for the economy and the society justify public 
policies guaranteeing universal broadband coverage with increasing speeds”.  
Considering the positive impact of NGA investments on the economy and the 
inappropriateness of cost-based access prices for promoting such investments, 
the European Commission (EC) issued a Recommendation on regulated access 
to NGA providing the NRAs with guidelines for tackling the trade-off between 
fostering competition and promoting investments with regard to NGA networks.   
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3.3 A critical review of the EC Recommendation on regulated access to 
NGA networks 
This section presents the main principles of the EC Recommendation on 
regulated access to NGA [38] and discusses its effectiveness on achieving its 
primary goal “to foster the development of the single market by enhancing legal 
certainty and promoting investment, competition and innovation in the market for 
broadband services in particular in the transition to next generation access 
networks”. According to the Recommendation, where an investor operator with 
Significant Market Power (SMP) is found within Market 4 (market for wholesale 
network infrastructure access) and/or Market 5 (wholesale broadband access), an 
appropriate set of remedies should be applied. 
The building block of the Recommendation is the fact that when investments in 
non-replicable physical access are not specific to the deployment of NGA 
networks (and do not entail a similar level of systematic risk), the risk profile 
should not be considered to be different from that of existing copper 
infrastructure. In this case, the access is also regulated at cost-based prices 
which imply a reasonable return on capital employed. On the contrary, when 
investments in non-replicable physical access are specific to the deployment of 
NGA networks, the investor should be compensated for any additional and 
quantifiable investment risk incurred by investing in NGA networks. Such 
compensation takes place by including an access markup, which reflects the 
additional risk of the NGA investments, in the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) calculation currently performed for setting the price of access to the 
unbundled copper loop.  
Therefore, the access to NGA networks is regulated at cost-based prices which 
include a risk premium that compensates the investor for any additional and 
quantifiable investment risk. According to the Dutch Regulatory Authority (OPTA), 
the total access price includes four elements [62]: 
 The cost of providing the access to the NGA networks. 
 The WACC applicable to the existing copper local loop. In the course of time 
this WACC is expected to fluctuate relatively little. 
 The fibre premium which is a premium to the WACC for the copper local loop 
that takes account of the uncertainty about future demand for fibre-based 
services and the systematic risks of NGA investments. It is expected that the 
fibre premium will be higher at the beginning of the investment and will 
decrease gradually in the course of time as uncertainty over the demand for 
new fibre services decreases. 
 The regulatory risk premium which compensates the investor for the 
regulatory uncertainty.  
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Figure 4: Cost-based access price including an all-risk premium (based on [62]) 
In addition, criteria such as the existence of economies of scale, high retail 
market shares, control of essential infrastructures and privileged access to equity 
and debt markets are likely to mitigate the risk of NGA investment for the SMP 
operator, and hence, should lead to a decrease in the access price. More 
interestingly, additional mechanisms serving to allocate the investment risk 
between investors and access seekers and to foster market penetration, such as 
ex ante and ex post contracts, could also be used. In such cases, the risk 
premium is reduced accordingly. The recommended risk-sharing mechanisms 
are: 
 Volume Discounts. This scheme is based on the fact that the investment risk 
decreases with the total number of fibre loops already sold in a given area. 
Under this scheme, access prices vary in accordance with the volume 
purchased. Once the access seeker reaches some pre-determined 
thresholds, it has access to lower access prices. The higher the threshold is, 
the lower the access price becomes. Hence, volume discounts incentivize 
access seekers to increase their retail activities and decrease the investment 
risk incurred by the investor. This, in turn, leads to higher investments and to a 
more intense competition in the retail market.  
 Long-term contracts. This scheme is also based on the fact that investment 
risk decreases with the total number of fibre loops already sold in a given 
area. Unlike volume discounts, long-term contracts are related to an ex ante 
commitment from the access seeker for using a certain number of fibre loops 
for a certain period of time. It is reasonable that long-term access contracts 
would be priced at a lower level per access line than short-term access 
contracts since the longer the commitment, the lower the investment risk 
incurred by the investor.  
It can be deduced that long-term contracts provide more certainty to the investor 
than volume discounts because long-term contracts are related to an ex ante 
commitment, whereas volume discounts becomes valid ex post. Therefore, the 
former risk sharing scheme provides more incentives for NGA investments than 
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the latter. Furthermore, long-term contracts incentivize the access seeker to 
increase its retail activities in order to fulfil its commitment. It can be argued that 
the access seeker’s effort to increase its retail activities is much greater in the 
case of long-term contracts than volume discounts because in the first case the 
access seeker strives to reach a certain market share in the retail market (or fulfil 
its commitment that provides it with a low access price which is lower than 
volume discounts), whereas in the second case it strives to take a discount 
without having made any commitment. Therefore, it is expected that long-term 
contracts rather than volume discounts will lead to more intense competition 
between the operators that participate in a risk sharing scheme. It should be 
noted that long-term contracts give the opportunity to alternative operators to 
compete with the investor not only in the retail market, but also in the wholesale 
market by reselling the long-term capacity (if not prohibited or restricted by the 
contractual arrangements or the NRAs).  
In conclusion, the EC envisions that a cost-based access price that includes a 
risk premium for compensating the investor for NGA specific-risk strikes a 
balance between on the one hand providing adequate incentives for undertakings 
to invest (implying a sufficiently high rate of return) and promoting allocative 
efficiency, sustainable competition and maximum consumer benefits on the other 
(implying a rate of return that is not excessive).  It can thus be deduced that the 
current goal of the regulatory policy in Europe is to promote sustainable service-
based competition over NGA networks. Given that the prospective investors in 
NGA networks (and probably the SMP operators) are for large part the former 
incumbent operators [42], [43], the regulatory goal is to provide the incumbents 
with significant incentives to invest in new fibre-based access networks and foster 
competition in the retail market.  
European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (ETNO), which 
comprises most of the European incumbents, had already argued that the 
proposed risk premium will not solve the lack of incentives for widespread NGA 
roll-out in Europe [63]. The first reason is that a risk premium removes the 
structural disadvantages of investing only when the NGA investment turns to be 
successful. Otherwise, the incumbent has to bear all the cost alone since the risk 
premium does not have any impact on the incumbent’s revenues. According to 
the second reason, even if the probability of success is relatively high, the 
proposed risk premium does not reflect the structural cost advantage of the 
second-movers (or, the access seekers) over the investors. Firstly, the second 
mover can choose between a fixed and a variable cost structure when facing 
demand uncertainty, heterogeneity, geographical differences and demand 
evolving over time. This option is widely known as “make-or-buy”. Secondly, the 
access seeker can exit the market at low cost (before making its own 
investment), whereas the investment of the first mover is typically sunk. Thirdly, 
the second mover has the option to enter the market once the critical mass has 
been created. This option is known as “wait-and-see”. In addition, even if a risk 
premium results in higher wholesale revenues for the investor, raising prices for 
the new infrastructure may lead to a competitive disadvantage of NGA networks 
vis-à-vis competing platforms and the existing copper network that often will 
coexist with NGAs for some time.  
On the other hand, European Competitive Telecommunications Association 
(ECTA), with members the majority of the European alternative service providers, 
argues that alternative operators are in a similar position as the incumbent 
operators [42]. In particular, ECTA argues that alternative operators invest in all 
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network elements that are replicable and they seek access to network elements 
that are not replicable. These investments can be also characterized as sunk. 
Furthermore, the “wait-and-see” option is not costless because if the alternative 
operator decides to enter the market later, the first mover will have already taken 
over the most interesting part of the market. Hence, it becomes more difficult or 
more costly for the alternative network operator to reach the critical market share 
which is necessary for its viability. Last but not least, the “make-or-buy” option is 
of low interest in the case of NGA, and especially in the case of FTTH, because 
the degree of replicability of such networks is very limited. ECTA concludes that 
the risk premium should only reflect the uncertainty about future demand for new 
fibre-based services and the regulatory uncertainty. Moreover, the reduction of 
risk for the investor due to the adoption of risk sharing schemes should be 
reflected in the risk premium and there should be a sufficient margin between 
wholesale and retail prices to avoid margin squeeze. 
It is thus obvious that there is high ambiguity about the effectiveness of a risk 
premium on encouraging the incumbents to invest in NGA networks and fostering 
service-based competition over NGA networks. However, the main innovation of 
the EC Recommendation is that it deviates from the traditional regulation of the 
access at cost-based prices by including an access markup into the access 
pricing formula. The next section reviews the research articles that shift their 
focus from studying the impact of the principles governing the regulation of the 
copper access networks on static and dynamic efficiency to the deployment of 
new regulatory approaches that may promote both static efficiency and 
investments in NGA networks. 
 
3.4 The efficiency implications of alternative regulatory approaches: A 
literature review 
The previous section showed that the current regulatory goal is to encourage the 
incumbent to invest in new fibre-based access networks and simultaneously 
promote service-based competition over such networks. The official proposal 
described by the EC Recommendation states that the access to the incumbent’s 
NGA network should be provided at cost-oriented prices including a risk premium 
to reflect any additional and quantifiable investment risk incurred by the investor. 
Risk allocation mechanisms, such as long-term access pricing and volume 
discounts, which decrease the risk that an investor incurs when investing in NGA 
networks, lead to a respective decrease in the risk premium. 
This section reviews the literature that provides alternative regulatory practices 
which aim at achieving the current regulatory two-fold goal. This implies that such 
regulatory approaches deviate from implementing the principles governing the 
regulation of the unbundled copper loop to the regulation of the access to NGA 
networks. In other words, the proposed approaches depart from regulating the 
NGA access at usage cost-based prices which are designed to stimulate 
competition in the market by facilitating entry of alternative operators at the cost 
of dynamic efficiency. Therefore, this departure can take three different forms:  
 Deviation from cost-based access prices. This deviation concerns the access 
pricing policy. 
 Deviation from the permanent regulation of access. This deviation concerns 
the regulatory regime employed. 
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 Deviation from usage access prices. This deviation concerns the access 
pricing formula. 
The next sections classify the research articles that propose alternative regulatory 
approaches according the form of deviation from the permanent regulation of 
NGA access at usage cost-based prices and discuss their performance and 
efficiency implications.  
 
3.4.1 Deviation from cost-based access prices 
The EC Recommendation provides a first approach that deviates from the 
standard cost-based access pricing policy since it proposes the inclusion of an 
access markup into the access price in order to compensate the incumbent for 
the NGA investment risk. A second significant deviation discussed in the related 
literature concerns the regulation of the access to NGA networks at investment-
contingent access prices. Such prices are dependent on the level of the 
investment, and hence, higher NGA deployment results in higher access prices. 
Therefore, the investor is compensated for the higher uncertainty of an NGA 
deployment in more rural areas and/or a fibre deployment closer to the 
consumers’ premises.  
A first set of papers studies the effectiveness of particular investment-contingent 
access prices on encouraging the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal 
investments in NGA networks (i.e. encouraging the incumbent to invest in NGA 
networks and simultaneously achieving static efficiency) under regulatory 
certainty.8 For this reason, these papers assume that the regulator can make ex 
ante credible commitments, and hence, the regulator sets the access price prior 
to the investment decisions. In this context, Henriques [64] and Sauer [65] show 
that contrary to a fixed access charge, an access fee that is contingent on firms’ 
(non-overlapping) investments can implement the socially efficient investment 
level. This outcome holds either if the access charge depends on the investments 
of both the incumbent and the entrant (former article) or on each operator’s own 
investment level (latter article). 
Although this modeling setup is consistent with the EC Recommendation on 
regulated access to NGA, it is widely known that the regulator has significant 
incentives to deviate from an investment-contingent access price (once the 
investments are in place) by setting the access price at the marginal cost of 
providing the access in order to maximize social welfare. As a result, a second 
set of papers studies the impact of access regulation on investment incentives 
and retail competition under regulatory non-commitment. In this case, it is 
assumed that the regulator cannot make ex ante credible commitments, and 
hence, the firms invest prior to the regulation of the access.   
                                                          
8
 In a static framework (or in a hypothetical world of economic certainty), the incumbent may 
invest under regulatory certainty if the investment decision is undertaken after the regulation of 
the access price. However, the regulation of the access is a dynamic process and regulatory 
remedies are also imposed after the investment decisions. Although theoretical static models are 
useful for giving an insight into regulatory policies, we should keep in mind that uncertainty can be 
reduced to risk, possibly even low risk, but not certainty. This fact is also considered in the EC 
Recommendation since NRAs are encouraged (in order to provide greater certainty) to clarify to 
the greatest extent possible (i.e. not to fully commit) how foreseeable changes in market 
circumstances might affect remedies. 
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Klumpp and Su [66] assume an investment-contingent access price which is 
revenue-neutral. This implies that each downstream firm contributes to the 
depreciation of the investment costs according to its market share. They show 
that, under this rule, the incumbent chooses a higher investment level compared 
to that of a monopolist and its investment incentives increases with the number of 
downstream competitors. Thus, they argue that a policy of revenue-neutral open 
access can increase both static and dynamic efficiency. Sarmento and Brandao 
[67] compare the investment and competition outcomes of an access price which 
equals the marginal cost of providing the access plus the average cost of the 
investments with those derived by the retail-minus regulation and the 
deregulation of the access price. They conclude that retail-minus regulation leads 
to better results than cost-based plus regulation in terms of investment level and 
consumer surplus as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus 
instrument. 
It can thus be concluded that the related literature provides useful results 
concerning the effectiveness of particular access pricing schemes on promoting 
both static and dynamic efficiency. However, the articles that examine the 
relationship between access regulation and investment incentives under 
regulatory non-commitment take the regulator’s decision as given. As a result, 
they fail to take into account the fact that there is uncertainty about the access 
pricing policy once the investments are in place. In particular, some articles 
assume that the firms anticipate that the regulator will set the welfare-maximizing 
access price [46], [47], whereas others  assume that the investment-contingent 
access price is ex ante known [66], [67]. However, in fact, it is uncertain whether 
the regulator will set an investment-contingent or a welfare-maximizing access 
price after the NGA deployment.  
The following article, which is part of this thesis, models this fact in order to study 
the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake 
the socially optimal investments in NGA networks.  
 M. Tselekounis and D. Varoutas, “Investments in next generation access 
infrastructures under regulatory uncertainty,” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 
37, no. 10, pp. 879–892, Nov. 2013. [28] 
The motivation, the modeling setup and the main results of this article are 
presented in the next section.  
 
3.4.1.1 Investments in Next Generation Access infrastructures under 
regulatory uncertainty 
The related literature discusses the effectiveness of two different regulatory 
approaches on the regulator’s goal to achieve the socially efficient investment 
level when it sets the access price after the investment decision of the incumbent. 
The first approach supports that the regulator sets a particular investment-
contingent access price, which compensates the incumbent for the investment 
risks, in order to provide significant investment incentives. On the contrary, the 
second approach argues that the regulator deviates from such ex ante known 
access price (once the investments are in place) by setting the access price at 
the marginal cost of providing the access in order to maximize social welfare. 
Tselekounis and Varoutas [28] modeled the more realistic case in which the 
regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access with 
some probability and gives an access markup, which equals the average cost of 
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the investments, with the complementary probability. Therefore, it is uncertain 
which of the two assumptions made in the related literature will prevail when the 
new access infrastructures are in place.   
A non-commitment setting is used in order to take account for regulatory 
uncertainty. In addition, the retail (downstream) market is characterized as an 
unregulated duopoly market in which the incumbent (the subsidiary firm of the 
upstream monopolist) and the entrant (the independent firm) choose quantities 
simultaneously and independently (i.e. firms compete á la Cournot). The level of 
NGA investment undertaken by the incumbent leads to an outward parallel shift in 
the demand, and hence, NGA investments have a positive impact on the demand 
for the new fibre-based services. Furthermore, the incumbent faces a quadratic 
NGA investment cost function with respect to the investment level implying that 
the slope of the marginal investment cost function is linear and increasing in the 
investment level.  
The privately and the socially optimal investment levels are derived as a function 
of the probability [0,1]  of incorporating into the access price an access 
markup, which equals the average cost of the investments, in order to fully 
compensate the incumbent for the NGA investment risk. A first significant finding 
is that a marginal increase in such probability positively affects the private 
investment incentives and negatively affects the socially optimal investments. The 
comparison of the privately and the socially optimal investment levels show that 
there is a unique positive value   denoted by   which induces the incumbent to 
undertake the socially optimal investments. If    (respectively,   ), the 
NGA investment level chosen by the incumbent is higher (respectively, lower) 
than the socially optimal one. This implies that any deviation from the socially 
optimal investments leads to welfare losses. 
A second significant result is that the derived value of   is significantly affected 
by the impact of the investments on demand and the slope of the marginal 
investment cost function. In particular, the value of   is positively affected by an 
increase in the impact of investments on demand and negatively affected by an 
increase in the slope of the marginal investment cost function (ceteris paribus).  
This implies that, for a given slope, higher consumers’ valuation for the NGA 
services results in higher  , which, in turn, leads to higher efficient investment 
levels. In other words, higher consumer consumers’ valuation for the NGA 
services makes the investments more socially desirable, and hence, the socially 
optimal investment level is achieved for a higher probability of compensating the 
incumbent for the investment risks. This result positively affects the incumbent’s 
investment incentives, and hence, the achieved efficient investment level 
increases as well.  
On the contrary, for a given positive impact of the investments on demand, a 
steeper slope of the marginal investment cost function leads to lower values of 
 . This implies that as the NGA investment becomes marginally more expensive, 
the society is better off by a lower NGA deployment which is achieved by a higher 
probability of setting the access price at the marginal cost of providing the 
access. Therefore, the efficient NGA investment level is achieved for lower values 
of  . 
Combining the two aforementioned significant results leads to the main result of 
Tselekounis and Varoutas [28]:  
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(i) When the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly 
steep in relation to the positive impact of investments on demand, the 
incumbent always underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment 
level. The reason is that the critical value of the probability of including an 
access markup into the access price ( ) is higher that 1. This implies that the 
socially desirable outcome cannot be achieved even if the regulator commits 
to an access price scheme that includes an access markup equal to the 
average cost of the investments. In this case, a higher access markup which 
leads to 1  seems to be socially desirable. 
(ii) On the contrary, in the more realistic case when the impact of investments on 
demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment cost function, 
the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of 
incorporating an access markup into the access price. In this case (0,1) , 
and hence, the incumbent overinvests for high probability of incorporating an 
access markup into the access price and underinvests for low probability 
values. As a result, the optimal social welfare outcome cannot be achieved 
with the incumbent’s profit maximizing investment level when   . This 
implies that regulatory uncertainty significantly affects the incumbent’s 
incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. 
 
3.4.2 Deviation from the permanent regulation of access 
Another significant deviation from the principles governing the regulation of the 
copper access networks concerns the particular regulatory regime employed. The 
regulation of the copper access networks is based on the permanent regulation of 
access in order to promote efficient entry. Although the EC Recommendation 
proposes the implementation of permanent regulation to the NGA networks, other 
regulatory regimes have recently attracted the interest of many academics and 
policy makers due to the lack of investment incentives provided by the permanent 
regulation of access to the new access infrastructures.  
The two extreme regulatory regimes are the “permanent regulation” and the 
“regulatory forbearance”. Permanent regulation implies that the ex ante imposed 
remedies hold for the whole lifecycle of the NGA investment, whereas regulatory 
forbearance refers to the situation where there is no ex ante regulation on NGA 
networks. It is obvious that regulatory forbearance maximizes investment 
incentives but also creates significant barriers to entry for access seekers. 
Therefore, regulatory forbearance will probably fail to promote both static and 
dynamic efficiency. “Regulatory holidays” and “sunset clauses” are intermediate 
regulatory regimes between regulatory forbearance and permanent regulation. 
Under regulatory holidays, the investor is not imposed to any regulatory 
constraints for a pre-determined period of time, whereas by imposing a sunset 
clause, the regulator commits that access obligations will be withdrawn after a 
pre-determined date.  
Charalampopoulos, Katsianis and Varoutas [68] as well as Gavosto, Ponte and 
Scaglioni [69] use a real option approach to study the impact of the four different 
regulatory regimes (permanent regulation, regulatory forbearance, regulatory 
holidays and sunset clauses)  on the timing of the investment decision of an 
incumbent to expand to a new network infrastructure. The former article shows 
that regulatory holidays induce the incumbent to expand its current network as 
soon as the regulatory holiday season ends, which is long before the expiration 
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date of the option to expand. However, concerning the incumbent’s discounted 
profits, regulatory forbearance and sunset clauses give identical results, followed 
by regulatory holidays and permanent regulation. The latter article concludes that 
investment is carried out immediately under forbearance and regulatory holiday 
regimes, while it is delayed by around two years in the other cases. Therefore, it 
can be deduced that both articles argue that regulatory holiday regime appears 
superior to the other regulatory regimes, although the two papers provide 
different results about the impact of regulatory holidays on the particular timing of 
the investment. 
Of course, the efficiency outcomes are significantly affected by the level of the 
access prices set under each particular regulatory regime. Nitsche and Wiethaus 
[70] study the efficiency implications of a combined deviation from the permanent 
regulation of access at cost-based prices in terms of both the access pricing 
policy and the regulatory regime employed. In particular, they allow an access 
pricing scheme that spreads investment costs over total output quantities (i.e. 
another form of investment-contingent access pricing) for taking into account: (i) 
different regulatory regimes; (ii) the fact that the success of NGA investments is 
uncertain; and (iii) regulatory certainty. They show that a regime with Fully 
Distributed Costs (FDC)9 or regulatory holidays induce the incumbent to 
undertake a larger NGA deployment, followed by risk-sharing and Long-Run 
Incremental Costs (LRIC). In addition, in combining strong competitive intensity 
with reasonable investment incentives, simulations indicate that a risk sharing 
approach induces highest consumer surplus, followed by regimes with FDC, 
regulatory holidays and LRIC. Therefore, they conclude that risk-sharing can be 
an effective tool since it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives 
with strong ex-post competitive intensity. They also find that forward-looking cost-
based regulation neither induces investments nor consumer surplus, which 
implies a clear policy for deviating from permanent cost-based access prices.   
In combining these results with those of [68] and [69], it can be deduced that 
although regulatory holidays appear superior to the other regulatory regimes in 
terms of both NGA investment level and the timing of the investments, their 
effectiveness on promoting service-based competition is rather ambiguous. For 
this reason, the next two articles, which are part of this thesis, study the 
effectiveness of regulatory holidays (or regulatory forbearance in a static 
framework) to result in improved social welfare outcomes when: (i) the monopolist 
is allowed to geographically price discriminate; and (ii) the monopolist chooses a 
mix of NGA networks deployed in different geographic areas.  
 M. Tselekounis, D. Maniadakis, and D. Varoutas, “NGA investment incentives 
under geographic price discrimination,” in 40th EARIE Conference, 30 August-
1 September 2013, Évora, Portugal. [29] 
 M. Tselekounis, E. Xylogianni, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “Geographically 
differentiated NGA deployment,” accepted in 24th European Regional 
Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS), 20-23 
October 2013, Florence, Italy. [30] 
                                                          
9
 Under the fully distributed costs regulation, the incumbent may recoup NGA investment costs 
through the access price, regardless of the NGA's market success since the entrant is forced to 
cover part of the investment cost. 
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3.4.2.1 NGA investment incentives under geographic price discrimination 
The research articles that study the effectiveness of alternative regulatory 
approaches on encouraging investments in NGA networks and fostering 
competition explicitly assume that all consumers equally benefited by a certain 
extent of NGA deployment. However, it is expected that there will be a significant 
variation among consumers’ willingness to pay for the additional benefits of NGA-
based services since there are consumers who place a low valuation to the 
enhanced characteristics of such services and consumers who have higher 
valuation for advanced bandwidth-hungry services. The prospective investor in 
NGA networks could exploit this information by pricing the final services such that 
they more closely reflect retail consumers’ willingness to pay (“value-based” 
pricing) and/or geographical differences in network costs.  
Contrary to uniform pricing, price discrimination is defined as selling the same 
product to different customers at different prices even if the cost of sale is the 
same to each other [71]. Price discrimination has recently attracted much interest 
since regulatory forbearance and holidays could lead to geographic de-averaging 
of prices that would reflect the geographic variances in market conditions, which 
may significantly differ from traditional PSTN/DSL conditions. Indeed, after a 
period of obligation of non-discrimination [72], currently, price discrimination is 
allowed to a certain (at least wholesale) extent related to NGA networks in 
Europe in order to foster innovation and welfare growth by promoting investments 
[38]. Thus, there may be a case for designing remedies that can vary across 
geographic markets that would be defined as locations with homogeneity in terms 
of willingness to pay, competitive conditions, cost, etc.  
Alexandrov and Deb [73] as well as Valletti [74] study the impact of price 
discrimination on a monopolist’s incentives to invest in quality. This implies that 
both articles assume that the number of the markets that the quality-enhanced 
product will be sold is exogenously defined (e.g. the whole country), whereas the 
investment in quality (i.e. the particular extent of fibre deployment in the local 
loop) is endogenously derived. In other words, consumers who live in different 
geographic areas place the same valuation on each particular quality level. It is 
found that price discrimination results in more investment in quality than uniform 
pricing, whereas its impact on social welfare depends on the specific underlying 
industry characteristics. 
However, in the NGA context, the main source of variation among consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the additional benefits of NGA-based services is the fact 
that consumers live in different geographic areas in terms of population density. 
Indeed, the main take-away of the relevant studies [75], [76] is that consumers 
who place a higher (lower) valuation to broadband subscription tend to live in 
higher (lower) densely populated areas. As a result, population density has a 
significant positive impact on the consumers’ valuation for ultra high-speed 
services provided by NGA networks. Therefore, the difference in consumers’ 
willingness to pay for very high-speed services is mainly due to their geographic 
differentiation rather than on the difference in their valuation for a particular 
improved quality service.  
Contrary to [73] and [74], Tselekounis, Maniadakis and Varoutas [29] compare 
the impact of retail price discrimination and uniform pricing on a monopolist’s 
incentives to extend its Next Generation Access (NGA) network deployment to 
less densely populated geographic areas. This implies that the quality of an NGA-
based service is exogenously defined (e.g. FTTH), whereas the number of 
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geographic areas (markets) that this service will be provided is endogenously 
chosen. In other words, consumers who live in different geographic areas place a 
different valuation on each particular quality level. 
It is found that geographic price discrimination provides the monopolist with 
higher incentives to deploy a larger NGA network (i.e. the NGA investment is 
extended to rural, less densely populated areas). In addition, geographic price 
discrimination results in better welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as 
the investment cost is not extremely low. In such cases, the regulator should 
allow the monopolist to geographically price discriminate since the monopolist 
chooses the socially optimal pricing regime. On the contrary, when the 
investment cost is extremely low, uniform pricing is the socially optimal pricing 
regime, whereas differential pricing maximizes private investment incentives. In 
such cases, a benevolent regulator may impose the uniform pricing regime in 
order to mitigate the detrimental impact of regulatory forbearance or holidays on 
social welfare. 
 
3.4.2.2 Geographically differentiated NGA deployment 
The previous section showed that, in a static context, the deployment of NGA 
networks is a two-dimensional issue. First, the incumbent has to decide the 
quality of the NGA investment related to the part of the copper access network 
that will be replaced by fibre optics. Second, the incumbent has to decide the 
extent of the NGA deployment which concerns the number of geographic areas in 
which an NGA network will be deployed.10  
Hitherto, the reviewed literature does not discriminate between the two different 
dimensions of the NGA investments, and hence, it assumes that a higher NGA 
investment level indiscriminately reflects either a larger NGA deployment to rural, 
less densely populated areas or a fibre deployment closer to the consumers’ 
premises. In particular, existing studies assume that a prospective investor in 
NGA networks chooses either the quality or the geographic coverage of the NGA 
network. This implies that the investor decides : (i) the quality of the NGA network 
that will be provided in an exogenously given number of geographic areas; or (ii) 
the number of geographic areas in which an exogenously given NGA technology 
network will be deployed. In each case, the investor focuses on one of the two 
dimensions of the NGA investment decision taking the other dimension as given. 
However, in fact, the investor in NGA networks does not choose either the extent 
of the deployment towards consumers’ premises in given geographic areas or the 
geographic deployment of a particular NGA quality, but it simultaneously decides 
the NGA quality that will be provided in each geographic area. This implies that a 
mix of NGA technologies will co-exist according to the underlying demand and 
cost conditions in each geographic area.   
Tselekounis, Xylogianni, Varoutas and Martakos [30] model the demand and cost 
structures in each geographic area in order to assess the optimal mix of NGA 
technologies deployed in different geographic areas by a monopolist. In other 
words, they find the optimal degree of copper replacement by fibre (i.e. the 
optimal NGA quality) in every geographic area. Based on this relationship, the 
incumbent chooses the extent of NGA deployment that is the optimal number of 
geographic areas in which a different quality of NGA network will be provided.  
                                                          
10
  In a dynamic context, the incumbent has also to decide the timing of the NGA deployment. 
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In order to derive the optimal mix of NGA technologies deployed in different 
geographic areas by a monopolist, the authors use the following functions for 
representing the demand and investment cost, respectively, in each geographic 
area i : 
2
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i i
i
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where ip  and iq  is the retail price and the quantity supplied by the monopolist in 
each geographic market, A  represents the maximum valuation that the 
consumers place to the basic high-speed broadband service, ix  reflects the 
geographic NGA deployment and iy  reflects the NGA quality (technology). A 
larger ix  implies a larger NGA deployment to less densely populated areas, 
whereas a larger iy  implies a fibre deployment closer to the consumers’ 
premises. It is obvious that, contrary to existing studies which assume an 
exogenously given slope of the marginal investment cost function, a higher NGA 
technology positively affects the consumers’ willingness to pay, but its impact 
declines as it is provided to less densely populated rural areas. In addition, 
contrary to existing studies which assume that a higher level of NGA investment 
in terms of either technology or coverage leads to a more outward parallel shift in 
the demand curve (and thus equally benefits all consumers), the investment cost 
of providing a particular NGA technology becomes marginally more expensive as 
it is extended to less densely populated areas.  
Tselekounis, Xylogianni, Varoutas and Martakos find that both the privately and 
the socially optimal investment decisions result in a geographically differentiated 
NGA deployment implying that different quality NGA networks are deployed in 
different geographic areas. In addition, although a geographically differentiated 
NGA investment provides the unregulated monopolist with incentives to install a 
nationwide NGA deployment, the monopolist underinvests compared to the 
socially optimal levels of both quality and geographic coverage.  
Moreover, the authors make several, but plausible, assumptions in order to make 
their results comparable to the Europe 2020 Strategy [61] which envisions that, 
by 2020: (i) all Europeans will have access to much higher internet speeds of 
above 30 Mbps; and (ii) 50% or more of European households will subscribe to 
internet connections above 100 Mbps. They show that the first objective is 
feasible when the demand for NGA-based services is significantly elastic, 
whereas the second objective is not a feasible goal. 
 
3.4.3 Deviation from usage access prices 
The last deviation from the principles governing the regulation of the copper 
access networks concerns the access pricing formula. In particular, the access 
pricing formula can be used to allocate the investment risk between the 
incumbent and the access seekers. Although such risk-sharing mechanisms are 
not present in the EC Recommendation, OPTA has included them in its proposed 
measures to reduce the investment risk [43].  
Access prices (as well as retail prices) can consist of one-off fees and periodic 
fees (e.g. monthly rentals). By giving the investor the choice to recoup fixed costs 
via a one-off fee, the investor can affect his own investment risk and the entry risk 
resting on the buyers of unbundled fibre access. The advantage of recoupment 
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via a one-off fee is that the investor recoups some of its investment in the early 
phase of the economic life of the network. This early recoupment of parts of the 
investment leads to a lower capital requirement over time, a decrease in the 
investment risk and an increase in the investor’s willingness to invest.  
The general rule says that the higher the allocation of investments costs to the 
one-off component, the more investment risk on a per line basis is allocated from 
the investor to the access seeker. However, charging this one-off fee should not 
create a barrier to entry for buyers of unbundled fibre access. If relatively many 
costs are charged as one-off tariffs, this raises the barrier for purchasing services, 
because a buyer is confronted with higher start-up costs. 
Gans and King [77] state that in a dynamic context, the regulator should set a 
two-part tariff in which the fixed fee is set equal to the economic profit of the 
access seekers and the usage access fee follows the Ramsey rule. Otherwise, 
regulatory holidays is a desirable regime that results in the incumbent’s earlier 
investments only when the regulator cannot make ex ante credible commitments. 
The main take-away from the paper of Gans and King is that the regulatory 
commitment problem has a significant impact on the optimal regulatory policy and 
that two-part tariffs may be an effective tool in order to promote both static and 
dynamic efficiency. In addition, Brito, Pereira and Vareda [78] study the impact of 
the regulatory commitment problem on the effectiveness of two-part access tariffs 
to solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation. They find that when 
the investment cost is low compared to the investment benefits, two-part tariffs 
solve the dynamic consistency problem either under regulatory certainty or 
uncertainty. In this case, the optimal regulatory policy is to set the fixed access 
price in order to induce investments by the incumbent and the usage access price 
at the marginal cost of providing the access in order to promote static efficiency. 
If, on the contrary, the investment cost takes intermediate values compared to the 
investment benefits, the commitment and the no-commitment games have 
different equilibria, with the incumbent investing in the commitment equilibrium, 
and not investing in no-commitment game. Last, if the investment cost is high 
compared to the investment benefits, investment is not socially desirable under 
both commitment and no-commitment games. Therefore, contrary to Gans and 
King, two-part access tariffs may not solve the dynamic consistency problem 
even when the regulator can commit ex ante to a particular access pricing policy. 
 
3.5 Summary 
Chapter 3 discussed the effectiveness of different access pricing schemes on 
promoting the current regulatory goal of encouraging investments in NGA 
networks and fostering service-based competition over such networks. It was 
shown that cost-based access prices are limited to promote service-based 
competition within one network since they disincentivize incumbents and, 
especially, entrants to invest in new access infrastructures. Combining this fact 
with the huge investment cost of deploying an NGA network and the uncertainty 
of such investments provides the reasons that explain the reluctance of firms to 
undertake NGA investments. However, investments in digital infrastructures by 
far exceed the private incentives for investments. It is thus deduced that there is a 
clear policy towards a deviation from the permanent regulation of access at cost-
based prices in order to compensate the investors for the risk they incur when 
deploy an NGA network.  
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The first official deviation from cost-based access prices was proposed by the EC 
Recommendation of regulated access to NGA which recommends calculating the 
access at a cost-based form including a risk premium. However, the effectiveness 
of such pricing policy on promoting service-based competition over NGA 
networks has been fiercely criticized by both incumbents and entrants. In 
addition, it was found that regulatory uncertainty has a significant impact on an 
investor’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal NGA investments. Due to 
these facts, the regulatory holidays regime has recently received much interest. 
Given that the NGA investments are significantly costly, it was shown that 
regulatory holidays may increase both investment incentives and allocative 
efficiency when the monopolist is allowed to geographically price discriminate. 
However, even under the price discrimination regime, the monopolist 
underinvests compared to the socially optimal geographically differentiated NGA 
deployment.
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4. FROM SERVICE-BASED TO FACILITIES BASED COMPETITION 
OVER NGA NETWORKS: PROMOTING DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
Although service-based competition over NGA networks increases both static and 
dynamic efficiency, the full benefits of competition are only achieved by facilities-
based competition. This explains why the ultimate goal of regulators is to promote 
dynamic efficiency which results in maximum welfare gains, maximum market 
growth and minimum production costs.  
This chapter discusses the future regulatory goal of achieving dynamic efficiency 
by promoting facilities-based competition over NGA networks. In particular, given 
that an initial investor has already deployed an NGA network and sustainable 
service-based competition has been established, the optimal access pricing 
policy should incentivize the access seekers to gradually invest in their own NGA 
infrastructures.   
The first part of this chapter reviews the proposed regulatory approaches which 
aim to encourage access seekers to invest in their own fibre-based access 
networks. Afterwards, a comparison of these regulatory approaches with the 
current regulatory framework in the European NGA market described by the EC 
Recommendation is made. It is found that the proposed regulatory approaches 
not only fail to reflect the basic principles of the EC Recommendation, but also fail 
to take into account the fact that the regulatory policy implemented in this phase 
has a direct impact on the initial investor’s incentives to invest in NGA networks.  
For this reason, the second part of this chapter presents an innovative theoretical 
approach that not only reflects the current regulatory framework in the European 
NGA market, but also encourages the initial investor (which is assumed to be the 
incumbent) to invest in NGA networks, although at the same time it incentivizes 
the entrants to gradually invest in their own NGA infrastructures. It is shown that 
the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit 
Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based 
competition over NGA networks. 
 
4.1 Encouraging facilities-based competition: A literature review 
This section discusses the impact of access regulation on an entrant’s incentives 
to invest in new access infrastructures in order to act as a facilities-based 
competitor. In particular, this literature studies whether service-based competition 
serves as a stepping stone to facilities-based competition or the presence of the 
option to “buy” the incumbent’s facilities represents an opportunity cost when the 
entrant chooses to engage in infrastructure competition (i.e. creates the so-called 
“replacement effect”). 
Cave and Vogelsang [79] point out that the entrants typically invest in replicable 
assets first and then progress to less replicable ones. Thus, they rank the 
incumbent’s network assets according to their degree of replicability from an 
entrant’s perspective and propose an innovative access scheme in which the 
price for the less replicable network elements is low but increasing over time as 
assets are replicated. Therefore, as the entrant’s customer bases grow, the 
access price increases in order to encourage the entrant to invest in the next less 
replicable asset. This process continues until the entrant invests in its own 
infrastructure which represents the higher rung in the investment ladder. Thus, 
the so-called “ladder of investment” theory argues that service-based competition 
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serves as a stepping stone to facilities-based competition. Cave [12] proposes 
and illustrates methods for assessing the replicability of different assets and sets 
out the steps which regulators can follow in implementing the approach. 
An alternative regulatory tool that resembles the “ladder of investment” approach 
is the so-called “sunset clause” regulatory regime. By imposing a sunset clause, 
the regulator commits that access obligations will be withdrawn after a pre-
determined date. The building block of both approaches is the expectation that as 
service-based competition becomes less attractive over time, the entrant will 
gradually invest in its own network infrastructure. Although sunset clauses and 
the “ladder of investment” theory have been embraced by many 
telecommunications regulators and organizations [38], [80–83], the related 
literature provides mixed results about the effectiveness of each approach to 
make service-based and facilities-based competition complements in promoting 
both investments and competition.  
Bourreau and Doğan [84] use a dynamic model of technology adoption to 
compare the impact of unbundling on the entrant’s incentives to compete service-
based or facilities-based. Assuming a utility model that captures variety and 
quality differentiation, they show that an unregulated incumbent sets too low a 
constant usage rental price for its loops over time, and hence, the entrant adopts 
the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective. The rationale of 
such behavior is that a low access price increases the entrant’s profits which 
represent an opportunity cost when the entrant chooses to engage in 
infrastructure competition. Therefore, the incumbent avoids a fiercer competition 
in the retail market by providing the entrant with disincentives to invest in its own 
infrastructure. The regulatory implication is twofold. First, the regulator who is 
concerned with promoting facility-based competition should regulate the rental 
price of the loops; and second, a sunset clause neither incentivizes the entrant to 
invest in network upgrade nor improves social welfare. Bourreau and Doğan [85] 
also discuss the impact of unbundling on an entrant’s investment incentives from 
a dynamic perspective but allows for a time variant rental price as well as a 
general competitive setting.  They show that the optimal regulatory policy is to set 
the access price at the level that maximizes social welfare under service-based 
competition until the date at which facilities-based entry is socially optimal, and 
then to ban access to the incumbent’s infrastructure (or to set too high a price for 
it) from that date on. 
In addition, Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi [86] assume that developing an 
alternative infrastructure requires both time and an installed base of consumers 
which implies that a period of service-based competition is a prerequisite for 
facilities-based competition in the next period. They find that a multi-period 
schedule where regulated access charges rise over time is critical to foster 
efficient infrastructure investment, whereas a sunset clause on regulation dilutes 
investment incentives. Contrary to [84] and [85], which assume regulatory 
certainty, they point out that the regulatory commitment problem may affect the 
robustness of their main result. Thus, they propose that the access price should 
depend both on time and entry period in order to ensure that late entrants are 
provided with the same dynamic access conditions. In a more recent paper, 
Bourreau and Drouard [87] use a general model of competition in order to study 
the impact of both a “replacement effect” and a “stepping stone effect” on an 
entrant’s investment to invest in network upgrade. Thus, they allow an initial 
serviced-based period for the entrant to build its market share progressively. This 
implies that the entrant might have significant incentives to prolong the service-
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based competition phase in order to build a larger market share. They show that 
if facilities-based entry is a short-term (long-term) possibility, the replacement 
effect (the stepping stone effect) prevails, and hence, a phase of service-based 
competition delays (accelerates) facilities-based entry.  
Therefore, as Bourreau, Doğan and Manant [88] point out, a phase of service-
based competition may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to ensure 
that it will serve as a stepping stone to facilities-based entry if the replacement 
effect is neutralized. The authors also challenge another assumption of the ladder 
of investment theory which states that the regulator has the instrument to 
neutralize the replacement effect. They argue that although access prices that 
increase over time may neutralize the replacement effect, credibility of regulatory 
commitments and informational requirements raise several concerns about the 
successful implementation of this theory.  
In addition, the effectiveness of the “ladder of investment” theory to serve as a 
stepping stone from service-based to facilities-based competition has been 
criticized not only theoretically but also empirically. Hausman and Sidak [52] use 
real data from five countries (the USA, the UK, New Zealand, Canada and 
Germany) over the 1993-2003 period in order to test whether the new entrants 
use the unbundled loops to evolve into facilities-based competitors. They 
conclude that although the “ladder of investment” theory is theoretically plausible 
under certain assumptions yet has not been satisfied in practice. Hazlett and 
Bazelon [89] use semi-annual US state-level data from December 1999 to 
December 2004 to examine whether the number of the unbundled lines in one 
period is correlated with the number of facilities-based line in future periods. Their 
main conclusion is that the “ladder of investment” theory is rejected since there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the unbundled lines in one period 
and the number of facilities-based line in future periods in each US state.  
Distaso, Lupi and Manenti [90] use semi-annual data from 12 European countries 
(study period: January 2005-July 2007) and test the “ladder of investment” theory 
by looking at the link between the prices of wholesale access services and the 
relative growth rates of the three alternative inputs that can be used by new 
entrants to provide access and broadband services to end users: bitstream 
services, LLU services and their own network. Although they point out that the 
policies adopted by NRAs are broadly consistent with the “ladder of investment” 
theory, their graphical results reveal that only few countries (France and Spain) 
have succeeded in encouraging the entrants to climb the investment ladder due 
to increasing access prices over time. In a more recent empirical study, Bacache, 
Bourreau and Gaudin [91] use data covering incumbent and entrant fixed-
broadband operators in 15 European member states for 15 semesters (2002-
2009) in order to test the “ladder of investment” hypothesis. They find no 
statistically significant effect of the number of unbundled lines on the number of 
new access infrastructure lines built by entrants, which implies that there is no 
evidence in support of the “ladder of investment” hypothesis.  
As a result, although the EC Recommendation states that the appropriate array of 
remedies imposed by an NRA should reflect a proportionate application of the 
“ladder of investment” principle, its effectiveness to induce the entrants to invest 
in their own NGA networks is quite ambiguous. Therefore, both the inclusion of a 
risk premium into the cost-based access price and the application of the “ladder 
of investment” theory seem to have ambiguous results. This implies that the basic 
principles of the EC Recommendation, which aims at initially encouraging the 
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incumbents to invest in NGA networks without distorting competition and then at 
inducing the entrants to be facilities-based competitors, have been fiercely 
criticized in the related literature. However, the research articles study the impact 
of access prices on the investment incentives of either an incumbent or an 
entrant without taking into account that the investment decisions are taken in a 
sequential order, and hence, there is a strategic interaction between their 
investment decisions which is significantly affected by the regulatory policy. 
For this reason, the next section presents an innovative approach that resolves 
the current regulatory trade-off between promoting service-based competition 
over copper access networks and encouraging the incumbent to invest in NGA 
networks, while also tackles the future trade-off between fostering service-based 
competition over NGA networks and incentivizing the entrants to invest in their 
own infrastructures. This approach is proposed by the following article which is 
also part of this thesis. 
 M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas, and D. Martakos, “A CDS approach to induce 
facilities-based competition over NGA networks,” submitted to 
Telecommunications Policy (under 3rd round revision), 2013. [31] 
The motivation of the proposed approach, its modeling setup and its main 
conclusions are presented in the next section. 
 
4.1.1 A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA 
networks 
The goal of this section is to propose a novel approach in order to effectively 
meet the current and the future regulatory goals using the regulatory settings 
recommended by the European Commission. The current regulatory framework 
in the European NGA market is described by the following four basic principles 
concerning: 
 The evolution of the regulatory goals over time. The regulatory policy 
should initially encourage the incumbent to invest in new fibre-based access 
networks and promote service-based competition over such networks. Once 
the new fibre-based access network has been deployed and service-based 
competition over such networks has been established, the regulatory policy 
should encourage access seekers to invest in their own fibre infrastructures.  
 The characteristics of the access pricing formula. The access to the 
incumbent’s network should be provided at cost-oriented prices including a 
risk premium to reflect any additional and quantifiable investment risk incurred 
by the investor. Risk allocation mechanisms, such as long-term contracts or 
volume discounts which decrease the risk that an investor incurs when 
investing in NGAs, lead to a respective decrease in the risk premium. 
However, since the EC Recommendation does not include in such 
mechanisms the fixed-fee payments, it is deduced that two-part access tariffs 
do not reflect the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market. 
Therefore, NRAs should apply usage (or uniform or linear) access prices 
under a regime of permanent regulation as long as an SMP operator is found 
within markets 4 and/or 5. 
 The evolution of the access prices. Access prices should be aligned with 
the EC statement that the appropriate array of remedies imposed by an NRA 
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should reflect a proportionate application of the “ladder of investment” 
principle. 
 The provision of regulatory certainty. According to the EC 
Recommendation, regulatory certainty is a key to promoting efficient 
investments by all operators. Applying a consistent regulatory approach over 
time is important to give investors confidence for the design of their business 
plans. In order to mitigate the uncertainty associated with periodical market 
reviews, NRAs should clarify to the greatest extent possible how foreseeable 
changes in market circumstances might affect remedies. 
It is obvious that the literature studying the impact of access regulation on firms’ 
incentives to invest in NGA networks fail to take into account the basic principles 
governing the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market. The 
reason is that the reviewed research articles study the impact of alternative 
regulatory approaches on either the incumbents’ or the entrants’ investment 
incentives without considering the strategic interaction between their investment 
decisions. In other words, they do not take into account the fact that when the 
incumbent (respectively, the entrant) decides its optimal investment decision, it 
also considers the optimal investment reaction of the entrant (respectively, the 
incumbent). This implies that the disclosed access pricing policy should take into 
account the impact of access regulation on both firms’ incentives to invest 
although such investment decisions are taken in a sequential order.  
To best of author’s knowledge, the only paper that reflects the current regulatory 
framework in terms of the evolution of the regulatory goals over time is that of 
Vareda [92]. In particular, Vareda considers a dynamic framework in which an 
incumbent chooses how much to upgrade the quality of its network and then an 
entrant, at each point in time, has the option to enter as a service-based 
competitor, by asking for access to the incumbent’s network, or as a facilities-
based competitor, by building a bypass network. He shows that when the 
regulator can ex ante commit to a two-part access tariff: (i) the entrant’s 
investment in a bypass network is delayed with a higher incumbent’s investment 
in quality; (ii) the possibility of investment in a bypass network by the entrant has 
a positive effect on the incumbent’s incentive to upgrade quality; (iii) the effect of 
access prices on both incumbent and entrant firms’ incentives to invest is 
ambiguous; and (iv) a welfare improving access tariff that could be designed by 
the regulator would be one where the access fee is increasing (decreasing) in 
quality if the incumbent’s incentives are such that it underinvests (overinvests). 
However, the work of Vareda not only uses a two-part access tariff (rather than a 
usage access price), but also assumes that the access price is fixed over time 
(rather than reflecting a proportionate application of the “ladder of investment” 
principle). Therefore, his model fails to align with two of the four basic principles 
of the EC Recommendation. 
On the contrary, Tselekounis, Varoutas and Martakos [31] propose an innovative 
approach that reflects the current regulatory framework in the European NGA 
market as described by the EC Recommendation. In particular, the approach 
proposed by [31] models the four basic principles of the current European 
regulatory framework and then assesses its effectiveness on inducing facilities-
based competition over NGA networks. This implies that this paper can be 
included in the literature that departs from assessing the efficiency outcomes of 
applying the regulation of the copper access networks to the NGA market. The 
aim of the proposed approach is to meet the current and the future regulatory 
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goals by tackling the initial trade-off between encouraging the incumbents to 
invest in NGA networks and fostering competition, while incentivizing the entrants 
to gradually climb the ladder of investment when the NGA investment is proven to 
be successful. Therefore, the proposed approach provides a theoretical way to 
encourage the deployment of a nationwide NGA network (i.e. maximize the 
potential investment outcome in terms of geographic coverage) with the ambition 
that such deployment will finally reflect the socially desirable choice as reflecting 
in an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA 
networks. 
The structure and the implementation of the proposed approach are based on the 
basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS). A CDS contract is an 
agreement between two parties, the protection buyer and the protection seller. 
The first party to the contract, the protection buyer, wishes to insure against the 
possibility of default on a bond issued by a particular company. The company that 
has issued the bond is called the reference entity. The second party to the 
contract, the protection seller, is willing to bear the risk associated with default by 
the reference entity.  The protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of 
payments (the CDS "fee" or "spread") to the protection seller and, in exchange, 
receives a payoff in the event of a default by the reference entity. If a default does 
not occur over the life of the contract, the contract expires at its maturity date, and 
hence, the protection seller does not make any payments to the protection buyer. 
In an NGA context, the incumbent, which is assumed to be the initial operator that 
invests in NGA networks, and the regulator agree on a business plan that allows 
the incumbent to recover the investment in a nationwide NGA deployment (i.e. 
the deployment of an NGA network in every geographic area in the country) 
during a certain period of time. If the investment has not been recovered at the 
end of this period, the regulator commits itself that it will compensate the 
incumbent for the unrecovered part of the investment. After the end of this period, 
no regulatory remedies will be imposed to the incumbent (sunset clause). In 
exchange, the incumbent should make periodic payments to the regulator. 
However, the regulator chooses to subtract this amount from the payments that 
an access seeker makes to the incumbent in order to have access to the NGA 
networks. This implies that the incumbent does not pay a periodic fee to the 
regulator but it subtracts this amount from the access payments it receives. If, 
however, the investment has been recovered before the end of the clause, the 
regulator does not make any payment to the incumbent, the incumbent stops 
making indirect periodic payments to the access seeker and no remedies 
imposed to the incumbent. In such contract, the incumbent is the protection buyer 
and the regulator is the protection seller which will compensate the incumbent in 
the case of a default event (i.e. if the investment has not been recovered at the 
end of the pre-determined period). 
In addition, the model proposes that the contract commits the regulator to apply a 
certain policy during the whole pre-determined period. This policy, which 
concerns the derivation of the access pricing formula as well as its evolution over 
time, is ex ante known to the incumbent. As it has already been stated above, it is 
not optimal for the regulator to intervene in the market very often because it 
dilutes investment incentives. On the contrary, it is socially not optimal for the 
regulator to make ex ante commitments for an unreasonably long regulatory 
period. Thus, this model proposes an intermediate solution in which the regulator 
makes periodic reviews at a pre-determined period. In each periodic review, the 
regulator may increase or decrease the access price according to whether the 
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NGA investment (at the time of each review) is more successful (i.e. an upside 
case) or less successful (i.e. a downside case) than the initial estimations. It can 
thus be deduced that the incumbent invests in NGA networks under regulatory 
certainty. 
It is shown that in an upside (respectively, downside) case, the implementation of 
the basic principles governing a CDS contract requires a proper increase 
(respectively, decrease) in the access price. Therefore, an endogenous access 
pricing rule encourages the entrants to climb the ladder of investment in each 
upside case (i.e. when the initial NGA investment by the incumbent is 
successful). On the contrary, such endogenous access pricing rule provides the 
entrants with disincentives to invest in each downside case. However, in the latter 
case, the regulator’s goal is to increase the total demand rather than to 
incentivize the entrant to invest in NGA networks. The reason is that the entrant 
invests in NGA networks only when the NGA investment is successful. Therefore, 
the regulator should first promote the success of the NGA investment and then 
encourage the entrant to invest in its own facilities. It is obvious that in the 
downside cases the proposed approach fulfils in enhancing the diffusion process 
since a lower access price facilitates service-based competition over NGA 
networks. As a result, such an access pricing policy increases the probability of 
an upside case in the next regulatory review. 
The authors believe that the proposed approach will eventually lead to the 
recovery of the NGA investment at the end of the pre-determined period or even 
earlier. After the end of the clause, the regulator does not make any payment to 
the incumbent, the latter stops making indirect periodic payments to the entrant 
and no regulatory remedies are imposed to the incumbent. This implies that the 
incumbent is free to set the access price to the recovered NGA networks. 
However, the entrant would have probably established a significantly high 
customer base, and hence, it will invest in the higher rungs of the investment 
ladder in order to be active in the market unless the incumbent prices the access 
too low in order to avoid intense facilities-based competition. The authors also 
discuss the case in which the NGA investment has not been recovered at the end 
of the pre-determined period, and hence, public funds are needed in order to 
compensate the incumbent for the unrecovered part of the NGA investment. They 
provide a theoretical cost-benefit analysis from a welfare perspective in order to 
show that, even in this case, the proposed approach is superior to the active 
governmental involvement in the deployment of a nationwide NGA network. 
In conclusion, although its limitations and its potential implementation 
shortcomings, the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles 
governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), tackles the initial trade-off between 
encouraging the incumbent to invest in NGA networks and fostering competition, 
while it incentivizes the entrant to gradually climb the ladder of investment. This 
implies that the proposed approach represents an effective way towards facilities-
based competition over NGA networks. In addition, the quite general approach of 
their paper also aims to trigger a fruitful open discussion about several economic 
and technical aspects of the optimal access pricing policy that should achieve 
both the current and the future regulatory goals.  
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4.2 Summary 
This section provided a survey of the literature studying the impact of access 
regulation on an entrant’s incentive to invest in its own access infrastructures in 
order to act as a facilities-based competitor to the incumbent. The main 
regulatory policy proposed to facilitate the migration from service-based to 
facilities-based competition is the “ladder of investment” theory which has 
attracted the interest of many academics and policy makers. However, this 
literature is based on the assumption that the incumbent has already deployed 
his NGA network, and hence, the implemented regulatory policy only affects the 
entrant’s investment decisions. However, it is obvious that since facilities-based 
competition reflects the future regulatory goal, the disclosed regulatory policy 
which will be implemented in the future migration phase also affects the 
incumbent’s incentives to invest the socially efficient outcome, which reflects the 
current regulatory goal. 
For this reason, many aspects of the EC Recommendation should be reviewed 
taking into account the impact of current and future access regulation on the 
sequential investment decisions of an incumbent and an entrant. The second part 
of this section proposed an innovative approach that aims to provide an efficient 
migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks by taking 
into account the current framework in the European NGA market.  
It was shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles 
governing a CDS contract, can achieve the current and the future regulatory 
goals. In particular, it initially incentivizes the incumbent to deploy an NGA 
network and as service-based competition leads to higher demand for fibre-based 
services, it encourages the entrant to gradual invest in its own access 
infrastructures.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The telecommunications industry is the most rapidly evolving network industry 
since it has undergone extensive changes in recent decades. Although these 
changes are mainly related to technological advancements, the regulatory policy 
has played a significant role in the promotion of competition and innovation.  
From a static perspective, competition is related to the creation of a self-
sustaining pro-competitive market structure in which firms have significant 
incentives to invest in innovative, differentiated services. Such service-based 
competition promotes both productive efficiency (i.e. existing assets are utilized 
efficiently) and allocative efficiency (i.e. existing resources are efficiently allocated 
to the economy). Therefore, consumers enjoy the welfare gains from static 
efficiency (lower prices, better quality and extended variety of services).   
From a dynamic perspective, competition is related to the creation of a 
competitive market structure in which firms have significant incentives to invest in 
new network facilities. Such facilities-based competition leads to socially efficient 
investment decisions and the adoption of better technologies, which implies that 
consumers enjoy the welfare gains of dynamic efficiency (maximum market 
growth, minimized production cost, innovative technologies and advanced 
services). 
It is thus obvious that the ultimate goal of regulators is to encourage all firms to 
undertake the socially optimal investment decisions in terms of both timing of 
investment and the extent of network deployment in order to promote dynamic 
efficiency. However, the initial market structure of the telecommunications sector, 
in which there was a state-owned monopoly (incumbent) operator, could not 
promote facilities-based competition. For this reason, the past regulatory goal 
was to reduce the incumbent’s market power by allowing alternative operators 
(new entrants) to enter the market in order to effectively service-based compete 
with the incumbent. This implies that the promotion of dynamic efficiency is a 
long-run goal which will be gradually achieved in the telecommunications sector 
due to its innate asymmetric nature.  
This thesis modeled the framework in the migration from a state monopoly market 
to a competitive telecommunications industry in order to study the impact of 
access prices on the entrant’s incentives to undertake the efficient make-or-buy 
decision in terms of both productive and allocative efficiency. It was found that the 
particular model of competition that describes the competition in the retail market 
significantly affects the effectiveness of access prices to achieve static efficiency. 
However, cost-based access regulation, which was widely adopted by the 
regulatory authorities, was found to promote both productive and allocative 
efficiency regardless of the competition conditions. Therefore, theoretical 
modeling showed that usage cost-based prices achieve the past regulatory goal 
concerning the promotion of static efficiency. 
Although dynamic efficiency seems to be the next regulatory goal once 
sustainable service-based competition over copper access networks has been 
established, the unambiguous positive impact of investments in new broadband 
infrastructures on economic growth and employment as well as the increasing 
need for bandwidth made national governments set as their first priority the 
encouragement of investments in fibre-based access networks (the so-called 
Next Generation Access (NGA) networks) rather than the promotion of dynamic 
efficiency. The reason is that investments in NGA infrastructures require a huge 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 76 
initial fixed cost, whereas the expected return is uncertain due to demand and 
regulatory risk factors. In other words, the current regulatory goal is to promote 
service-based competition over NGA networks rather than promote facilities-
based competition over such networks.  
It should be noted that the majority of the research articles studying the impact of 
access regulation of firms’ investment incentives assumes that the incumbents 
rather than the entrants will eventually undertake NGA investments mainly due to 
their better economic situation. The related literature concludes that mandating 
access to NGA networks at usage cost-based prices discourages both 
incumbents and entrants to invest in such networks. Therefore, the research 
focuses on studying alternative regulatory schemes that may promote both 
investments and competition. These schemes deviate from the permanent 
regulation of access at usage cost-based prices in terms of the access pricing 
policy (i.e. non-cost-based access prices), the access pricing formula (i.e. non-
usage access prices) and/or the regulatory regime employed (i.e. non-permanent 
regulation of access). 
This literature strand concludes that such alternative regulatory schemes can 
induce the incumbent to undertake to socially optimal investments in NGA 
networks (i.e. promote both static and dynamic efficiency) under certain 
conditions concerning the demand and cost structure. However, these studies do 
not take into account the fact that regulators have a significant incentive to 
deviate from such schemes by setting a cost-based access price in order to 
maximize the efficiency outcomes once NGA networks have been deployed. This 
thesis modeled this fact in order to study the impact of regulatory uncertainty on 
an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the efficient investments in NGA 
networks. It was found that the feasibility of the socially optimal outcome is not 
only affected by the demand and cost structure, but also by the perceived 
regulatory uncertainty.  
A growing number of research studies propose a regulatory holidays regime 
(under which the investor is not imposed to any regulatory constraints for a pre-
determined period of time) in order to maximize private investment incentives 
since although the social benefits from NGA deployment by far exceed the private 
incentive for investment, regulatory uncertainty and demand uncertainty 
undermine the expected profits. This thesis contributed to this literature by 
showing that a regulatory holidays regime may also improve social welfare if the 
monopolist is allowed to geographically price discriminate when the investment 
cost is not extremely low. However, even under the price discrimination regime, 
the monopolist underinvests compared to the socially optimal geographically 
differentiated NGA deployment. 
It is thus obvious that although such alternative regulatory schemes may succeed 
in increasing both static and dynamic efficiency, the full welfare gains are 
achieved by facilities-based competition which reflects the long-run goal of the 
regulatory policy. As a result, the future regulatory goal is expected to be the 
migration from service-based to facilities-based competition over NGA networks. 
The literature studying the impact of access regulation on an entrant’s incentives 
to invest in its own NGA networks (after the deployment of an NGA network by 
the incumbent) provides mixed results. In addition, it does not take into account 
that the disclosed regulatory policy in this migration phase affects the incumbent’s 
investment decisions in the transition from service-based competition over copper 
access networks to service-based competition over NGA networks. This implies 
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that the current and the future regulatory goals are closely related and a 
combined regulatory policy should be applied. This fact is also present in the EC 
Recommendation on regulated access to NGA networks which states that the 
access should be set at cost-based prices including an access markup for 
providing the initial investor with significant incentives, but such pricing scheme 
should also reflect a proportionate application of the ladder of investment 
principle in order to incentivize the access seekers to gradually invest in their own 
NGA infrastructures.  
This thesis contributed to this literature by proposing an innovative regulatory 
approach which is based on the basic principles governing a CDS contract. It was 
shown that under quite general but plausible assumptions about demand and 
cost factors, the proposed approach can induce an efficient migration towards 
facilities-based competition over NGA networks. It is thus obvious that this thesis 
not only discussed the past, the present and the future state of 
telecommunications networks, but also significantly contributed to the literature 
which studies the optimal access pricing policy that achieves the past, the current 
and the future regulatory goals. Although this contribution provides significant 
results with clear policy implications, future research is needed in order to study 
the robustness of the derived results under different conditions and improve the 
proposed approaches by taking into account specific economic and technical 
aspects of NGA networks. 
In particular, the contributed research articles in this thesis do not take into 
account the fact that the migration from copper access networks to NGA 
networks is a slow process [93]. This implies that even if fibre access networks 
replace much of the existing copper access infrastructures, there will be a period 
during which both are in operation and are competing for customers. Therefore, 
both the access prices for the copper and the NGA networks affect the final 
outcomes in terms of investment incentives and competition. Firstly, in the 
presence of a positive spillover of new investments, higher access prices 
increase the incumbent’s opportunity cost of investment due to the wholesale 
revenue effect (if the incumbent invests in a higher quality network, the entrant 
will invest in reaction, and the incumbent will then lose some wholesale profits). 
Secondly, low access prices for the copper access networks increase the 
opportunity cost of the entrant’s investment in NGA networks, making such 
investment less attractive, whereas low retail prices for the copper-based 
services discourage consumers to move from the old to the new technology 
unless the fibre-based services are priced sufficiently low as well [94]. The former 
effect is widely known as a “replacement effect” and the latter as a “business 
migration” effect. The fundamental point is that higher access prices lead to 
higher retail prices. Therefore, a higher difference between fibre and copper 
access prices implies a higher difference between fibre and copper retail prices, 
which, in turn, disincentivizes both entrant and consumers to move to the NGA 
networks. As a result, the impact of the regulation of the legacy network on the 
firms’ investment incentives when the NGA market is left unregulated or when 
there is an interplay between the access prices of the two networks has recently 
attracted much attention and has been also studied by [95] and [96]. 
Another avenue for future research concerns the introduction of competition into 
the research articles that study a monopolist’s incentives to undertake the socially 
optimal investments in NGA networks under geographic price discrimination. 
Such improvement will highlight the role of access regulation, whereas it will also 
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trigger a discussion about the impact of wholesale price discrimination on the 
efficiency outcomes. 
Last, the related literature, part of which are the contributed research articles in 
this thesis, implicitly or explicitly assumes that firms: (i) do not face capacity 
constraints; and (ii) make their optimal choices under fixed-coefficient technology 
with constant returns to scale. However, it is obvious that telecommunications 
networks have a limited capacity, whereas they are also closely related to 
modern technology which implies increasing returns to scale in production. 
Therefore, potential multiple equilibria and market failure may change the nature 
of access regulation.  
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ABBREVIATIONS – ACRONYMS 
ADSL Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line 
CC Current Costs 
CDS Credit Default Swap 
CRTC 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission 
EC European Commission 
ECTA European Competitive Telecommunications Association 
ESON Ethernet Switched Optical Network 
ETNO 
European Telecommunications Network Operators’ 
Association 
EU European Union 
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
FDC Fully Distributed/Allocated Cost 
FTTC Fibre-to-the-Curb  
FTTH Fibre-to-the-Home  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GPON Gigabit Passive Optical Network 
HC Historic Costs 
LLU Local Loop Unbundling 
LRAIC Long Run Average Incremental Cost 
LRIC Long Run Incremental Cost 
MC Marginal Cost 
NGA/NGAN Next Generation Access Networks 
NRA National Regulatory Authority 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
P2P(E) Point-to-Point (Ethernet)  
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network 
SAC Stand-Alone Cost 
SMP Significant Market Power 
TELRIC Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost 
TSLRIC Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost 
US United States (of America) 
VDSL Very high-bit-rate Digital Subscriber Line 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
ΟΤΕ Hellenic Telecommunications Organization 
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APPENDIX A 
The research towards the completion of this thesis led to the publication of six 
original articles that are at the centre of the literature studying the optimal 
regulatory intervention in each migration phase during the evolution of the 
telecommunications networks. Appendix A quotes these articles as they have 
been originally published in refereed international journals or including in the 
proceedings of refereed international conferences.  
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1. Introduction 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorized new suppliers (entrants) of 
telecommunications services to have access to incumbent suppliers’ key network 
elements at cost-based prices. The purpose of this policy is “to promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher 
quality services for (American) telecommunications consumers and encourage 
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies”. Hence, the 
ultimate goal of this unbundling policy is twofold. First, it aims at inducing service-
based competition in the downstream (retail) market which leads to lower prices, 
higher quality and higher social welfare. Second, once service-based competition 
has been established, it aims at promoting facilities-based competition which 
leads to innovation and market growth. Service-based competition requires 
mandated access to the incumbent network, whereas facilities-based competition 
requires investment in network infrastructure by incumbents and, especially, 
entrants.  
The promotion of service-based competition is mainly based on cost-oriented 
input (or access) prices, and especially on LRIC (Long-Run Incremental Cost) 
methodology.1 The main advantage of this methodology is that it provides the 
new entrants with significant incentives to enter the market and, as a result, the 
consumers enjoy the short-run benefits from service-based competition. On the 
contrary, the main drawback of this methodology is that it discourages both 
incumbents and new entrants to invest in new access infrastructures (the so-
called Next Generation Access networks, or NGA).  
Indeed, Jorde et al. (2000) study the impact of cost-based input prices on the 
incumbents’ incentives to upgrade their access network and find that the input 
prices based on LRIC methodology discourage incumbents to invest. Ingraham 
and Sidak (2003) confirm empirically the result of Jorde et al. (2000). According 
to Cave and Prosperetti (2001), the reason for this negative relationship between 
access regulation and incumbents’ investment incentives is that input prices 
based on LRIC discourage incumbents to invest in networks because they 
anticipate that they will be required to offer access to their rivals at cost-based 
prices.   
In addition, Jorde et al. (2000) show that regulating input prices based on LRIC 
methodology encourages entrants to deviate from the socially optimal investment 
level and to delay entry. Furthermore, Bourreau and Dogan (2006) show that 
unbundling of the local loop may delay facilities-based competition, even in an 
unregulated environment. 
Therefore, cost-based input prices cannot induce both effective competition and 
investments in new access networks. One of the most known theories for tackling 
this trade-off is the so called “ladder of investment theory” proposed by Cave and 
Vogelsang (2003). This theory is based on the fact that entrants will typically 
invest in replicable assets first and then progress to less replicable ones. Thus, it 
suggests that at the initial stage of competition the input price for the less 
replicable network elements should be low but increasing over time as assets are 
replicated. Although this theory has been fiercely criticized by Crandall et al. 
(2004) and Hazlett and Bazelon (2005), the EC Recommendation on regulated 
                                                          
1
  See Armstrong (2002) and Valletti and Estache (1998) for an excellent and extensive review of 
the literature on access pricing. 
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access to NGA (EC, 2010)2 stresses that the appropriate array of remedies 
imposed by an NRA should reflect a proportionate application of the ladder of 
investment theory.  
The papers closest to ours are Sappington (2005) and Gayle and Weisman 
(2007a)  which study the impact of different downstream interactions on a new 
entrant’s profits when it purchases an essential upstream input from the 
incumbent and when it makes the upstream input itself. In particular, Sappington 
(2005) uses the standard Hotelling (1929) model of downstream competition to 
show that input prices are irrelevant for an entrant’s decision to make or buy an 
input required for downstream production. This result is striking since it negates 
most of the aforementioned studies concluding that cost-based input prices 
promote effective competition but discourage both incumbents and new entrants 
to invest in new access infrastructures. 
According to Sappington, the reason for this result is that previous studies fail to 
take into account the impact of a new entrant’s make-or-buy decision on 
subsequent retail price competition. When the incumbent sells an upstream input 
to the new entrant, the incumbent faces an opportunity cost of expanding its retail 
output. The incorporation of this opportunity cost into the incumbent’s total cost 
makes the incumbent act as if its upstream cost of production were equal to the 
specified input price. Therefore, regardless of the input price, the entrant will 
choose to buy (respectively, make) the upstream input whenever the incumbent 
(respectively, entrant) has an innate upstream cost advantage. Therefore, the 
entrant’s decision always minimizes industry costs and ensures efficient entry 
and utilization of the telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, the entrant always 
undertakes the efficient make-or-buy decision.   
After Sappington’s suggestion, Gayle and Weisman (2007a) consider alternative 
downstream interactions and show that input prices are not necessarily irrelevant 
in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model and are not irrelevant in the Cournot 
model. This implies that departure from cost-based input prices may distort the 
efficiency of the entrant’s make-or-buy decision. 
As a result, Sappington (2005) and Gayle and Weisman (2007a) study the impact 
of input prices on the efficiency of the entrant’s make-or-buy decisions. This 
paper studies the impact of input prices on the social optimality of the entrant’s 
make-or-buy decisions under the alternative theoretical settings of Sappington 
(2005) and Gayle and Weisman (2007a). First, we make explicit the Sappington’s 
conjecture that regardless of the established price of the upstream input, the 
entrant always undertakes the make-or-buy decision that is not only efficient, but 
also socially optimal. Second, we explore the robustness of this result in the 
Bertrand vertical differentiation model and in the Cournot model. We find that the 
social optimality of the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is affected by two crucial 
factors: (a) the particular level of the price of the upstream input; and (b) the cost 
differential between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s unit costs of producing the 
upstream input. For this reason, we obtain the range of both input prices and 
upstream cost differential that induce the entrant to undertake the socially 
desirable decision.  
By combining our results with those of Sappington (2005) and Gayle and 
Weisman (2007a), we show that the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is 
always socially optimal in the case of Hotelling, is socially optimal for the set of 
                                                          
2
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input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the efficient decision in the case 
of Cournot competition and is not necessarily socially optimal in the Bertrand 
vertical differentiation model. Therefore, we make regulatory implications 
concerning the range of input prices that tackle the regulatory trade-off, while 
(cannot) result in the most efficient outcome.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the 
basic assumptions and definitions. Section 3 presents the main findings 
concerning the impact of input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy 
decisions in the Hotelling model, in the Cournot model and in the Bertrand vertical 
differentiation model. The last section compares the results of the three models, 
summarizes the key findings and makes regulatory implications. The proofs of all 
assumptions, lemmas and propositions are in the Appendix A. 
 
2. Assumptions and definitions 
We consider a duopoly case where two suppliers compete according to a 
particular model of downstream competition. Each unit of the downstream service 
requires one unit of the upstream input and one unit of the downstream input. 
Each firm supplies its own downstream input. The unit costs of producing the 
downstream input are Idc  and dc
  for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. 
Without loss of generality, we further assume that the unit cost of producing the 
downstream input is the same for the two retailers and is set to zero. The 
incumbent and entrant’s unit costs of producing the upstream input are denoted 
by Iuc  and uc
 , respectively.  
The entrant has to decide between buying the upstream input from the incumbent 
at a regulated price w and making the upstream input itself. The entrant is 
understood to make the efficient make-or-buy decision if it purchases the input 
from the incumbent when the incumbent is the least-cost supplier ( u uc c
  ) and 
produces the input itself whenever it is the least-cost supplier ( u uc c
  ). In 
addition, the entrant is understood to make the socially optimal make-or-buy 
decision if it chooses to buy (respectively, make) the upstream input when this 
decision leads to higher social welfare level than its decision to make 
(respectively, buy) the upstream input. The timing of the game is as follows. First, 
the regulator sets the input price w. After observing the input price, the entrant 
decides whether it will buy the upstream input from the incumbent or produce it 
itself. Last, the two providers choose their retail prices that maximize their profits. 
We use the backward induction method to find the equilibrium of the whole game. 
Therefore, the analysis begins with the computation of the retail price and the 
outputs of the firms. Then, using these results, the entrant undertakes its make-
or-buy decision, which depends on the regulated input price. Finally, based on 
the previous information, the regulator sets the input price that induces the 
entrant to undertake the best feasible outcome in terms of social welfare, 
productive efficiency, competition level and investment level. In this paper, we 
examine the impact of input prices on each regulatory goal for three alternative 
models of downstream competition: Hotelling model, Cournot model and Bertrand 
vertical differentiation model. 
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3. Findings 
3.1 Hotelling model 
The two rivals, whose final services are differentiated á la Hotelling (1929), are 
located at the two extremities of the market. In particular, the incumbent is 
located at point 0IL   and the entrant is located at point 1
E
L  . N consumers are 
uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0,1]. Consumers are endowed with utility 
( , )i i i iL v tU L P P L L     where locations )(
i
L and prices ( )iP  for the incumbent 
and the entrant are denoted by the superscript I and E, respectively, i.e. ,i I E .  
The term  it L L  can be interpreted as the disutility which the consumer located 
at point [0,1]L  incurs through the distance of transport. The first term, 0v  , can 
be interpreted as the reservation price and it is assumed that it exceeds the sum 
of price and transport cost in order to ensure that each consumer buys one unit of 
the final service. Note that consumer utility LU  has a maximum where the 
consumer’s location L and the firm’s location coincide. 
Sappington (2005) discusses the entrant’s make-or-buy decision by comparing 
the entrant’s profits when it decides to buy the upstream input from the incumbent 
( EB ) with its profits when it chooses to make the upstream input itself (
E
M ). His 
main finding is stated in proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1 (Sappington, 2005). Regardless of the established price (w) of 
the upstream input: (a) the entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent when the incumbent is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. 
E E
B M   if u uc c
  ); and (b) the entrant prefers to make the upstream input itself 
when it is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. E E    if u uc c
  ). 
 
From proposition 1 we infer that input prices are irrelevant for the entrant’s make-
or-buy decision. In addition, it is obvious that the entrant’s decision always results 
in the most efficient outcome. Hence, regardless of the established price of the 
upstream input, the entrant always undertakes the efficient make-or-buy decision. 
Furthermore, we show in the Appendix A13 that input prices do not have an 
impact on social welfare.4 Therefore, input prices are irrelevant not only for the 
entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision, but also for the regulator’s goal to 
maximize social welfare. The reason is that a marginal increase (decrease) in the 
input price causes a unit increase (decrease) in the incumbent’s profits and a unit 
decrease (increase) in consumer surplus. As social welfare is the unweighted 
sum of industry profits and consumer surplus, it is thus not affected by a marginal 
change in input prices.  
However, our primary goal is to examine the social optimality of the entrant’s 
efficient make-or-buy decision. Thus, we compare the social welfare level 
obtained when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input ( BSW ) to the 
                                                          
3
 See equation (A13). 
4
 Shim and Oh (2006) also state that the level of the input price does not affect the entrant’s 
profits and the total social surplus. However, they do not combine this result with the entrant’s 
efficient make-or-buy decision. 
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respective level of social welfare obtained when the entrant chooses to make the 
upstream input itself ( MSW ). We can then state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. Regardless of the established price (w) of the upstream input: (a) 
the entrant’s decision to buy the upstream input from the incumbent is socially 
optimal when the incumbent is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. 
B MSW SW  if u uc c
  ); and (b) the entrant’s decision to make the upstream input 
itself is socially optimal when it is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. 
M BSW SW  if u uc c
  ). 
 
Combining propositions 1 and 2 concludes that the entrant’s decision to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent if u uc c
   and to make the upstream input 
itself if u uc c
  , is not only efficient, but also socially optimal. Hence, the 
maximization of social welfare is in line with the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy 
decision. 
 
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium of the Hotelling model, the efficient make-or-buy 
decision undertaken by the entrant is always socially optimal.  
 
Proposition 3 presents a significant finding: although access price regulation 
affects neither the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant nor 
the level of social welfare, the regulator always succeeds in fulfilling the 
maximization of social welfare by not intervening in the upstream market. When 
u uc c
   the entrant chooses to make the upstream input and, as a result, it invests 
in alternative infrastructures, which is socially optimal. In this case, the absence 
of access price regulation tackles the trade-off between service-based and 
facilities-based competition. Thus the regulator’s twofold aim is fulfilled. On the 
contrary, when u uc c
   the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent, which is also socially optimal. In this case, the society only enjoys the 
short-run benefits from service-based competition.  
 
3.2 Cournot model 
The two rivals, whose final services are homogeneous, choose their optimal 
amount of output they will produce independently and simultaneously. The 
inverse demand function is given by ( )P Q A BQ  , where ( )P Q  is the retail 
market price, 0A   is the reservation price,  0B   is the slope of the inverse 
demand function and 
I E
Q Q Q   is market output, where 
I
Q  and 
E
Q  denote the 
incumbent and the entrant’s output, respectively. 
Gayle and Weisman (2007a) discuss the impact of input prices on the entrant’s 
make-or-buy decision by comparing the entrant’s profits when it decides to buy 
the upstream input from the incumbent with its profits when it chooses to make 
the upstream input itself. Their main finding is stated in proposition 4: 
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Proposition 4 (Gayle and Weisman, 2007a). In the equilibrium of the Cournot 
model: (a) The entrant makes the input rather than buys the input from the 
incumbent when u wc
  ; and (b) The entrant buys the input from the incumbent 
when u wc
  . 
 
From proposition 4, it can be deduced that input prices are not irrelevant for the 
entrant’s make-or-buy decision. In addition, the entrant’s decision results in the 
most efficient outcome when min{ , }Iu uwc c
   or max{ , }Iu uwc c
  . Therefore, there is 
a potential efficiency distortion in the make-or-buy decision and hence input 
prices are not irrelevant. Concerning the impact of input prices on social welfare, 
we find that that the society is indifferent about the entrant’s decision to make or 
buy the upstream input when:  
2 2 26 14( )( ) 4( ) 6 ( ) 11 8 ( ) 2 0( ) ( )
I E I I EI E
u u u u uu uw A A Awc c c c c wc c         (1) 
By solving equation (1) with respect to w, the optimal input price ( *w ) that makes 
the society be indifferent about the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is derived: 5 
2 2* 22( ) 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2( ) ( )
I I E E IE I
u u u u uu uA A Aw c c c c cA c c          (2) 
 
Proposition 5. (a) The entrant’s decision to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent is socially optimal when *w w ; and (b) the entrant’s decision to make 
the upstream input itself is socially optimal when *w w . 
 
By combining propositions 4 and 5, it is deduced that the entrant’s decision is 
always socially optimal when 
*
u wc
  . Therefore, for any * uw c
  there is a 
potential social welfare distortion in the make-or-buy decision and hence input 
prices may not be irrelevant. For this reason, we derive the set of input prices that 
induce the entrant to undertake the socially optimal make-or-buy decision. Then, 
we examine whether the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is also socially 
optimal. It is instructive to limit our study to the range of input prices for which a 
Nash equilibrium exists: 
 
Assumption 1. Let (α) 
2 22 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2 0( ) ( )
I E E IE I
u u u uu uA Ac c c cA c c      ; (b) 
( ) / 2Iuw w A c   ; and (c) [ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)
I I
u uw w A Ac c       . 
 
The first constraint ensures that w  , the second one that the entrant is active 
when it buys the upstream input from the incumbent (i.e. 0
E
Q  ) and the third 
one that the incumbent’s profits are non-negative when it sells the upstream input 
                                                          
5
 The second solution of equation (1) is rejected because it leads to negative input prices (see 
Appendix A2). 
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to the entrant (i.e. 0IB  ).
6 Therefore the second inequality provides the highest 
input price ( w ) at which a Nash equilibrium exists, whereas the third inequality 
provides the lowest input price ( w ) at which a Nash equilibrium exists.  
Since *w  is affected by both 
I
uc  and 
E
uc , we should discriminate between three 
cases regarding the upstream cost differential in order to derive the set of input 
prices that induce the entrant to undertake the socially optimal make-or-buy 
decision. 
 
3.2.1 Neither provider has an innate upstream cost advantage 
In this case, the unit cost of producing the upstream input is the same for the two 
retailers, that is I Eu uc c . Substituting 
I E
u uc c  into equation (2) gives the optimal 
input price ( *w ) that makes the society be indifferent about the entrant’s make-or-
buy decision. 
 
Lemma 1. If I Eu uc c  then 
*I E
u uw wc c w    . 
 
Figure 1 presents a graphical analysis of propositions 4 and 5 for the case 
described in lemma 1.  
ww w
BUY
BUY MAKE
MAKE
Entrant’s 
decision
Social 
preference
:
:
*I E
u uc c w 
 
Fig. 1 The effect of input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions when neither provider has 
an upstream cost advantage  
It is deduced that when neither provider has an innate upstream cost advantage: 
(a) the entrant’s decision to buy the upstream input from the incumbent is socially 
optimal when uw c
 ; and (b) the entrant’s decision to make the upstream input 
itself is socially optimal when uw c
 . We conclude that the entrant’s decision to 
make or buy the upstream input is always socially optimal when neither provider 
has an innate upstream cost advantage. However, the fulfillment of the 
regulator’s two-fold goal requires the regulator to set the input price at a higher 
level than the providers’ unit cost of producing the upstream input. Therefore, it is 
obvious that the optimal regulatory policy is to induce the entrant to produce the 
upstream input itself.     
3.2.2 The entrant has an innate upstream cost advantage 
                                                          
6
 Another necessary constraint to ensure that 0IB   is 
[ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)I Iu uw w A Ac c       . However, the second constraint of the first 
assumption is sufficient to ensure that w w  (See Appendix A2). 
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In this case, the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent in producing the 
upstream input, that is E Iu uc c . We should calculate the optimal input price (
*
w ) in 
order to derive the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the 
socially optimal make-or-buy decision. The impact of the entrant’s upstream cost 
advantage on the optimal input price ( *w ) is described by the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 2. (a) If ( ) 'E E Iu u uc c c   then 
* E I
u uw ww c c    ; and (b) if ( ) '
E E I
u u uc c c   
then * E Iu uw ww c c   , where 
4 7 198 5 54
( ) ' ( )
11 5
I
uE I
u u
A c
Ac c
 
   . 
 
Figure 2 presents a graphical analysis of propositions 4 and 5 for each of the two 
cases described in lemma 2.  
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Fig. 2(a) The effect of input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions when the entrant is not 
much more efficient than the incumbent 
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Fig. 2(b) The effect of input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions when the entrant is 
much more efficient than the incumbent 
A number of observations derived by the analysis of figure 2 are instructive. First 
when the upstream cost differential is low enough, the socially optimal decision 
for the entrant is to make the upstream input even for relative low input prices, 
whereas when the upstream cost differential is high enough, the socially optimal 
decision for the entrant is to make the upstream input regardless of the input 
price. The rationale of this result is that the more efficient the entrant is in 
producing the upstream input, the larger the range of input prices that lead the 
society to prefer the entrant to make the upstream input. As a result, a low 
(respectively, high) enough upstream cost differential causes input prices to be 
relevant (respective, irrelevant) for the impact of an entrant’s make-or-buy 
decision on social welfare. Second, an entrant’s make-or-buy decision is socially 
optimal when (a)  *w w  or 
E
uw c  for ( ) '
E E I
u u uc c c  ; and (b) 
E
uw c  for 
( ) 'E E Iu u uc c c  . This implies that there is a potential distortion of the social 
optimality of make-or-buy decisions. Third, regardless of the upstream cost 
differential, an entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal. 
Indeed, the entrant is understood to make the efficient make-or-buy decision if it 
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produces the input itself since it is the least-cost supplier ( u uc c
  ). Therefore, the 
entrant undertakes the efficient make-or-buy decision if Euw c , which also leads 
to the socially optimal outcome.  
In conclusion, the entrant’s efficient decision not only leads to the socially optimal 
outcome, but also tackles the trade-off between fostering effective competition 
and encouraging investments in new access infrastructures. Thus, the regulator 
should set Euw c .  
 
3.2.3 The incumbent has an innate upstream cost advantage 
In this case, the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant in producing the 
upstream input, that is E Iu uc c . Like the case in which the entrant had an innate 
upstream cost advantage, we should calculate the optimal input price ( *w ) in 
order to derive the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the 
socially optimal make-or-buy decision. The impact of the incumbent’s upstream 
cost advantage on the optimal input price ( *w ) is described by the following 
Lemma: 
 
Lemma 3. (a) If ( ) ''I E Eu u uc c c   then 
*I E
u uw wc c w    ; and (b) if ( ) ''
E E
u u wc c   
then *I Eu uw wc c w   , where 
5 17
( ) ''
22
I
uE
u
A c
c

 . 
 
Figure 3 presents a graphical analysis of propositions 4 and 5 for each of the two 
cases described in lemma 3.  
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Fig. 3(a) The effect of input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions when the incumbent is 
not much more efficient than the entrant 
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Fig. 3(b) The effect of input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions when the incumbent is 
much more efficient than the entrant 
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From figure 3, it is deduced that when the upstream cost differential is low 
enough, the socially optimal decision for the entrant is to buy the upstream input 
even for relative high input prices, whereas when the upstream cost differential is 
high enough, the socially optimal decision for the entrant is to buy the upstream 
input regardless of the input price. The rationale of this result is that the more 
efficient the incumbent is in producing the upstream input, the larger the range of 
input prices that lead the society to prefer the entrant to buy the upstream input. 
As a result, a low (respectively, high) enough upstream cost differential causes 
input prices to be relevant (respective, irrelevant) for the impact of an entrant’s 
make-or-buy decision on social welfare. Another significant deduction is that an 
entrant’s make-or-buy decision is socially optimal when (a)  *w w  or 
E
uw c  for 
( ) ''I E Eu u uc c c  ; and (b) 
E
uw c  for ( ) ''
E E
u u wc c  . This implies that there is a 
potential distortion of the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions. Last, 
regardless of the upstream cost differential, an entrant’s efficient make-or-buy 
decision is always socially optimal. Indeed, the entrant is understood to make the 
efficient make-or-buy decision if it purchases the input since the incumbent is the 
least-cost supplier ( u uc c
  ). Therefore, the entrant undertakes the efficient make-
or-buy decision if Euw c , which also leads to the socially optimal outcome.  
However, the social optimality of facilities-based competition is fulfilled only when 
the upstream cost differential is low enough, the regulated access price is relative 
high ( *w w ) and, of course, at the cost of the productive efficiency. In this case 
there is another trade-off between the productive efficiency and the social 
optimality of make-or-buy decisions.  
 
3.2.4 Discussion 
Given that the downstream competition is characterized by the Cournot model, 
the analysis of the impact of input prices on social welfare shows that regardless 
of which provider has an innate upstream cost advantage, input prices are (not) 
irrelevant for the social optimality of the entrant’s make-or-buy decision when the 
upstream cost differential is high (low) enough.  
In addition, although the absence of access price regulation always leads to the 
socially optimal make-or-buy decision in the case of Hotelling, regulatory 
intervention is necessary in order to induce the entrant to undertake the socially 
optimal make-or-buy decision in the case of the Cournot competition. This implies 
that there is a potential distortion in the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions 
and especially in the fulfillment of the regulator’s twofold goal.  
However, the main conclusion of the analysis of the entrant’s make-or-buy 
decision from a social perspective is that the entrant’s efficient decision is always 
socially optimal. Therefore, we can state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6. In the equilibrium of the Cournot model, the efficient make-or-buy 
decision undertaken by the entrant is always socially optimal.  
 
Proposition 6 states that when E Iu uc c  (respectively, 
E I
u uc c ), the entrant’s 
decision to make (respectively, buy) the upstream input not only leads to the most 
efficient outcome, but also to the socially optimal one. It is worth noting, that in 
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the Hotelling model, as well as, in the Cournot model, the entrant’s efficient 
make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal. However, in the former case the 
social optimality of the efficient make-or-buy decisions is fulfilled without any 
regulatory intervention in the upstream market, whereas in the latter case the 
regulatory intervention is necessary for ensuring such optimality. In particular, the 
regulator should set Euw c  if 
E I
u uc c  and 
E
uw c  if 
E I
u uc c  in order to ensure the 
social optimality of the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant. 
Any deviation from this regulatory policy may result in a socially optimal outcome 
which is not efficient, or to an entrant’s decision that is not socially optimal.  
Therefore, we demonstrate a continuum of findings in which, depending of the 
input prices, the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is both efficient and socially 
optimal, is only socially optimal and is neither efficient nor socially optimal.  
 
3.3 Bertrand vertical differentiation model 
In the Bertrand vertical differentiation model, the final products of the two rivals 
can be ordered in an objective way according to their perceived difference in 
quality. In this paper, it is assumed that the incumbent produces the high quality 
good and the entrant produces the lower quality good. Like Gayle and Weisman 
(2007a), we assume that a consumer requires only one unit of the product and 
her indirect utility for the high quality good is given by, h h hpV   , while her 
indirect utility for the low quality good is given by, l l lpV   , where h l  . 
Each consumer has a unique θ, which captures taste heterogeneity in the 
population and is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 
1].Without loss of generality, we also normalize the population of consumers to 1.  
Gayle and Weisman (2007a) discuss the impact of input prices on the entrant’s 
make-or-buy decision by comparing the entrant’s profits when it decides to buy 
the upstream input from the incumbent with its profits when it chooses to make 
the upstream input itself. Their main finding is stated in proposition 7: 
 
Proposition 7 (Gayle and Weisman, 2007a). In the equilibrium of the Bertrand 
vertical differentiation model: (a) The entrant makes the input rather than buys 
from the incumbent when E Iu uc c  for 
E
uw c ; and (b) The entrant buys the input 
from the incumbent if and only if E Iu uc c  and )( ) ( )(2
E I
l u l uh
w wc c      . 
 
The main conclusion of the above proposition is that when the entrant is (not) the 
least-cost supplier, its make-or-buy decision is (not) independent of input prices in 
a Bertrand framework. Therefore, input prices are not necessarily irrelevant in the 
Bertrand vertical differentiation model. This implies that there is a potential 
efficiency distortion in the make-or-buy decision. In this paper, we examine the 
impact of input prices on social welfare when the entrant chooses to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent and when it chooses to make the upstream 
input itself. Therefore, we should compare the level of social welfare when an 
entrant purchases an essential upstream input from the incumbent to the 
respective level of social welfare when an entrant makes the upstream input 
itself. The results of this comparison can be summarized in the following 
proposition: 
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Proposition 8.  (a) The entrant’s decision to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent is socially optimal when **w w ; and (b) the entrant’s decision to make 
the upstream input itself is socially optimal when **w w , where 
**
w  represents 
the input price that makes the society be indifferent about the entrant’s decision 
to make or buy the upstream input. 7 
 
From proposition 8, we deduce that input prices are not irrelevant for the 
maximization of social welfare and, as a result, for the social optimality of the 
entrant’s make-or-buy decision. However, the main goal of this paper is not to 
show that input prices are not irrelevant for the maximization of social welfare, but 
(a) to find the conditions under which the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is 
socially optimal; and (b) to provide the set of input prices that induce the entrant 
to undertake not only the socially optimal decision but also the most efficient one. 
Thus, we should combine the results of propositions 7 and 8.  
The main part of the analysis that follows is conducted via numerical simulations 
due to the complexity of closed-form solutions for the endogenous variable **w . 
Therefore, we use numerical examples in order to derive the equilibrium results. 
Like in the case of the Cournot model, we discriminate between three main 
cases: (a) neither provider has an innate upstream cost advantage; (b) the 
entrant has an innate upstream cost advantage; and (c) the incumbent has an 
innate upstream cost advantage. 
The analysis conducted is similar to Gayle and Weisman (2007a) and Gayle and 
Weisman (2007b) with the exception that this paper takes into account the impact 
of the upstream cost differential on the entrant’s make-or-buy decision and, as a 
result, on the subsequent social welfare level. In other words, we examine the 
social optimality of make-or-buy decisions for many combinations of the 
incumbent’s and the entrant’s unit costs of producing the upstream input rather 
than fixing arbitrarily their upstream unit costs. For each combination, we 
estimate the input prices that cause (a) the society; and (b) the entrant, to be 
indifferent between the latter’s decision to make or buy the upstream input ( **w  
and ) ] / 2( )[(2 E Il u l u h le h c cw        , respectively). The results are presented in 
Table 1 (Appendix B).  
Note that when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input, the curve that 
represents its profits ( lB ) is a convex and decreasing function of w, whereas the 
curve that represents the social welfare ( BSW ) is a concave and decreasing 
function of w. Since the entrant’s profits and the social welfare are not affected by 
input prices when the entrant chooses to make the upstream input itself, the 
respective curves lM  and MSW  are horizontal lines. In this numerical example 
the incumbent’s upstream cost of providing the upstream input is fixed at 0.55. 
Therefore, we assume different values of the entrant’s upstream cost of providing 
the upstream input in order to study the effect of both upstream cost differential 
and input prices on the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions. 
 
                                                          
7
  It is worth noting that the value of 
**
w  depends on the model’s parameters, as described in the 
Appendix A3. In some special cases, which are also described in the Appendix A3, there are two 
positive input prices that cause 
M BSWSW  . 
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3.3.1 The entrant has an innate upstream cost advantage 
We begin the analysis by assuming a very high upstream cost differential 
( 0.1Euc  ). Increasing the assumed value for 
E
uc  ( 10.1
E
uc  ) does not affect the 
entrant’s profits curve lB  and the social welfare curve BSW , but it does serve to 
shift the entrant’s profits curve  lM  downwards and the social welfare curve 
MSW  initially downwards and then upwards.  
From Table 1 we deduce that when the entrant is much more efficient than the 
incumbent in making the upstream input ( 0.1Euc   and 0.2
E
uc  ), the 
l
M curve is 
above the lB  curve and the MSW  curve  is above the BSW  curve for 
0 1.5w  .8,9 Therefore, regardless of the input prices, the entrant’s decision to 
make the upstream input is socially optimal when the entrant is much more 
efficient than the incumbent in making the upstream input. The implication is that 
the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is socially optimal.   
It should be noted that as the entrant becomes less efficient in making the 
upstream input (but it is still more efficient than the incumbent), the incumbent’s 
profits increase, the entrant’s profits decrease and consumer surplus decrease. 
Hence, it is obvious that increasing Euc  makes the 
l
M curve shift downwards and 
hence intersects the lB  curve at a higher input price level. This implies that as 
the entrant becomes less efficient, it chooses to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent for a larger range of input prices. Concerning the impact of an 
increase in Euc  on social welfare, we find that MSW  decreases with an increase in 
E
uc  as far as 
E I
u uc c . However, the MSW  curve intersects the BSW  curve at a 
(0,1.5)w  only for low enough upstream cost differential ( 0.3Euc  ). In these 
cases, ** ew w .
10 This implies that the society prefers the entrant to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent for a larger range of input prices than the 
range that induces the entrant to buy the upstream input. Or, in other words, the 
society prefers the entrant to make the upstream input from the incumbent for a 
lower range of input prices than the range that induces the entrant to make the 
upstream input itself. Therefore, the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is not 
socially optimal for **[ , )ew w w  and is socially optimal for 
**w w . 
 
3.3.2 Neither provider has an innate upstream cost advantage 
Not surprisingly, when neither provider has an innate upstream cost advantage 
( 0.55I Eu uc c  ), both the society and the entrant are indifferent between the 
latter’s decision to make-or-buy the upstream input for the same input price 
( ** ew w ).
11 This implies that when ew w  (respectively, ew w ), the entrant 
chooses to buy (respectively, make) the upstream input. By combining this result 
with proposition 8, we deduce that when I Eu uc c , the make-or-buy decision 
undertaken by the entrant is socially optimal. 
                                                          
8
  See Appendix B for the proof of this inequality. 
9
  See, indicatively, figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix B. 
10
  See Table 1 and, indicatively, figures 6 and 7 in the Appendix B.  
11
  See Table 1 and figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix B. 
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3.3.3 The incumbent has an innate upstream cost advantage 
A further increase in Euc  makes the incumbent has an upstream cost advantage. 
As the incumbent becomes more efficient than the entrant in producing the 
upstream input (or as Euc  further increases), the incumbent’s profits increase, the 
entrant’s profits decrease and consumer surplus decrease. This implies that the 
l
M curve intersects the 
l
B  curve at a higher input price level. Therefore, the 
higher the Euc , the higher the range of input prices that induces the entrant to buy 
the upstream input from the incumbent.  
Concerning the impact of an increase in Euc  on social welfare, we find that MSW  
decreases with an increase in Euc  as far as 
*
( )
E E
u uc c . Therefore, the MSW  curve 
intersects the BSW  curve at a higher input price. However, if 
*
( )
E E
u uc c , a further 
increase in Euc  causes MSW  to increase. Therefore, the MSW  curve intersects the 
BSW  curve at a lower input price. This implies that if the incumbent is much more 
efficient than the entrant in producing the upstream input, the society prefers the 
entrant to make the input for a very large range of input prices even though this is 
not an efficient outcome.   
It is worth noting that regardless of the impact of an increase in Euc  on social 
welfare, the input price that makes the society be indifferent about the entrant’s 
make-or-buy decision is always lower than the respective level of input price that 
makes the entrant be indifferent between making or buying the upstream input, 
that is ** ew w .
12 This implies that the society prefers the entrant to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent for a lower range of input prices than the 
range that induces the entrant to buy the upstream input. Therefore, the entrant’s 
efficient make-or-buy decision is not socially optimal for **( ], ew ww  and is 
socially optimal for **w w . 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The main conclusion concerning the analysis of the social optimality of make-or-
buy decisions in the case of the Bertrand model can be stated in the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 9. In the equilibrium of the Bertrand vertical differentiation model, the 
efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant is not necessarily 
socially optimal.  
 
Proposition 9 shows that unlike the cases of Hotelling and Cournot models, in 
which the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant is always 
socially optimal, in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model the entrant’s efficient 
make-or-buy decision is not necessarily socially optimal. In particular, there is a 
set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake its efficient make-or-buy 
decision which leads to lower social welfare level than the respective level 
resulted by not undertaking the efficient make-or-buy decision. 
                                                          
12
  See Table 1 and, indicatively, figures 10 and 11 in the Appendix B. 
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4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to study the impact of input prices on an entrant’s 
efficient make-or-buy decision from a social perspective. Thus, it improved the 
results of Sappington (2005) and Gayle and Weisman (2007a), which study the 
impact of input prices on an entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision, by 
examining their impact on the subsequent level of social welfare. Some very 
instructive results for regulatory purposes were drawn.  
First, this paper showed that when the downstream competition is described by 
the Hotelling model, input prices do not affect the maximization of social welfare. 
In addition, combining this result with those of Sappington leads us to conclude 
that the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is not only socially optimal, but also leads 
to the most efficient outcome. Therefore, the absence of access regulation 
always leads to both efficient and socially optimal outcome. However, the inability 
of regulator to affect the exogenous factors, such as the providers’ unit costs of 
producing the upstream input, may distort the fulfillment of the regulator’s two-fold 
goal of promoting competition and encouraging investments in access 
infrastructures. 
Second, it found that when the two providers compete á la Cournot, input prices 
are not necessarily irrelevant for the society’s preference for the entrant’s 
decision to make or buy the upstream input. The combination of this result with 
those of Gayle and Weisman showed that the entrant’s make-or-buy decision is 
not necessarily socially optimal. However, the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy 
decision always results in the socially optimal outcome. In particular, when the 
entrant has an innate upstream cost advantage, the regulator can set such an 
input price that leads the entrant to make the upstream input. This policy leads to 
(a) the most efficient outcome; (b) the socially optimal outcome; and (c) the 
fulfillment of regulator’s two-fold goal. However, when the incumbent has an 
innate upstream cost advantage, the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision only 
promotes service-based competition. In this case, the regulator’s two-fold goal 
can only be fulfilled when the upstream cost differential is low enough and, of 
course, at the cost of efficiency distortion.      
Last, in the case of the Bertrand vertical differentiation model, the impact of input 
prices on the society’s preference for the entrant’s make-or-buy decision and on 
the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions is as described in the case of the 
Cournot model. However, in the case of Bertrand model, the entrant’s efficient 
make-or-buy decision does not always result in the socially optimal outcome. The 
rationale of these results is that if the entrant is much more efficient than the 
incumbent in producing the upstream input, the absence of access regulation 
leads the entrant to make the upstream input which not only results in the most 
efficient and socially optimal outcome, but also fulfills the regulator’s two-fold 
goal. However, if the entrant is not much more efficient than the incumbent or the 
incumbent has an innate upstream cost advantage, the regulator’s intervention is 
necessary in order to set such an input price which induces the entrant to 
undertake the efficient make-or-buy decision that is also socially optimal.      
The above analysis showed that the particular model that describes the 
competition in the downstream market, as well as, each provider’s efficiency in 
producing the upstream input have a significant impact on the social optimality of 
the entrant’s (efficient) make-or-buy decisions. This implies that regulators should 
have perfect information about each provider’s unit cost of producing the 
upstream input and the way that the two providers compete in the downstream 
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market in order to draw their optimal access pricing policy. This paper assessed 
the impact of input prices on the entrant’s make-or-buy decisions and on the 
subsequent social welfare level for every upstream cost differential for three 
alterative models of downstream competition. Thus, this paper provided the 
optimal access pricing policy that results in the best feasible outcome in terms of 
social welfare, productive efficiency, competition level and investment level given 
the upstream cost differential and the particular model of downstream competition 
employed.  
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Appendix A 
A1. Hotelling model 
Case 1: The entrant chooses to make (M) the upstream input itself  
Let 
^
L  Є [0,1] denote the location of the consumer that is indifferent between 
purchasing from the incumbent and the entrant. Therefore, 
^
I
M
L Q . The analysis 
is similar to Sappington (2005) with one exception that 0I Ed dc c  . As a result, 
see Sappington (2005) for equations that give the equilibrium prices (P), output 
levels (Q) and profits (Π), for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j , where prices, outputs and profits for 
the incumbent and the entrant are denoted by the superscript I and E, 
respectively.   
2
3
i j
u ui
M
c c
tP

   (A1) 
1
[ (1 )]
2 3
j i
i u u
M
c c
NQ
t

   (A2) 
2
(3 )
][
18
i j
i u u
M
t c c
N
t
 
  (A3) 
Consumer surplus is given by:  
^
^
1
{ [ ( 0)] [ (1 )] }
L
I E
M MM
L
N v t L dL v t L dLCS P P

           (A4) 
2
[ ( ) ])(
2
I I IE I E
M M MM M M M
t
N v t tQ Q QCS P P P        (A5) 
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Substituting (A1) and (A2) into (A5) provides the resulting level of consumer 
surplus: 
2 2 2[36 2( )( ) 18( ) 18( ) 45 ] / (36 )( ) ( )
I I EI E
u u u uu uN vt t t tCS c c c c tc c

         (A6) 
Social welfare is the sum of both providers’ profits and consumer surplus: 
2 2 2[36 10( )( ) 18( ) 5 18( ) 9 ] / (36 )5( ) ( )
I I EI E
M u u u uu uN vt t t tSW c c c c tc c
        (A7) 
 
Case 2: The entrant chooses to buy (B) the upstream input from the incumbent  
Equilibrium prices, output levels and profits for the incumbent (I) and the entrant 
(E) are as described in Equations (A8)-(A11), for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j  : 
i
B w tP    (A8) 
1
2
i
NQ   (A9) 
( )
2
II
B u
t
N w c    (A10) 
2
E
B
t
N  (A11) 
For the proof of Equations (A8)-(A11) see Sappington (2005). In addition, the 
consumer surplus level obtained when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream 
input from the incumbent is given by substituting (A8) and (A9) into (A5). 
Therefore: 
( 5 / 4)B N v w tCS     (A12) 
Social welfare is the sum of both providers’ profits and consumer surplus: 
( / 4)IB uN v tSW c    (A13) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The result of proposition 1 is derived by comparing equations (A3) and (A11). 
See Sappington (2005) for the whole proof.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From equations (A7) and (A13): 
M BSW SW   (A14) 
2 2 2[36 10( )( ) 18( ) 5 18( ) 9 ] / (36 )5( ) ( )
( / 4)
I I EI E
u u u uu u
I
u
N vt t t tc c c c tc c
N v tc
      
  
 (A15) 
) )( 5(
[ 1] 0
2 18
I I
u uu uc cc c
t
 
 
   (A16) 
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Like Sappington (2005), we assume that both the incumbent and the entrant 
serve retail consumers in equilibrium. Hence, 3j iu u tc c   (for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j ). 
This implies that 
)5(
1 0
18
I
uuc c
t


  . Therefore, from (A16) it is deduced that: (a) if 
I
u uc c
  , then M BSW SW ; (b) if 
I
u uc c
  , then M BSW SW ; and (c) if 
I
u uc c
  , then 
M BSW SW . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Given that the entrant is understood to make the efficient make-or-buy decision if 
it purchases the input from the incumbent when the incumbent is the least-cost 
supplier ( u uc c
  ) and produces the input itself whenever it is the least-cost 
supplier ( u uc c
  ), proposition 3 is derived straightforward by combining 
propositions 1 and 2. 
 
A2. Cournot model 
Case 1: The entrant chooses to make (M) the upstream input itself  
The analysis is similar to Gayle and Weisman (2007a) with one exception that 
0I Ed dc c  . In particular, when the entrant chooses to make the upstream input 
itself, the profit functions for the incumbent and the entrant are given, 
respectively, by: 
)(
III
M uM MP Qc   (A17) 
)(
EEE
M uM MP Qc   (A18) 
where ( )
I E
M M
P A B Q Q   . Taking the first order conditions of (A17) and (A18) 
with respect to 
I
MQ  and 
E
MQ , respectively, and solving simultaneously yields the 
Nash outputs:  
2
3
j i
i u u
M
A c c
Q
B
 
  (A19) 
for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j . Substituting equation (A19) into the inverse demand function 
( )P Q A BQ   yields the equilibrium retail price: 
3
i j
u ui
M
A c c
P
 
  (A20) 
Substituting equations (A19) and (A20) into (A17) and (A18) yields each 
provider’s profits: 
2
( 2 )
9
j i
i u u
M
A c c
B
 
  (A21) 
Consumer surplus is given by: 
22
)(
2 2
I E
M M MQ Q Q
CS

    (A22) 
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2
(2 )
18
I E
u uA c c
CS
B

 
  (A23) 
Social welfare is given by adding both providers’ profits and consumer surplus: 
2 2 2
( 2 ) ( 2 ) (2 )
9 9 18
E I I E I E
u u u u u u
M
A A Ac c c c c c
SW
B B B
     
    (A24) 
 
Case 2: The entrant chooses to buy (B) the upstream input from the incumbent  
The analysis is similar to Gayle and Weisman (2007a) with the exception that 
0I Ed dc c  . Therefore, see Gayle and Weisman (2007a) for equations (A25) to 
(A29) that provide the equilibrium retail prices (for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j ), each provider’s 
output and each provider’s profits when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream 
input itself. 
3
I
ui
B
A w c
P
 
  (A25) 
2
3
I
I uA w c
Q
B

 
  (A26) 
2
3
I
E uA w c
Q
B

 
  (A27) 
2
( )( 2 )( 2 )
9 3
I II
u uuI
B
w A wA w c cc
B B
   
   (A28) 
2
( 2 )
9
I
uE
B
A w c
B
 
  (A29) 
Consumer surplus is given by: 
22
)(
2 2
I E
B B B
B
Q Q Q
CS

    (A30) 
2
(2 )
18
I
u
B
A wc
CS
B
 
  (A31) 
Social welfare is given by adding both providers’ profits and consumer surplus: 
 
2 2 2
( )( 2 )( 2 ) ( 2 ) (2 )
39 9 18
I II I I
u uu u u
B
w A wA w A w A w c cc c c
SW
BB B B
       
     (A32) 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The result of proposition 4 is derived by comparing equations (A21) and (A29). 
See Gayle and Weisman (2007a) for the whole proof.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
From equations (A24) and (A32): 
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M BSW SW   (A33) 
2 2 2
2 2 2
( 2 ) ( 2 ) (2 )
9 9 18
( )( 2 )( 2 ) ( 2 ) (2 )
39 9 18
E I I E I E
u u u u u u
I II I I
u uu u u
A A Ac c c c c c
B B B
w A wA w A w A w c cc c c
BB B B
     
  
       
   
 (A34) 
2 2 26 14( )( ) 4( ) 6 ( ) 11 8 ( ) 2 0( ) ( )
I E I I EI E
u u u u uu uw A A Awc c c c c wc c          (A35) 
2 222( ) 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2( ) ( )
I I E E IE I
u u u u uu uw A A Ac c c c cA c c          (A36) 
From (A36) we conclude that the society is indifferent about the entrant’s make-
or-buy decisions when 
2 2* 22( ) 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2( ) ( )
I I E E IE I
u u u u uu uA A Aw c c c c cA c c         . It is worth 
noting that we reject the second solution since it results in negative access 
prices. Therefore, (a) if *w w , then M BSW SW ; (b) if 
*w w , then M BSW SW ; 
and (c) if *w w , then M BSW SW . 
 
Proof of Assumption 1 
(a) The first constraint is derived straightforward by (A36). 
(b) When the entrant buys the upstream input from the incumbent, an increase in 
the access price causes the new entrant’s output to decrease. Therefore, in order 
to ensure that the new entrant is active in the market, we assume that 0
E
Q  or 
( ) / 2Iuw w A c   .  
(c) When the entrant buys the upstream input from the incumbent, a decrease in 
the access price causes the incumbent’s profits to decrease. Therefore, in order 
to ensure that the incumbent’s profits are non-negative, we assume that 0   
or  
2
( )( 2 )( 2 )
0
9 3
I II
u uu w A wA w c cc
B B
   
    (A37) 
22 25 5 ( ) [ 7 ( ] 0)
I I I
u u uw A Aw c cA c         (A38) 
[ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10) [ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)I I I Iu u u uA A w A Ac c c c             (A39) 
Therefore, the lower limit of the input prices is [ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)I Iu uw A Ac c      . 
Concerning the upper limit of the input prices, we state that the upper limit is 
( ) / 2Iuw A c   if and only if  
( ) / 2 [ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)I I Iu u uA A Ac c c         (A40) 
0 6 5( )IuA c    (A41) 
Therefore, is it obvious that (A41) holds and therefore the upper limit is  
( ) / 2Iuw A c  . 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
First, note that Iuw wc  . The reason is that  
[ 5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)I I Iu u uA Ac c c        (A42) 
5( ) 6,7( )] 10I I Iu u uA Ac c c        (A43) 
1,7( ) 0IuA c   (A44) 
and ( ) / 2 0I I Iu u uA Ac c c      which both holds. 
Furthermore, in this case, we assume that I Eu uc c . Therefore, substituting 
I E
u uc c  
into (A36) yields: 
M BSW SW   (A45) 
2
2( ) ( )
I II
u uuw A Ac cc      (A46) 
Therefore,  *w =
2
2( ) ( )
I II
u uuA Ac cc    . Then Lemma 1 is straightforward.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
In this case, we assume that E Iu uc c . In addition 
E
uc  cannot be lower than w  
because if Eu wc   then the first constraint of assumption 1 is violated. Therefore, 
E I
u uw c c  . However, the value of 
E
uc  affects the relative value of 
*
w  with respect 
to w . For this reason, we calculate the values of  Euc  that causes 
* ww  . Hence, 
2 222( ) 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2( ) ( )
5( ) 3 5( )] / ( 10)
I I E E IE I
u u u u uu u
I I
u u
A A Ac c c c cA c c
A Ac c
        
    
 (A47) 
The solution of (A47) shows that * ww   if 
4 7 198 5 54
( )
11 5
I
uE I
u u
A c
Ac c
 
   (A48) 
The first solution of (A48) is rejected because it causes E Iu uc c . Therefore, the 
critical value of Euc  that causes 
* ww   is 
4 7 198 5 54
) ' ( )(
11 5
I
E u I
uu
A c
Ac c
 
   . It 
follows that ) '(
E I
uuc c .  
As a result if ) '(
E IE
uu uc cc   then 
* ww   and if ) '(
E E I
u uuc c c   then 
* ww  . However, 
we should also prove that * Euw c  when 
E I
u uc c . Indeed,  
 * Euw c   (A49) 
2 222( ) 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2( ) ( )
I I E E I EE I
u u u u u uu uA A Ac c c c c cA c c           (A50) 
2 2 22 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( 2 )
I E E IE I E I
u u u uu u u uA A Ac c c cA c c c c         (A51) 
( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 0E I E E I I E Iu u u u u u u uA c c c c c c c c        (A52) 
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( )( 2 ) 0E I E Iu u u uAc c c c     (A53) 
which holds since E Iu uc c  and 2 0
E I
u uA c c    because 0
E
Q  . Note that if 
E I
u uc c  
then * E Iu uw c c   (as we have already proven) and if 
2 0 ( ) / 2E I E Iu u u uA Ac c c c      , then 
* E
uw c , as well. However, since we 
assume that E Iu uc c , the only feasible solution is 
* .Euw c  This completes the proof 
of lemma 2. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
In this case, we assume that E Iu uc c . Therefore, from (A53) we deduce that 
* E
uw c  if ( ) / 2
I E I
u u uAc c c     and 
* E
uw c  if ( ) / 2
E I
u uw Ac c   . As a result, we 
have examined the relative value of *w  with respect to 
E
uc . In addition, we should 
examine the relative value of *w  with respect to w . For this reason, we calculate 
the values of  Euc  that causes 
* ww  . Hence, 
2 222( ) 14( )( ) 11 8 ( ) 10 ( ) 2 ( ) / 2( ) ( )
I I E E I IE I
u u u u u uu uA A A Ac c c c c cA c c           (A54) 
The solution of (A54) shows that * ww   if 
5 17
( ) ''
22
I
uE E
u u
A c
c c

   (A55) 
or 
( ) / 2E Iu uAc c   (A56) 
Therefore, we conclude that (a) if ( ) / 2E Iu uAc c   then 
*E
u wwc  ; (b) if ( ) ''
E E
u uc c  
then * ww  ; and (c) if ( ) ''
E E
u uc c  then 
* ww  . Moreover, if ( ) ''
E E
u uc c  then 
* ww  . 
Last, from equation (A55) it is obvious that ( ) ''I Eu uc c  since 
I
uA c . This completes 
the proof of lemma 3. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Firstly, let u uc c
  . Given that (a) the entrant is understood to make the efficient 
make-or-buy decision if it purchases the input from the incumbent when the 
incumbent is the least-cost supplier ( u uc c
  ); and (b) the implication of 
proposition 4 that the entrant buys the input from the incumbent when uw c

 , we 
conclude that the entrant undertakes the efficient make-or-buy decision when 
uw c

 . In addition, given the result of lemma 3 that 
*E
uc w  and the implication of 
proposition 5 that the entrant’s decision to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent is socially optimal when *w w , it follows that uw c

  is a necessary 
and sufficient condition to ensure that the entrant’s efficient decision to buy the 
upstream input is also socially optimal.  
Secondly, let u uc c
  . Given that (a) the entrant is understood to make the 
efficient make-or-buy decision if it makes the input when it is the least-cost 
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supplier ( u uc c
  ); and (b) the implication of proposition 4 that the entrant makes 
the input when uw c

 , we conclude that the entrant undertakes the efficient 
make-or-buy decision when uw c

 . In addition, given the result of lemma 2 that 
*E
u wc   and the implication of proposition 5 that the entrant’s decision to make the 
upstream input is socially optimal when *w w , it follows that uw c

  is a 
necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the entrant’s efficient decision to 
make the upstream input is also socially optimal.  
By combining the above results, it can be concluded that the entrant’s efficient 
make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal in the equilibrium of the Cournot 
model. 
 
A3. Bertrand vertical differentiation model 
The analysis is similar to Gayle and Weisman (2007a) with one exception that 
0I Ed dc c  . Therefore, the consumer whose taste parameter is 
~
/l lP   is 
indifferent between buying and not buying, whereas the consumer whose taste 
parameter is 
^
) / )( (
h l
lhP P      is indifferent between the high and the low 
quality product. As a result, the demand functions for the incumbent and the 
entrant are given, respectively, by: 
( )
h l
l h
h l l h l
P P
Q

    
 
 
 (A57) 
1
h l
h
h l
P P
Q
 

 

 (A58) 
 
Case 1: The entrant chooses to make (M) the upstream input itself  
The profit functions for the incumbent and the entrant are given, respectively, by: 
)(
h hIh
M uP Qc   (A59) 
)(
l lEl
M uP Qc   (A60) 
See Gayle and Weisman (2007a) for equations (A61), (A62), (A63) and (A64) 
that provide the equilibrium retail prices, the entrant’s output and the entrant’s 
profits when the entrant chooses to make the upstream input itself.  
[2( ) 2 ]
4
I E
h h l u uh
M
h l
c c
P
  
 
  


 (A61) 
( ) 2 ]
4
I E
l h l l u h ul
M
h l
c c
P
    
 
  


 (A62) 
( ) 2 ][
(4 )( )
I E E
l h l l u l u h uh l
M
l h l h l
c c c
Q
     
    
   

 
 (A63) 
2
2
( ) 2 ][
( )(4 )
I E E
h l l u l u h uhl l
M
l h l h l
c c c     
    
   

 
 (A64) 
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Substituting equations (A61) and (A62) into (A58) and rearranging yields the 
incumbent’s output.  
( ) (2 )2
(4 )( )
EI
h h l uh u h l l
M
h l h l
cc
Q
    
   
   

 
 (A65) 
In addition, substituting the resulting incumbent’s output 
h
MQ and (A61) into (A59) 
gives the incumbent’s profits: 
2
2
( ) ][2 (2 )
( )(4 )
EI
h l uu h lhh l
M
h l h l
cc    
   
   

 
 (A66) 
Consumer surplus is given by: 
^
~ ^
1
( ) ( )l hl hCS d dP P

 
           (A67) 
^ ~ ^2 2 2
( ) ( )12 2
l hl hl hCS Q QP P
 
        (A68) 
Substituting the equilibrium prices and quantities and the resulting values of 
^
  
and 
~
  into (A68) provides the consumer surplus level when the entrant chooses 
to make the upstream input itself.  
22 33 2 2 2 2
2 22 2
2
4 5( )[4 8
6 8 4 3 ]( ) ( )
( )(4 )2
E E
u hh luh h l h l h l
I E I E
h u h u h l h ll l u u
M
l h l h l
c c
c c c c
CS
       
      
    
   
  

 
 
(A69) 
Social welfare is the sum of both providers’ profits and consumer surplus, that is: 
h l
M MM MSW CS     (A70) 
 
Case 2: The entrant chooses to buy (B) the upstream input from the incumbent  
The profit functions for the incumbent and the entrant are given, respectively, by: 
) ( )(
h h lI Ih
B u uwP Q Qc c     (A71) 
)(
l ll
B wP Q   (A72) 
See Gayle and Weisman (2007a) for equations (A73), (A74), (A75) and (A76) 
that provide the equilibrium retail prices, the entrant’s output and the entrant’s 
profits when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the incumbent.  
[2( ) 3 ]
4
h h lh
B
h l
w
P
  
 
 


 (A73) 
( ) )](2
4
l h l hl l
B
h l
w
P
   
 
  


 (A74) 
2 )(
(4 )
l h l
B
l h l
w
Q

  



 (A75) 
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2
2
( )( 2 )
(4 )
h h l ll
B
l h l
w   
  
 


 (A76) 
Substituting equations (A73) and (A74) into (A58) and rearranging yields the 
incumbent’s output: 
2
4
h h
B
h l
w
Q

 



 (A77) 
In addition, substituting the resulting incumbent’s output 
h
BQ  and equations (A73) 
and (A75) into (A71) gives the incumbent’s profits:  
2 2 223 2 2 2
2 2 22
2
12 8 84 4 8
3 2
(4 )
I I
l u uh h hlh h l h l
I I I
h h u h l h l u ul l lh
B
l h l
w wc w c
w w wc w c c
      
       
  
    
   


 
(A78) 
Consumer surplus is given by (A68). Substituting the equilibrium prices and 
quantities and the resulting values of 
^
  and 
~
  into (A68) provides the consumer 
surplus level when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent.  
2 2 22 2
2
(4 5 16 4 2 5 )
(4 )2
h l h h l h lh l l
B
l h l
w ww w
CS
        
  
    


 (A79) 
Social welfare is the sum of both providers’ profits and consumer surplus, that is: 
h l
B BB BSW CS     (A80) 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
The result of proposition 7 is derived by comparing equations (A64) and (A76). 
See Gayle and Weisman (2007a) for the whole proof.  
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
From equations (A70) and (A80): 
M BSW SW   (A81) 
23 3 3 3 3 2 22
22 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 23 3 3 222 2
2 2
(8 8 16 12 4 4( )
12 16 12 16 12( )
9 4 4 8 9( ) ( )
6 6
E I IE
l u l u uh h h h h h lu
E I E II
u u u uh l h l uh h hl l l
I EE I
h u h u h hl l l lu uh hl l
I E
h u u hl
w wc c w cc
w wc c c cc
ww c cc c
c c
       
        
         
 
     
    
     

2 22 2 3 32
2
2 5 2 2 )( ) ( )
0
( )(4 )2
I IE I
u h h ul l l l lu u
l h l h l
w wc w cc c     
    
   

 
 
(A82) 
Solving (A82) with respect to w provides two values of w that make the society be 
indifferent about the entrant’s decision to make or buy the upstream input. 
Depending on the particular values of Iuc  and 
E
uc , (a) the one optimal value of  w 
is positive and the other negative; (b) both are positive; or (c) do not exist. In the 
numerical example provided here, it is assumed that Iuc  is low enough in order to 
exclude the second case. Thus, let us denote the potential positive root of 
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equation (A82) by **w . Therefore, proposition 8 has been just proved. However, if 
I
uc  is high enough ( 0.65
I
uc   in our example), the BSW  curve initially increases 
with an increase in the input price, reaches its maximum level and then 
decreases. Therefore, for high enough Euc ( 0.45
E
uc   in our example), there are 
two positive values of w that make the society be indifferent about the entrant’s 
decision to make or buy the upstream input. In addition, if Euc  is low enough, 
MSW  is greater than BSW  for all admissible values of w. 
 
Proof of Proposition 9 
From Table 1 we deduce that if E Iu uc c  then 
**
ew w . Therefore, the entrant 
undertakes the efficient decision to make the upstream input itself for ew w , 
whereas such a decision is socially optimal only for **w w . Since, 
**
ew w , it can 
be concluded that the entrant’s efficient decision to make the upstream input is 
not socially optimal for **[ , )ew w w  and is socially optimal for 
**w w . In addition, 
regardless of the input price, the entrant’s efficient decision to make the upstream 
input is also socially optimal when the upstream cost differential is very high (see 
figures 4 and 5). On the contrary, from Table 1 we deduce that if E Iu uc c  then 
**
ew w . Therefore, the entrant undertakes the efficient decision to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent for ew w , whereas such a decision is socially 
optimal only for **w w . It can be concluded that the entrant’s efficient decision to 
buy the upstream input is not socially optimal for **( ], ew ww  and is socially 
optimal for **w w . Hence, the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the 
entrant is not necessarily socially optimal.  
 
Appendix B 
The following is a numerical example used to analyze the impact of input prices 
on the social optimality of an entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision when the 
downstream competition is described by the Bertrand vertical differentiation 
model. It is instructive to limit our study to the range of input prices for which both 
providers are active in the market. Thus, we assume that / 2lw   which ensures 
that 0
l
BQ   and 
( )
2
I
l h l l uE
u
h l
c
c
   
 
 


 which ensures that 0
l
MQ  . The assumed 
parameter values are 0.55Iuc  , 5h   and 3l  . Therefore, we find the entrant’s 
profits and the social welfare level when the former chooses to make the 
upstream input itself and when it chooses to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent for 0 1.5w   and 0 1.092Euc  . This implies that we discriminate 
between three cases regarding the incumbent’s and the entrant’s unit costs of 
producing the upstream input:  
(a) when 0 0.55Euc  , the entrant has an innate upstream cost advantage. See, 
indicatively, figures 4 and 5 for the case that the upstream cost differential is high 
enough and figures 6 and 7 for the case that the upstream cost differential is low 
enough;  
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(b) when 0.55Euc  , neither provider has an innate upstream cost advantage. The 
derived results are presented in figures 8 and 9; and  
(c) when 0.55 1.092Euc  , the incumbent has an innate upstream cost advantage. 
See, indicatively, figures 10 and 11 for a graphical presentation of the derived 
results. 
The following table shows the values of input prices **w  and ew  for different 
values of Euc  that affect the upstream cost differential.  
 
E
uc  ew  
**
w  
0.1 - - 
0.2 - - 
0.3 0.1125 - 
0.4 0.2875 0.3023 
0.5 0.4624 0.4957 
0.55 0.55 0.55 
0.6 0.6375 0.5881 
0.7 0.8125 0.6268 
0.8 0.9875 0.6219 
0.9 1.1625 0.5724 
1 1.3975 0.4638 
Table 1 The values of 
**
w  and ew  for different upstream cost differentials 
Applying the values of Table 1 to propositions 7 and 8 and combining the derived 
results proves proposition 9 (as proved in Appendix A3). It is worth noting that the 
particular values of parameters h  and l  do not have an impact on the social 
optimality of an entrant’s make-or-buy decisions. The following figures present 
graphically the derived results of Table 1 when 0.1Euc  , 0.4
E
uc  , 0.55
E
uc   and 
0.8Euc  . Each of these four upstream cost differentials reflects an indicative 
example of the special cases described above and in the text. 
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Fig. 4 Entrant’s profits as a function of w for 0.1Euc   
 
 
Fig. 5 Social welfare level as a function of w for 0.1Euc   
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Fig. 6 Entrant’s profits as a function of w for 0.4Euc   
 
 
Fig. 7 Social welfare level as a function of w for 0.4Euc   
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Fig. 8 Entrant’s profits as a function of w for 0.55Euc   
 
 
Fig. 9 Social welfare level as a function of w for 0.55Euc   
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Fig. 10 Entrant’s profits as a function of w for 0.8Euc   
 
 
Fig. 11 Social welfare level as a function of w for 0.8Euc   
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ABSTRACT 
 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires incumbent providers to lease network 
inputs to rivals at cost-based prices in order to secure lower prices and higher 
quality services through service-based competition. Once service-based 
competition has been established, the Act aims at promoting investment in 
alternative network infrastructures through facilities-based competition. Hence, 
access (input) price regulation aims at both securing service-based competition 
and promoting facilities-based competition. Sappington (Sappington, D. (2005). 
American Economic Review, 95(5), 1631-1638) uses the standard Hotelling 
model to show that input prices are irrelevant for an entrant’s decision to make or 
buy an essential input for downstream production. Hence, he shows that input 
price regulation is not an efficient instrument to promote facilities-based 
competition. We show that input prices are also irrelevant for the maximization of 
social welfare and, as a result, input price regulation is also an inefficient 
instrument to secure service-based competition. Therefore, input prices are 
irrelevant from the regulatory perspective. In particular, we show that the efficient 
make-or-buy decision undertaken by an entrant is always socially optimal. Hence, 
when the entrant prefers to make the upstream input, both regulator’s goals are 
fulfilled, whereas when the entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent, the regulator fails to promote facilities-based competition. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorized new suppliers (entrants) of 
telecommunications services to have access to incumbent suppliers’ key network 
elements at cost-based prices.1 The purpose of this policy is “to promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher 
                                                          
1
  See Armstrong (2002) and Valletti and Estache (1998) for an excellent and extensive review of 
the literature on access pricing. 
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quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the 
rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies”. Hence, the ultimate 
goal of this unbundling policy is twofold. First, it aims at inducing service-based 
competition in the downstream (retail) market which leads to lower prices, higher 
quality and higher social welfare. Second, once service-based competition has 
been established, it aims at promoting facility-based competition which leads to 
innovation and market growth. Service-based competition requires mandated 
access to the incumbent network, whereas facility-based competition requires 
investment in network infrastructure by incumbents and, especially, entrants.  
The optimal access price that maximizes social welfare and promotes network 
investment is still an open issue. Existing studies on regulation and investment, 
mainly in broadband market, examine this issue from both theoretical and 
empirical perspective.2 
Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000) examine the impact of access price on total 
investment incentives. They show that regulating access prices based on TELRIC 
(Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost) methodology discourages 
incumbents to invest and encourages entrants to deviate from socially optimal 
investment level and to delay entry. Ingraham and Sidak (2003) confirm 
empirically the result of Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000). In addition, Friederiszick, 
Grajek and Roller (2008) study the correlation between unbundling and 
investment in 25 European countries for the period 1997-2006 and find that 
unbundling discourages infrastructure investment by entrants in fixed-line 
telecommunications but does not affect substantially the incumbent’s investment 
in fixed-line services.  
Vareda (2007) studies the effect of access price regulation on the incumbent’s 
incentives to invest. He shows that unbundling may lower the incumbent’s 
incentives to invest in quality upgrades but it also raises the incentives in cost-
reduction investment. Hence, the aggregate effect of access price regulation on 
incumbent’s incentives to invest is doubtful.  
Another set of papers addresses and analyzes the effect of access price 
regulation on entrants’ incentives to invest in alternative infrastructures. Crandall, 
Ingraham and Singer (2004) conclude that unbundling decreases facilities-based 
competition in the short term. However, they point out that their model cannot rule 
out the possibility that low UNE (unbundled network elements) rates encourage 
the entrants to rent at first, and then build facilities once they have some market 
experience. Cave and Vogelsang (2003), based on the fact that entrants will 
typically invest in replicable assets first and then progress to less replicable ones, 
suggest that at the initial stage of competition the access price for the less 
replicable network elements should be low but increasing over time as assets are 
replicated.  This theory is widely known as “ladder of investment”. Avenali, 
Matteucci and Reverberi (2008) argue for the efficiency of an access price that 
rises over time for fostering investment by new entrants. Using a simulation 
model, Christodoulou and Vlahos (2001) show that a “mix” of infrastructure and 
service competition with a gradually increasing price of the UNE from an initially 
low level to forward-looking costs stimulates investment by both incumbents and 
entrants.  
                                                          
2
 See (Cambini and Jiang, 2009) for an excellent and extensive review of the literature on 
broadband investment and regulation.  
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From the above studies we infer that, although there is a great controversy about 
the effect of access regulation on investment incentives, most researchers agree 
that an access price too low may deter investment in alternative networks and an 
access price too high would discourage entrants from joining service-based 
competition. Hence, the regulatory policy should reflect the trade-off between the 
short-run benefits from service-based competition and long-run benefits of 
improved facility-based competition. 
However, Sappington (2005) shows that input prices are irrelevant for an 
entrant’s decision to make or buy an input required for downstream production. 
This result is striking since it negates most of the above studies. He uses the 
standard Hotelling model of competition to compare the new entrant’s profits 
when it purchases an essential upstream input from the incumbent and when it 
makes the upstream input itself. He concludes that “the entrant undertakes the 
efficient make-or-buy decision if it purchases the upstream input from the 
incumbent whenever the incumbent is the least-cost supplier of the input, and 
produces the upstream input itself whenever it is the least-cost supplier of the 
input”. In other words, the entrant compares its cost and the incumbent’s cost of 
making the input in order to undertake the efficient make-or-buy decision. Hence, 
the actual level of input prices is irrelevant. According to Sappington, the reason 
of this striking result is that previous studies fail to take into account the impact of 
a new entrant’s make-or-buy decision on subsequent retail price competition. 
After Sappington’s suggestion, Gayle and Weisman (2007) consider alternative 
downstream interactions and show that input prices are not necessarily irrelevant 
in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model and are not irrelevant in the Cournot 
model.  
As we have already mentioned above, the regulator aims at setting the access 
price that not only maximizes social welfare but also induces investment in 
alternative networks. Sappington (2005) studies the effect of input prices on the 
entrant’s incentives to make the upstream input. In this paper, we complement 
Sappington’s result by studying the effect of input prices on social welfare. Like 
Sappington, we use the standard Hotelling model and show that input prices are 
irrelevant for the regulator’s goal to maximize social welfare. In particular, we 
show that when the incumbent (entrant) is the least-cost supplier of the input, 
social welfare is maximized when the entrant decides to buy (make) the input. 
Therefore, the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant 
maximizes social welfare.3   
This indifference result is also striking because it proves that input prices affect 
neither service-based nor facilities-based competition.4 In addition, we show that 
the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant is always socially 
optimal. Therefore, although it seems that access price regulation is an inefficient 
instrument of fulfilling the regulator’s twofold goal, it always succeeds in 
maximizing social welfare. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the 
basic assumptions and definitions of our model. Section 3 presents the main 
                                                          
3
 Shim and Oh (2006) also state that the level of the input price does not affect the entrant’s 
profits and the total social surplus. However, they do not combine this result with the entrant’s 
efficient make-or-buy decision. 
4
 It should be noted that the irrelevance of input prices on social welfare is sensitive to the 
particular model of competition employed.  
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findings of this paper. The last section summarizes the key findings and makes 
regulatory implications. 
 
2. Assumptions and definitions 
We consider a duopoly case where there are two suppliers whose final services 
are differentiated á la Hotelling (1929). The two rivals are located at the two 
extremities of the market. The incumbent is located at point 0iL   and the entrant 
is located at point 1eL  . N consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit 
interval [0,1]. Consumers are endowed with utility ( , ) ( )j j j jL v tU L P P L L    . 
Consumer utility LU  has a peak where the consumer’s location L and the firm’s 
location coincide. The term  ( )jt L L  can be interpreted as the linear 
transportation (disutility) cost which the consumer located at point L Є [0,1] incurs 
through the distance of transport. 0v   can be interpreted as the reservation 
price and it is assumed that it exceeds the sum of price and transport cost in 
order to assure that each consumer buys one unit of the final service. jP  ( , )j i e  
represents the price at which each provider supplies its final service. 
Each unit of the downstream service requires one unit of an upstream input and 
one unit of the downstream input. Each firm supplies its own downstream input. 
The unit costs of producing the downstream input are Idc  and dc
  for the 
incumbent and the entrant, respectively. The incumbent’s and entrant’s unit costs 
of producing the upstream input are denoted by Iuc  and uc
 , respectively. Without 
loss of generality, we further assume that the unit cost of producing the 
downstream input is the same for the two retailers and is set to zero. 
The price at which the entrant can purchase the upstream input from the 
incumbent is denoted by w. The regulator sets the input (access) price that 
maximizes social welfare. Then the entrant decides whether it will buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent or produce it itself. Once the entrant has 
made its efficient make-or-buy decision, the providers choose their retail prices 
that maximize their profits. Finally, consumers make their purchase decisions. 
 
3. Findings 
In this section we estimate the input price that maximizes social welfare (SW) 
defined as the unweighted sum of profits and consumer surplus.  We use the 
backward induction method to solve this problem. Equilibrium prices (p), output 
levels (Q), profits (Π), consumer surplus (CS) and social welfare (SW) are as 
characterized in Lemmas 1 and 2.  Prices, outputs and profits for the incumbent 
and the entrant are denoted by the superscript I and E, respectively.  The 
subscript M (respectively, B) denotes prices, outputs, profits, consumer surplus 
and social welfare following the entrant’s decision to make (respectively, buy) the 
upstream input. 
LEMMA 1: If the entrant chooses to produce the upstream input itself, equilibrium 
retail prices, outputs, profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are (for ,i j  I, 
E, i ≠ j ): 
(1) 
2
3
i j
u ui
M
c c
tP

   
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(2) 
1
[ (1 )]
2 3
j i
i u u
M
c c
NQ
t

   
(3) 
2
(3 )
][
18
i j
i u u
M
t c c
N
t
 
  
(4) 
2
2 )(
[ ]
3 18
I I
u u uu
c c c cN v tCS
t
 

 
     
(5) 
2
2 )(
[ ]
3 6
I I
u u uu
M
c c c cN vSW
t
  
    
 
LEMMA 2: If the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the incumbent, 
equilibrium retail prices, outputs, profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are 
(for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j ): 
(6) iB w tP    
(7) 
1
2
i
NQ   
(8) ( )
2
II
B u
t
N w c    
(9) 
2
E
B
t
N  
(10) ( )B N v w tCS     
(11) ( )IB uN vSW c   
 
Sappington (2005) discusses the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision by 
comparing equations (3) and (9). His main finding is stated in proposition 1: 
 
PROPOSITION 1 (Sappington): Regardless of the established price (w) of the 
upstream input: (a) the entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent when the incumbent is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. 
E E
B M   if u uc c
  ) and (b) the entrant prefers to make the upstream input itself 
when it is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. E E    if u uc c
  ). 
 
From proposition 1 we infer that input prices are irrelevant for the entrant’s make-
or-buy decision. Furthermore, from (11) we infer that input prices do not have an 
impact on social welfare. Hence, input prices are irrelevant not only for the 
entrant’s make-or-buy decision, but also for the regulator’s goal to maximize 
social welfare. The reason is that a marginal change in input price causes a unit 
increase in incumbent’s profits and a unit decrease in consumer surplus. As 
social welfare is the unweighted sum of profits and consumer surplus, it is thus 
not affected by a marginal change in input prices.  
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It is of high interest to examine the impact of the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy 
decision on social welfare. When the entrant prefers to make the upstream input 
itself, social welfare is given by (5) and when the entrant prefers to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent, social welfare is given by (11). By comparing 
(5) and (11), we can state the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Regardless of the established price (w) of the upstream input: 
(a) the society prefers the entrant to buy the upstream input from the incumbent 
when the incumbent is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. B MSW SW  if 
u uc c
  ) and (b) the society prefers the entrant to make the upstream input itself 
when it is the least-cost supplier of the input (i.e. M BSW SW  if u uc c
  ). 
 
From Proposition 1 and 2, we infer that if u uc c
   both the entrant’s profits and 
social welfare are maximized when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input 
from the incumbent and if u uc c
   both the entrant’s profits and social welfare are 
maximized when the entrant chooses to make the upstream input itself. Hence, 
the maximization of social welfare is in line with the entrant’s efficient make-or-
buy decision. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: The efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant 
is always socially optimal.  
 
Proposition 3 presents another very significant finding: although access price 
regulation neither affects the efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the 
entrant nor the social welfare, the regulator always succeeds in fulfilling the 
maximization of social welfare. When u uc c
   the entrant chooses to make the 
upstream input and as a result it invests in alternative infrastructure, which is 
socially optimal. In this case, the regulator’s twofold aim is fulfilled and the trade-
off between service-based and facility-based competition disappears. On the 
contrary, when u uc c
   the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent, which is also socially optimal. In this case, the society only enjoys the 
short-run benefits from service-based competition.  
However, from (8) and (10) we infer that when the entrant chooses to buy the 
input, access price regulation affects both the incumbent’s profits and consumer 
surplus. In particular, there is a transfer of money from consumers to incumbent, 
which equals the input price. Hence, the entrant passes on the cost of buying the 
input to consumers. If the regulator’s priority is to maximize consumers’ utility, it 
should set the input price to zero. Alternatively, if the regulator can bind the 
incumbent to invest its extra profits from the upstream market to network facilities, 
it may set the access price to a level equal or below BCS . The latter policy 
induces investments in network infrastructures by the incumbent but does not 
provide incentives for facilities-based competition. The reason is that the 
incumbent’s unit cost of producing the upstream input is expected to decrease 
and as a result the entrant will find it profitable to buy the input from the 
incumbent. Another alternative is that the regulator sets a positive input price that 
allows the incumbent to recover the fixed costs that typically incurs in practice. In 
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each case, the regulator’s priority does not affect social welfare and the entrant’s 
profits, but only consumer surplus and the incumbent’s profits. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The primary objective of this paper was to examine whether input prices are 
irrelevant from regulatory point of view. The ultimate goal of regulators is to 
maximize social welfare and to promote investments in alternative infrastructures 
(especially by entrants, in order to induce facilities-based competition). 
Sappington (2005) uses the Hotelling model to show that input prices are 
irrelevant for an entrant’s decision to make or buy an upstream input required for 
downstream production. Using the same model, we showed that input prices are 
also irrelevant for the maximization of social welfare. By combining Sappington’s 
results with ours, we have concluded that input prices are irrelevant from the 
regulatory point of view. 
Another interesting result was that the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is 
always socially optimal. In other words, the entrant’s efficient decision always 
maximizes social welfare. Therefore, when the entrant prefers to make the 
upstream input itself, both regulatory goals are fulfilled. This result is very 
significant because the regulator succeeds in fulfilling its goals without affecting 
either the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision or the social welfare. However, 
when the entrant prefers to buy the upstream input from the incumbent, the 
regulator’s goal to promote facilities-based competition cannot be fulfilled.  
In addition, we showed that, although input prices are irrelevant for make-or-buy 
decisions and for the maximization of social welfare, it can be used by the 
regulator in order to fulfill other goals, such as the maximization of consumer 
surplus, the promotion of investments by the incumbents and the recovery of the 
fixed cost that the incumbents typically incur in practice.   
The main implication from this article is that regulators should perceive the 
particular model that characterizes the retail competition between the providers in 
order to forecast the impact of access price regulation on providers’ strategies 
and consumers’ utility, which in turn affect the fulfillment of regulators’ goals. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Let 
^
L  Є [0,1] denote the location of the consumer that is indifferent between 
purchasing from the incumbent and the entrant when the entrant chooses to 
make the upstream input. See Sappington (2005) for equations (1) to (3) and the 
equation that gives the location of the indifferent consumer. Consumer surplus is 
given by  
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(A1) 
^
^
1
1 2{ [ ( 0)] [ (1 )] }
L
L
CS N v t L dL v t L dLP P

           
(A2) 
2^2^
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2 1 2
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2 2
LLCS N v L P P P

       
Substituting (1) in (A2) provides: 
(A3)  
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3 18
I I
u u uu
c c c cN v tCS
t
 

 
     
Social welfare is the sum of both providers’ profits and consumer surplus. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
See Sappington (2005) for equations (6) to (9) and the equation that gives the 
location of the indifferent consumer when the entrant chooses to buy the 
upstream input from the incumbent. Substituting (6) in (A2) provides the 
consumer surplus when the entrant chooses to buy the upstream input from the 
incumbent. 
(A4) ( )B N v w tCS     
Social welfare is the sum of both providers’ profits and consumer surplus. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
See Sappington (2005). 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From equations (5) and (11) in the text: 
(A5) M BSW SW  
(A6) 
2
2 )(
[ ] ( )
3 6
I I
u u Iuu
u
c c c cN v N v c
t
  
     
(A7) 
1
)( 2) 0(
3 2
I
u uI
uu
c c
c c
t

 
    
Like Sappington (2005), we assume that both the incumbent and entrant serve 
retail consumers in equilibrium. Hence, 3j iu u tc c   (for ,i j  I, E, i ≠ j ). From (A7) 
we infer that: 
a. if Iu uc c
  , then M BSW SW  
b. if Iu uc c
  , then M BSW SW  
c. if Iu uc c
  , then M BSW SW  
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ABSTRACT 
This article studies the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s 
incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. Thus, 
a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the regulator sets the access price 
after the deployment of the NGA network is used. In particular, it is assumed that 
the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access 
with some probability and gives an access markup, which equals the average 
cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. It is found that when 
the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in 
relation to the impact of investments on demand, the incumbent underinvests 
compared to the socially optimal investment level. On the contrary, when the 
impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal 
investment cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending 
on the probability of incorporating an access markup into the access price.  
 
Keywords: access regulation, dynamic efficiency, investment incentives, 
regulatory uncertainty, social welfare, telecommunications 
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1. Introduction 
The migration from the legacy copper access networks to fibre access networks 
capable of providing high-speed broadband services (hereafter referred to as 
Next Generation Access (NGA) networks1) has induced a growing interest in the 
relationship between access regulation and investment incentives.2 The related 
literature concludes that the regulators’ two fold-goal to foster competition and 
encourage efficient and timely investments in NGA networks is related to the 
common trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. 
In particular, mandated access at cost-based prices reduces the use of monopoly 
power over the access infrastructure by preventing the incumbent from 
foreclosing the entrants from the downstream (retail) market. Cost-based access 
regulation thus leads to sustainable service-based competition within one 
network, and hence, improves static efficiency (Valletti, 2003; Bouckaert, van Dijk 
and Verboven, 2010). However, mandating the access at cost-based prices 
discourages both incumbents and potential entrants to invest in new access 
infrastructures (Jorde, Sidak and Teece, 2000). According to Cave and 
Prosperetti (2001), the reason for this negative relationship between access 
regulation and incumbents’ incentives to invest is that the incumbents anticipate 
that they will be required to offer access to their rivals at cost-based prices. 
Therefore, potential entrants, who can free-ride on the incumbent’s network, will 
wait for the incumbent to invest in new access infrastructures and then seek 
access (Valletti, 2003). The conclusion is that cost-based access regulation, 
which is limited to promote service-based competition, leads to losses in dynamic 
efficiency (Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven, 2010).  
For this reason, the ongoing research on this area is gradually shifting its focus 
from assessing the efficiency implications of cost-oriented access schemes to 
proposing new regulatory approaches that may promote both static and dynamic 
efficiency. This implies that access regulation of NGA services is still considered 
necessary for inducing socially optimal investments. In this context, a first set of 
papers studies the impact of an investment-contingent access price on 
investment incentives and competition. Henriques (2011) and Sauer (2011) show 
that contrary to a fixed access charge, an access fee that is contingent on firms’ 
(non-overlapping) investments can implement the socially efficient investment 
level. This outcome holds either if the access charge depends on the investments 
of both the incumbent and the entrant (former article) or on each operator’s own 
investment level (latter article).  
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) introduce uncertainty about the success of NGA 
investments and focus on an incumbent’s investment incentives in order to study 
the efficiency outcomes of different regulatory regimes. They show that under an 
access price that spreads investment costs over total output quantities (i.e. an 
investment-contingent access scheme), a regime with fully distributed costs or a 
regulatory holiday induce highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and 
forward-looking cost-based regulation. In addition, combining strong competitive 
                                                          
1
 According to EU Commission (2010) NGA networks means wired access networks which consist 
wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of delivering broadband access 
services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those 
provided over already existing copper networks. In most cases NGAs are the result of an upgrade 
of an already existing copper or coaxial access network. 
2
 See Cambini and Jiang (2009) for a recent and comprehensive review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between broadband investment and regulation. 
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intensity with reasonable investment incentives indicates that a risk sharing 
approach induces highest consumer surplus, followed by regimes with fully 
distributed costs, regulatory holiday and forward-looking cost-based regulation. 
Bender (2011) extends the work of Nitsche and Wiethaus by introducing 
horizontal product differentiation and assuming that the entrant may not share the 
investment costs with the incumbent but bears a fixed part of the investment 
costs (i.e. a cooperation regime). The author finds that there is no single regime 
which always yields highest investments as full distribution, as well as, 
cooperation might maximize the investment incentives, whereas the optimal 
regulatory policy is mainly subject to the degree of product differentiation. 
It is important to note that the abovementioned articles, which are based on an 
investment-contingent access price, assume that the regulator can make ex ante 
credible commitments. This implies that the regulator sets the access price prior 
to the investments, and hence, the firms invest under regulatory certainty. 
Although this modeling setup is consistent with the European Commission (EC) 
Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EU Commission, 2010), it is 
socially not optimal for the regulator to make ex ante commitments for an 
unreasonably long regulatory period (WIK, 2009). Therefore, in providing greater 
regulatory certainty the regulator has to make another trade-off between the 
positive effects of greater certainty on investment incentives and possible 
negative effects of erroneous intervention on welfare (OPTA, 2010). 
As a result, a second set of papers studies the impact of access regulation on 
investment incentives under regulatory non-commitment. In this case, it is 
assumed that the regulator cannot make ex ante credible commitments, and 
hence, the firms invest prior to the regulation of the access. Foros (2004) studies 
the impact of cost-based access regulation on an incumbent’s incentives to invest 
in network upgrade in the presence of spillover effects. It is found that when the 
incumbent is much more efficient in providing value-added services than the 
entrant, then the incumbent can foreclose the entrant from the market by 
overinvesting in quality. In addition, Kotakorpi (2006) points out that, under cost-
based regulation, the incumbent underinvests in relation to the socially optimal 
level. Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) allow an enlarged range of spillovers in order to 
examine the impact of regulatory non-commitment on the properties of a welfare 
maximizing access charge. They find that when the degree of spillover is small 
and the incumbent’s investment cost is high (respectively, low), the incumbent 
has an incentive to utilize regulatory non-commitment to induce a high 
(respectively, low) access charge by overinvesting (respectively, underinvesting) 
in infrastructure.  
Contrary to the three previous articles that use a fixed access charge, Klumpp 
and Su (2010) assume an investment-contingent access price which is revenue-
neutral. This implies that each downstream firm contributes to the depreciation of 
the investment costs according to its market share. They show that, under this 
rule, the incumbent chooses a higher investment level compared to that of a 
monopolist and its investment incentives increases with the number of 
downstream competitors. Thus, they argue that a policy of revenue-neutral open 
access can increase both static and dynamic efficiency. Sarmento and Brandao 
(2007) compare the investment and competition outcomes of an access price 
which equals the marginal cost of providing the access plus the average cost of 
the investments with those derived by the retail-minus regulation and the 
deregulation of the access price. They conclude that retail-minus regulation leads 
to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and 
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consumer surplus as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus 
instrument. 
Last, Cambini and Silvestri (2012) also study the impact of regulatory non-
commitment on the incumbent’s investment incentives, but their research focuses 
on the timing of the investments rather than on the extent of NGA deployment. 
For this reason, they use a dynamic setting with demand uncertainty in order to 
compare the efficiency outcomes of three different regulatory regimes: full 
regulation (the NGA network is regulated), partial regulation (the NGA network is 
unregulated) and risk sharing (fixed investment costs are shared but there are no 
side payments between firms for the use of the NGA). They conclude that the 
investment is always undertaken later than in the social optimum in all regulatory 
regimes.  
It can be thus concluded that the related literature provides useful results 
concerning the effectiveness of particular access pricing schemes and certain 
regulatory regimes on promoting both static and dynamic efficiency. However, the 
articles that examine the relationship between access regulation and investment 
incentives under regulatory non-commitment take the regulator’s decision as 
given. As a result, they fail to take into account the fact that there is uncertainty 
about the access pricing formula once the investments are in place. In particular, 
some articles (Foros, 2004; Kotakorpi, 2006; Mizuno and Yoshino, 2012) assume 
that the firms anticipate that the regulator will set the welfare maximizing access 
price, whereas others (Klumpp and Su, 2010; Sarmento and Brandao, 2007) 
assume that the investment-contingent access price is ex ante known. Therefore, 
the difference in the results of the commitment and the non-commitment models 
is mainly driven by the sequential timing of the games rather than by the 
regulatory uncertainty of the non-commitment games. 
On the contrary, this paper takes into account the regulator’s incentives to deviate 
from an investment-contingent access pricing rule (which implies that the 
regulator compensates the incumbent for the investment risks) by setting the 
social welfare maximizing access price once the investments are in place. In 
particular, it is assumed that the regulator may implement the access rule 
proposed by Sarmento and Brandao (2007) or set the welfare maximizing access 
price. This implies that when the incumbent invests prior to the regulation of the 
access, there is an uncertainty about the level of the access charge. The aim of 
this paper is to model such regulatory uncertainty and to study its impact on an 
incumbent’s investment incentives and on the subsequent welfare outcomes.  
It is found that when the probability of compensating the incumbent for the 
investment risks increases, the incumbent’s investment incentives increase and 
the socially optimal investment level decreases. In addition, the critical value of 
such probability that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal 
(efficient) investments is decreasing in the slope of the marginal investment cost 
function and increasing in the effect of the investments on demand. Thus, when 
the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in 
relation to the positive impact of investments on demand, the incumbent always 
underinvests compared to the socially optimal investments. On the contrary, 
when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the 
marginal investment cost function, the incumbent overinvests for high probability 
of setting the access pricing rule of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) and 
underinvests for low probability values.  
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It is thus obvious that the effectiveness of access price regulation on promoting 
both static and dynamic efficiency (i.e. inducing the socially optimal investments 
in NGA networks) does not only depend on the underlying demand and cost 
structure (as the related literature concludes), but is also dependent on the 
expected probability of deviating from a particular investment-contingent access 
pricing rule.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the 
basic assumptions and definitions of the model. Section 3 provides the 
equilibrium of the game when the regulatory uncertainty is taken into account. 
Section 4 compares the privately and the socially optimal investment levels 
derived in section 3 in order to draw regulatory implications. The last section 
summarizes the key findings of this article. 
 
2. The model 
This section presents a simple model used in order to assess the impact of 
regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially 
optimal investments in new access infrastructures. In particular, the model used 
in this paper is quite similar to that of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) in terms of 
demand and cost structure, as well as, the timing of the game.  
 
2.1. Demand side 
The retail (downstream) market is characterized as an unregulated duopoly 
market in which the incumbent (the subsidiary firm of the upstream monopolist) 
and the entrant (the independent firm) choose quantities simultaneously and 
independently (i.e. firms compete á la Cournot).  It is further assumed that since 
the prospective investors in NGA networks are for large part the former 
incumbent operators (OPTA, 2010), the incumbent decides its optimal NGA 
investment level first and then the entrant seeks access to the incumbent’s NGA 
network.3  
The inverse demand function is given by 
1 2
1 ( )p I q q    , where p  is the 
retail market price, 
1
q  and 2q  are the quantities supplied by the incumbent and 
the entrant respectively, I  represents the level of the NGA investments 
undertaken by the incumbent, and   represents the impact of a marginal change 
in the investment level on the retail price (ceteris paribus). It is also assumed that 
0  , which implies that an increase in the NGA investment level leads to an 
outward parallel shift in the demand that benefits both retailers. 
 
 
                                                          
3
  This assumption reflects the EU Commission’s argument that in most cases NGAs are the 
result of an upgrade of an already existing copper access network. The reason is that the former 
incumbent operators usually upgrade their access networks by replacing part of the copper 
networks with optical elements (i.e. FTTC variants). On the contrary, a narrower definition of NGA 
networks (i.e. FTTH/B) may reflect the fact that alternative operators seem to dominate such 
network deployment. However, the results of this paper do not change qualitatively if we assume 
that the entrant decides its optimal NGA investment level first and then the incumbent seeks 
access to the entrant’s NGA network.   
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2.2. Supply side 
The NGA deployment is continuous where a larger I  reflects a fibre deployment 
closer to the consumers’ premises. The incumbent faces a quadratic NGA 
investment cost function with respect to I , given by 2( ) / 2C I I , with 0  . 
The cost parameter   represents the slope of the marginal investment cost 
function, and hence, as   increases the total investment costs increase as well 
(for a given investment level). For this reason, the term “investment cost 
parameter” refers to  , whereas the term “investment costs” refers to the total 
cost of NGA investments denoted by ( )C I . The convex form of the NGA 
investment cost function reflects the fact that fibre deployment becomes 
marginally more expensive as it is being laid down towards consumers’ premises. 
It is further assumed that the NGA investment level does not have any impact on 
the (fixed) marginal cost of providing the access denoted by c , ( 1c  ). In 
addition, the production of one unit of the retail service requires one unit of the 
upstream input (fixed coefficients technology). 
The access price that the entrant should pay to the incumbent in order to have 
access to the incumbent’s NGA network is denoted by w , assuming w c . The 
regulator defines the access price as the marginal cost of providing the access 
( c ) plus a fraction k  of the total investment costs, that is ( ) w c kC I , with 1k . 
If 0k , the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the 
access, whereas if (0,1)k , the regulator (partially or fully) compensates the 
investor for the uncertainty of NGA investments. 
Last, the quality of the input sold by the monopolist is the same whether it is sold 
to the incumbent or to the entrant. In addition, the cost of all other inputs is equal 
for both retailers and normalized to zero.  
 
2.3. Timing of the game 
This paper falls into the literature which assumes that the regulator cannot make 
ex ante credible commitments on its future interventions, and hence, the 
incumbents decide their optimal investment level prior to the regulation of the 
access. Therefore, the timing of the game is as follows: 
 Firstly, the incumbent decides the investment level I  that maximizes its 
profits. 
 Secondly, the regulator chooses an access price w  that may incorporate a 
risk premium reflecting the uncertainty of NGA investments, i.e [0,1)k . 
 Finally, the retail price and outputs of the firms are defined by Cournot 
competition between downstream firms. 
According to Sarmento and Brandao (2007), the regulator sets the access price 
equal to the marginal cost of providing the access plus the average cost of the 
investments. Therefore, (1/ )k I  and ( / 2) w c I . This definition of the access 
price implies that the average cost of the investments can be seen as an access 
markup that fully compensates the investor for the uncertainty of NGA 
investments. However, Cave and Prosperetti (2001), as well as, Foros (2004) 
argue that the regulator is expected to set the access price at the marginal cost of 
providing the access (i.e. 0k ) in order to maximize social welfare as soon as 
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the incumbent invests in NGA network.4 In this paper, it is assumed that the 
incumbent anticipates that (1/ )k I  with probability   and 0k  with probability 
(1 ) , where [0,1] .5 In the former case, the regulator fully compensates 
(“FC”) the incumbent for the investment risks; and in the latter case, the regulator 
sets the social welfare maximizing access price, which implies that the regulator 
does not compensate (“NC”) the incumbent for the uncertainty of NGA 
investments.  
The profit functions of the incumbent (firm 1) and the entrant (firm 2) are given, 
respectively, by: 
2
1 1 2
( ) ( ) / 2p c w cq q I                   (1) 
2 2
( )p w q                  (2) 
Therefore, when ( / 2) w c I , the two firms make the following profits (gross of 
investment costs): 
1 1 2
[( ) ( / 2) ]
FC FC FCFC c Ip q q                   (3) 
2 2
[( / 2) ]
FC FCFC c Ip q                  (4) 
whereas, when w c  the respective profit functions are (gross of investment 
costs): 
1 1
[( ) ](1 )
NC NCNC cp q                   (5) 
2 2
[( ) ](1 )
NC NCNC cp q                  (6) 
It is obvious that total profits of the incumbent and the entrant are given, 
respectively, by: 
1
2
1 1 / 2
FC NC
I                    (7) 
2 2 2
FC NC                    (8) 
 
3. Equilibrium of the game 
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the 
incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA networks and to draw regulatory 
implications from the comparison between the NGA investment level chosen by 
the incumbent (i.e. the privately optimal level) and the respective level of NGA 
investments that maximizes social welfare (i.e. the socially optimal level).  
The backward induction technique is used to find the equilibrium of the whole 
game. Therefore, the analysis begins with the computation of the retail price and 
the output of the firms as a function of the investment level and the access price. 
Then, the regulator chooses an access price w  that may incorporate a risk 
premium reflecting the uncertainty of NGA investments. In particular, the access 
price is ( / 2) w c I  with probability   or w c  with probability (1 ) . Hence, 
                                                          
4
  Indeed, it is shown in Appendix A1 that social welfare is maximized for 0k  . However since it 
is generally assumed that w c , the access price that maximizes social welfare is w c . 
5
 This is the typical way that the related literature handles the imperfect commitment to access 
price. For a particular example, see Vareda (2010). 
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the profits functions of both retailers are derived as a function of the investment 
level and the probability  . Taking into account the derived results, the privately 
and socially optimal investment levels are obtained as a function of  .  
 
3.1. Retail competition 
Substituting 
1 2
1 ( )p I q q     in Eqs. (1) and (2), and taking the first order 
condition with respect to 
1
q  and 2q , respectively, gives the reaction function of 
each firm to the quantity supplied by the other. Solving simultaneously the 
reaction functions for both operators yields the output of the firms and the 
subsequent retail price: 
1 (1 2 ) / 3q I w c                   (9) 
2 (1 2 ) / 3q I w c                 (10) 
(1 ) / 3p I w c                 (11) 
 
3.2. Access price regulation 
In this stage the regulator sets the price that the entrant should pay to the 
incumbent in order to have access to the NGA network. In particular, the 
regulator may compensate the incumbent for the NGA investment risks or set the 
access price equal to the marginal cost of providing the access in order to 
maximize social welfare. Substituting ( / 2) w c I  in Eqs. (9)-(11) gives the 
output of the firms and the subsequent retail price when the access price includes 
a markup equal to the average cost of the investments. Hence: 
1
(1 / 2) / 3
FC
I c Iq                   (12) 
2
(1 ) / 3
FC
I c Iq                   (13) 
(1 2 / 2) / 3
FC
I c Ip                  (14) 
On the contrary, when the regulator does not compensate the incumbent for the 
investment risks, the output of the firms and the subsequent retail price are 
derived by substituting w c  in Eqs. (9)-(11). Hence: 
1
(1 ) / 3  
NC
I cq               (15) 
2
(1 ) / 3  
NC
I cq               (16) 
(1 2 ) / 3
NC
I cp                 (17) 
Given that the total output in the compensation case is given by  1 2FC FCFCQ q q   
and in the non-compensation case by  1 2NC NCNCQ q q  , the levels of total output 
(Q ), consumer surplus (CS), each provider’s profits, and social welfare (SW) are 
as follows: 
(1 ) (2 2 2 / 2) / 3FC NCQ Q Q I c I                   (18) 
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   
2 2
2 2 2
(1 ) / 2
(1 )(16 16 32 8 ) (16 8 ) / 72
FC NCCS Q Q
CS c c I I I
    
  
         
 
    
       (19) 
1
2 2 2 2[(1 )(4 4 8 10 ) 2 (5 9) (4 5 )] / 36              c c I I I I        (20) 
2
2 2 2[(1 )(1 2 2 ) ( 2 ] / 9c c I I I                      (21) 
1 2
2 2 2(1 )(32 32 64 4 ) (32 4 36 ) / 72
   
          
SW CS
SW c c I I I
 
     
      (22) 
 
3.3. Privately optimal investments 
Taking the first order condition of Eq. (20) with respect to I , gives the NGA 
investment level that maximizes the incumbent’s (private) profits: 
2 2* (1 )(4 5 ) / (18 5 10 )4I c                     (23) 
It is obvious that, as long as 
2 2
18 5 10 04    X     , the incumbent's 
profit is a concave function of I , and hence, there exists a unique equilibrium in 
which the incumbent chooses a positive NGA investment level. In addition, taking 
the first derivative of Eq. (23) with respect to   yields: 
* 2 2/ 10 (1 )(9 2 2 ) / ( ) 0I c X                     (24) 
From Eq. (24) it can be deduced that as    increases, the incumbent chooses a 
higher NGA investment level. In other words, a higher certainty about the 
compensation of the incumbent leads to a higher NGA deployment. In addition, 
the level of social welfare that corresponds to the privately optimal investments is 
derived by substituting *I  into Eq. (22). Therefore: 
* 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) (100 125 880 1720 800
1260 16 7488 5760 576 10368 ) / (72 )
     
     
SW c
X
           
       
      (25) 
Although this section pointed out the significance of the regulatory uncertainty on 
the incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA networks, a more elaborate analysis 
is needed in order to examine such relationship from a social perspective.  
 
3.4. Socially optimal investments 
The socially optimal investment level is derived by taking the first order condition 
of Eq. (22) with respect to I . Hence, the NGA investment level that maximizes 
social welfare is given by: 
2 2** (1 )(32 2 ) / (36 4 )32     I c                (26) 
Equation (26) states that the NGA investment level that maximizes social welfare 
is positive as long as: (i) the investment cost parameter,  , is not extremely high 
in relation to the impact of investments on demand (i.e. 16 /   ); and (ii) 
social welfare is a concave function of I (i.e. 
2 2
36 4 032    Y     ). A 
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necessary and sufficient condition which ensures that X  and Y  are both positive 
is  L  , where  2 222 8 18 81 2 18 /L            .6  
 
Remark 1. Assuming that the investment cost parameter is higher than the 
critical value L  ensures that the privately and the socially optimal investment 
levels are both positive as long as the investment cost parameter is not extremely 
high in relation to the impact of investments on demand. 
 
Remark 1 implies that the higher the impact of the investments on demand, the 
higher the investment cost parameter should be in order to ensure that the 
incumbent will choose a positive NGA investment level that maximizes either its 
profits or social welfare. Therefore, given that the investment cost parameter is 
not extremely high in relation to the impact of investments on demand (i.e. 
16 /   ),  the assumption L   ensures that , 0X Y . 
Furthermore, taking the first derivative of Eq. (26) with respect to   yields: 
** 2 2/ 8 ( 1)(9 8 4 ) / ( ) 0I c Y                     (27) 
From Eq. (27) it can be deduced that there is a negative relationship between   
and **I  since 1c  . This implies that the socially optimal investment level 
increases with an increase in the probability of setting the access price equal to 
the marginal cost of providing the access. Therefore, a marginal increase in   
positively affects the private investment incentives and negatively affects the 
socially optimal investments. This is an expected result since the incumbent’s 
profits increase with an increase in the access price, whereas social welfare 
increases with a decrease in the access price.  
However, for any given value of  , the level of social welfare that corresponds to 
the socially optimal investments reflects the maximum social welfare outcome. 
This level is derived by substituting **I  into Eq. (22): 
** 2 2(1 ) (288 8 ) / (18 )   SW c Y               (28) 
Since the aim of this paper is to study the impact of the regulatory uncertainty on 
an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA 
networks, the next section derives the value of    that results in the same 
privately and socially optimal investment level. 
 
4. Comparison of privately and socially optimal investments 
This section assesses the value of    that makes the incumbent undertake the 
socially optimal investments in NGA networks. The comparison of *I  and **I  
shows that: 
** * 3 (1 ) / ( )  I I Z c XY              (29) 
                                                          
6
 The proof is given in Appendix A2. 
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where 2 2 2144 52 72 5 56    Z                 (30) 
Given that , 0X Y   and 1c  , it can be concluded that when 0Z  , the 
incumbent undertakes the socially optimal investments in NGA networks, 
whereas when 0Z   (respectively, 0Z  ) the incumbent underinvests 
(respectively, overinvests) compared to the socially optimal investment level.  
In addition, the comparison of *SW  and **SW  shows that: 
** * 2 2[ (1 )] / (72 )SW SW Z c X Y              (31) 
From Eq. (31) it can be inferred that the society is always better off when the 
incumbent undertakes the socially optimal investment level rather than the 
respective level that maximizes its profits, with the exception of 0Z  . In the latter 
case, the incumbent undertakes the socially optimal investments, and hence, the 
derived social welfare level reaches the maximum welfare outcome. It can be thus 
deduced that the incumbent’s choice to deviate from the socially optimal 
investment level results in welfare losses which reflects the standard trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency.  
Solving Eq. (30) with respect to   derives the value of the probability of including 
a markup into the access price that tackles this efficiency trade-off. In other words, 
the value of    which leads to ** *I I  and ** *SW SW  (or equivalently to 0Z  ) 
is given by: 
2
2
4 3 2 2 2 2 2
26 36 28
/ (5 )
2 196 364 169 504 288 324
   
  
      
  
 
        
        (32) 
Let   denotes the positive value of    that induces the incumbent to undertake 
the socially optimal investments.7 Therefore: 
2
2
4 3 2 2 2 2 2
26 36 28
/ (5 )
2 196 364 169 504 288 324
   
  
      
  
 
        
        (33) 
It can be thus deduced that, when    (respectively,   ), the value of Z  is 
negative (respectively, positive), and hence, the NGA investment level chosen by 
the incumbent is higher (respectively, lower) than the socially optimal one. This 
implies that any deviation from the socially optimal investments leads to welfare 
losses (i.e. ** *SW SW  for   ). The derived value of   is significantly affected 
by the impact of the investments on demand and the investment cost parameter. 
In particular, the value of   is positively affected by an increase in   and 
negatively affected by an increase in   (ceteris paribus).8 This implies that, for a 
given investment cost parameter, higher consumers’ valuation for the NGA 
services results in higher  , which in turn leads to higher efficient investment 
levels. In other words, higher values of  , make the investments more socially 
desirable, and hence, the socially optimal investment level is achieved for a 
                                                          
7
  This result is numerically proven in Appendix B. In particular, the positive (respectively, 
negative) value of   is decreasing (respectively, increasing) function of  . However, there is 
always one positive and one negative value of   since they both tend to zero as   tends to 
infinity.   
8
  The proof is given in Appendix A3. 
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higher probability of compensating the incumbent for the investment risks. This 
result positively affects the incumbent’s investment incentives, and hence, the 
achieved efficient investment level increases as well.  
On the contrary, for a given positive impact of the investments on demand, a 
steeper slope of the marginal investment cost function leads to lower values of 
 . This implies that as the NGA investments become marginally more expensive, 
the society is better off by a lower NGA deployment which is achieved by a higher 
probability of setting the access price at the marginal cost of providing the 
access. Therefore, the efficient NGA investment level is achieved for lower values 
of  .  
Figure 1 graphically presents the results of the above analysis concerning the 
impact of   and   on  . In particular, it presents the results of the numerical 
simulations used in order to derive the values of   for different combinations of 
  and   given that ( ) L   .
9  
 
Fig. 1. The relationship between   and   
Figure 1 graphically verifies the positive relationship between   and  , as well 
as, the negative relationship between   and  . In addition, it is obvious that there 
are some combinations of   and   which leads to 1 . This implies that for 
every value of   there is at least one value of   that makes 1 . Solving 1  
with respect to   yields: 
 226 36 6 11 32 36 / 5                    (34) 
                                                          
9
  Figure 1 is a graphical representation of Tables B1-B3 of Appendix B. 
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Let   denote the highest value of    that makes the privately and the socially 
optimal investment levels coincide when 1 .10 Therefore: 
 226 36 6 11 32 36 / 5                    (35) 
From Eq. (35) it can be deduced that as long as   , the value of    that 
makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments is higher than 1. 
In other words, when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not 
particularly steep in relation to the impact of NGA investments on consumers’ 
willingness to pay, then regulatory certainty about the incorporation of an access 
markup into the access price (i.e. 1 ) is not adequate to achieve the efficient 
investment outcome. This implies that the incumbent always underinvests 
compared to the socially optimal investment level since [0,1]   . In this case, 
a higher access markup which leads to 1  seems to be socially desirable. This 
implies that the combination of a low investment cost parameter and a high 
impact of investments on demand makes the investments more attractive from a 
social perspective. Thus, the optimal regulatory policy is to provide the incumbent 
with significant investment incentives. 
In addition, the critical value  , which makes the incumbent undertake the 
socially optimal investments when 1 , increases with an increasing rate as   
increases as well.11 This implies that as   increases, the investment cost 
parameter should be significantly higher in order to ensure that 1 . If the 
investment cost parameter is higher than the critical value of   given by Eq. (35), 
then the value of    that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal 
investments is lower than 1. In other words, when the investment cost parameter 
is relatively high compared to the impact of the investments on demand, the 
incumbent undertakes the socially optimal investments for a particular (0,1) . 
Therefore, the following proposition can be stated: 
 
Proposition 1. As long as the investment cost parameter is high in relation to the 
impact of the investments on demand, there is a positive critical value of  , 
denoted by (0,1) , that induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal 
investments. When    (respectively,   ), the incumbent underinvests 
(respectively, overinvests) compared to the socially optimal investments, and 
hence, there are welfare losses. 
 
From proposition 1, it can be deduced that the uncertainty about future regulatory 
intervention significantly affects the incumbent’s expectations, and hence, its 
decision to undertake the socially efficient investments. Moreover, when the value 
of   is close to 0, the regulator has significant incentives to set the access price 
at the marginal cost of providing the access. On the contrary, when the value of 
  is close to 1, an investment-contingent access price which includes a lower 
                                                          
10
  Table B5 (see Appendix B) provides the values of   for different values of  . The discussion 
following Table B5 proves that: (i) the value of   given by Eq. (35) is the highest one; and (ii) the 
rejected value of   does not affect the final outcomes.  
11
  The proof is given in Appendix A4. 
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markup than the average cost of the investments and leads to 1  seems to be 
socially desirable.  
As it has been already stated above, the derived value of   is significantly 
affected by the particular value of the parameters   and  . Figure 2 presents a 
representative example of the cases in which the difference between   and   is 
relatively high (i.e. results in 1  ) since they illustrate the relationship between 
*I  and **I , as well as, *SW  and **SW when 1  and 6  (i.e. results in 
0.530 ). 
 
Fig. 2. The privately and socially optimal investment levels as a function of   ( 1 , 6 , 0.5c ) 
Figure 2 numerically verifies the results of Eqs. (24) and (27) which state than an 
increase in   positively affects the privately investment incentives and negatively 
affects the socially optimal investments. In addition, it shows that the privately 
and the socially optimal NGA investment levels coincide for 0.530 1   . This is 
due to the fact that the investment cost parameter is high in relation to the impact 
of the investments on demand since 6 2.648    . Therefore, when   , 
Eq. (30) yields 0Z , and hence, ** *I I . On the contrary, when    
(respectively,   ), the incumbent underinvests (respectively, overinvests) 
compared to the socially optimal investment level. The resulting social welfare 
levels are presented in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. The subsequent social welfare levels as a function of   ( 1 , 6 , 0.5c ) 
Figure 3 shows that there is a unique positive value of    which leads the social 
welfare levels derived by the privately and the socially optimal investment choices 
to coincide (i.e. ** *SW SW ). In this numerical example, Eq. (31) holds for 
0.530   which implies that the value of   that makes the incumbent undertake 
the socially optimal investments equals the respective value of   that makes the 
social welfare levels derived by the privately and the socially optimal investment 
choices coincide. Therefore, the incumbent not only undertakes the socially 
optimal investments, but also maximizes the potential social welfare outcome 
since ** *I I  and ** *SW SW . In all other cases ** *SW SW , which means that 
the optimal social welfare outcome cannot be achieved with the incumbent’s profit 
maximizing investment level.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to study the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an 
incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA 
networks. For this reason, a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the 
incumbent invests prior to the regulation of the access was used. The related 
literature discusses the effectiveness of two different regulatory approaches on 
the regulator’s goal to achieve the socially efficient investment level. The first 
approach supports that the regulator sets a particular investment-contingent 
access price, which compensates the incumbent for the investment risks, in order 
to provide significant investment incentives. On the contrary, the second 
approach argues that the regulator deviates from such ex ante known access 
price (once the investments are in place) by setting the access price at the 
marginal cost of providing the access (i.e. setting the social welfare maximizing 
access price).   
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is that it modeled the 
more realistic case in which the regulator sets the access price at the marginal 
cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup, 
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which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary 
probability. Therefore, it is uncertain which of the two assumptions made in the 
related literature will prevail when the new access infrastructures are in place. 
It is found that when the investment cost parameter ( ) is not high (which implies 
that the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep) in 
relation to the impact of investments on demand (  ), the incumbent underinvests 
compared to the socially optimal investment level. The reason is that the critical 
value of the probability of including an access markup into the access price ( ), 
which leads the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments, is 
decreasing in   and increasing in  . As a result, 1  . This implies that the 
socially desirable outcome cannot be achieved even if the regulator commits to 
an access price scheme that includes an access markup equal to the average 
cost of the investments. In this case, a higher access markup which leads to 1  
seems to be socially desirable. 
On the contrary, when the investment cost parameter is high and the impact of 
investments on demand is relatively low, the incumbent may overinvest or 
underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating the average cost of the 
investments into the access price. In this case, 1  . In particular, when    
(respectively,   ), the incumbent underinvests (respectively, overinvests) 
compared to the socially optimal investment, and hence, there are welfare losses. 
This implies that regulatory uncertainty significantly affects the incumbent’s 
incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. 
However, it is acknowledged that significant future research is needed. For 
example, the derived results may change if we take into account the fact that the 
migration from copper access networks to NGA networks is a slow process 
(Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012). This implies that during the migration 
phase both the legacy copper access networks and the NGA networks are in 
operation and are competing for customers. Therefore, the impact of the 
regulation of the legacy copper networks on the uncertainty about the regulation 
of the NGA networks should be modeled in order to assess the investment and 
competition outcomes.12  
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  See Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012), Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010, 2012) and Inderst 
and Peitz (2012) for the impact of the regulation of the legacy network on the firms’ investment 
incentives when the NGA market is left unregulated or when there is an interplay between the 
access prices of the two networks. 
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Appendix A 
A1. Proof that social welfare is maximized for k<0. 
Substituting Eqs. (9)-(11) into (1) and (2) gives the profit functions of the 
incumbent and the entrant, respectively, under Cournot competition: 
1
2 2[2 2 (2 7 5 ) 2 14 10 (1 ) 9 ] /18I I c w c c w c w I                (A1) 
2
2(1 2 ) / 9I w c             (A2) 
Consumer surplus is given by: 
1 2
2 2( ) / 2 (2 2 ) /18CS I c wq q             (A3) 
whereas social welfare (SW) is the unweighted sum of industry profits and 
consumer surplus (i.e. 1 2SW CS    ): 
2 2 2 2 2(8 8 14 2 16 5 4 14 2 9 ) /18SW I cI wI I c cw c w w I                (A4) 
Now assume that the regulator sets an access price equal to the marginal cost of 
providing the access ( c ) plus a fraction k  of the total investment costs, that is 
( ) w c kC I , with 1k . Substituting this access price in Eq. (A4) and taking the 
first order condition with respect to k  gives:  
2 2/ 0 (2 2 2 ) / 36 0SW k I I c k I              
* 22(1 ) /k I c I             (A5) 
It is obvious that * 0k   since 1c  . This implies that the optimal access price is 
lower than the marginal cost of providing the access. Considering this optimal 
value of k , the access price is given by 2 1w c I   . Therefore, the retail price 
equals the marginal cost of providing the access ( p c ), the incumbent is not 
active in the market ( 1 0q  ) and the entrant produces the whole output 
( 2 1q I c   ). Since the incumbent’s profits are negative, which are offset by 
the positive profits of the entrant, the optimal investment policy for the incumbent 
is to avoid any NGA deployment (i.e. 0I   given that 0I  ).  
However, it should be noted that since it is assumed that w c , the regulator 
maximizes social welfare by setting * 0k  , or equivalently, w c . 
 
A2. Proof that L   is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that 
, 0X Y . 
Recall that 
2 2
18 5 104X         and 
2 2
36 4 32Y        . 
Therefore, X Y  when: 
   2 221 9 7 49 112 126 81 / 4                          (A6) 
or 
   2 222 9 7 49 112 126 81 / 4                          (A7) 
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In particular, Y X when 1 2     and X Y when 1   or 2  . In the 
former case (Y X ), X  and Y  are both positive if 0X  . This implies that   
should be higher than the positive root of 0X   with respect to   which is given 
by: 
   2 223 5 9 25 20 90 81 / 5                          (A8) 
However, note that the difference 1 3   is always positive for 0  . This implies 
that 1 3  , and hence, 3   since 1 2    . As a result , 0X Y  . 
On the contrary, X Y when 1   or 2  . In this case, X  and Y  are both 
positive if 0Y  . This implies that   should be higher than the positive root of 
0Y   with respect to   which is given by: 
 2 224 2 8 18 81 2 18 /                                     (A9) 
It should be also noted that the difference 1 4   is always positive for 0  . 
This implies that 4 1  . Therefore, the condition which ensures that 0Y   is 
4  .  
In conclusion, 4 L    , which implies that the investment cost parameter is 
higher than a critical value of   denoted by L , is a necessary and sufficient 
condition which ensures that , 0X Y  .  
 
A3. The impact of   and    on  . 
Taking the first order condition of   with respect to   gives: 
 2 2/ 0 13 36 169 576 1296 / 27                         (A10) 
Therefore, as long as    , there is a positive relationship between   and  . 
Substituting   into   and then the derived value of   into L , gives the lower 
value of   which ensures that , 0X Y  . It is proven that L  , and hence 
/ 0     since L  . The numerical simulations presented in Appendix B and 
graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 verify the positive relationship between   and  .   
In addition, taking the first order derivative of   with respect to   gives: 
 
2 3 22
3
4 22 2
18 288 756 546 28
/ 5
394 324 169 13
     
 
     
       
 
     
         (A11) 
where 
4 3 2 22 2 2194 364 169 504 288 324              . The numerical 
simulations presented in Appendix B and graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 show that 
there is a negative relationship between   and   (i.e. / 0    ).  
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A4. The relationship between   and  .  
Taking the first order derivative of   with respect to   provides: 
2
2
33 48 13 11 32 36
5 11 32 36
    
 
    
 
 
                    (A12) 
It is easy to prove (i.e. using excel solver) that Eq. (A12) is minimized for 0 . 
Therefore, for 0 , there is a positive relationship between   and  . In 
addition, taking the second order derivative of   with respect to   provides: 
 
2
32
2 2
168
11 32 36



 



                            (A13) 
It is obvious that the second order derivative of   with respect to   is positive 
since 
2
11 32 36 0    due to Eq. (A12). Therefore, the critical value  , which 
makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments when 1 , 
increases with an increasing rate as   increases as well. 
 
Appendix B 
This section uses numerical simulations in order to assess the impact of 
regulatory uncertainty on the incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially 
optimal investment level. In particular, the positive value of   , denoted  by  , 
that induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments (i.e. 
results in 0Z ) is derived for many combinations of   and   under the 
assumptions that: (i) 16 /   , which implies that the investment cost 
parameter is not extremely high in relation to the impact of investments on 
demand; and (ii) ( )L   , which ensures that 
*( ) 0I    and **( ) 0I   .  
In addition, the analysis is limited to the cases in which 2   in order to ensure 
that the entrant is always active in the retail market. In particular, substituting *I  
into Eq. (13) gives 
2
(1 )(18 4 5 ) / (3 )
FC
c Xq       . This implies that when the 
regulator compensates the incumbent for the investment risks, the entrant is 
active in the market when (18 4 5 ) 0    . Obviously, 
2
0
FC
q   if 
(18 4 ) / (5 )    . However, 
2
FC
q  decreases with an increase in  . Therefore, if 
2
0
FC
q   when 1  , then 2 0
FC
q   for [0,1] . The condition which ensures that 
2
0
FC
q   when 1   is 2  . Therefore, although a necessary and sufficient 
condition to ensure that 
2
0
FC
q   is (18 4 5 ) 0    , the condition 2   can be 
used for simplicity without affecting the final results.  
Tables B1-B3 provide the positive and the negative values of   , which are 
denoted respectively by   and 2 , and lead the incumbent to undertake the 
socially optimal investments. The derive results corresponds to the cases in 
which the investment cost parameter takes positive integral values between 1 
and 10, whereas the impact of investment on demand is 0.5  , 1   or 1.5  . 
It is found that regardless of the particular value of  ,   is always positive and 
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2  is always negative. In addition,   is positively correlated with   and 
negatively correlated with  . These results numerically verify the respective 
results of Appendix A3. Moreover, an increase in   leads   to decrease and 2  
to increase. Simulations show that when   tends to infinity, then 2 0   . This 
implies that there is always one positive and one negative value of  . Thus, the 
whole analysis is based on the positive value of   , denoted  by  , which 
induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments. Tables B1-
B3 also show the value of  , denoted by ( )L  , which ensure that when   , 
the privately and the socially optimal investment levels are both positive. The 
derived levels of investments and social welfare are also provided for ( )L   .   
Table B1 ( 0.5  , 0.5c ) 
    2 0   ( ) L  
*
**
( )
( )
I
I



 
*
**
( )
( )
SW
SW



 
1 1.099 -13.099 0.208 0.220 0.132 
2 0.609 -5.909 0.214 0.098 0.120 
3 0.421 -3.799 0.217 0.063 0.117 
4 0.322 -2.797 0.218 0.047 0.115 
5 0.260 -2.212 0.219 0.037 0.115 
6 0.219 -1.830 0.219 0.031 0.114 
7 0.188 -1.560 0.220 0.026 0.114 
8 0.166 -1.359 0.220 0.023 0.113 
9 0.148 -1.209 0.220 0.020 0.113 
10 0.133 -1.081 0.220 0.028 0.113 
Table B2 ( 1  , 0.5c ) 
    2 0   L  
*
**
( )
( )
I
I



 
*
**
( )
( )
SW
SW



 
1 1.704 -16.904 0.726 1.142 0.338 
2 1.200 -6.000 0.767 0.250 0.158 
3 0.916 -3.494 0.792 0.133 0.137 
4 0.738 -2.428 0.809 0.096 0.129 
5 0.618 -1.860 0.821 0.072 0.124 
6 0.530 -1.508 0.830 0.059 0.122 
7 0.465 -1.265 0.837 0.050 0.120 
8 0.417 -1.088 0.842 0.043 0.119 
9 0.372 -0.955 0.846 0.038 0.118 
10 0.339 -0.851 0.850 0.034 0.117 
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Table B3 ( 1.5  , 0.5c ) 
    2 0   L  
*
**
( )
( )
I
I



 
*
**
( )
( )
SW
SW



 
1 1.682 -25.622 1.482 - - 
2 1.500 -7.200 1.523 0.875 0.366 
3 1.298 -3.698 1.571 0.283 0.190 
4 1.125 -2.400 1.616 0.167 0.156 
5 0.985 -1.753 1.654 0.118 0.142 
6 0.874 -1.374 1.686 0.091 0.135 
7 0.783 -1.126 1.713 0.074 0.130 
8 0.709 -0.952 1.736 0.062 0.127 
9 0.647 -0.825 1.755 0.054 0.125 
10 0.595 -0.727 1.772 0.047 0.123 
 
It should be noted that for [0,1]  the optimal investment level is lower than 1. 
This result leads to access prices which are higher than the total investment 
costs, and hence, the condition that 1k  is violated. However, this result is due 
to the normalized demand function used in this paper. It is easy to proof that an 
inverse demand function given (for example) by 
1 2
100 ( )p I q q    , which 
implies that this demand curve intersects the price axis at a significantly higher 
point than 
1 2
1 ( )p I q q    , results in 1k  without affecting the derived 
outcomes concerning the particular values of  . 
Table B4 presents the corresponding results when 2  . In this case the value of 
  should be lower that 1 in order to ensure that 
2
0
FC
q  . It is found that 1  for 
8 . In addition, when 2.5  , 1  for 21.25 . This implies that as   
increases, the level of the investment cost parameter which ensures that 
2
0
FC
q   
increases with an increasing rate. 
 
Table B4 ( 2  , 0.5c ) 
    2 0   L  
*
**
( )
( )
I
I



 
*
**
( )
( )
SW
SW



 
9 0.926 -0.768 2.783 0.070 0.134 
10 0.861 -0.669 2.824 0.060 0.131 
 
Lastly, Table B5 shows the values of   that makes the privately and the socially 
optimal investment levels coincide when 1 .  
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Table B5 ( 0.5c ) 
  0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
  1.124 2.648 4.885 8 11.770 15.894 
2  
-
10.324 
-6.648 -3.685 -1.6 -0.170 
0.906 
 
It is obvious that as long as 2.5  , the highest value of    that makes the 
privately and the socially optimal investment levels coincide when 1  is 
denoted by   since 0  and 2 0 . Therefore, if    (respectively,   ), 
the value of    that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal 
investments is higher (respectively, lower) than 1. However, note that when 
2 , the value of   is equal to the respective value of   that makes 
2
0
FC
q  . 
Therefore,   , and hence, 1 . In addition, when 3 ,   and 2  are both 
positive. However, note that in such cases the value of   should be extremely 
high in order to ensure that 
2
0
FC
q  . For example, when 3 , the investment 
cost parameter which ensure that 
2
0
FC
q   is 48 . Therefore,   should be 
higher than the highest value of   that makes the privately and the socially 
optimal investment levels coincide when 1 . As a result,   , which implies 
that 1 . From the above analysis, it is proven that 2  does not affect the final 
outcomes, and hence, the whole analysis should focus on  . 
Furthermore, Table B5 numerically verifies the results of Appendix A4 concerning 
the relationship between   and  . In particular, the critical value   increases 
with an increasing rate as   increases as well. In addition, Table B5 is in line 
with Fig. 1 since it reveals the values of   that make 1  for different values of 
 . 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares the impact of retail price discrimination and uniform pricing 
on a monopolist’s incentives to extend its Next Generation Access (NGA) network 
deployment to less densely populated geographic areas. It is found that 
geographic price discrimination provides the monopolist with higher incentives to 
deploy a larger NGA network. In addition, geographic price discrimination results 
in better welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as the investment cost is 
not extremely low. In such cases, the regulator should allow the monopolist to 
geographically price discriminate since the monopolist chooses the socially 
optimal pricing regime. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, the number of internet users, as well as, the capacity they 
demand have increased spectacularly. As a result, the increasing transmitted 
volume of data has made the traditional access copper networks incapable of 
providing end-users with the demanded bandwidth. On the contrary, access 
networks based on optical fibre are the only future proof solution capable to 
satisfy the future demand (Shumate, 2008) since the transmission capabilities of 
fibre are theoretically unlimited providing high data rates, low loss and low 
distortion. Such fibre-based access networks are widely known as Next 
Generation Access (NGA) networks. 
Not only technical reasons but also economic ones make the need for 
investments in NGA networks imperative. In particular, it is found that 
investments in broadband infrastructures have an undisputable positive effect on 
economic growth, broadband diffusion and job creation (Czernich et al., 2011; 
ITU, 2012). These results partially interpret why national governments rank 
among their top priorities the encouragement of investments in NGA networks. 
Nevertheless, a number of features of NGA networks make investments 
principally challenging. Demand uncertainty is particularly problematic because of 
the substantial sunk investment cost. In addition, there has been an ongoing 
discussion on the outcomes of potential regulatory intervention, especially with 
regard to its impact on investment and competition outcomes. According to 
several studies (Charalampopoulos et al., 2011; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011), 
permanent or temporary absence of access regulation (regulatory forbearance or 
holidays, respectively) appear superior to other regulatory regimes in terms of 
both NGA investment level and the timing of investments, although they result in 
ambiguous outcomes in terms of social welfare.  
Recently, there has also been a growing discussion supporting regulatory 
forbearance in certain geographic areas as a means of stimulating NGA 
investments (ERG, 2008). This could lead to geographic de-averaging of prices 
that would reflect the geographic variances in market conditions, which may 
significantly differ from traditional PSTN/DSL conditions. Indeed, after a period of 
obligation of non-discrimination (EU, 2002), currently, price discrimination is 
allowed to a certain (at least wholesale) extent related to NGA networks in 
Europe in order to foster innovation and welfare growth by promoting investments 
(EC, 2010). Thus, there may be a case for designing remedies that can vary 
across geographic markets that would be defined as locations with e.g., 
homogeneity in willingness to pay, competitive conditions, cost, etc. Such 
practice is widely known as price discrimination which can be defined as selling 
the same product to different customers at different prices even if the cost of sale 
is the same to each other (Posner, 2001). 
Concerning the prospective consumers’ reaction to the launch of NGA-based 
services, it is expected that there will be a significant variation among consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the additional benefits of such enhanced services. This 
implies that some end-users, which have low willingness to pay, will still buy the 
basic “universal-level” service only, while some others have higher valuation for 
advanced bandwidth-hungry services, and hence, will migrate to the NGA 
networks. The main take-away of the relevant studies (Flamm and Chaudhuri, 
2007; Preston et al., 2007) is that consumers who place a higher (lower) 
valuation to broadband subscription tend to live in higher (lower) densely 
populated areas. Under a geographic price discrimination perspective the 
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operator could exploit such information and be able to price-discriminate in order 
to reflect more closely retail consumers’ willingness to pay (“value-based” pricing) 
and/or geographical differences in network costs. 
Academic research points out that price discrimination increases producer 
surplus while the outcomes on consumer surplus and social welfare are 
heterogeneous. Varian (1985) shows that a necessary condition for price 
discrimination to improve welfare is that output increases. More recent articles 
study the impact of price discrimination not only on welfare outcomes, but also on 
a monopolist’s investment incentives. In particular, these recent articles study the 
impact of price discrimination on the level of investment in quality (Alexandrov 
and Deb, 2012; Valletti, 2006). In both articles the number of the markets that the 
quality-enhanced product will be sold is exogenously defined, whereas the 
investment in quality is endogenously derived. It is found that price discrimination 
results in more investment in quality than uniform pricing, whereas its impact on 
social welfare depends on the specific underlying industry characteristics. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned articles, this paper studies the impact of price 
discrimination on the geographic level of NGA deployment chosen by a 
monopolist. This implies that the quality of an NGA-based service is exogenously 
defined (e.g., FTTH), whereas the number of geographic areas (markets) that this 
service will be provided is endogenously chosen. It is found that that geographic 
price discrimination provides the monopolist with higher incentives to deploy a 
larger NGA network. In addition, geographic price discrimination results in better 
welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as the investment cost is not 
extremely low. The policy implication from these results is that an unregulated 
monopolist will choose the socially optimal pricing regime as long as the 
investment cost is not extremely low.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
compares two pricing regimes, differential and uniform pricing, in terms of 
investment incentives and the subsequent social welfare level. The last section 
summarizes the main results of this article and proposes the directions for future 
work. 
 
2. The model 
Assume a hypothetical country consisting of different geographic areas which can 
be indexed in a decreasing order according to their population density. In 
particular, geographic areas are indexed by i  with [1, ]i n , where low values of i  
imply geographic areas with high population density, whereas geographic areas 
that are indexed by i  close to n  represent rural areas (i.e., with low population 
density). A monopolist provides a basic “universal-level” broadband service (e.g., 
ADSL) to all geographic areas at a uniform price. 
Now assume that the monopolist invests in access network upgrade in order to 
provide a certain ultra-fast NGA-based service to the consumers (i.e., FTTH). The 
monopolist determines the geographic extent of the NGA deployment denoted by 
[1, ]x n . A larger x  reflects a fibre deployment to less densely populated 
geographic areas. The monopolist faces a quadratic NGA investment cost with 
respect to x , given by  
2
( ) / 2c x φx . The parameter > 0φ  represents the slope of 
the marginal investment cost function, and hence, higher values of  φ  imply a 
higher investment cost for a given investment level. The convex form reflects the 
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fact that fibre deployment becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended 
to rural, less densely populated areas. It is further assumed that the NGA 
investment level does not have any impact on the marginal cost of providing the 
NGA-based service. Thus, the unit costs of production and distribution are set to 
zero. 
In addition, the NGA deployment positively affects the willingness to pay of all 
consumers e.g., due to the emerging positive network effects. However, as it has 
already been noted in the introduction section, the consumers who live in more 
densely populated areas place a higher valuation to the additional benefits 
stemming from the NGA-based services than the consumers who live in less 
densely populated areas. In particular, it is assumed that the impact of the NGA 
deployment on the consumers’ willingness to pay is given by x / i
2( ) . Therefore, 
the demand function in each geographic area i  is given by: 
2
i i
A x / iq p                  (1) 
where 
ip  and iq  are the retail market price and the quantity supplied by the 
monopolist, respectively, in each geographic area. The parameter A  represents 
the point at which the inverse demand function, 2
i i
A x / ip q   , intersects the 
vertical (price) axis when no investments have taken place. This implies that A  
represents the maximum valuation that the consumers place to the basic 
“universal-level” service, which affects the overall valuation for this service. As a 
result, the profit function of the monopolist in each geographic area is given by: 
2( )i i iA x / ip p                        (2) 
whereas, the total profits of the monopolist are given by: 
2 2
1
( ) ( / 2)    
x
i i
A x / i di xp p   `           (3) 
A two-stage game is considered. In the first stage, the monopolist determines the 
extent of the NGA deployment, whereas in the second stage, it provides the 
exogenously determined quality of the NGA-based service in the geographic 
areas where the NGA network has been deployed and sets the price(s) according 
to the chosen pricing regime. In particular, there are two possible pricing regimes. 
Under the first pricing regime, the monopolist sets a different retail price to each 
geographic area (differential pricing) which reflects the different impact of the 
NGA deployment on the willingness to pay of the consumers who live in different 
geographic areas. According to the second one, the monopolist sets the same 
retail price (uniform pricing) to all geographic areas. 
 
3. Investment and welfare outcomes 
This section compares the two pricing regimes in terms of investment incentives 
and social welfare. In both cases, the game is solved backwards. This implies 
that in the second stage, the investment cost is sunk and the monopolist sets the 
price(s) of the ultra-fast broadband service for a given level of NGA deployment 
chosen in the first stage. 
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3.1. Differential pricing 
In each geographic area, the monopolist sets the retail price that maximizes its 
profits. Taking the first order condition of (2) with respect to
ip  yields the optimal 
regional retail prices as a function of the investment level x : 
22 2
i
A x
p
i
                 (4) 
Substituting (4) into (1) gives the quantity demanded (number of subscribers) in 
each geographic area: 
22 2
i
A x
q
i
                 (5) 
Therefore, the total profits of the monopolist and the consumer surplus are given, 
respectively, by: 
2 2
22 2
2
1
( 1)(3 6 1) / (12 ) ( / 2)
2 2 2


 
           
 

x
d A x xdi x A x Ax x x x x
i
        (6) 
2
2 2
1
( 1)(3 6 1) / (24 )
2
x
d iqCS di x A x Ax x x x                             (7) 
Taking the first order condition of (6) with respect to x  gives the optimal 
investment level chosen by the monopolist under price discrimination: 
2
23 9
d y yx v
z z v
                    (8) 
where: 
23 6y A A            
                 (9) 
12 2z                (10) 
1
32
3 6 3
1 1
3 2 3 3 2
y y y
v
z z z z z
 
       
           
        
 
                (11) 
This investment level reflects the less densely populated geographic area which 
is passed by NGA network. Substituting (8) into (6) gives the monopolist’s profits 
from all NGA geographic areas passed ( d ), whereas consumer surplus ( dCS ) is 
derived by substituting (8) into (7). Social welfare ( dW ) is the unweighted sum of 
profits and consumer surplus. 
 
3.2. Uniform pricing 
In this pricing regime, the monopolist sets the same price, p , in each geographic 
area. This implies that the demand function in each geographic area i  is 
2
i
A x / i pq    , and hence, the total demand faced by the monopolist is given 
by: 
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1
 ( 1)( 1 )
x
i
q di x A pq                 (12) 
Therefore, the total profits of the monopolist are given by: 
2 2
( / 2) ( 1)( 1 ) ( / 2)u pq p x A pφx φx                      (13) 
Taking the first order condition of (13) with respect to p  yields the optimal retail 
price: 
( 1) / 2p A               (14) 
As a result, the total quantity demanded (number of subscribers) in all geographic 
areas is given by: 
( 1)( 1) / 2q x A                (15) 
Therefore, the total profits of the monopolist and the consumer surplus are given, 
respectively, by: 
22( 1)( 1) / 4 ( / 2)u x A φx                          (16) 
2
2 2
1
( 1)(3 6 4 5 4) / (24 )
2
      
x
u iqCS di x A x Ax x x x              (17) 
Taking the first order condition of (16) with respect to x  yields the optimal 
investment level chosen by the monopolist under uniform pricing: 
2( 1)
4
u Ax



                      (18) 
Substituting (18) into (16) gives the monopolist’s profits from all NGA geographic 
areas passed ( u ), whereas consumer surplus ( uCS ) is derived by substituting 
(18) into (17). Social welfare ( uW ) is the unweighted sum of profits and consumer 
surplus. 
 
3.3. Comparison of the pricing regimes 
This section compares the two pricing regimes in terms of investment incentives 
and social welfare. It is obvious that the complex form of (8), which gives the 
optimal investment level under differential pricing, makes the comparison of the 
investment levels derived by differential and uniform pricing extremely difficult 
without providing much critical appraisal. In addition, both the monopolist’s profits 
and consumer surplus are significantly affected by the chosen investment levels, 
and hence, the comparison of the social welfare levels under each pricing regime 
is also extremely difficult in a theoretical way. Thus, numerical simulations are 
used in order to compare the two pricing regimes in terms of investment 
incentives and social welfare. 
There are two independent parameters, A  and φ . Therefore, this paper studies 
the impact of such parameters on the effectiveness of each pricing regime to 
induce higher levels of both investments and social welfare. It is obvious that the 
study focuses on the range of the parameters that leads to non-negative profits 
for the monopolist under both regimes. In particular, differential pricing leads to 
non-negative profits for 
dd
    , whereas, under uniform pricing, the 
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monopolist’s profits are non-negative for 
u
  . These critical values of φ  are 
affected by a change in A  according to the following Table.  
 
Table 1. The critical values of φ  for different values of  A  
A 
d
  
d
  
u
  
xφ  Wφ  
5 0.605 8.469 4.500 9.045 0.878 
10 0.589 29.740 15.125 30.424 0.868 
15 0.586 63.490 32.000 63.071 0.866 
20 0.584 109.740 55.125 110.865 0.865 
25 0.584 168.490 84.500 172.419 0.865 
30 0.584 239.740 120.125 236.401 0.865 
 
It is obvious that 
u d
  for all values of A , and hence, the range that leads the 
monopolist to earn non-negative profits under both pricing regimes is 
ud
    . 
Figure 1 shows the impact of A  and φ  on the investment levels undertaken by 
the monopolist under each pricing regime for 5A  , 10A  , 15A   and 20A  .  
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Figure 1. The levels of NGA deployment under differential and uniform pricing as a function of φ  for 
different values of A  
From figure 1 it can be deduced that for any given value of A , an increase in φ  
leads the monopolist to undertake a lower NGA deployment either under 
differential or uniform pricing regime. This implies that as the investment cost 
increases, the monopolist has lower incentives to invest in NGA networks. In 
addition, an increase in A  shifts the investment function upwards, which implies 
that, given a particular investment cost parameter φ , higher valuation for the 
basic “universal-level” broadband service leads to higher investment levels. It is 
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thus obvious that an increase in φ  negatively affects both investment levels, 
whereas an increase in A  positively affects the monopolist’s investment 
incentives. Not surprisingly, the monopolist has higher incentives to deploy a 
larger NGA network for low investment cost and high valuation for the basic 
“universal-level” broadband service.  
Concerning the impact of A  and φ  on the effectiveness of each pricing regime to 
induce higher investment level, simulations show that differential pricing leads to 
higher investment level than uniform pricing as long as xφ φ . When xφ = φ , the 
two pricing regimes result in the same outcome in terms of NGA deployment (i.e., 
d ux x ). Table 1 also provides the values of xφ  for different values of A . It is 
obvious that xφ  is always higher than the upper limit of  φ  (denoted by 
u
 ) that 
makes the monopolist earn non-negative profits under both pricing regime. 
Therefore, the following proposition can be stated: 
 
Proposition 1. For any admissible values of A  and φ , differential pricing always 
results in higher investment levels than uniform pricing (i.e., d ux x ). 
 
The main regulatory implication stemming from the above proposition is that the 
regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price discriminate if its 
unique purpose is to promote investments in NGA networks. However, the goal of 
regulators is not only to encourage NGA investments but also to prevent the 
monopolist from exploiting its market power to the detriment of consumers. In 
other words, the regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price 
discriminate if such regime results in better outcomes than uniform pricing in 
terms of both investment incentives and social welfare. Figure 2 shows the 
impact of A  and φ  on the subsequent social welfare levels derived by the 
monopolist’s optimal investment choice under each pricing regime for 5A  , 
10A  , 15A   and 20A  .  
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Figure 2. The levels of social welfare under differential and uniform pricing as a function of φ  for 
different values of A  
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It is obvious that the behavior of the welfare functions is similar to that of 
investments. In particular, an increase in A  has a positive impact on the welfare 
levels derived by both pricing regimes, whereas an increase in the investment 
cost φ  negatively affects the social welfare outcomes. Concerning the 
comparison between the derived social welfare levels under each pricing regime, 
simulations show that differential pricing leads to better welfare outcomes than 
uniform pricing as long as Wφ > φ . On the contrary, when Wφ φ , the socially 
optimal pricing regime is that of uniform pricing. Therefore, for every value of A , 
there is a critical value of  φ  denoted by Wφ  that makes d uW W .  This fact is 
clearly depicted in figure 2, whereas Table 1 provides the particular values of Wφ  
for different values of A .  
Note that the values of  Wφ  are very close to that of 
d
 implying that there is a 
very limited range of φ  that makes u dW W  hold.  In other words, when 
d Wφ   , uniform pricing is the socially optimal pricing regime. In this case, 
there is a trade-off between encouraging the monopolist to deploy a larger NGA 
network and preventing the monopolist from exploiting its market power. 
However, when Wφ , differential pricing leads to better outcomes than uniform 
pricing in terms of both investments and social welfare. Given that the particular 
value of Wφ is rather low and the range of  φ  that makes u dW W  hold is rather 
limited, the following proposition can be stated: 
 
Proposition 2. The regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price 
discriminate as long as the investment cost is not extremely low. 
 
As a result, geographic price discrimination in NGA markets should be allowed by 
the regulator when the investment cost is not extremely low. In this case, the 
monopolist will price the NGA-based services according to the socially optimal 
pricing regime, which is the differential pricing. On the contrary, when the 
investment cost is extremely low (i.e., 
d Wφ   ), there is a trade-off between 
encouraging investments and promoting social welfare. In this case, the regulator 
may oblige a uniform pricing in order to improve social welfare since investments 
in access infrastructures may have already been encouraged by allowing the 
monopolist to ban access to the new NGA infrastructures by alternative operators 
(these are the cases of regulatory forbearance or regulatory holidays).  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper discussed the impact of retail price discrimination on investment 
incentives and social welfare when the investor is not obliged to provide access 
to its improved access infrastructures to its competitors. In particular, it was 
assumed that the firm invests in NGA networks under regulatory forbearance or 
regulatory holiday. Thus, the investor firm acts as a monopolist in the market for 
ultra-fast broadband services provided over the new fibre-based access network. 
It was further assumed that the consumers place a different valuation to the ultra-
fast broadband connection according to their geographic area. In particular, 
consumers who live in more densely populated areas place a higher valuation to 
the ultra-fast broadband service due to socioeconomic characteristics, such as 
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income, education, etc. 
It was found that geographic price discrimination provides the monopolist with 
higher incentives to deploy a larger NGA network (i.e., the NGA investment is 
extended to rural, less densely populated areas). In addition, geographic price 
discrimination results in better welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as 
the investment cost is not extremely low. In such cases, the regulator should 
allow the monopolist to geographically price discriminate since the monopolist 
chooses the socially optimal pricing regime. On the contrary, when the 
investment cost is extremely low, uniform pricing is the socially optimal pricing 
regime, whereas differential pricing maximizes private investment incentives. In 
such cases, a benevolent regulator may impose the uniform pricing regime in 
order to mitigate the detrimental impact of regulatory forbearance or holidays on 
social welfare. 
Although its limitations, this paper provided some very interesting results 
concerning the regulation of the retail NGA market. However, since the focus of 
regulators is continuously shifting from the regulation of the retail market to the 
regulation of the wholesale market, this paper can trigger a discussion on the 
investment and welfare outcomes of geographic price discrimination at a 
wholesale level. Thus, future research should focus on improving this paper by 
introducing competition both for investments and consumers, and then, studying 
the regulatory implications of a geographic differentiated access price. 
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Abstract 
This paper studies the incentives of an unregulated monopolist to undertake the 
socially optimal investment in NGA networks when it takes into account the fact 
that the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision concerning 
both the quality (or equivalently, technology) and the geographic coverage. It is 
found that both the privately and the socially optimal investment decisions result 
in a geographically differentiated NGA deployment implying that different quality 
NGA networks are deployed in different geographic areas. In particular, NGA 
networks of higher (lower) quality are deployed in the more (less) densely 
populated geographic areas. Although such geographically differentiated NGA 
investment leads the monopolist to provide a nationwide NGA deployment, it is 
found that the monopolist underinvests compared to the socially optimal levels of 
both technology and geographic coverage. In addition, since the objectives of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy concern both the NGA technology and the NGA coverage, 
this paper shows that the first objective of providing all Europeans with access to 
much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps is feasible when the demand for 
NGA-based services is significantly elastic, whereas the second objective of 
providing internet connection speeds of 100 Mbps to 50% or more of European 
households is not a feasible goal. 
 
Keywords: Broadband, geographic areas, investment incentives, next generation 
access networks, telecommunications 
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1. Introduction 
Investments in Next Generation Access (NGA) networks1, which allow ultra fast 
internet connections, are expected to have a positive impact on economic growth, 
employment and social prosperity. This fact has been notably highlighted in the 
European Commission Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EC, 
2010a) and in the Digital Agenda for Europe (EC, 2010b), whereas it has been 
empirically proven by Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann (2011) and 
Katz, Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern and Suter (2010). However, recent data from the 
European Commission (EC, 2012) shows that European telecommunication 
operators are reluctant to invest in NGA networks. According to the Dutch 
regulatory authority, OPTA (2008), the main factors that negatively affect an 
investor’s incentives to invest in NGA networks are: (i) the uncertainty about 
future demand for new NGA-based services; and (ii) the regulatory uncertainty 
related to the regulator’s limited ability to make ex ante credible commitments. 
Therefore, there is a growing interest among policy makers about the optimal 
regulatory policy that promotes both competition and investment in NGA 
networks.  
 
1.1. Regulatory concerns 
In fact, the assessment of such optimal regulatory policy is a very complex and 
challenging task because there are many different factors that affect the 
profitability of an NGA investment project and the subsequent competition 
outcomes. This implies that regulators have to make a number of decisions that 
directly affect the level of NGA deployment and the intensity of competition. 
 Initially, regulators have to decide the regulatory regime applied to the NGA 
market. Permanent regulation implies that the ex ante imposed remedies hold for 
the whole lifecycle of the NGA investment, whereas regulatory forbearance refers 
to the situation where there is no ex ante regulation on NGA networks. 
Regulatory holidays and sunset clauses are intermediate regulatory regimes 
between regulatory forbearance and permanent regulation. Under regulatory 
holidays, the investor is not imposed to any regulatory constraints for a 
predetermined period of time, whereas by imposing a sunset clause, the regulator 
commits that will withdraw access obligations after a predetermined date. It is 
obvious that regulatory forbearance or holidays appear superior to the other 
regulatory regimes in terms of both NGA investment level and the timing of the 
investments but they fail to promote an efficient competition level 
(Charalampopoulos, Katsianis and Varoutas, 2011; Gavosto, Ponte and 
Scaglioni, 2007; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011). 
Secondly, regulators have to assess the level of the access price that an access 
seeker should pay to the NGA investor in order to have access to the fibre-based 
access network. This regulatory decision has attracted much interest in the policy 
debate. A sizeable number of papers study the effect of different combinations of 
regulatory regimes and access prices on an operator’s investment incentives and 
on the subsequent social welfare outcomes. A first literature strand concludes 
                                                          
1
 According to European Commission (EC, 2010a), Next Generation Access (NGA) networks 
means wired access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are 
capable of delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher 
throughput) as compared to those provided over already existing copper networks. In most cases 
NGAs are the result of an upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial access network. 
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that an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes 
static efficiency but leads to losses in dynamic efficiency (Bouckaert, van Dijk and 
Verboven, 2010).2 This implies that cost-oriented access prices is an effective 
regulatory tool for fostering service-based competition in order to improve static 
efficiency, but they cannot promote investments in new NGA networks by either 
incumbents or entrants since the investors are not compensated for the 
uncertainty of NGA investment.3  
As a result, a second literature strand studies the impact of alternative regulatory 
settings on promoting both static and dynamic efficiency. In particular, this set of 
papers explores the effectiveness of several investment-contingent access prices 
to increase both static and dynamic efficiency when a single operator invests 
under either demand uncertainty (Bender, 2011; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011) or 
regulatory uncertainty (Klumpp and Su, 2010; Sarmento and Brandao, 2007; 
Tselekounis and Varoutas, 2013), as well as, when two operators invest in non-
overlapping areas (Henriques, 2011; Sauer, 2011). This literature concludes that 
compensating the investor(s) for the uncertainty of NGA investment through an 
investment-contingent access price can achieve both static and dynamic 
efficiency under certain demand, cost and regulatory conditions. 
The aforementioned papers that study the impact of alternative regulatory 
regimes and access pricing rules on investment and competition outcomes 
neglect the fact that there is a period during which both copper and NGA 
networks are in operation and are competing for customers. Therefore, the third 
regulatory decision concerns the level of the access price applied to the copper 
access network. This regulatory task gives rise to a more recent stream of papers 
which discuss the impact of the regulation of the copper access network on the 
firms’ investment incentives when the NGA market is left unregulated or when 
there is an interplay between the access prices of the two networks (Bourreau, 
Cambini and Doğan, 2013; Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan, 2012; Bourreau, Lupi 
and Manenti, 2013; Brito, Pereira and Vareda, 2012; Cambini and Silvestri, 2012; 
Cave, Fournier and Shutova, 2012; Inderst and Peitz, 2012; Neumann and 
Vogelsang, 2013). The main conclusion of this literature is that although a higher 
access charge for the copper access network seems to lead to lower incentives 
to invest for the firm owning the copper access network and to stronger incentives 
to invest for its competitor, a positive correlation between the access prices of the 
two networks incentivizes the migration to the NGA network. 
A last regulatory decision, which has mostly been overlooked in the related 
literature, concerns the possibility of defining different geographical markets 
according to the prevailing competitive and cost conditions, and therefore, the 
imposition of geographically differentiated remedies. Indeed, after a period of 
                                                          
2
  Static efficiency concerns the short-run regulatory goal to provide firms with significant 
incentives to invest in innovative, differentiated services. Such service-based competition leads to 
a self-sustaining pro-competitive market structure in which firms behave in a competitive manner, 
and hence, the consumers enjoy the welfare gains from static efficiency (lower prices, better 
quality and extended variety of services). On the other hand, dynamic efficiency concerns the 
long-run goal of access regulation to induce the firms to undertake the socially optimal (efficient) 
investment decisions in new competing infrastructures. Such facilities-based competition achieves 
the full benefits of competition, and hence, the consumers enjoy the full welfare gains from 
dynamic efficiency (maximum market growth in terms of both volume and value so that markets 
achieve minimized costs, innovative technologies and advanced services). 
3
  See Cambini and Jiang (2009) for an excellent review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the relationship between broadband investment and regulation. 
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obligation of non-discrimination (EU, 2002), currently, price discrimination is 
allowed to a certain (at least wholesale) extent related to NGA networks in 
Europe in order to foster innovation and welfare growth by promoting investments 
(EC, 2010b). Bourreau, Cambini and Hoerning (2013) assume that differentiated 
wholesale access schemes vary according to the degree of infrastructure 
competition and point out that the regulator faces a dilemma between setting a 
lower access charge to maximize per-area welfare by maintaining lower retail 
prices, and setting a high access charge to maximize investment incentives. They 
show that differentiated remedies (where access is regulated in non-competitive 
areas, while access is privately negotiated in competitive areas) can be either too 
high or too low from a social perspective. 
From the above analysis, it can be deduced that the derivation of an optimal 
regulatory policy that promotes both NGA investment and competition is a very 
difficult and complex task since it requires the estimation of the impact of four 
interrelated decisions on the twofold regulatory goal. This task becomes even 
more complex if we take into account the previously overlooked fact that the 
deployment of an NGA network is a two-dimensional investment decision.  
 
1.2. The two dimensions of an NGA investment decision 
A potential investor in an NGA network has to decide: (i) the quality of the NGA 
network which is closely related to the provided NGA technology, and hence, to 
the provided internet connection speeds; and (ii) the geographic coverage of the 
NGA deployment.  
The first decision is related to the part of the copper wire being replaced by fibre 
optics. There are certain NGA architectures, the most common of which are: (i) 
Fibre-to-the-Curb (FTTC); (ii) Fibre-to-the-Building (FTTB); and (iii) Fiber-to-the-
Home (FTTH). It is obvious that the higher the part of the copper wire being 
replaced by fibre optics, the higher the internet connection speeds that can be 
provided to end-users. However, the quality of the NGA network is not only 
affected by the particular point of the local loop at which the fibre is terminated, 
but also by the particular access technology used to implement each architecture. 
In particular, the FFTH architecture can be implement by using either the point-to-
point (P2P) connectivity technology, in which each device at the subscriber 
premises is connected through a dedicated optical fibre to a switch port located at 
the central office of the investor, or the point-to-multi-point (P2M)/ passive optical 
network (PON) connectivity technology which divides an optical signal into 
several shared connections. As a result, an investor in NGA network has to 
decide the combination of the NGA architecture and the connectivity technology 
that leads to a deployment of an NGA network of a particular quality (or NGA 
technology). This decision is closely related to the internet connection speeds 
that will be provided by the investor to its consumers. The second decision 
concerns the geographical extent of the NGA deployment. Therefore, the investor 
also chooses the geographic areas in which a fibre-based access network will be 
deployed. This decision determines the geographic NGA coverage.  
Although the research papers that study the impact of the four interrelated 
regulatory decisions on investment incentives and competition outcomes 
separately treat the two dimensions of an NGA investment decision, it should be 
noted that the investor’s decisions concerning the NGA technology and the 
geographic NGA coverage are closely related. In particular, existing studies 
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assume that a prospective investor in NGA networks chooses either the quality or 
the geographic coverage of the NGA network. This implies that the investor 
decides: (i) the quality of the NGA network that will be provided in an 
exogenously given number of geographic areas; or (ii) the number of geographic 
areas in which an exogenously given NGA technology network will be deployed. 
In each case, the investor focuses on one of the two dimensions of the NGA 
investment decision by taking the other dimension as given. A reasonable 
extension would be to consider a static modeling approach in which an investor 
endogenously chooses its optimal NGA technology network that will be deployed 
only in the geographic areas that the investment is proven to be profitable.  
This paper goes one step beyond and models the fact that the investor chooses 
the NGA technology that will be provided in each geographic area.4 Therefore, 
not only the quality of the NGA network and the coverage of the NGA deployment 
are both endogenously chosen by the investor, but also different NGA 
technologies may co-exist according to the prevailing demand and cost 
conditions in each geographic area. This modeling setup is the first step towards 
studying an operator’s incentives to deploy a geographically differentiated NGA 
network. As a result, this paper derives the provided NGA technology in each 
geographic area, as well as, the optimal number of areas that will be upgraded to 
any NGA technology. In addition, it compares the privately optimal two-
dimensional investment decision with the socially optimal geographically 
differentiated NGA deployment. In other words, the aim of this paper is to assess 
whether the regulatory decision to allow an investor to deploy a quality-
differentiated NGA network can promote both static and dynamic efficiency (i.e. 
induces the socially optimal investment outcome).  
It should be noted that the derived results are comparable to the objectives of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy (EC, 2010b) which envisions that, by 2020, (i) all 
Europeans will have access to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps 
and (ii) 50% or more of European households will subscribe to internet 
connections above 100 Mbps. It is obvious that these goals concern both the 
NGA technology and the NGA coverage, and hence, the research focus should 
shift towards modeling approaches that take into account the fact that the NGA 
deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision which results in a 
geographically differentiated NGA deployment.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of 
the basic assumptions and definitions of the model. Section 3 compares the 
privately and the socially optimal investment levels in terms of both quality and 
geographic coverage in order to assess whether the investor undertakes the 
socially optimal investment decision. The last section summarizes the main 
results of this article and proposes the directions for future work. 
 
2. The model 
This section presents an innovative modeling setup which aims at reflecting the 
fact that the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment decision which 
concerns both the NGA technology and the geographic NGA coverage. Since the 
                                                          
4
 In fact, the investor has also to decide the time at which it will build an NGA network of a 
particular quality in each geographic area. However, the optimal timing of an NGA investment is 
studied using dynamic modeling approaches, and hence, is out of the scope of this paper, 
although we acknowledge that it provides an excellent field for future research.  
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goal of the paper is to assess whether the regulatory decision to allow an investor 
to deploy a different quality NGA network in each geographic area can promote 
both investment and social welfare, all the other regulatory decisions are 
exogenously chosen in order to simplify the model as much as possible. In 
particular, it is assumed that the investor is not obliged to provide access to its 
improved access infrastructures to its competitors, which implies that the 
monopolist firm invests in NGA networks under regulatory forbearance. Although 
such monopolistic regime does not resolve the trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency, the study of the derived investment outcomes is very useful 
for comparison purposes since they obviously represent the upper limit of the 
investment level.  It is further assumed that the deployment of an NGA network 
eliminates the services provided over the pure copper access network (e.g. 
ADSL), and hence, the impact of the access price applied to the copper access 
network is of no significance. The last assumption made concerns the imposition 
of geographically differentiated remedies. In particular, the monopolist investor is 
allowed to geographically price discriminate in the retail market, which of course, 
increases its investment incentives compared to the uniform pricing regime 
(Alexandrov and Deb, 2012; Tselekounis, Maniadakis and Varoutas, 2013; 
Valletti, 2006).  
The model used in this paper is based on a hypothetical country consisting of a 
continuum of geographic areas which can be indexed in a decreasing order 
according to their population density. In particular, geographic areas are indexed 
by i  with [1, ]i n , where low values of i  imply geographic areas with high 
population density, whereas geographic areas that are indexed by i  close to n  
represent rural areas (i.e. with low population density). A monopolist provides a 
basic “universal-level” broadband service (e.g. ADSL) to all geographic areas at a 
uniform price. Now assume that the monopolist invests in access network 
upgrade by deciding which geographic areas will be passed by any technology 
NGA network and which NGA quality will be provided in each geographic area. 
Therefore, the monopolist initially determines the geographic extent of the NGA 
deployment denoted by max [1, ]x n  and then decides which NGA technology 
denoted by min max[ , ]i i iy y y will be provided in each geographic area ix , [1, ]i n . 
Obviously both investment decisions are continuous in [1, ]n  and min max[ , ]i iy y , 
respectively. It is expected that the most densely populated geographic area ( 1x ) 
will be covered by the highest quality NGA network ( maxiy ), whereas the least 
densely populated, but NGA-passed, area ( maxx ) will be covered by the lowest 
quality NGA network ( miniy ). 
Contrary to the existing studies which assume that a higher level of NGA 
investment in terms of either technology or coverage leads to a more outward 
parallel shift in the demand curve (and thus equally benefits all consumers), this 
paper models the fact that a higher NGA technology network positively affects the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for ultra-fast NGA-based services, but its impact 
declines as it is provided to more rural areas. The reason is that consumers who 
place a higher (lower) valuation to broadband subscription tend to live in higher 
(lower) densely populated areas (EC, 2010b; Götz, 2013; Preston, Cawley and 
Metykova, 2007). In addition, the investment cost is assumed to be increasing 
and convex reflecting the fact that the NGA investment becomes marginally more 
expensive as a better quality NGA network is deployed in order to provide end-
users with higher internet connection speeds. However, contrary to existing 
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studies which assume an exogenously given slope of the marginal investment 
cost function, this paper models the fact that the investment cost of providing a 
particular NGA technology becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended 
to less densely populated areas. Once again, population density has been proven 
to be an effective proxy for reflecting the fact that the investment cost per 
potential user decreases in the population density (Götz, 2013). It is thus obvious 
that geographic areas not only differ with respect to the cost of rolling out an NGA 
network of a particular technology, but also with respect to the impact of such 
NGA deployment on consumers’ willingness to pay. Therefore, the demand and 
the investment cost functions in each geographic area   are given, respectively, 
by: 
2
i
i i
i
y
p A q
x
     (1) 
and   
2
( )
2
i ix yC i   (2) 
where ip  and iq  denote the retail market price and the quantity supplied, 
respectively, in each geographic area, 0  represents the slope of the inverse 
demand function and A  represents the maximum valuation that the consumers 
place to the services provided over the pure copper access network when the 
NGA investment has not taken place. In addition, ix  reflects the geographic NGA 
deployment and iy  reflects the NGA technology. A larger ix  implies an NGA 
deployment to less densely populated areas, whereas a larger iy  implies a fibre 
deployment closer to the consumers’ premises combined with a better 
connectivity technology. It is obvious that a higher NGA technology positively 
affects the consumers’ willingness to pay, but its impact declines as it is provided 
to more rural areas. In addition, the investment cost of providing a higher NGA 
technology becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended to less densely 
populated areas.  
 
3. Investment and welfare outcomes 
This section studies the incentives of an unregulated monopolist to undertake the 
socially optimal investment decision in terms of both NGA technology provided in 
each geographic area and geographic coverage of the NGA deployment. As 
usual, the game is solved backwards. This implies that in the third stage, the 
investment cost is sunk and the monopolist sets the geographic differentiated 
retail prices of the different ultra-fast broadband services provided in each area 
given the level of NGA deployment chosen in the first stage and the quality of the 
NGA network chosen in the second stage. 
 
3.1. Privately optimal level of NGA technology 
The profit function of the investor (net of investment cost) derived from the 
investment iy  in each geographic region ix  is given by: 
i i ip q   (3) 
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Substituting the solution of Eq. (1) with respect to 
iq  in Eq. (3) and taking the first 
order condition with respect to 
ip  gives the retail market price that maximizes the 
monopolist’s profits in each geographic area.  
2
*
22
i i
i
i
Ax y
p
x

  (4) 
As a result, the optimum quantity supplied in each geographic area is given by: 
 
2
*
22
i i
i
i
Ax y
q
x



 (5) 
Obviously, both the retail price and the quantity supplied in each geographic area 
are positively affected by a higher NGA technology and a higher population 
density. Substituting Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (3) and taking into account the 
investment cost in each geographic area given by Eq. (2) yields the profits of the 
investor in each geographic area as a function of the NGA technology ( iy ) and 
the index of the corresponding geographic area ( ix ).   
2
2 2
2
1
2 2
i i i i
i
i
Ax y x y
x
 
   
 
 (6) 
Taking the first order condition of Eq. (6) with respect to iy  gives the quality of the 
NGA network that maximizes the monopolist’s regional profits.  
2
52 1
M
i
i
i
Ax
y
x


 (7) 
Equation (7) shows the level of NGA technology iy  that the monopolist investor is 
willing to install in each geographic area ix . Obviously, the privately optimal level 
of the NGA technology is different among the various geographic areas. In 
particular, by studying the first and second derivatives of Eq. (7) with respect to 
ix , it is concluded that the privately optimal level of NGA technology in each 
geographic area is a decreasing and convex function of ix . This implies that the 
unregulated monopolist chooses a geographically differentiated NGA network in 
terms of the provided quality. In other words, the less (more) densely populated a 
geographic area is, the less (more) the extent of NGA upgrade that maximizes 
the investor’s regional profits.  
 
3.2. Socially optimal level of NGA technology 
Social welfare is the unweighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. Given that 
the consumer surplus in each geographic area is given by  
2
/ 2i iCS q  , it is 
deduced that the socially optimal level of NGA technology should maximize the 
following social welfare function: 
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1
2 2 2 (2 )
i i i i i i
i
i i
Ax y x y Ax y
SW
x x
     
      
    

 
 (8) 
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Therefore, the socially optimal level of NGA technology is given by taking the first 
order condition of Eq. (8) with respect to 
iy : 
2
5
3
4 3
SW
i
i
i
Ax
y
x


 (9) 
Assumption 1. Let 54 3 0ix   . 
Assumption 1 ensures that the privately and the socially optimal levels of NGA 
technology are both positive in each geographic area. In particular, 5 0.75ix   is 
a sufficient condition to ensure that , 0
M SW
i i
y y  . 
In addition, by studying the first and second derivatives of Eq. (9) with respect to 
ix , it is deduced that the socially optimal level of NGA technology in each 
geographic area is also a decreasing and convex function of ix . This implies that 
the society is better off by a geographically differentiated NGA network in terms of 
the provided quality. 
 
3.3. Comparison of privately and socially optimal levels of NGA technology 
The comparison of Eqs. (7) and (9) shows that the level of NGA investment in 
quality in each geographic area imposed by the investor’s private investment 
incentives is less than the corresponding socially optimal level of NGA investment 
in quality (i.e. 
M SW
i i
y y ). 
Proof. 
2 2
5 5
3
4 3 2 1
SW M
i i
i i
i i
Ax Ax
y y
x x 
   
 
5 56 3 4 3i ix x     6 4 ■ 
Therefore, the following proposition can be stated: 
Proposition 1. The unregulated investor always underinvests compared to the 
socially optimal investment level of NGA quality (or technology).   
The above result is graphically presented by Figure 1. The solid line reflects the 
privately optimal NGA quality provided in each geographic area, whereas the 
dashed line reflects the corresponding socially optimal level. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between ix  and iy  from a private and a social perspective ( 10A   and 0.8 ) 
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3.4. Privately and socially optimal levels of geographic NGA coverage 
The goal of this section is to derive the privately and the socially optimal levels of 
geographic NGA coverage. In other words, this section aims at assessing the 
least densely populated geographic area that will be upgraded to any NGA 
technology when the investor is the unregulated monopolist and when the NGA 
investment is undertaken by the society. Substitution Eq. (7) into Eq. (6) gives the 
regional profits of the investor: 
2 5
52(2 1)
i
i
i
A x
x
 

 (10) 
It is obvious that the investor’s profits in each geographic area are positive. This 
implies that the unregulated investor is willing to deploy a nationwide quality-
differentiated NGA deployment, although the installation of fibre optics in the local 
loop will be far away from the consumers’ premises at the less densely populated 
areas. This fact gives rise to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. When the unregulated investor is allowed to deploy a 
geographically differentiated NGA network, it is willing to invest in all geographic 
areas within a given country, although the fibre deployment in the less densely 
populated areas is rather insignificant. 
This result is a very interesting finding since is in contrast with existing studies 
which conclude that there is an optimal (one-dimensional) investment level that 
maximizes the investor’s profits. Of course, the result of proposition 2 is due to 
the ability of the investor to maximize its regional profits by providing a different 
NGA quality network in each geographic area. 
However, it is practical to limit our study to the lowest quality NGA network that is 
technically available. This is the Fibre-to-the-Curb (FTTC) architecture that 
provides internet connection speeds from 30Mbps to 100Mbps. Obviously, this is 
the reason that the Digital Agenda for Europe envisions that, by 2020, all 
Europeans will have access to internet speeds of at least 30Mbps.  
Therefore, it is assumed that the highest quality NGA network is achieved by the 
P2P architecture (which can provide internet connection speeds of up to 
1000Mbps) and is denoted by 2P Py . It is reasonable to consider maxiy  corresponds 
to the socially optimal level of NGA technology provided in the most densely 
populated area. This level is derived by setting  1 1ix x   in Eq. (9). Therefore: 
max
1
3
4 3
SW
i
A
y y 

 (11) 
It is obvious that maxiy  takes its maximum value when the denominator of Eq. (11) 
is minimized. The solution of 4 3 0    is 0.75  , which implies that 0.8   is a 
sufficient condition to ensure that  1 0
SWy  . Moreover, given that   negatively 
affects the optimal level of investment in quality, the highest internet connection 
speed is achieved for 0.8 , and hence, 2 1 ( 0.8)
P P SWy y  , which implies that 
2 15 1000MbpsP Py A  . Note that in the most densely populated area the privately 
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optimal level of NGA technology is given by setting 1 1ix x   in Eq. (7) and is 
maximized for 0.8 . Hence:  
 1 1.667
2 1
M Ay A 

 (12) 
As a result, the minimum threshold of the internet connection speed that is 
acceptable in the present study (i.e. 30Mbps) will be provided to the least densely 
populated area in which an NGA network will be deployed. Let denote this 
geographic are by [1, ]n n . Therefore: 
min 2 min min30 45 0.45
1000 100
P P
i i in
y y y y A y A       (13) 
Equating  Eqs. (13) and (7) and solving with respect to ix  gives the geographic 
area in which the monopolist investor will deploy the minimum quality NGA 
network. In addition, equating  Eqs. (13) and (9) and solving with respect to ix  
yields the socially optimal geographic area covered by the minimum quality NGA 
network. The former geographic area reflects the privately optimal geographic 
NGA coverage denoted by 
max
Mx n , whereas the latter reflects the socially 
optimal geographic NGA coverage denoted by max
SWx . Since both levels of 
geographic coverage are affected by the slope of the inverse demand function, 
table 1 provides the levels of 
max
Mx  and max
SWx  for the values of   that ensure a 
positive geographic NGA development (i.e. max 1
Mx  , or equivalently, [0.8,1.6]  ). 
 
Table 1 (for 10A   and min 0.45iy   ) 
      
0.8 1.21863 1.37180 
0.9 1.17805 1.32505 
1 1.14312 1.28483 
1.1 1.11261 1.24970 
1.2 1.08562 1.21863 
1.3 1.06149 1.19087 
1.4 1.03974 1.16585 
1.5 1.01998 1.14312 
1.6 1.00191 1.12235 
1.7 0.98530 1.10326 
 
Table 1 reveals that the unregulated monopolist underinvests compared to the 
socially optimal geographic NGA coverage (i.e. max max
M SWx x ). This is an expected 
result since the socially optimal level of NGA technology in each geographic area 
is always higher than the corresponding privately optimal level, and hence, the 
same level of NGA technology (which, in this case, corresponds to 30Mbps) is 
privately provided to a more densely populated area than the corresponding 
socially optimal geographic area.  

max
Mx
max
SWx
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Table 1 also provides useful implications about the feasibility of the first goal of 
the Digital Agenda for Europe concerning the provision of access to much higher 
internet speeds of above 30 Mbps to all Europeans. Assuming that the EC sets 
its objectives from a social rather than an industrial perspective as well as that the 
European households are uniformly distributed to all geographic areas, the total 
number of the households of a given country will correspond to a particular value 
of 
max
SWx  denoted by maxˆ
SWx . In turn, maxˆ
SWx  corresponds to a particular value of   
denoted by ˆ . Therefore, if the demand for ultra-fast broadband services is more 
inelastic than ˆ  (i.e. ˆ  ), then the achievement of the first goal of the Digital 
Agenda for Europe is not feasible. On the contrary, when ˆ  , the fulfillment of 
this goal is feasible when the privately optimal NGA coverage is at least equal to 
the socially optimal NGA coverage derived by ˆ . In this case, the monopolist 
provides all households with at least 30Mbps. The particular value of   that leads 
to the provision of 30Mbps in the least densely populated area of a given country 
is given by: 
2 2
5 5
3 2ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ2 1 34 3
M SW n n
n n
n n
Ax Ax
y y
x x
    
 
   
 
 (14) 
Equation (14) implies that the first goal of the Digital Agenda for Europe is 
feasible when ˆ66,7%  . For instance, assume that the total number of 
households correspond to the geographic area 1.14312ix  , which in turn 
corresponds to ˆ 1.5   . According to Eq. (14), the monopolist will provide this 
least populated area with at least 30Mbps if 1  . Indeed, table 1 shows that the 
privately optimal geographic NGA coverage is max 1.14312
Mx   when 1   . For 
1  , internet connection speeds of above 30Mbps are provided to all 
households.   
In other words, the slope of the inverse demand function for NGA-based services 
should be significantly flatter than the respective slope that leads to the provision 
of 30 Mbps to all households by the socially optimal investment in geographic 
coverage. The reason is that as the demand for NGA-based services becomes 
more elastic, the effectiveness of price discrimination to decrease consumer 
surplus in favor of the monopolist is limited, and hence, the monopolist has 
incentives to extend its NGA coverage to more geographic areas. 
This paper can also assess the feasibility of the second objective of the Digital 
Agenda for Europe, which refers to the goal of achieving the provision of internet 
connection speeds of 100 Mbps to 50% or more of European households. This 
goal is equivalent to providing half of the households in each European country 
with internet connection speeds of 100 Mbps. Given that 2 15P Py A  represents 
the internet connection speed of 1000Mbps, the respective speed of 100Mbps is 
given by:  
 ' 2 '
1
1.5
10
P P
i iy y y A    (15) 
According to Eq. (7), the unregulated monopolist is willing to provide this internet 
connection speed to a particular geographic area. This area is derived by 
equating Eqs. (7) and (14) and solving with respect to ix . Since the derived level 
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of ix  is a function of  , table 2 provides the geographic area in which the 
installed NGA network will provide internet speeds of 100Mbps ( '
max
Mx ) as well as 
the respective socially optimal geographic NGA coverage. 
 
Table 2 (for 10A  ) 
  '
max
Mx  max
SWx  
0.8 1.00978 1.37180 
0.9 0.98188 1.32505 
1 0,95772 1,28483 
1.1 0,93649 1,24970 
1.2 0,91760 1,21863 
1.3 0.90064 1.19087 
1.4 0.88528 1.16585 
1.5 0.87125 1.14312 
1.6 0.85838 1.12235 
1.7 0.84649 1.10326 
 
Table 2 reveals that the monopolist invests in the provision of internet connection 
speeds of above 100 Mbps only when the demand for the NGA-based services is 
extremely elastic (i.e. (0.75,0.833]   since [1, ]ix n ). However, in order to 
assess whether the derived values of 'max
Mx   represent the 50% of the national 
households, we should first define the total number of the households of a given 
country. Once again, we use as a point of reference the critical value ˆ   which 
corresponds to the provision of 30 Mbps to all households under the socially 
optimal investment in coverage as presented by the second column of the above 
table. It is obvious that regardless of the particular value of ˆ 0.8 , the provision 
of internet connection speeds of 100 Mbps is much less than 50% of the total 
households. The reason is that the ratio of ( 'max 1
Mx  ) to any value of max( 1)
SWx   is 
lower than 50%.5 Therefore, the second objective of the Digital Agenda for 
Europe is not a feasible goal.   
 
4. Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to study the incentives of an unregulated monopolist 
to undertake the socially optimal investment in NGA networks when it takes into 
account the fact that the NGA deployment is a two-dimensional investment 
decision. In particular, the investor has to decide the quality of the NGA network 
and the geographic coverage of the NGA network. For this reason, a suitable 
modeling setup was used in order to reflect the fact that as an investment in 
quality upgrade extended to less densely populated (i.e. more rural) areas, not 
only it has a declining positive impact on the consumers’ willingness to pay, but 
also becomes marginally more expensive. This paper highlighted the expected 
                                                          
5
 This result holds under the assumption that the household density in each geographic area 
follows the same distribution as the population density. 
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result that the investor is better off by deploying a geographically differentiated 
NGA network (i.e. by installing a different quality NGA network in each 
geographic area).  
The main result of this paper was that although a geographically differentiated 
NGA investment provides the unregulated monopolist with incentives to install a 
nationwide NGA deployment, the monopolist underinvests compared to the 
socially optimal levels of both quality and geographic coverage. However, the 
fibre deployment in the less densely populated areas was found to be rather 
insignificant, and hence, certain assumptions were made in order to make the 
derived results comparable to the Europe 2020 Strategy which envisions that, by 
2020: (i) all Europeans will have access to much higher internet speeds of above 
30 Mbps; and (ii) 50% or more of European households will subscribe to internet 
connections above 100 Mbps. It was shown that the former objective is feasible 
when the demand for NGA-based services is significantly elastic, whereas the 
latter is not a feasible goal. 
Our framework is suitable to be extended in many different directions. Firstly, the 
focus of regulators is continuously shifting from the regulation of the retail market 
to the regulation of the wholesale market, and hence, the introduction of 
competition between an investor and an access seeker will certainly highlight the 
role of access regulation in encouraging NGA investments and promoting 
competition. Secondly, it is reasonable to expect that a geographically 
differentiated NGA deployment calls for geographically differentiated access 
remedies. Therefore, the modeling approach of Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig 
(2013) which studies the impact of differentiated wholesale access schemes on 
coverage and welfare should be combined with the modeling setup of this paper 
in order to conclude about the optimal pricing scheme that leads to the socially 
optimal geographically differentiated NGA deployment. A last interesting 
extension concerns the introduction of some dynamics in our setting since the 
most significant factors that affect the NGA deployment change over time. In this 
case, particular focus should be given on the impact of regulatory uncertainty on 
investment incentives. The reason is that variations in the demand and cost 
conditions may require regulatory remedies that change over time which, in turn, 
increase the risk of an ex ante NGA deployment.  
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ABSTRACT 
The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the 
basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the 
legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fibre-based 
Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related 
literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative 
operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with 
disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the 
optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments 
in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with 
the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both 
the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory 
settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet 
the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the 
proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit 
Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based 
competition over NGA networks. 
 
Keywords: access regulation; Credit Default Swap (CDS); facilities-based 
competition; investment incentives; Next Generation Access Networks (NGA)  
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1. Introduction 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FCC, 1996) passed by US Congress and 
administered by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), as well as, the 
European Commission’s (EC) Regulation on Local Loop Unbundling (EC, 2000) 
mandated unbundled access to the metallic local loops of incumbent operators at 
cost-based prices. The short-run goal of this unbundling policy was to reduce the 
incumbent’s market power in order to enable alternative operators (new entrants) 
to enter the market and compete effectively with the incumbent in the retail 
(downstream) market. Therefore, operators would compete on their services 
(service-based competition), and hence, consumers would enjoy the welfare 
gains from static efficiency (i.e. existing assets are used efficiently and prices are 
driven towards marginal cost). Armstrong (2002), Valletti (2003) and Vogelsang 
(2003) summarize the optimal access pricing policy in different static contexts, in 
which it is appropriate to apply cost-based access pricing, Ramsey pricing and 
the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR).  
However, the long-run goal of this unbundling policy was to promote investments 
in new network infrastructures from the incumbents, and especially entrants. In 
this case, operators would compete on their facilities (facilities-based competition) 
rather than on their services, and hence, consumers would enjoy the welfare 
gains from dynamic efficiency (i.e. the encouragement of investments in 
competing infrastructures and the deployment of new technologies). In particular, 
facilities-based competition is regarded as the only means to achieve sustainable 
competition (Cave, 2006; Oldale and Padilla, 2004) since it creates a level 
playing field between the incumbent and the entrants (De Bijl and Peitz, 2002). In 
addition, a growing number of empirical studies conclude that facilities-based 
competition has been the main driver for broadband diffusion (Bouckaert, van Dijk 
and Verboven, 2010; Denni and Gruber, 2007; Distaso, Lupi and Manenti, 2006; 
Höffler, 2007) although they do not find a negative relationship between service-
based competition and broadband diffusion. Given that broadband penetration 
positively affects economic growth (Greenstein and McDevitt, 2009; Koutroumpis, 
2009), it can be deduced that facilities-based competition creates a superior 
potential for economic growth than does service-based competition. 
Many research articles try to model such unbundling practices and assess their 
effectiveness and efficiency implications both theoretically and empirically.1 Using 
different theoretical models of downstream competition, Foros (2004) and 
Kotakorpi (2006) show that cost-oriented access prices discourage incumbents to 
invest in network upgrade unless they are much more efficient than their rivals in 
the downstream market. Sarmento and Brandao (2007) also find a negative 
relationship between cost-based access prices and the incumbents’ incentives to 
invest even if the incumbents are partially compensated for the investment cost. 
Not only the incumbents’ investment incentives are negatively affected by cost-
oriented access prices, but also the new entrants’ investment decisions are 
negatively influenced. Valletti (2003) argues that potential entrants, who can free-
ride on the incumbent’s network, will wait for the incumbent to invest in access 
infrastructure and then seek access. In addition, Bourreau and Doğan (2005, 
2006) show that unbundling of the local loop may delay the entrants’ investments, 
even in an unregulated environment. Grajek and Röller (2009) empirically confirm 
the negative impact of an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative 
                                                          
1
  See Cambini and Jiang (2009) for an excellent review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the relationship between broadband investment and regulation. 
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operators on incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. In particular, they 
use a comprehensive panel data set (180 fixed-line operators in 25 European 
countries observed from December 1997 to December 2006) in order to show 
that unbundling results in a significant negative effect on the incumbents’ 
incentives to invest in network upgrade, whereas easier access pushes entrants 
towards service-based competition. 
It is thus obvious that cost-based access prices disincentivize both the 
incumbents and the entrants to invest in network upgrade. On the other hand, 
cost-based access prices have been proven very effective in promoting static 
efficiency. Indeed, by analyzing the results of Tselekounis, Varoutas and 
Martakos (2012), it can be deduced that when the access is priced at cost, the 
productively efficient make-or-buy decision undertaken by the entrant is always 
socially optimal. The main conclusion of the above studies is that an unbundling 
policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based 
competition but leads to losses in dynamic efficiency (Bouckaert, van Dijk and 
Verboven, 2010). This implies that cost-oriented access prices is an effective 
regulatory tool for fostering service-based competition over the legacy copper 
access networks, which were largely deployed by public funds, but they cannot 
promote investments in new fibre-based access infrastructures (the so-called 
Next Generations Access Networks, or NGAs) by either incumbents or entrants. 
However, the need for the deployment of NGA networks is almost imperative. 
Firstly, the number of internet users, as well as, the capacity they demand have 
increased dramatically during the last decade. As a result, the increasing 
transmitted volume of data has made the traditional access copper networks 
incapable of providing end-users with the demanded bandwidth. On the contrary, 
NGA networks are the only future-proof solution capable to handle future demand 
(Shumate, 2008) since the transmission capabilities of fibre are theoretically 
unlimited, whereas it also provides high data rates, low loss and low distortion. 
Secondly, investments in broadband infrastructure have an indisputable positive 
effect on broadband diffusion, economic growth, job creation and consumers’ 
welfare (Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann, 2011; ITU, 2012; Katz, 
Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern and Suter, 2010; Reynolds, 2009).  
These two reasons partially interpret why national governments rank among their 
top priorities the encouragement of investments in NGA networks rather than the 
promotion of facilities-based competition. The US government’s National 
Broadband Plan (FCC, 2010) and the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for 
Europe (EC, 2010a) are examples of these perceived political priorities for the 
diffusion of broadband infrastructure access and services.  
Considering the above-mentioned technical and economic issues that make the 
need for investments in NGA networks imperative, as well as, the 
inappropriateness of cost-based access prices for promoting such investments, 
the European Commission (EC) issued a Recommendation on regulated access 
to NGA (EC, 2010b) providing the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) with 
guidelines for tackling the trade-off between fostering competition and promoting 
investments with regard to NGA networks. Section 2 discusses the EC 
Recommendation, as well as, its impact on competition and firms’ investment 
incentives. The main implication of this Recommendation is that the initial 
regulatory focus is to establish service-based competition over NGA networks, 
and then to promote facilities-based competition. This implies that regulators 
should initially tackle the trade-off between encouraging investments in NGA 
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networks and promoting competition. Once service-based competition over NGA 
networks has been achieved, the disclosed regulatory policy should provide 
access seekers with incentives to invest in their own network infrastructures in 
order to be facilities-based competitors. 
In addition, the ongoing academic research shifts its focus from assessing the 
effectiveness and efficiency implications of cost-oriented access schemes to 
proposing new regulatory approaches, and then assessing their efficiency and 
other performance implications. Thus, section 3 provides a review of the articles 
that depart from the main principles governing the regulation of the copper 
access networks (i.e. permanent regulation of the access at uniform cost-oriented 
prices) by proposing alternative regulatory settings that may promote both 
competition and investments in NGA networks. 
In fact, there is a major difference between the reviewed research articles and the 
EC Recommendation. Existing research articles study the impact of alternative 
regulatory approaches on either an investment leader’s or an investment 
follower’s (access seeker) incentives to invest in NGA networks. However, in the 
former case, the existing studies do not take into account the access seeker’s 
subsequent investment reaction, whereas in the latter case, they assume that the 
investment leader has already deployed an NGA network. On the contrary, the 
goal of the EC Recommendation is to propose an access scheme that encourage 
the initial investor to deploy an NGA network without distorting the competition 
level, and then to induce the access seekers to act as facilities-based 
competitors. Therefore, the current regulatory framework in the European NGA 
market requires a composite (rather than a separate) approach to induce a 
gradual migration from service-based competition over copper access networks 
to facilities-based competition over NGA networks. There are also minor 
differences between the existing literature and the EC Recommendation mainly in 
terms of the regulatory settings, such as the characteristics of the access pricing 
formula, the evolution of the access price over time and the provision of 
regulatory certainty. It is thus obvious that there is a gap between the existing 
literature and the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market. 
This paper proposes an innovative regulatory approach which not only is 
consistent with the goal of the EC Recommendation, but also takes into account 
the recommended regulatory settings. In particular, the proposed approach is 
based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), which is a 
widely known financial tool for transferring credit risk. Section 4 provides a 
detailed description of this approach and discusses its impact on investment 
incentives and competition. The novelty of this approach is twofold. It is the first 
time that a financial instrument for transferring credit risk (in our case a CDS) is 
applied to the field of regulatory economics. It should be noted that this is not the 
first time that a pure financial tool is applied to the information and 
communications technology (ICT) industries. There is also a well known 
modification of the call option on a share of stock that aims to better value an ICT 
investment project. Such modification has led to the deployment of the so-called 
“real option” methodology. Furthermore, it is the first paper that aims to develop a 
model that reflects the current regulatory framework in the European NGA 
market. It is shown that, under plausible assumptions, the proposed approach 
provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over 
NGA networks, and hence, resolves the standard trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency.  
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2. The current European NGA regulatory framework 
Investment in NGA networks not only requires a high initial fixed cost but also is 
mainly sunk once the investment has been made. This implies that potential 
investors are reluctant to invest in NGA networks unless they are reimbursed for 
the risk they incur when investing in such networks. Although there are many 
factors influencing the riskiness of an NGA investment project2, OPTA (2008) 
argues that the main factors that negatively affect an investor’s incentives to 
invest in NGA networks are: (i) the uncertainty about future demand for new fibre-
based services; and (ii) the regulatory uncertainty related to the regulator’s limited 
ability to make ex ante credible commitments. The first type of uncertainty 
includes the uncertainty about: (i) the penetration of the customer base; (ii) the 
market shares of the investor and the access seekers; and (iii) the consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for the new fibre-based services. Concerning the second type 
of uncertainty, regulatory risk could be eliminated if the regulator fixes the 
principles of tariff regulation for the whole period of the economic lifecycle of an 
NGA investment. However, regulatory certainty bears the risk of erroneous 
intervention. According to WIK (2009), it is socially not optimal for the regulator to 
make ex ante commitments for an unreasonably long regulatory period. 
Therefore, in providing greater regulatory certainty the regulator has to make 
another trade-off between the positive effects of greater certainty on investment 
incentives and possible negative effects of erroneous intervention on welfare 
(OPTA, 2010). 
The main conclusion is that regulators should provide the investors with 
significant incentives to invest in NGA networks without distorting competition. 
The EC issued a Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EC, 2010b) 
providing the NRAs with guidelines for tackling the trade-off between fostering 
competition and promoting investments with regard to NGA. In particular, the aim 
of this Recommendation is “to foster the development of the single market by 
enhancing legal certainty and promoting investment, competition and innovation 
in the market for broadband services in particular in the transition to next 
generation access networks”.  
According to the Recommendation, where an investor operator with Significant 
Market Power (SMP) is found within Market 4 (market for wholesale network 
infrastructure access) and/or Market 5 (wholesale broadband access), an 
appropriate set of remedies should be applied. In particular, the EC recommends 
calculating the access in a cost-based form that incorporates a risk premium. This 
premium should reflect any additional and quantifiable investment risk incurred by 
the investor. Additional mechanisms serving to allocate the investment risk 
between investors and access seekers and to foster market penetration, such as 
ex ante and ex post contracts, could also be used.3 In such cases, the risk 
premium is reduced accordingly. 
It can thus be deduced that the initial goal of the current regulatory policy in 
Europe is to promote service-based competition over fibre networks. Given that 
the prospective investors in NGA networks (and probably the SMP operators) are 
                                                          
2
  For an extensive review of all the factors influencing the riskiness of an NGA investment project, 
see ERG (2009), pp. 17-18; WIK (2009), pp.1-7; and EC (2010b), page 18. 
3
  Long-term access pricing and volume discounts are examples of ex ante and ex post contracts, 
respectively. See Inderst and Peitz (2012a) for a discussion about the impact of different contract 
types on competition and investment incentives. 
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for large part the former incumbent operators (OPTA, 2010; WIK, 2009), the 
regulatory goal is to provide the incumbents with significant incentives to invest in 
new fibre-based access networks and foster competition in the retail market. 
Although the EC argues that the incorporation of a risk premium into the access 
pricing formula can promote both investments and competition, Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2011) support that a risk premium removes the structural 
disadvantages of investing only when the NGA investment turns to be successful. 
Otherwise, the incumbent has to bear all the cost alone since the risk premium 
does not have any impact on the incumbent’s revenues.  
In fact, when the incumbent makes an investment in an NGA network it gives up 
its option to wait to see how uncertainty about markets, costs, and regulations is 
resolved since network investments are largely irreversible (Pindyck, 2007). This 
“real option” is analogous to a financial “call option” in the sense that the 
incumbent has the right but not the obligation to invest in an asset at some future 
time of its choosing. Therefore, such lost option value reflects an opportunity cost 
that must be included as part of the cost of the investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994). Alleman, Madden and Kim (2008) provides an excellent summary of the 
literature that focuses on the application of real options methodology to the ICT 
industries and conclude that the magnitude of the option value is directly related 
to the level of uncertainty of future market conditions. As a result, any additional 
and quantifiable investment risk incurred by the investor reflects an option value 
which is translated to a higher risk premium over the cost-based access price.4  
This view is also expressed by the European Telecommunications Network 
Operators’ Association (ETNO), which comprises most of the European 
incumbents. It states that even if the probability of success is relatively high, the 
risk premium proposed by the EC Recommendation does not reflect the structural 
cost advantage of the second-movers (or, the access seekers) over the investors 
(ETNO, 2008). Firstly, the second mover can choose between a fixed and a 
variable cost structure when facing demand uncertainty, heterogeneity, 
geographical differences and demand evolving over time. This option is widely 
known as “make-or-buy”. Secondly, the access seeker can exit the market at low 
cost (before making its own investment), whereas the investment of the first 
mover is typically sunk. Thirdly, the second mover has the option to enter the 
market once the critical mass has been created. This option is known as “wait-
and-see”. In addition, even if a risk premium results in higher wholesale revenues 
for the investor, raising prices for the new infrastructure may lead to a competitive 
disadvantage of NGA networks vis-à-vis competing platforms and the existing 
copper network that often will coexist with NGAs for some time. Therefore, ETNO 
concludes that the proposed risk premium will not solve the lack of incentives for 
widespread NGA roll-out in Europe unless it incorporates the incumbents’ 
opportunity cost of giving up their “real option”.   
It is obvious that there is high ambiguity about the effectiveness of a risk premium 
on encouraging incumbents to invest in NGA networks. This ambiguity is 
enhanced by the fact that the appropriate array of remedies imposed by an NRA 
should reflect a proportionate application of the “ladder-of-investment” principle 
proposed by Cave and Vogelsang (2003). This theory is extensively presented 
                                                          
4
  Franklin and Diallo (2013) propose a model and methodology for valuing the option to delay 
network investment decisions and calculating cost-based access prices by taking into account the 
fact that an option value multiple must be calculated for each network element where a network 
element is an identifiable part of the network infrastructure. 
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and discussed in section 3.2 of this paper. Therefore, the ultimate goal of the 
current regulatory policy in Europe is to encourage the gradual migration from 
service-based to facilities-based competition over NGA networks.  
In conclusion, the analysis of the regulatory economics of NGA investments 
showed that the optimal regulatory policy should be aligned with the current 
regulatory framework in the European NGA market described by the following 
four basic principles concerning: 
i) The evolution of the regulatory goals over time. The regulatory policy 
should initially encourage the incumbent to invest in new fibre-based access 
networks and promote service-based competition over such networks. Once the 
new fibre-based access network has been deployed and service-based 
competition over such networks has been established, the regulatory policy 
should encourage the access seekers to invest in their own fibre infrastructures.  
ii) The characteristics of the access pricing formula. The access to the 
incumbent’s network should be provided at cost-oriented prices including a risk 
premium to reflect any additional and quantifiable investment risk incurred by the 
investor. Risk allocation mechanisms, such as long-term access pricing or 
volume discounts, which decrease the risk that an investor incurs when investing 
in NGAs, lead to a respective decrease in the risk premium. However, since the 
EC Recommendation does not include in such mechanisms the fixed-fee 
payments, it is deduced that two-part access tariffs do not reflect the current 
regulatory framework in the European NGA market. Therefore, NRAs should 
apply uniform (or usage or linear) access prices under a regime of permanent 
regulation as long as an SMP operator is found within markets 4 and/or 5. 
iii) The evolution of the access prices. Access prices should be aligned with 
the EC statement that the appropriate array of remedies imposed by an NRA 
should reflect a proportionate application of the ladder-of-investment principle. 
iv) The provision of regulatory certainty. According to the EC 
Recommendation, regulatory certainty is a key to promoting efficient investments 
by all operators. Applying a consistent regulatory approach over time is important 
to give investors confidence for the design of their business plans. In order to 
mitigate the uncertainty associated with periodical market reviews, NRAs should 
clarify to the greatest extent possible how foreseeable changes in market 
circumstances might affect remedies. 
     
3. Literature review 
In the introductory section, we showed that the permanent regulation of access at 
uniform cost-based prices, which is designed to stimulate competition in the 
market by facilitating entry of alternative operators, promotes static efficiency at 
the cost of dynamic efficiency.  
Thus, this section reviews the research articles that shift their focus from the 
impact of the principles governing the regulation of the copper access networks 
on static and dynamic efficiency to the deployment of new regulatory approaches 
that may promote both static and dynamic efficiency (i.e. induce the socially 
optimal investments in NGA networks). Such alternative approaches depart from 
existing practices in terms of the access pricing formula and/or the regulatory 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 196 
regime employed.5 In the former case the effectiveness of non-uniform or non-
cost-based access prices on the levels of competition and investments is studied, 
whereas in the latter case the impact of non-permanent regulatory regimes on the 
timing of the investment decisions and on the subsequent competition level is 
discussed.  
The reviewed research articles can be classified into three broad categories as 
proposed by Vogelsang (2010). The first strand deals with the effect of the 
regulated access price on the incumbents’ incentives to invest in new 
infrastructures and on the subsequent competition level, independent of the effect 
on potential alternative competitors. The second strand deals with the incentive 
effects of unbundling obligations on the entrants’ investments and on the 
subsequent competition level. Last, a third part of the access-related literature 
deals with incumbent and entrant investment decisions in models that capture a 
new industry, in which two firms have to decide, which one will invest first and in 
which access regulation has been established before.  
 
3.1. Access regulation and an incumbent’s incentives to invest 
This section studies the impact of alternative regulatory settings in terms of either 
the access pricing formula or the regulatory regime employed on the standard 
trade-off between promoting static and dynamic efficiency.  
Klumpp and Su (2010) propose a uniform access price that spreads investment 
costs over total output quantities (which implies that the incumbent can recoup 
investment costs through the access prices) in order to show that such an access 
pricing scheme can promote both static and dynamic efficiency  comparing with 
the monopolistic market (i.e. regulatory holidays). However, Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2011) show that the result of Klumpp and Su (2010) is dependent on 
the particular regulatory regime and the assumption about regulatory uncertainty. 
Thus, they allow the access pricing scheme that spreads investment costs over 
total output quantities for taking into account different regulatory regimes, as well 
as, assume that the incumbent invests after the regulator has set the access 
price (i.e. regulatory certainty).6 They show that a regime with fully distributed 
                                                          
5
  The following regulatory regimes are studied in the respective literature. Permanent regulation 
implies that the ex ante imposed remedies hold for the whole lifecycle of the NGA investment, 
whereas regulatory forbearance refers to the situation where there is no ex ante regulation on 
NGA networks. Regulatory holidays and sunset clauses are intermediate regulatory regimes 
between regulatory forbearance and permanent regulation. Under regulatory holidays, the 
investor is not imposed to any regulatory constraints for a predetermined period of time, whereas 
by imposing a sunset clause, the regulator commits that will withdraw access obligations after a 
predetermined date.  
6
  In a static framework (or in a hypothetical world of economic certainty), the incumbent may 
invest under regulatory certainty if the investment decision is undertaken after the regulation of 
the access price. However, the regulation of the access is a dynamic process and regulatory 
remedies are also imposed after the investment decisions. Although theoretical static models are 
useful for giving an insight into regulatory policies, we should keep in mind that uncertainty can be 
reduced to risk, possibly even low risk, but not certainty. This fact is also considered in the EC 
Recommendation since NRAs are encouraged (in order to provide greater certainty) to clarify to 
the greatest extent possible (i.e. not to fully commit) how foreseeable changes in market 
circumstances might affect remedies. 
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costs (FDC) 7 or  regulatory holidays induce highest investments, followed by risk-
sharing and long run incremental costs (LRIC), which is a particular methodology 
of forward-looking cost-based regulation. In addition, in combining strong 
competitive intensity with reasonable investment incentives, simulations indicate 
that a risk sharing approach induces highest consumer surplus, followed by 
regimes with fully distributed costs, regulatory holidays and LRIC. Therefore, they 
conclude that risk-sharing can be an effective tool since it combines relatively 
high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity. They 
also confirm that forward-looking cost-based regulation neither induces 
investments nor consumer surplus.  
Contrary to the previous articles that study the impact of different regulatory 
regimes on the levels of investments and competition, Charalampopoulos, 
Katsianis and Varoutas (2011) and Gavosto, Ponte and Scaglioni (2007) use a 
real option approach in order to study the impact of four different regulatory 
regimes (permanent regulation, regulatory forbearance, regulatory holidays and 
sunset clauses) on the timing of the investment decision of an incumbent to 
expand to a new network infrastructure. The former article shows that regulatory 
holidays induce the incumbent to expand its current network as soon as the 
regulatory holiday season ends, which is long before the expiration date of the 
option to expand. The latter article concludes that investment is carried out 
immediately under forbearance and regulatory holiday regimes, while it is delayed 
by around two years in the other cases. Therefore, it can be deduced that both 
articles argue that regulatory holidays appear superior to the other regulatory 
regimes, although the two papers provide different results about the impact of 
regulatory holidays on the particular timing of the investment. In combining these 
results with those of Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), it can be deduced that 
although regulatory holidays appear superior to the other regulatory regimes in 
terms of both NGA investment level and the timing of the investments, they fail to 
promote an efficient competition level. In this context, Tselekounis, Maniadakis 
and Varoutas (2013) show that the regulator should allow the monopolist to 
geographically price discriminate since such pricing regime results in better 
investment and welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as the investment 
cost is not extremely low. 
Contrary to the aforementioned articles that study the efficiency implications of 
different regulatory regimes, Tselekounis and Varoutas (2013) study the impact of 
the uncertainty about future access prices on an incumbent’s incentives to 
undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. For this reason, 
they assume that the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of 
providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup, which 
equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. 
They found that when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not 
particularly steep in relation to the impact of investments on demand, the 
incumbent underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment level. On the 
contrary, when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the 
slope of the marginal investment cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or 
                                                          
7
 Under the fully distributed costs regulation, the incumbent may recoup NGA investment costs 
through the access price, regardless of the NGA's market success since the entrant is forced to 
cover part of the investment costs. 
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underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating an access markup into 
the access price. Therefore, uniform access prices may lead to significant welfare 
losses due to the impact of regulatory uncertainty on investment incentives.  
Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010) study the impact of the regulatory commitment 
problem on the effectiveness of two-part access tariffs to solve the dynamic 
consistency problem of the regulation. They find that when the investment cost is 
low compared to the investment benefits, two-part tariffs solve the dynamic 
consistency problem either under regulatory certainty or uncertainty. In this case, 
the optimal regulatory policy is to set the fixed access price in order to induce 
investments by the incumbent and the usage access price at the marginal cost of 
providing the access in order to promote static efficiency. If, on the contrary, the 
investment cost takes intermediate values compared to the investment benefits, 
the commitment and the no-commitment games have different equilibria, with the 
incumbent investing in the commitment equilibrium, and not investing in no-
commitment game. Last, if the investment cost is high compared to the 
investment benefits, investment is not socially desirable under both commitment 
and no-commitment games. Therefore, two-part access tariffs may not solve the 
dynamic consistency problem even when the regulator can commit ex ante to a 
particular access pricing policy. 
 
3.2. Access regulation and an entrant’s incentives to invest 
The second literature strand deals with the impact of access regulation on an 
entrant’s incentives to invest in network upgrade. In particular, this literature 
studies whether service-based competition serves as a stepping stone to 
facilities-based competition or the presence of the option to “buy” the incumbent’s 
facilities represents an opportunity cost when the entrant chooses to engage in 
infrastructure competition (i.e creates the so-called “replacement effect”). 
Cave and Vogelsang (2003) point out that entrants will typically invest in 
replicable assets first and then progress to less replicable ones. Thus, they rank 
the incumbent’s network assets according to their degree of replicability from an 
entrant’s perspective and propose an innovative access scheme in which the 
price for the less replicable network elements is low but increasing over time as 
assets are replicated. Therefore, as the entrant’s customer bases grow, the 
access price increases in order to encourage the entrant to invest in the next less 
replicable asset. This process continues until the entrant invests in its own 
infrastructure which represents the higher rung in the investment ladder. Thus, 
the so-called “ladder-of-investment” theory argues that service-based competition 
serves as a stepping stone to facilities-based competition. Cave (2006) proposes 
and illustrates methods for assessing the replicability of different assets and sets 
out the steps which regulators can follow in implementing the approach. An 
alternative regulatory tool that resembles the ladder-of-investment approach is 
the already discussed “sunset clause” regulatory regime. By imposing a sunset 
clause, the regulator commits that will withdraw access obligations after a 
predetermined date. The building block of both approaches is the expectation that 
as service-based competition becomes less attractive over time, the entrant will 
gradually invest in its own network infrastructures.  
Although sunset clauses and the ladder-of-investment theory have been 
embraced by many telecommunications regulators and organizations (ARCEP, 
2007; EC, 2010b; ERG, 2005; ERG, 2006), the related literature provides mixed 
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results about the effectiveness of each approach to make service-based and 
facilities-based competition complements in promoting both investments and 
competition. Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi (2010) use a dynamic discrete 
choice model and assume that developing an alternative infrastructure requires 
both time and an installed base of consumers which implies that a period of 
service-based competition is a prerequisite for facilities-based competition in the 
next period. They find that a multi-period schedule where regulated access 
charges rise over time is critical to foster efficient infrastructure investments, 
whereas a sunset clause on regulation dilutes investment incentives. In addition, 
they point out that the regulatory commitment problem may affect the robustness 
of their main result. Thus, they propose that the access price should depend both 
on time and entry period in order to ensure that late entrants are provided with 
the same dynamic access conditions. In a more recent paper, Bourreau and 
Drouard (2010) use a general model of competition in order to study the impact of 
both a “replacement effect” and a “stepping stone effect” on an entrant’s 
incentives to invest in network upgrade. Thus, they allow an initial serviced-based 
period for the entrant to build its market share progressively. This implies that the 
entrant might have significant incentives to prolong the service-based competition 
phase in order to build a larger market share. They show that if facilities-based 
entry is a short-term (long-term) possibility, the replacement effect (the stepping 
stone effect) prevails, and hence, a phase of service-based competition delays 
(accelerates) facilities-based entry.  
Therefore, as Bourreau, Doğan and Manant (2010) point out, a phase of service-
based competition may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to ensure 
that it will serve as a stepping stone to facilities-based entry if the replacement 
effect is neutralized. The authors also challenge another assumption of the 
ladder-of-investment theory which states that the regulator has the instrument to 
neutralize the replacement effect. They argue that although access prices that 
increase over time may neutralize the replacement effect, credibility of regulatory 
commitments and informational requirements raise several concerns about the 
successful implementation of this theory.  
The effectiveness of the ladder-of-investment theory on encouraging new entrant 
operators to invest in their own access infrastructures has been studied not only 
theoretically but also empirically. Distaso, Lupi and Manenti (2009) use semi-
annual data from 12 European countries (study period: January 2005-July 2007) 
and test the ladder-of-investment theory by looking at the link between the prices 
of wholesale access services and the relative growth rates of the three alternative 
inputs that can be used by new entrants to provide access and broadband 
services to end users: bitstream services, LLU services and their own networks. 
Although they point out that the policies adopted by NRAs are broadly consistent 
with the ladder-of-investment theory, their graphical results reveal that only few 
countries (France and Spain) have succeeded in encouraging the entrants to 
climb the investment ladder due to increasing access prices over time. In a more 
recent empirical study, Bacache, Bourreau and Gaudin (2011) use semi-annual 
data (from 2002 to 2009) covering incumbent and entrant fixed-broadband 
operators in 15 European member states in order to test the ladder-of-investment 
hypothesis. They find no statistically significant effect of the number of unbundled 
lines on the number of new access infrastructure lines built by entrants, which 
implies that there is no evidence in support of the ladder-of-investment 
hypothesis.  
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3.3. Access regulation and both firms’ incentives to invest 
This strand of the literature on access pricing and investment incentives focuses 
on the effect of access prices on firms’ incentives to invest in new access 
networks. This implies that the strategic impact of the investment decision of each 
firm on the other firms’ investment decisions is taken into account. In particular, 
the related articles assume that there are two firms which have to decide if and 
when to deploy a new access network. It is obvious that this part of the literature 
does not discriminate between an incumbent and an entrant since either firm can 
invest first in a new network infrastructure. Thus, both firms are assumed to be 
symmetric. 
In a dynamic context, firms may tend to preempt each other when there are 
significant first-mover advantages and delay investments when there are 
significant second-mover advantages. The former case triggers a race for 
investment, whereas the latter case leads to a waiting equilibrium. The regulator’s 
goal is to set the access price at the level that incentivizes each firm to invest at 
the socially optimal time.  
Hori and Mizuno (2006) use a model with stochastically growing demand in order 
to assess the impact of a uniform access price on a race of investment between 
two firms. They find that in the retail market an increase in the access price 
induces the leader to enter the market earlier and the follower to enter the market 
with access later or to build its bypass facility earlier. In addition, they also 
provide the conditions that induce the follower to enter the market by accessing 
the leader’s network and then build its own network. Hori and Mizuno (2008) 
improve their previous work by comparing the impact of service-based and 
facilities-based competition on the timing of investments. They show that in 
service-based competition a follower enters the market earlier and builds a 
bypass later than in facilities-based competition. Concerning the leader’s 
investment timing, they provide the conditions that determine the priority of the 
two competition schemes in terms of monopoly rents, access charges and degree 
of uncertainty.  
In a more recent article, Vareda and Hoernig (2010) assume two-part access 
tariffs in which the usage price is used to maximize static efficiency and the fixed 
price to induce dynamic efficiency (i.e. to incentivize each firm to invest at the 
socially optimal time). They show that in a waiting equilibrium higher access 
prices make both firms to invest earlier. Considering the preemption equilibrium, 
they conclude that higher access prices have also a positive effect on the 
follower’s investment timing but their impact on the leader’s investment timing is 
ambiguous. Therefore, the first-best cannot be achieved with any given two-part 
access tariff. Thus, a sunset clause (respectively, a regulatory holiday) may lead 
to the first-best investment outcome if the follower’s private investment incentives 
are small (respectively, high). 
 
3.4. Discussion 
This section reviewed the articles that propose new regulatory approaches and 
then assess their effectiveness and efficiency implications. There are many useful 
regulatory implications that can be drawn by the analysis of the effect of the 
proposed approaches on firms’ incentives to invest in NGA networks, as well as, 
on the subsequent competition level. 
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Firstly, although a regulatory holidays regime seems to induce the incumbent to 
deploy a broader NGA network earlier, it is inferior to risk-sharing and FDC 
regimes in terms of consumer surplus. However, regulatory holidays are superior 
to LRIC in terms of both investments and competition. In addition, a departure 
from uniform access prices cannot solve the dynamic consistency problem unless 
the investment cost is low compared to the investment benefits. Therefore, a 
departure from the permanent regulation of access at uniform cost-based prices 
is not adequate to promote both competition and investments in NGA networks 
by the incumbents. Secondly, although a phase of service-based competition 
may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to ensure that it will serve as a 
stepping stone to facilities-based entry, an access price that increases over time 
does not always succeed in encouraging the entrants to climb the investment 
ladder.  
It can thus be deduced that the related literature on the relationship between 
access regulation and investment incentives does not provide an optimal access 
pricing policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA 
networks by incumbents and then entrants. In particular, the above results raise 
serious doubts about the effectiveness of the EC Recommendation concerning 
the permanent regulation of access at uniform cost-based prices and the 
implementation of the ladder-of-investment theory during the migration to a phase 
of facilities-based competition. However, the research articles study the impact of 
alternative regulatory approaches on either the incumbents’ or the entrants’ 
investment incentives without considering the strategic interaction between their 
investment decisions. On the contrary, the current regulatory framework in the 
European NGA market considers that the incumbent will invest first in new 
access infrastructures, while the entrants will gradually invest in their own bypass 
facilities. It is obvious that when the incumbent (respectively, the entrant) decides 
its optimal investment decision, it takes into account the optimal investment 
decision of the entrant (respectively, the incumbent). This implies that the 
disclosed access pricing policy should take into account the impact of access 
regulation on both firms’ incentives to invest although such investment decisions 
are taken in a sequential order. The third literature strand takes into account such 
strategic reaction by allowing either an incumbent or an entrant to invest first in 
NGA networks. However, it provides mixed results concerning the impact of 
access prices on the leader’s investment incentives even if a two-part access 
price is used to maximize both static and dynamic efficiency, as well as, it does 
not discriminate between a vertically integrated incumbent and a new entrant 
operator. 
To best of authors’ knowledge, the only paper that reflects the current regulatory 
framework in terms of the evolution of the regulatory goals over time is Vareda 
(2011). In particular, it considers a dynamic framework in which an incumbent 
chooses how much to upgrade the quality of its network and then an entrant, at 
each point in time, has the option to enter as a service-based competitor, by 
asking for access to the incumbent’s network, or as a facilities-based competitor, 
by building a bypass network. He shows that when the regulator can ex ante 
commit to a two-part access tariff: (i) the entrant’s investment in a bypass network 
is delayed with a higher incumbent’s investment in quality; (ii) the possibility of 
investment in a bypass network by the entrant has a positive effect on the 
incumbent’s incentive to upgrade quality; (iii) the effect of access prices on both 
incumbent and entrant firms’ incentives to invest is ambiguous; and (iv) a welfare 
improving access tariff that could be designed by the regulator would be one 
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where the access fee is increasing (decreasing) in quality if the incumbent’s 
incentives are such that it under-invests (over-invests). 
However, the work of Vareda (2011) not only uses a two-part access tariff (rather 
than a uniform access price), but also assumes that the access price is fixed over 
time (rather than reflecting a proportionate application of the ladder-of-investment 
principle). Therefore, his model fails to align with two of the four basic principles 
of the EC Recommendation. 
On the contrary, this paper proposes an innovative approach that reflects the 
current regulatory framework in the European NGA market as described by the 
EC Recommendation (EC, 2010b). In particular, the proposed approach models 
the four basic principles of the current European regulatory framework and then 
assesses its effectiveness on inducing facilities-based competition over NGA 
networks. This implies that this paper can be included in the literature that 
departs from assessing the efficiency outcomes of the regulation of the copper 
access networks. It is shown that the proposed approach meets the current 
regulatory goals since it tackles the initial trade-off between encouraging the 
incumbents to invest in NGA networks and fostering competition, while it 
incentivizes the entrants to gradually climb the ladder-of-investment when the 
NGA investment is proven to be successful. Therefore, the proposed approach 
not only fills the gap between the reviewed literature and the current European 
regulatory framework, but also provides an effective migration path towards 
facilities-based competition over NGA networks. 
 
4. A CDS approach 
This section presents an innovative approach that aims to reflect the current 
regulatory framework in the European NGA market and then to assess its 
effectiveness on promoting competition and encouraging investments in NGA 
networks by both incumbents and entrants. In particular, the proposed approach 
is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS). Thus, 
this section initially provides a brief review of the basic features of a typical CDS 
contract. Then, it presents the proposed method, describes its implementation 
and discusses its impact on investment incentives and competition. It is shown 
that the proposed approach represents an effective way towards facilities-based 
competition over NGA networks. 
 
4.1. Background 
A CDS contract is an agreement between two parties, the protection buyer and 
the protection seller. The first party to the contract, the protection buyer, wishes to 
insure himself against the possibility of default on a bond issued by a particular 
company. The company that has issued the bond is called the reference entity. 
The second party to the contract, the protection seller, is willing to bear the risk 
associated with default by the reference entity.  The protection buyer of the CDS 
makes a series of payments (the CDS "premium" or "spread") to the protection 
seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff in the event of a default by the 
reference entity. If a default does not occur over the life of the contract, the 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
203  M. Tselekounis 
contract expires at its maturity date, and hence, the protection seller does not 
make any payments to the protection buyer.8 
The next section shows how the basic logic of a typical CDS contract can be 
applied in the telecommunications markets in order to induce facilities-based 
competition over new fibre access networks.  
 
4.2. The model  
The proposed model assumes that there are two parties in the contract: the 
incumbent, which invests in NGA networks, and the regulator. They both agree 
on a business plan that allows the incumbent to recover9 the investment in a 
nationwide NGA deployment (i.e. the deployment of an NGA network in every 
geographic area of the country) during a certain period of time. If the investment 
has not been recovered at the end of this period, the regulator commits itself that 
it will compensate the incumbent for the unrecovered part of the investment. After 
the end of this period, no regulatory remedies will be imposed to the incumbent 
(sunset clause). In exchange, the incumbent should make periodic payments to 
the regulator. However, the regulator chooses to subtract this amount from the 
payments that an access seeker makes to the incumbent in order to have access 
to the NGA networks. This implies that the incumbent does not pay a periodic 
premium to the regulator but it subtracts this amount from the access payments it 
receives. If, however, the investment has been recovered before the end of the 
clause, the regulator does not make any payment to the incumbent, the 
incumbent stops making indirect periodic payments to the access seeker and no 
remedies imposed to the incumbent. In such contract, the incumbent is the 
protection buyer and the regulator is the protection seller which will compensate 
the incumbent in the case of a default event (i.e. if the investment has not been 
recovered at the end of the predetermined period).  
A very significant issue that should be further investigated is the content of the 
business plan. In particular, the incumbent and the regulator agree on a business 
plan that describes the time evolution of the basic parameters affecting the 
profitability of an NGA investment project. In other words, the business plan 
should assess the period of time required for the recovery of the investment 
under plausible assumptions about the main factors that affect the profitability of 
an investment in NGA networks. As it has already been stated above, the main 
factor that negatively affects the investment incentives in NGA networks is the 
uncertainty about the demand parameters, such as the diffusion of the new fibre-
based services, the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for such services and the 
                                                          
8
 For a detailed description of CDS contracts, see Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Arora, 
Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012).  
9
 The exact interpretation of the term “investment recovery” depends on the particular financial 
methodology mutually agreed by the incumbent and the regulator in order to define the terms of 
the contract. Our main thesis is that this is an economic rather than an accounting term, and 
therefore, it is disconnected from any accounting terms (e.g. depreciation). We expect that the 
“investment recovery” will be based on discounted cash flows analysis (e.g. payback period based 
on discounted cash flows) with a fixed time horizon. Further discussion on the matter is beyond 
the scope of this paper, although we acknowledge that it provides an excellent field for future 
research.  
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market shares of the incumbent and the entrant. Thus, the business plan should 
clearly state how these parameters will evolve over time.  
It is expected that the diffusion process will follow an S-shaped curve since the 
most known models used for such purposes provide an S-shaped curve 
describing technology diffusion among specific populations (Michalakelis, 
Varoutas and Sphicopoulos, 2008). At the initial stages of the diffusion process 
the potential buyers of the new product are the innovators and then the early 
adopters. Internal influences, such as word-of-mouth, and external influences, 
such as mass-media communication, facilitate the adoption of the new product by 
early majority, late majority and, finally, laggards. Therefore, the S-shaped curve 
reflects the fact that the migration from copper access networks to NGA networks 
is a slow process (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012).   
However, according to Moore (1991) the most important phase in the diffusion 
process is the transition from the early adopters to early majority. The reason is 
that there are qualitative differences between these two groups, and hence, early 
adopters do not make good references for the early majority. Therefore, the 
whole investment may fail if the diffusion process does not cross this chasm. It is 
thus expected that the entrant will exploit the second-mover advantage of “wait-
and-see” until the diffusion process cross this chasm. This implies that at the 
initial stages of the diffusion process the incumbent will serve almost the whole 
market. Hence, the incumbent takes the more interesting part of the market first 
and it becomes more difficult or costly (i.e. increases the switching cost) for the 
entrant to reach the market share needed for its profitability (WIK, 2009). This 
implies that if the diffusion process crosses this chasm, the entrant increases its 
market share but this increase is mainly due to new consumers rather than 
existing ones.  
It is thus obvious that even if fibre access networks replace much of the existing 
copper access infrastructures, there will be a period during which both are in 
operation and are competing for customers. This implies that low access prices 
for the copper access networks increase the opportunity cost of the entrant’s 
investment in NGA networks, making such investment less attractive, whereas 
low retail prices for the copper-based services discourage consumers to move 
from the old to the new technology unless the fibre-based services are priced 
sufficiently low as well (Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan, 2012). The former effect 
is widely known as a “replacement effect” and the latter as a “business migration” 
effect. The fundamental point is that higher access prices lead to higher retail 
prices. Therefore, a higher difference between fibre and copper access prices 
implies a higher difference between fibre and copper retail prices, which in turn, 
disincentivizes both entrant and consumers to move to the NGA networks. As a 
result, the relationship between the fibre and the copper access prices not only 
affects the providers’ profits and investment incentives, but also the diffusion 
process of the new technology.10 
Another significant source of uncertainty is related to the regulator’s limited ability 
to make ex ante credible commitments. However, this model proposes that the 
contract commits the regulator to apply a certain policy during the whole 
                                                          
10
 See Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan (2013); Bourreau, Lupi and Manenti (2013); Brito, Pereira 
and Vareda (2012); Cambini and Silvestri (2012); Cave, Fournier and Shutova (2012); Inderst and 
Peitz (2012b); and Neumann and Vogelsang (2013) for a discussion about the impact of the 
regulation of the legacy network on the firms’ investment incentives when the NGA market is left 
unregulated or when there is an interplay between the access prices of the two networks. 
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predetermined period. This policy, which concerns the derivation of the access 
pricing formula, as well as, its evolution over time, is known to the incumbent ex 
ante. As it has already been stated above, it is not optimal for the regulator to 
intervene in the market very often because it dilutes investment incentives. On 
the contrary, it is socially not optimal for the regulator to make ex ante 
commitments for an unreasonably long regulatory period. Thus, this model 
proposes an intermediate solution in which the regulator makes periodic reviews 
at a predetermined period. In each periodic review the regulator may increase or 
decrease the access price according to certain rules that are described in the 
contract and presented in the following section. It can thus be deduced that the 
incumbent invests in NGA networks under regulatory certainty.  
 
4.3. Implementation 
At time 0t   the incumbent and the regulator agree on a business plan that 
allows the former to have recovered the investment in NGA networks at time  
t T  with a given probability. Or, in other words, they estimate the probability of 
default ( 0P ), as well as, the corresponding unrecovered part of the investment 
( 0X ) at the end of the predetermined period. The subscript “0” denotes the 
values of the parameters tP   and tX  , [0, ]t T , at the time that the estimation 
takes place (i.e. 0t   in this case). Based on the estimated values of 0X  and 0P , 
they assess the amount of the periodic payments ( 0K ) that the incumbent should 
make to the regulator. This implies that if the estimated demand parameters at 
0t   coincide with the actual ones during the whole predetermined period T, the 
total amount of the periodic payments will be 0TK .
11 However, the regulator 
chooses not to receive such payments but to subtract this amount from the 
access payments. Therefore, the reduced access payments that the entrant will 
finally make to the incumbent from 0t   to t T  are given by: 
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 In fact, 0X  denotes the estimation at 0t   for the discounted unrecovered part of the 
investment, and hence, the estimation at 0t   for the total amount of the discounted periodic 
payments is given by: 
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 , where r  denotes the interest rate.. However, throughout this 
paper, we have assumed, for simplicity, that 0r   since the abstraction of the time-value-of-
money does not change the results qualitatively.    
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 206 
Therefore, the access price that the entrant pays to the incumbent during the T 
years is given by 0 ( )  oCW W R . It is thus obvious that the access payments that 
an entrant pays to the incumbent for one period [0, ]t T  are derived by 
multiplying the access price with the number of the entrant’s subscriber at period 
t. The sum of these payments from 0t   to t T  yields the total access 
payments that the entrant pays to the incumbent in order to have access to the 
NGA networks for the whole predetermined period T. If the estimated demand 
parameters at 0t   coincide with the actual ones during the whole predetermined 
period T, then the initial regulatory policy will lead to the recovery of the NGA 
investment at time t T . Since the main factor that affects the profitability of an 
NGA investment is the demand for the new fibre-based services, it is expected 
that the cumulative recovery of the investment will also follow an S-shaped 
pattern as depicted in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative recovery of the NGA investment 
However, since the periodic payments are closely related to the possibility of 
default, it can be deduced that the amount of such payments may vary over time. 
The reason is that although the business plan forecasts the evolution of the 
demand parameters over time, it is uncertain whether the actual demand will 
coincide with the estimated one. For example, even if the diffusion process will 
follow an S-shaped curve, the time at which the saturation level will be achieved 
may deviate from the estimated one. As a result, it is also uncertain whether the 
investment will have been recovered at the end of the predetermined period. 
Since it is not optimal for the regulator to make ex ante commitments for 
unreasonably short or long regulatory periods, the proposed approach states that 
the regulator makes periodic reviews at predetermined periods in order to correct 
potential distortions due to any deviation from the estimated parameters. Thus, 
the business plan clearly states that the regulator will make periodic reviews 
every T/m years. In the example presented in figure 1, the regulator makes 
periodic reviews every T/4 years. In addition, the proposed model states that in 
each review, the regulator changes the access price only if the initial estimation 
(made at 0t  ) for the cumulative recovery at the time of the review, tD , deviates 
from the actual cumulative recovery more than x%. The exact percentage of x is 
mutually agreed by the incumbent and the regulator. 
However, the most significant issue is how the regulator changes the access 
price in each periodic review. The reason is that a marginal change in the access 
price will significantly affect the incumbent’s profits, the entrant’s investment 
incentives, as well as, the competition level. The basic principle governing the 
change in the access price is the estimation of the periodic payments made from 
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the protection buyer to the protection seller in a CDS contract. In each periodic 
review, the regulator should examine whether the cumulative recovery of the 
NGA investment is higher or lower than the initially estimated one by more than 
x%. Therefore, three cases should be studied. In the first case, the investment is 
successful since the actual cumulative recovery is higher than the initially 
estimated one by more than x% (upside case).  In the second case, the 
investment is not successful since the actual cumulative recovery is lower than 
the initially estimated one by more than x% (downside case). In the last case, the 
difference between the actual and the initially estimated cumulative recovery is 
less than x% (base case).   
 
4.3.1 The upside case 
Let’s assume that in the first regulatory review ( / 4t T ) the actual cumulative 
recovery is higher than the initially estimated one ( /4TD ) by more than x%, i.e. 
/4 /4/4
) / %(
actual
T TT
xD D D  . Therefore, the regulator should intervene in the access 
market in order to review the access price. In this case, the probability of default 
decreases since it is more probable that the investment will have been recovered 
before the end of the predetermined period T . Hence, the value of the probability 
of default at / 4t T  is lower than its value at 0t   (i.e. /4 0TP P ). In addition, the 
estimated unrecovered part of the investment ( /4TX ) is also lower than the initially 
estimated one ( 0X ). As a result, the periodic payments that the incumbent will 
make to the regulator from / 4t T  until t T  should be lower than the initially 
estimated ones (i.e. /4 0TK K ). Thus, the regulator should set /4TR  at the level 
that makes the following equation hold: 
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In other words, the regulator should assess the value of /4TR  that leads the left 
side of Eq. (4) to decrease as much as the decrease caused by the upside case 
to the right side of Eq. (4). Firstly, note that a decrease in the regulatory 
parameter tR  leads to an increase in the access price. Indeed, the access price 
that the entrant will pay to the incumbent from / 4t T  until t T  is given by 
/4/4 ( )  TT CW W R . Obviously, this access price is higher than 0W  since /4 0TR R . 
A higher access price causes the entrant’s market share to decrease and the 
incumbent’s market share to increase. Secondly, a higher access price leads to a 
higher retail price for the fibre-based services. Therefore, the difference between 
the retail prices of the copper and the NGA networks increases, thereby making 
the latter less attractive for consumers. This result mitigates the diffusion process 
and negatively affects the demand faced by each provider. It is thus obvious that 
when the regulator decreases the regulatory parameter tR , the entrant’s 
consumer base decreases due to the aforementioned reasons. 12  Therefore, a 
                                                          
12
 The value of x should be high enough in order to ensure that the annual periodic payments 
which the incumbent will make to the regulator )( tK  are substantially decreased (or increased in 
the downside case). The reason is that if the decrease in the entrant’s consumer base is much 
higher than the decrease in the annual periodic payments, then a higher tR  may be required in 
order to make Eq. (4) hold. However, this is in contrast with the fact that the decrease in the 
entrant’s consumer base stems from a decrease in tR . It is thus obvious that the access price 
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proper decrease in tR  ensures that the decrease in the amount subtracted from 
the access payments (left side of Eq. (4)) is equal to the decrease in the amount 
that the incumbent should have paid to the regulator (right side of Eq. (4)).13 
The most interesting result of this regulatory policy is that it encourages the 
entrant to invest in its own facilities. Indeed, an increase in the access price of the 
NGA networks raises the entrant’s variable cost, decreases its market share and 
its profits, and hence, makes fibre unbundling less attractive for the entrant. In 
conclusion, the proposed approach provides the entrant with incentives to climb 
the ladder-of-investment in each upside case. As the entrant gradually invests in 
its own network, it becomes more effective competitor. As a result, the retail price 
decreases which, in turn, enhances the diffusion process. Therefore, this 
approach increases the probability of a successive upside case in the next 
regulatory review. It is obvious that this approach will be implemented as long as 
the actual cumulative diffusion is higher than the initially estimated ones (i.e. 
/4TD , /2TD , 3 /4TD ) by more than x%. 
The opponents of this approach may argue that the incumbent does not have any 
incentives to invest under such a regulatory approach since its profits stoke the 
recovery of the investment, whereas the entrant makes positive profits by 
exploiting the second-mover advantages. However, we should keep in mind that 
as soon as the investment has been recovered, the sunset clause ends. 
Therefore, the incumbent pursues to accelerate the diffusion process in order to 
recover the investment earlier and then reap the benefits of being the first-mover 
(i.e. its high market share consisting of consumers with high willingness-to-pay).  
 
4.3.2 The downside case 
Now, let’s discuss the case of downside. Assume, for example, that the actual 
cumulative recovery is lower than the estimated one ( /4TD ) by more than x%, i.e. 
/4 /4/4
) / %( actualT TT xD D D  . Therefore, the regulator should review the access price. 
In this case the estimation made at / 4t T  for the probability of default, as well 
as, for the unrecovered part of the investment are higher than the initially 
estimated ones.  Hence, /4 0TP P  and /4 0TX X . As a result, the periodic 
payments that the incumbent will make to the regulator from / 4t T  until t T  
should be higher than the initially estimated ones (i.e. /4 0TK K ). Contrary to the 
upside case, the regulatory policy that makes Eq. (4) hold is to increase the 
regulatory parameter tR .  
The reason is that an increase in tR  has a twofold impact on the entrant’s 
consumer base. Firstly, the access price decreases, and hence, the entrant’s 
market share increases. Indeed, the access price that the entrant will pay to the 
incumbent from / 4t T  until t T  is given by /4/4 ( )  TT CW W R  and is lower than 
0W  since  /4 0TR R . Secondly, a lower access price for the NGA networks leads 
                                                                                                                                                                             
should be reviewed when the actual diffusion is significantly deviated from the initially estimated 
one (i.e. either in upside or downside cases). 
13
  Of course, an increase in the regulatory parameter tR  
causes the opposite results. In this case, 
the left side of Eq. (4) is higher than the respective right side, which implies that such a regulatory 
decision does not reflect the reduction (due to the upside case) in the amount that the incumbent 
should have paid to the regulator. 
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to a lower retail price for the fibre-based services. Therefore, the difference 
between the retail prices of the copper and the NGA networks decreases, thereby 
making the latter more attractive for consumers. This result positively affects the 
demand faced by each provider and enhances the diffusion process. Therefore, 
an increase in the regulatory parameter tR  leads the entrant’s consumer base to 
increase. As a result, a proper increase in tR  ensures that the increase in the 
amount of the left side of Eq. (4) is equal to the increase in the amount that the 
incumbent should have paid to the regulator given by the right side of Eq. (4). 
Of course, since the access price decreases, the entrant does not have any 
incentives to invest in its own facilities. However, in this case, the regulator’s goal 
is to increase the total demand rather than incentivizing the entrant to invest in 
NGA networks. The reason is that the entrant invests in NGA networks only when 
the NGA investment is successful. Therefore, the regulator should first promote 
the success of the NGA investment and then encourage the entrant to invest in 
its own facilities. It is obvious that the proposed approach fulfills in enhancing the 
diffusion process since a lower access price facilitates service-based competition 
over NGA networks, as well as, the new access network becomes more attractive 
for consumers. Therefore, it is expected that in the next regulatory review the 
diffusion process (and by extension the cumulative recovery) will coincide with 
the initially estimated one. 
The opponents of the proposed approach may also argue that a lower access 
price decreases the incumbent’s profits. Therefore, the incumbent would not have 
signed the modified CDS contract. However, recall that the probability of a 
downside is higher at the initial stages of the diffusion process and that the 
incumbent’s goal is to recover the NGA investment as soon as possible in order 
to exploit the first-mover advantages and maximize its profits after the end of the 
sunset clause. This implies that the incumbent is willing to sacrifice some short-
run profits for maximizing its long-run profits. A basic prerequisite for the early 
recovery of the NGA investment is the acceleration of the diffusion process and 
especially the crossing of the chasm at its initial stages. In addition, high access 
prices are more profitable for the incumbent in the upside case (i.e. when the 
entrant has a significant market share). On the contrary, in the downside case, a 
high access price deteriorates the entrant’s position in the market, thus making 
the magnitude of such an access price insignificant and the success of the NGA 
investment more uncertain.  
However, it should be noted that in the downside cases the proposed approach is 
more effective at the initial stages of the diffusion process rather than at its final 
stages. The reason is that the potential increase in the adoption rate due to a 
decrease in the access price is limited as the diffusion process approaches its 
saturation level. However, it is expected that the proposed model can handle the 
high probability of a downside at the initial stages of the diffusion process by 
increasing the adoption rate, and hence, leading to an upside at the following 
regulatory reviews. 
 
4.3.3 The base case 
In the base case, the difference between the actual cumulative recovery and the 
initially estimated one is lower than x%, i.e. /4 /4 /4/ % 
actual
T T T xD D D . This implies 
that the initially estimated demand parameters are very close to the actual ones, 
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and hence, the actual diffusion process is almost as expected. Therefore, the 
regulator does not change the access price until the next regulatory review. 
 
4.3.4 A numerical example 
This section presents a numerical example of the implementation of the CDS 
approach in order to show its impact on competition and investment incentives 
under an upside, a downside and a base case. In addition, it presents the 
competition and investment outcomes when the NGA investment is recovered 
before, after and at the predetermined period.  
Assume a hypothetical country of 10 million citizens. The regulator and the 
incumbent agree on a business plan which forecasts the diffusion process of the 
new fibre-based services for the next 12 years. The diffusion process follows the 
S-shaped pattern of figure 1 and approaches its saturation level of 50% in the 
12th year. In addition, the cumulative recovery at [0, ]t T  is assumed to be twice 
the diffusion of the fibre-based services at time t. Therefore, the cumulative 
recovery follows an S-shaped pattern as depicted in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Example of the cumulative recovery of the NGA investment 
It is further assumed that the incumbent’s initial market share of 95% decreases 
by 5% each year. Based on these estimations, the regulator and the incumbent 
agree that the NGA investment level will have been fully recovered after T=12 
years with a certain probability. Table 1 presents the estimated annual cumulative 
recovery (%), as well as, the modified estimations made in t=3 and t=6 due to a 
downside and an upside case, respectively. 
 
Table1. Estimated and actual cumulative recovery 
Year (t) 
Initially (made at 
t=0) estimated 
cumulative 
recovery  
Modified 
estimated 
cumulative 
recovery made at 
t=3 
Modified 
estimated 
cumulative 
recovery made at 
t=6 
0 0 0* 0* 
1 2 2* 2* 
2 6 4* 4* 
3 10 6* 6* 
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4 16 18 24* 
5 28 32 40* 
6 50 50 66* 
7 66 66 72 
8 76 76 78 
9 82 82 82 
10 90 90 90 
11 96 96 96 
12 100 100 100 
* indicates the actual cumulative recovery at [0, ]t T  
 
However, if the NGA investment has not been recovered after 12 years, the 
regulator will pay to the incumbent the unrecovered part of the investment. The 
investment cost of a nationwide NGA deployment is assumed to amount to 
10€10F . 
The initial estimation for the unrecovered part of the investment ( 0X ) and the 
probability of default ( 0P ) leads to an initial estimation of the annual periodic 
payments, e.g. 60 5 10 K €. This implies that if the initial assumptions coincide 
with the actual ones during the whole regulatory period, the investment will have 
been recovered after 12 years, whereas the incumbent will have paid to the 
regulator 60 60 10 TK €. As it has been already mentioned above, the regulator 
does not receive this amount, but he subtracts it from the cost-based access 
payments. The cost-based access price is given by (1 ) C c WACCW , where  c  
represents the cost of providing the access to the NGA networks and WACC is 
the weighted average cost of capital of the incumbent. This implies that if 10c € 
and WACC=10%, the cost-based access price is 11€. In addition, the value of 0R  
that makes equation (3) hold is 5,358€ since 
12
0
11.197.044



t
E
t
t
Q . Therefore, the 
access price is 11-5,358= 5,642€. According to Equation (2), the total access 
payments are 63.173.722€.     
However, the regulator should review the access price every 3 years in order to 
ensure that the diffusion process and the subsequent cumulative recovery will 
result in the recovery of the NGA investment after 12 years. If the difference 
between the actual cumulative recovery and the initially estimated one is more 
than x=10%, then the regulator changes the access price.  
Let’s assume that the time lag of the diffusion process is one year, which implies 
that in the first regulatory review (t=3) the cumulative recovery is 6% and the 
saturation level in t=12 will be 96%.  In this case, x>10%, and hence, the 
regulator should change the access price. The reason is that in the downside 
case the periodic payments that the incumbent should make to the regulator 
increase. Assume, for example, that 63 8 10 K €, which implies that 
6
3
72 10( 3)  T K €. Therefore, the regulator should increase the regulatory 
parameter tR  such that the product of 3R  and the subsequent increased 
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consumer base of the entrant is equal to 
3( 3)T K . Hence, the incumbent’s 
market share decreases with a higher rate, e.g. 7% each year. In addition, the 
decrease in the access price results in a decrease in the retail price of the fibre-
based services which, in turn, enhances the diffusion process. It is thus expected 
that in the next regulatory reviews the actual penetration levels will coincide with 
the initially estimated ones. This implies that the cumulative entrant’s subscribers 
from t=4 to t=12 are 13.359.117, and hence, the value of 3R  that makes Eq. (4) 
hold is 3 5,389R . In this case, the access price is 3 11 5,389 5,611  W .  
Now, let’s examine an upside case. Assume that in the next regulatory review 
(t=6) the cumulative recovery is 66%, and hence, the NGA investment will have 
been recovered at t=11. As a result, x>10% which implies that the regulator 
should change the access price. The reason is that in the upside case the annual 
periodic payments that the incumbent should make to the regulator decrease. 
Assume, for example, that 66 3 10 K €, which implies that 
6
6
15 10(11 6)   K €. 
Therefore, the regulator should decrease the regulatory parameter tR  such that 
the product of 6R  and the subsequent decreased consumer base of the entrant is 
equal to 
6( 6)T K . A decrease in tR  has a twofold effect on the entrant’s 
consumer base. Firstly, the access price increases which, in turn, leads the 
entrant’s market share to increase with a lower rate (or, equivalently, the 
incumbent’s market share decreases with a lower rate, for example 3%). 
Secondly, the increase in the access price results in an increase in the retail price 
of the fibre-based services which, in turn, negatively affects the diffusion process. 
It is thus expected that in the next regulatory reviews the actual penetration levels 
will coincide with the initially estimated ones and the investment will have been 
recovered at t=12. Therefore, the cumulative entrant’s subscribers from t=7 to 
t=12 are 9.995.395, and hence, the value of 6R  that makes Eq. (4) hold is 
6 1,507R  . In this case, the access price is 6 11 1,507 9,493W    .  
It seems that the proposed approach hinders the diffusion process by increasing 
the retail price through the increase in the access price. However, the increase in 
the access price, as well as, the decrease in the entrant’s market share will 
probably cause the entrant to climb the investment ladder. This expectation is 
enhanced by the fact that there was an upside in the diffusion process, which 
triggers the regulatory intervention in the access market, and hence, the 
investment seems to be profitable. As the entrant gradually invests in its own 
facilities, it becomes more effective competitor. This, in turn, decreases the retail 
prices and boosts the diffusion process. Hence, the probability of a successive 
upside case in the next regulatory review increases. As a result, the proposed 
approach is consistent with the ladder-of-investment theory when the investment 
is proven to be successful. 
Now, assume that in the next regulatory review (t=9) the cumulative recovery is 
as expected, i.e. 82%. In this case, the regulator does not change the access 
price set at the previous regulatory review since it is expected that the reviewed 
access price at t=6 will lead to the recovery of the NGA investment at t=12.  
 
4.4. The end of the clause  
Three different cases concerning the review of the access price has been already 
examined and discussed. However, the success of the proposed approach is 
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related with its ability to lead the NGA investment to be recovered (at least) at a 
predetermined period. Thus, a further discrimination between three cases 
according to whether the NGA investment is recovered earlier, later or at the 
predetermined period is needed.  
When the NGA investment has been fully recovered at t=T,  the regulator does 
not make any further payment to the incumbent, the latter stops making indirect 
periodic payments to the entrant and no regulatory remedies are imposed to the 
incumbent. This implies that the incumbent is free to set the access price to the 
recovered NGA networks. If the NGA investment has been fully recovered at t=T 
due to successive downside cases or because the initially estimated cumulative 
recovery has been very close to the actual one, then the entrant would have 
probably established a significantly high customer base. It is thus expected that 
the entrant will invest in its own facilities in order to be active in the market as 
soon as the clause ends unless the incumbent prices the access too low in order 
to avoid intense facilities-based competition. 
Furthermore, if the NGA investment has been fully recovered at t=T due to 
successive upside cases, then increasing access prices would have led to 
intense facilities-based competition. It is expected that the end of the clause does 
not significantly affect the entrant’s investment incentives since the entrant would 
have already climbed many rungs of the investment ladder. This implies that the 
new entrant will be based on its own infrastructure rather than on incumbent’s 
one for serving its consumers, thereby rendering the unregulated access price of 
limited significance. In these cases, the NGA investment may have been also 
recovered before the predetermined period. 
Although we believe that the proposed approach will eventually lead to the 
recovery of the NGA investment at t T  or even earlier, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the NGA investment would have not been recovered at the end of 
the predetermined period T. Assume that the actual cumulative recovery at t T  
is lower than the initially estimated one ( 100%TD ). In this case, the default 
event occurs and the regulator compensates the incumbent for the unrecovered 
part of the NGA investment which is given by (100% )( cos ) actualT investment tD . 
Using the numerical example of section 4.3.4, we assume that at t=12 the CDS 
approach has fulfilled in recovering only a part of the investment cost. For 
instance, if the actual cumulative recovery of the investment at t=12 is 70%, then 
the regulator should compensate the incumbent for the unrecovered part which is 
910(100% ) (30 ) /100 3 1010    
actual
T FD .   
The difference ( ) actualT TD D , which is closely related to the upside or downside 
cases in the previous regulatory reviews, significantly affects the entrant’s 
investment incentives and the subsequent competition level after the end of the 
clause. The reason is that after that time no regulatory remedies will be imposed 
to the incumbent, and hence, the entrant will not have access to the incumbent’s 
NGA networks at regulated prices. One should further discriminate between three 
cases according to the difference ( ) actualT TD D . 
Firstly, if in the previous regulatory reviews there were successive upside cases, 
this difference should be low enough and the diffusion process should have 
reached its saturation level. Hence, the entrant would have already climbed many 
rungs of the investment ladder and the end of the clause will incentivize the 
entrant to be a facilities-based competitor.  
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Secondly, if in the previous regulatory reviews there were successive downside 
or base cases which have led the entrant to build a critical market share due to 
low access prices, then the difference  ( ) actualT TD D  is expected to be low 
enough, and hence, the entrant will probably invest in its own facilities in order to 
continue being active in the market. 
However, if the low access prices have failed to induce the entrant to increase its 
market share due to the low demand for the new fibre-based services, then the 
difference would be high enough, the incumbent’s market share would be also 
low and the proposed approach would fail to promote facilities-based competition 
over NGA networks.  
It is obvious that regardless of the unrecovered part of the investment, public 
funds will be used in order to compensate the incumbent. Therefore, one could 
argue that the proposed CDS approach privatizes profits and socializes losses by 
allowing the regulator to bear part of the investment risk. For this reason, the next 
section discusses the economic rationale of the proposed approach. 
 
4.5 The economic rationale of the CDS approach 
Although the regulatory intervention at predetermined periods ensures that the 
cumulative recovery process will not deviate significantly from the initially 
estimated one, the possibility of a default event cannot be excluded. The 
existence of such probability implies that the proposed CDS approach may 
privatize profits and socialize losses by allowing the regulator to bear part of the 
investment risk. In other words, public funds may be used for compensating 
private investments in NGA networks. Therefore, the regulator should compare 
the costs and the benefits of bearing part of the investment risk from a social 
perspective.14 Obviously, the social cost of the CDS approach is the amount of 
compensating the incumbent in the case that the NGA investment has not been 
recovered after T years. If social benefits outweigh social costs, then the 
regulator is willing to bear part of the investment risk.  
According to the EC (2010b) “the EU single market for electronic communications 
services, and in particular the development of very high-speed broadband 
services, is key to creating economic growth and achieving the goals of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. The fundamental role of telecommunications and 
broadband deployment in terms of EU investment, job creation and overall 
economic recovery was notably highlighted by the European Council in the 
conclusions of its March 2009 meeting”. In addition, referring to work undertaken 
by the OECD (2009), the EC (2010c) states that “the cost savings in just four 
sectors of economy (transport, health, electricity and education) would justify the 
construction of a national fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) network”. It is thus obvious 
that “the social benefits from investment in digital infrastructures by far exceed 
the private incentive for investment” (EC, 2011). The reason is that like many 
infrastructure investments, NGA networks may create positive spill-over effects 
that are not captured in any individual user’s willingness-to-pay. This implies a 
clear public policy case for governments to facilitate the roll out of NGA networks 
                                                          
14
 Although in the economic terminology social surplus includes both industry profits and 
consumer surplus, we use the term social surplus as meaning consumer surplus (i.e. excluding 
private costs and benefits) in order to emphasize that the socialization of the losses is referred to 
the part of the losses which are funded by the consumers (not the firms) in the NGA market. 
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by reducing the risk for the investor (DotEcon, 2012). Therefore, when there are 
significant social benefits stemming from NGA investments but the private 
investment incentives are weak, the regulator should bear part of the investment 
risk in order to encourage the wide deployment of NGA networks. This view is 
also expressed in the Digital Agenda for Europe (EC, 2010a): “without strong 
public intervention there is a risk of a sub-optimal outcome, with fast broadband 
networks concentrated in a few high-density zones with significant entry costs 
and high prices. The spill-over benefits created by such networks for the 
economy and the society justify public policies guaranteeing universal broadband 
coverage with increasing speeds”.  
Recent empirical studies have tried to quantify the positive impact of investing in 
broadband infrastructures on the main economic and social indices, with the 
research focus shifting towards the impact of higher speed services. Considering 
that broadband penetration may be endogenous to the growth process, Czernich, 
Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann (2011) estimate the effect of broadband 
infrastructure investments on economic growth in the panel of OECD countries in 
1996–2007. They find that after a country had introduced broadband, GDP per 
capita was 2.7–3.9% higher on average than before its introduction. In terms of 
subsequent diffusion, an increase in the broadband penetration rate by 10 
percentage points raised annual growth in per capita GDP by 0.9–1.5 percentage 
points. Furthermore, Katz, Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern and Suter (2010) estimate the 
impact of broadband infrastructure investments on German employment and 
economic output, following the government’s National Broadband Strategy that 
extends through 2014 and the subsequent ultra-broadband evolution from 2015 
to 2020. They find that a total investment of close to 36 billion euros in broadband 
infrastructures would generate a total of approximately 1 million incremental jobs 
and an additional value added of 33.4 billion euros, while network externalities 
would result in an additional 137.5 billion euros. In total, this results in 170.9 
billion euros of additional GDP (0.60% GDP growth) in Germany.  
It can thus be concluded that broadband connectivity is widely accepted as 
strategically important not only because of its ability to accelerate the contribution 
of information and communications technology (ICT) to economic growth 
(Teppayayon and Bohlin, 2010), but also because network investments are 
potentially important targets of public investment during downturns as a way to 
increase demand and employment (Reynolds, 2009). These results have 
encouraged national government around the world to be actively involved in the 
deployment of regional or nationwide NGA networks by adopting various 
subsidization strategies (Cave and Hatta, 2009; DotEcon, 2012; Kenny and 
Kenny, 2011; Ruhle, Brusic, Kittl and Ehrler, 2011). Such supply-side policies 
exert a positive impact on penetration and economic growth at the initial stages of 
the diffusion process, thus justifying their use in the deployment of NGA networks 
(Belloc, Nicita, Rossi, 2012). These initiatives imply that social benefits not only 
exceed the private incentive for investments, but also the potential social costs. 
Therefore, governments are willing to use public funds in order to either deploy 
state-owned NGA networks or subsidy private investments in such networks, 
although there is a risk of socializing losses. It is thus obvious that the expected 
social benefits from the deployment of NGA networks are much greater than the 
part of the deployment cost which is financed by public funds.  
In the proposed CDS approach the social costs are even lower since the 
regulator compensates the incumbent only for the unrecovered part of the NGA 
investment and only in the case that the investment has not been recovered after 
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a predetermined period. Unlike the governments’ subsidization strategies which 
use the public funds ex ante (and thus regardless of the success of the 
investment), the proposed approach correlates the amount of the public funds 
used with the success of the investment. In particular, the more successful the 
investment is, the lower the amount of the public funds used for financing the 
NGA investment. Therefore, the expected social costs, which ex post stem from 
the CDS approach, are lower than the social costs of ex ante (partially or wholly) 
subsidizing a given NGA investment. As a result, the difference between social 
benefits and costs is even higher, which means that the adoption of the CDS 
approach is clearly justified in social terms.   
The basic mechanism used by the CDS approach to reduce (or even to 
annihilate) the amount of public funds used to compensate the incumbent is to 
make the new entrant receive a subsidy equal to the fictitious costs of the credit 
default insurance. From the incumbent’s point of view such subsidy is irrelevant 
since it does not affect its profits (ceteris paribus). Indeed, the incumbent 
considers the entrant’s subsidy as cost either if it takes the form of the credit 
default insurance or the form of a reduction in the access payments. Obviously, 
the entrant’s profits increase but the variation in the access price, which depends 
on the success of the NGA investment, makes the entrant an effective service-
based competitor in the downside cases and an effective facilities-based 
competitor in the upside cases. This result has a twofold implication. Firstly, not 
only the incumbent forgoes revenues from the access market in order to minimize 
the investment risk, but also it forgoes revenues from the retail market due to the 
intensification of competition. Therefore, the proposed CDS approach works 
pretty much in the same way as the financial CDS contract in which a protection 
buyer minimizes its investment risk by forgoing some of its future profits.15 
Secondly, the proposed CDS approach maximizes the potential efficiency 
outcomes taking into account the existing conditions in the NGA market. Of 
course, these efficiency outcomes have a strong positive impact on consumer 
surplus. In other words, the indirect subsidization of the entrant increases 
consumer surplus, and hence, social benefits outweigh social costs.  
It should be noted that this result does not necessarily imply that the proposed 
CDS approach maximizes social welfare. In fact, it provides a theoretical 
approach to encourage the deployment of a nationwide NGA network (i.e. 
maximize the potential investment outcome in terms of geographic coverage) with 
the ambition that such deployment will finally reflect the socially desirable choice 
as reflecting in an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition 
over NGA networks. 
 
4.6 Implementation issues and limitations  
The proposed model describes a feasible way to initially encourage the 
incumbent to invest in new fibre-based access networks and then to induce 
facilities-based competition over NGA networks. The access pricing scheme 
ensures that the access is provided at cost-based prices including a risk 
premium. In the proposed model, the regulator not only eliminates the uncertainty 
of the NGA investment, but also the uncertainty of the usefulness of the risk 
                                                          
15
  The Appendix provides an example of a financial CDS contract and relates the outcomes with 
the application of the CDS approach in the NGA market. 
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premium.16 For this reason, the risk premium is subtracted from the cost-based 
access price. This definition implies that the cost-based access price of the NGA 
networks represents the highest access charge that the entrant may pay to the 
incumbent. However, we should keep in mind that a cost-based access price 
does not necessarily implies a low access cost since: (i) the cost of providing the 
access to the NGA networks is much higher than the respective level of copper 
networks, and (ii) the level of the cost-based access price depends on the applied 
costing methodologies (DotEcon, 2012). Furthermore, the implementation of the 
CDS approach focuses on the impact of a change in the access price (regardless 
of its nominal value) on the recovery of the NGA investment and on the entrant’s 
incentives to invest in its own NGA network. Therefore, the proposed CDS 
approach can be also used in the cases where the initial access price is higher or 
lower than the cost-based access price. 
In addition, the flexibility of the regulator to review the risk premium following 
certain rules tackles the additional trade-off between the positive effects of 
greater certainty on investment incentives and possible negative effects of 
erroneous intervention on welfare. The rules under which the regulator review the 
access price ensure that such price increases over time as long as the 
investment is successful. This implies that the proposed model reflects an 
application of the ladder-of-investment theory, and hence, it succeeds in inducing 
facilities-based competition over NGA networks. It is thus obvious that the 
success of NGA investments is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the 
application of the ladder-of-investment theory. The reason is that even if the 
investment is successful, a decreasing access price reflecting the lower demand 
uncertainty increases the entrant’s opportunity cost of investing in its own 
facilities, and thus dilutes the entrant’s investment incentives. From the above 
analysis it can be deduced that the proposed approach is aligned with the four 
basic principles of the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market.  
Hitherto we have limited our analysis to the case in which one investor has 
undertaken a nationwide NGA deployment. However, it is widely known that both 
market and geographic characteristics affect the profitability of an NGA 
investment. In particular, potential investors are willing to deploy fibre access 
networks in the areas which are characterized by high population density and 
high GDP per capita. The former factor ensures low investment cost, whereas the 
latter is positively correlated with the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the new 
fibre-based services. This implies that both market and geographic conditions 
have already led to differences in the degree of NGA deployment not only across 
countries, but also across areas within a given country. In these cases, the CDS 
approach can be applied to encourage the deployment of NGA networks in the 
rest geographic areas either in an integrated or in a fragmented way. In the 
former case, the regulator and an investor agree on a business plan that allows a 
single investor to recover the NGA investment in the rest geographic areas. In the 
latter case, the regulator agrees on many business plans with different investors 
each of them being willing to invest in a specific geographic area in a country. 
The variety of local market and geographic conditions is reflected in the resulted 
regulatory remedies of the CDS approach. For instance, in the more densely 
populated areas the deployment of NGA networks is more profitable from an 
                                                          
16
 According to ETNO (2008), the risk premium reimburses the incumbent only when the 
investment is successful. Therefore, in the downside cases the usefulness of the risk premium is 
of limited importance. 
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investor’s perspective, and hence, the CDS approach results in higher access 
prices and shorter period of access regulation. On the contrary, in the less 
densely populated areas, the probability of default is higher, and hence, the CDS 
approach results in lower access prices which promotes entry by alternative 
operators in order to boost the diffusion process. In addition, the existence of a 
strong cable industry in a country implies that the nationwide NGA deployment 
creates a facilities-based competition between the investor and the cable 
company. This result has a positive effect on consumers’ willingness-to-pay, and 
therefore, to the diffusion process. Put differently, successive upside cases are 
expected which, in turn, lead to high access prices. This outcome is socially 
desirable since facilities-based competition is preferred than service-based 
competition which is promoted by low access prices. It can thus be deduced that 
the proposed CDS approach is scalable and consistent with the view of BEREC 
(2011) concerning the different regulatory treatment across countries or 
geographic areas when there are significant national or regional differences in 
terms of population density, willingness-to-pay, inter platform competition etc. 
Although the proposed CDS approach seems to facilitate the deployment of fibre-
based access networks and the gradual migration from service-based to facilities-
based competition over NGA networks, there are some limitations that should be 
further investigated.  
Firstly, the proposed approach does not take into account the impact of the 
bargaining power of the two parties in the contract on the periodically reviewed 
access price. In particular, the proposed approach implicitly assumes that both 
parties have the same bargaining power which does not change during the 
predetermined period. It is obvious that since the bargaining power of either the 
regulator or the incumbent may change as a result of the implementation of the 
CDS approach, the impact of such change on the access prices, and thus, on the 
cumulative recovery process should be further explored. 
Secondly, the major shortcoming of the proposed approach is the assumption 
that the regulator has full information about the evolution of the main demand and 
cost parameters. However, potential investors have an incentive to misrepresent 
information, such as to increase the total cost of the investment and to shorten 
the reasonable period for the recovery of the investment in order to be over-
compensated for the unrecovered part of the investment and then reap the 
benefits of being the first-mover. It is thus obvious that there are many 
informational requirements, and hence, regulators should oblige the investor to 
provide information about its business operation and its network structure. Both 
BEREC (2011) and the EC recommendation (EC, 2010b) envision such 
transparency, especially for the technical characteristics and the geographical 
location of the investor’s network. This implies that regulators should incentivize 
operators to provide the actual information about the access networks. In 
particular, regulators should crosscheck the provided information by applying 
various costing methodologies, cooperate with audit companies in order to 
retrieve financial statements and intensify quality and competition tests. When it 
is found that the provided information significantly deviates from the actual one, 
then the regulator should penalize the investor for misrepresenting information.17 
Therefore, if both the probability of finding such misrepresentation and the 
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 We would like to thank Professor Martin Cave for a private conversation about this issue at the 
19th ITS Biennial Conference. 
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subsequent penalty are high, then the investor does not have significant 
incentives to misrepresent information.  
Although such a regulatory treatment enables the regulators to properly assess 
the actual investment cost, it also makes regulatory agencies act as operators 
which are willing to invest in NGA network. This argument is enhanced by the 
proposed approach in which regulatory agencies are actively involved in business 
decisions concerning the expected profitability of deploying an NGA network 
taking into account the cost and the timing of such investments, the risk of the 
specific investment project and the periodic payments that correspond to the 
default event. Put differently, regulators should expertise in business and 
management decisions which implies a slippery slope from setting the rules 
under which incumbents and entrants operate toward micro-management of 
investments.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper initially showed that the regulatory policy which aims to stimulate 
competition in the market by facilitating entry of alternative operators, promotes 
static efficiency at the cost of dynamic efficiency. Thus, it reviewed the EC 
Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EC, 2010b) which provides the 
NRAs with guidelines for tackling this trade-off, as well as, the research articles 
which propose new regulatory approaches that may promote both static efficiency 
and investments in NGA networks. It was found that: (i) there is no consensus 
about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages 
investments in NGA networks; and (ii) the reviewed research articles are not 
consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market as 
described by the EC Recommendation in terms of both the evolution of the 
regulatory goals over time (i.e. encourage the incumbents to invest in new fibre-
based access networks without distorting service-based competition, and then 
encourage the access seekers to invest in their own fibre infrastructures) and the 
proposed regulatory settings (i.e. the characteristics of the access pricing 
formula, the evolution of the access price over time and the provision of 
regulatory certainty). 
Therefore, the goal of this paper was twofold. In particular, it aimed to develop a 
new regulatory approach which reflects the current European NGA framework 
and tackles the trade-off between promoting competition and encouraging 
investments. It was shown that under plausible assumptions the proposed 
approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap 
(CDS), tackles the initial trade-off between encouraging the incumbent to invest in 
NGA networks and fostering competition, while it incentivizes the entrant to 
gradually climb the ladder-of-investment. This implies that the proposed approach 
represents an effective way towards facilities-based competition over NGA 
networks. 
The main innovation of this paper was the application of a pure financial tool to 
the field of regulatory economics. For this reason, the migration from copper 
access networks to NGA networks was studied under quite general but plausible 
assumptions. For example, the proposed CDS approach was based on the 
assumption that the cumulative recovery process is analogous to the diffusion 
process of the fibre-based services. Although this is a plausible assumption, a 
more rigorous techno-economic analysis, which takes into account all the factors 
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that affect each provider’s profits, is needed. In addition, numerical calculations of 
the evolution of the probability of default and its impact on access prices, 
investment incentives and competition are also needed.  
It is thus obvious that this paper also aims to trigger a fruitful open discussion 
about its implementation limitations and its effectiveness on inducing facilities-
based competition over NGA networks. The starting point of this discussion 
should unambiguously be the need for an extensive review of the existing 
legislation regarding the legal authorities of the regulatory agencies. The current 
framework seems to provide legal restrictions on regulators to sign such CDS 
contracts that may result in the subsidization of the investors by using public 
funds. Therefore, the question of whether regulatory agencies should have the 
jurisdiction to sign such contracts deserves more attention and requires further 
investigation.  
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Appendix 
The model works pretty much in the same way as the CDS protection bought in 
the financial market. Let’s assume a simplified example in which a financial 
institution A invests 10M € in an investment grade corporate bond with annual 
coupon payment of 6% and 10 years to maturity. At the day of purchase, the 
corporate bond is downgraded to a speculative rating. To avoid selling on loss, 
the financial institution decides to enter into CDS with a financial institution B, with 
a 3% spread paid annual on face amount of 10M €. The following happens: 
 The financial institution A receives each year 6% coupon payment on 10M € 
i.e. 600.000€. 
 The financial institution A pays each year CDS premium of 3% on 10M € i.e. 
300.000€ to the financial institution B. 
 In the case of default the financial institution A receives from the financial 
institution B 10M €.  
 In the case of no default the financial institution A receives the face amount of 
10M € from the issuer of the bond. 
What happens in the above case is that the financial institution A has no risk at all 
no matter what the outcome of the investment is. It only gives up a premium of 
300.000€, which can be seen from our model’s perspective as the part that 
incumbent forgoes when agreeing to consider the regulatory parameter tR  in the 
access pricing model. 
 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
221  M. Tselekounis 
References 
ARCEP (2007). Rapport public d’ activite 2006. Available at: 
<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-
publics//074000424/0000.pdf>. 
Alleman, J., Madden, G., & Kim, H. (2008). Real options methodology applied to 
the ICT sector: a survey. Communications and Strategies, (70), 27–44. 
Armstrong, M. (2002). The theory of access pricing and interconnection. In Martin 
Cave, S. K. Majumdar, & I. Vogelsang (Eds.), Handbook of 
Telecommunications Economics: Vol. 1, structure, regulation and competition 
(pp. 295-386). Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Arora, N., Gandhi, P., & Longstaff, F. (2012). Counterparty credit risk and the 
credit default swap market. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 280-293.  
Avenali, A., Matteucci, G., & Reverberi, P. (2010). Dynamic access pricing and 
investment in alternative infrastructures. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 28(2), 167-175.  
Bacache, M., Bourreau, M., & Gaudin, G. (2011). Dynamic Entry and Investment 
in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from the Telecoms Industry. 
Telecom ParisTech Working Paper No. ESS-11-01. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1750217>.  
Belloc, F., Nicita, A., & Rossi, A. (2012). Whither policy design for broadband 
penetration? Evidence from 30 OECD countries. Telecommunications Policy, 
36(5), 382-398 
BEREC (2011). Report on the Implementation of the NGA-Recommendation. 
October 2011. Available at: 
<http://berec.europa.eu/doc/berec/bor_11_43.pdf>.  
Bouckaert, J., van Dijk, T., & Verboven, F. (2010). Access regulation, 
competition, and broadband penetration: An international study. 
Telecommunications Policy, 34(11), 661-671.  
Bourreau, M., Cambini, C., & Doğan, P. (2013). Access regulation and the 
transition from copper to fiber networks in telecoms. EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2013/52. Available at: 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27597/RSCAS_2013_52.pdf?se
quence=1>. 
Bourreau, M., & Doğan, P. (2005). Unbundling the local loop. European 
Economic Review, 49(1), 173-199. 
Bourreau, M., & Doğan, P. (2006). “Build-or-Buy” Strategies in the Local Loop. 
American Economic Review, 96(2), 72-76. 
Bourreau, M., & Drouard, J. (2010). Stepping Stone or Stonewall? Progressive 
Entry and the Incentives to Invest in Alternative Infrastructures. Telecom 
ParisTech Working Paper No. ESS-10-07. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662402>. 
Bourreau, M., Cambini, C., & Dogan, P. (2012). Access Pricing, Competition, and 
Incentives to Migrate from 'Old' to 'New' Technology. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 30(6), 713-723. 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 222 
Bourreau, M., Cambini, C., & Hoernig, S. (2012). Ex ante regulation and co-
investment in the transition to next generation access. Telecommunications 
Policy, 36(5), 399-406.  
Bourreau, M., Doğan, P., & Manant, M. (2010). A critical review of the “ladder of 
investment” approach. Telecommunications Policy, 34(11), 683-696. 
Bourreau, M., Lupi, P., & Manenti, F. (2013). Old Technology Upgrades, 
Innovation, and Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets. "Marco 
Fanno" working paper N.158. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217525>. 
Brito, D., Pereira, P., & Vareda, J. (2012). Incentives to invest and to give access 
to non-regulated new technologies. Information Economics and Policy, 24(3-
4), 197–211. 
Brito, D., Pereira, P., & Vareda, J. (2010). Can two-part tariffs promote efficient 
investment on next generation networks? International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 28(3), 323–333.  
Cambini, C., & Jiang, Y. (2009). Broadband investment and regulation: A 
literature review. Telecommunications Policy, 33(10-11), 559-574.  
Cambini, C., & Silvestri, V. (2012). Technology investment and alternative 
regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty. Information Economics and 
Policy, 24(3-4), 212–230. 
Cave, M. (2006). Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of 
investment. Telecommunications Policy, 30(3-4), 223-237. 
Cave, M., Fournier, A., & Shutova, N. (2012). The Price of Copper and the 
Transition to Fibre. Communications & Strategies, (85), 147–168. 
Cave, M., & Hatta, K. (2009). Transforming telecommunications technologies--
policy and regulation. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(3), 488-505. 
Cave, M., & Vogelsang, I. (2003). How access pricing and entry interact. 
Telecommunications Policy, 27(10-11), 717-727. 
Charalampopoulos, G., Katsianis, D., & Varoutas, D. (2011). The option to 
expand to a next generation access network infrastructure and the role of 
regulation in a discrete time setting: A real options approach. 
Telecommunications Policy, 35(9-10), 895-906.  
Czernich, N., Falck, O., Kretschmer, T., & Woessmann, L. (2011). Broadband 
Infrastructure and Economic Growth. The Economic Journal, 121, 505-532.  
De Bijl, P., & Peitz, M. (2002). Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications 
Markets. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Denni, M., & Gruber, H. (2007). The Diffusion of Broadband Telecommunications 
in the US: The Role of Different Forms of Competition. Communications & 
Strategies, 68, 139-157. 
Distaso, W, Lupi, P., & Manenti, F. (2006). Platform competition and broadband 
uptake: Theory and empirical evidence from the European union. Information 
Economics and Policy, 18(1), 87-106. 
Distaso, W., Lupi, P., & Manenti, F. (2009). Static and Dynamic Efficiency in the 
European Telecommunications Market . The Role of Regulation on the 
Incentives to Invest and the Ladder of Investment. In Handbook of research 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
223  M. Tselekounis 
on telecommunications planning and management. (Lee, Ed.) Regulation. 
U.S.A.: IGI Global. 
Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. S. (1994). Investment under uncertainty (pp. 1–40). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
DotEcon (2012). Regulatory policy and the roll-out of FTTH networks. A report for 
the FTTH Council Europe. July 2012. Available at: 
<http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/Reports/Dot-
econ_Regulatory_Report.pdf>. 
EC (European Commission) (2000). Commission Regulation No 2887/2000 on 
unbundled access to the local loop. Available at: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:336:0004:0008:EN:P
DF>. 
EC (European Commission) (2010a). A Digital Agenda for Europe. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-
agenda/publications/index_en.htm>. 
EC (European Commission) (2010b). European Commission Recommendation 
on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks (NGA). Available 
at: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:251:0035:0048:EN:P
DF>. 
EC (European Commission) (2010c). European Broadband: investing in digitally 
driven growth. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/broadband/docs/bb_commu
nication.pdf>. 
EC (European Commission) (2011). Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility. 
Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20111019_2_en.pdf>. 
ERG (2005). Broadband market competition report (05-23). Available at: 
<http://www.irg.eu/streaming/erg_05_23_ 
broadbd_mrkt_comp_report_p.pdf?contentId=543362&field=ATTACHED_FIL
ES>. 
ERG (2006). Revised ERG common position on remedies — Explanatory 
memorandum (06-19). Available at: 
<http://www.irg.eu/template20.jsp?categoryId=260348&contentId=544952>. 
ERG (2009). Report on Next Generation Access – Economic Analysis and 
Regulatory Principles, June 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_09_17_nga_economic_analysis_r
egulatory_principles_report_090603_v1.pdf >. 
ETNO (2008). ETNO Reflection Document in response to the Commission 
Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGA). ETNO synthesis paper SP295. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_cons
ult/nga/etno_sp295.pdf>. 
FCC (Federal Communications Commission) (1996). Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. Available at: 
<http://transition.fcc.gov/telecom.html>. 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 224 
FCC (Federal Communications Commission) (2010). Connecting America: The 
national broadband plan. Available at: <http://www.broadband.gov/download-
plan/>. 
Foros, Ø. (2004). Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and 
foreclosure in the broadband access market. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 22(1), 1-24. 
Franklin, S. L., & Diallo, M. (2013). Real options and cost-based access pricing: 
Model and methodology. Telecommunications Policy, 37(4-5), 321–333. 
Gavosto, A., Ponte, G., & Scaglioni, C. (2007). Investment in Next Generation 
Networks and the Role of Regulation : A Real Options Approach. ISEG-UTL 
Economics Working Paper No. 031/2007/DE . Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1080564>. 
Grajek, M. and L. H. Röller (2009). The Effect of Regulation on Investment in 
Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms. ESMT Working 
Paper No. 09-004. Available at: < https://www.esmt.org/fm/479/ESMT-09-
004.pdf>. 
Greenstein, S., & McDevitt, R. (2009). The broadband bonus: Accounting for 
broadband Internet’s impact on US GDP. NBER Working Paper No. 14758. 
Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14758>. 
Hori, K., & Mizuno, K. (2006). Access pricing and investment with stochastically 
growing demand. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(4), 795-
808. 
Hori, K., & Mizuno, K. (2008). Competition schemes and investment in network 
infrastructure under uncertainty. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 35(2), 179-
200. 
Höffler, F. (2007). Cost and benefits from infrastructure competition. Estimating 
welfare effects from broadband access competition. Telecommunications 
Policy, 31(6-7), 401-418. 
Inderst, R., & Peitz, M. (2012a). Network investment, access and competition. 
Telecommunications Policy, 36(5), 407-418. 
Inderst, R., & Peitz, M. (2012b). Market Asymmetries and Investments in Next 
Generation Access Networks. Review of Network Economics, 11(1). 
ITU (2012). The impact of broadband on the economy: Research to date an 
policy issues. April 2012. Available at: <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/broadband/ITU-BB-Reports_Impact-of-Broadband-on-the-
Economy.pdf>. 
Katz, R., Vaterlaus, S., Zenhäusern, P., & Suter, S. (2010). The impact of 
broadband on jobs and the German economy. Intereconomics, 45(1), 26-34. 
Kenny, R., & Kenny, C. (2011). Superfast broadband: is it really worth a subsidy? 
Info, 13(4), 3-29. 
Klumpp, T., & Su, X. (2010). Open access and dynamic efficiency. American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2, 64-96. 
Kotakorpi, K. (2004). Access price regulation, investment and entry in 
telecommunications. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(5), 
1013-1020. 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
225  M. Tselekounis 
Koutroumpis, P. (2009). The economic impact of broadband on growth: A 
simultaneous approach. Telecommunications Policy, 33(9), 471-485.  
Longstaff, F. A., Mithal, S., & Neis, E. (2005). Corporate Yield Spreads: Default 
Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit. The journal of finance, 60(5), 
2213-2253. 
Michalakelis, C., Varoutas, D., & Sphicopoulos, T. (2008). Diffusion models of 
mobile telephony in Greece. Telecommunications Policy, 32(3-4), 234-245. 
Moore, G. (1991). Crossing the chasm. Harper Business Essentials, New York. 
Neumann, K.-H., & Vogelsang, I. (2013). How to price the unbundled local loop in 
the transition from copper to fiber access networks? Telecommunications 
Policy, ISSN 0308-5961, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2013.05.011, in 
press. ISSN0308-5961. 
Nitsche, R., & Wiethaus, L. (2011). Access regulation and investment in next 
generation networks — A ranking of regulatory regimes. International Journal 
of Industrial Organization, 29(2), 263-272.  
OECD (2009). Network developments in support of innovation and user needs. 
Available at: 
<http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=
en&cote=dsti/iccp/cisp(2009)2/final>. 
Oldale, A., & Padilla, J. (2004). From state monopoly to the “‘investment ladder’”: 
competition policy and the NRF. Swedish Competition Authority Series: The 
Pros and Cons of Antitrust in Deregulated Markets. Stockholm. 
OPTA (2008). Policy rules tariff regulation for unbundled fiber access. The 
Hague, 19 December 2008. Available at: <http://www.opta.nl/en/news/all-
publications/publication/?id=2832>. 
OPTA (2010). Regulation, risk and investment incentives, Regulatory policy note 
06. May 2010. Available at: <http://www.opta.nl/en/news/all-
publications/publication/?id=3201>. 
Pindyck, R. S. (2007). Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in 
Telecom Networks. Review of Network Economics, 6(3), 274–298. 
Reynolds, T. (2009). The role of communications infrastructure investment in 
economic recovery (DSTI / ICCP / CISP ( 2009 ) 1 / FINAL). Policy. Paris. 
Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/43/42799709.pdf>. 
Ruhle, E.-O., Brusic, I., Kittl, J., & Ehrler, M. (2011). Next Generation Access 
(NGA) supply side interventions—An international comparison. 
Telecommunications Policy, 35(9-10), 794-803. 
Sarmento, P., & Brandao, A. (2007). Access pricing: A comparison between full 
deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation, cost-
based and retail-minus. Telecommunications Policy, 31(5), 236-250. 
Shumate, P. W. (2008). Fiber-to-the-home: 1977-2007. Journal of  Lightwave 
Technology, 26(9), 1093-1103. 
Teppayayon, O., & Bohlin, E. (2010). Broadband Universal Service in Europe: 
Review of Policy Consultations 2005-2010. Communications and Strategies, 
80, 21-42. 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 226 
Tselekounis, M., Maniadakis, D., & Varoutas, D. (2013). NGA Investment 
Incentives under Geographic Price Discrimination. In 40th EARIE Conference, 
30 August-1 September 2013, Évora, Portugal (accepted). Available at: 
<http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/earie/2013/258/EARIE2013_Tseleko
unis.pdf>. 
Tselekounis, M., & Varoutas, D. (2013). Investments in next generation access 
infrastructures under regulatory uncertainty. Telecommunications Policy, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2013.06.001, in press. ISSN0308-5961. 
Tselekounis, M., Varoutas, D., & Martakos, D. (2012). On the social optimality of 
make-or-buy decisions. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 41(2), 238-268. 
Valletti, T. M. (2003). The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment 
incentives. Telecommunications Policy, 27(10-11), 659-675. 
Vareda, J. (2011). Quality upgrades and bypass under mandatory access. 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 40(2), 177-197. 
Vareda, J., & Hoernig, S. (2010). Racing for investment under mandatory access. 
The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1).  
Vogelsang, I. (2003). Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications 
Networks. Journal of Economic Literature, 41(3), 830-862. 
Vogelsang, I. (2010). Incentive regulation, investments and technological change. 
Ifo/CESifo & OECD Conference on Regulation: Political Economy, 
Measurement and Effects on Performance, Munich, Germany (Vol. 49, pp. 1-
38). Munich, January 29-30: CESifo. 
WIK (2009). The economics of Next Generation Access. A study for the 
European Competitive Telecommunications Association ECTA. Bad Honnef, 
15 July 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.wik.org/uploads/media/Ecta_Study_Addendum_2009.pdf>. 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
227  M. Tselekounis 
APPENDIX B 
The research towards the completion of this thesis led to the publication of six 
original articles that are not at the centre of the literature studying the optimal 
regulatory intervention in each migration phase during the evolution of the 
telecommunications networks. Appendix B quotes these articles as they have 
been originally published in refereed international journals or including in the 
proceedings of refereed international conferences.  
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Risks associated with Next Generation Access networks 
investment scenarios 
  
Abstract— The deployment of Next Generation Access Networks (NGA) is 
investigated from technical, regulatory and investment perspectives. A brief 
review of the possible network architectures and deployment scenarios of NGA is 
provided. Risk calculations of these NGA scenarios are performed based on a 
fully detailed techno-economic model. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the 
European Commission’s Recommendation on regulated access to NGA aiming to 
tackle the regulatory trade-off between encouraging investments and promoting 
competition is discussed. 
 
Index Terms— Investment risk, Next Generation Access Networks, Techno-
economics, Engineering Management 
D. Katsianis, Th. Rokkas, I. Neokosmidis, M. Tselekounis, D. 
Varoutas, I. Zacharopoulos, and A. Bartzoudi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last years, there is an explosive growth of internet in terms of both the 
number of users and the transmitted volume of data. It is interesting to note that 
the aggregate volume of data circulated in the internet is expected to increase 
with an annual growth of 30% for the next years [1]  while the lowest demanded 
capacity by the end-users is doubled almost every two years [2]. Therefore, there 
is an increasing need for bandwidth resulting in new access methods. 
In the case of access networks based on copper, there are several inherent 
technical and physical limitations setting barriers to performance such as the 
maximum distance, the bandwidth, the number of concurrent customers etc. On 
the other hand, access networks based on optical fibers are the only future proof 
solution capable to handle the future demands [3], since the transmission 
capabilities of fiber are theoretically unlimited providing high data rates, low loss 
and low distortion.  
According to European Commission “Next generation access  networks (NGAs) 
mean wired access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements 
and which are capable of delivering broadband access services with enhanced 
characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those provided over 
already existing copper networks. In most cases NGAs are the result of an 
upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial access network” [4]. Therefore, 
according to the EC two technologies are assumed as NGA i.e. FTTCab and 
FTTH/B.   
There has been an extensive discussion regarding NGA during the recent years, 
however the high cost of the development of NGA, in combination with the high 
uncertainties mainly on demand and revenues (that induces corresponding 
uncertainty to investment returns) and restrain service providers from investing in 
NGA [5]. In this perspective, this paper aims to identify, quantify, evaluate and 
discuss the risk characteristics of the NGA.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: initially the regulation framework 
regarding NGA is presented in section II. Technological options are illustrated in 
Section III. Section IV reports regulatory options related to NGA and Section V 
discusses the modeling assumptions. Results regarding the total risk are 
presented in section V. Some concluding remarks are given in Section VI.   
 
II. NGA REGULATION & POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Various policies are discussed and have been followed in order to overcome the 
uncertainty related to the deployment of NGA networks. USA provided regulatory 
holiday to two (geographically separated) operators in order to build their NGA 
networks, while other countries (mainly in Asia) have preferred the state-aid 
solution towards the NGA investing firms.  
The European Commission (EC) issued a Recommendation on regulated access 
to NGA [4] in order to provide National Regulatory Authorities (NRA) with 
guidelines for tackling the trade-off between fostering competition and promoting 
investments with regard to NGA.  
In particular, the EC Recommendation is in accordance with the overall Europe’s 
regulation regime since it proposes that the access fees in any of wholesale 
products should be based on a cost-based form.  
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This holds for any wholesale access product irrespective whether it falls in the 
scope of  the market for wholesale physical network infrastructure (usually named 
as Market #4) or the wholesale broadband access (Market #5).  
However, the EC Recommendation introduced the term of risk premium that 
should be included in the calculation of the costs of the wholesale access fees in 
order to compensate the investor  for any additional and quantifiable risks 
incurred when investing in NGA networks. The principles of this premium 
calculation are described in detail in a special annex of the EC Recommendation. 
More specifically, this premium should reflect: “(i) uncertainty relating to retail and 
wholesale demand; (ii) uncertainty relating to the costs of deployment, civil 
engineering works and managerial execution; (iii) uncertainty relating to 
technological progress; (iv) uncertainty relating to market dynamics and the 
evolving competitive situation, such as the degree of infrastructure-based and/or 
cable competition; and (v) macroeconomic uncertainty.”. It is worth mentioning 
that the incumbent operators usually claim that there is another risk factor named 
regulatory risk which is related to the regulator’s limited ability to make ex-ante 
credible commitments. 
 
III. NGA ARCHITECTURES SET BY THE EC RECOMMENDATION 
Although several architectures of access networks have already been proposed, 
including wireless ones, the EC proposed only fixed ones and always based on 
fiber [7]. In this paper four alternative architectures are modeled and studied. One 
is FTTC with VDSL and the other three are FTTH.  
 
A. Fiber to the Curb (FTTC) with VDSL 
Regarding the FTTC architecture, the path from the service provider’s Point of 
Presence (POP) to the intermediate node (street cabinet) that serves an entire 
neighborhood exclusively consists of optical fiber (Fig. 1). A switch (Digital 
Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer – DSLAM), placed on the street cabinet, is 
connected to the POP of the service provider via a fiber or a pair of optical fibers 
carrying the aggregated traffic from the neighborhood traffic usually through 
Gigabit Ethernet. The access of each end user up to the switch of the street 
cabinet is realized using the standard copper cables used for the PSTN network 
and Very High Speed DSL (VDSL technology over copper cables. Depending on 
both the technology and the distance, the end users experience symmetric or 
asymmetric data rates of up 100Mbps, depending on the copper length. 
The FTTC architecture provides to the incumbent the advantage to connect its 
subscribers to existing copper cable infrastructure in the first mile. Additionally, it 
has lower capital requirements since the NGA investment is done only in part of 
the access network. However, it has limited time frame since there is a need for 
capacity doubling every two years. 
 
B. Fiber to the Home (FTTH) scenarios 
According to the Fiber to the Home architecture, the path from the service 
provider’s point of presence (POP) to the end user exclusively consists of optical 
fiber (Fig. 1). The fiber is terminated inside the home or the workplace of the end 
user. Therefore, each device at the subscriber premises is connected through a 
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dedicated optical fiber to a switch port located at POP or to the optical splitter 
which in turn connects to the POP via a single feeder fiber.  
Three FTTH technologies are mature enough to use in an NGA investment. The 
choice of each technology depends on the type of the transmitted service, the 
infrastructure cost, the existing infrastructure and future plans towards new 
technologies. 
 
1. Gigabit Passive Optical Network (GPON) 
In passive optical networks, each customer is connected to the optical network 
via a passive optical splitter. The advantages of FTTH PON [8] are related to: (a) 
the use of purely passive components between the central office and the end 
user (b) less requirements for fiber investment in the network segment LEX-
outdoor cabinet (c) less space requirements inside the LEX since less fibers and 
thinner trenches are terminated to LEX. The above issues lead to lower 
maintenance and operational costs. However, there are a number of 
disadvantages related to the GPON: (a) since a number of users (up to 16-32 or 
at maximum 64) share the capacity traveling over just one fiber, there are 
limitations on the maximum capacity per user. (b) due to the above, since there is 
congestion among the various users, it is mandatory to have resource protocols 
to run between LEX and users as well as to have more advanced CPEs (such as 
burst receivers) compared simper CPEs required in case of pure point-to-point 
connections (c) the unbundling is limited by physical network resources.  
The Optical Line Termination (OLT) is the basic element of the network. It is 
usually placed at the Central Office (CO) and is the driving force of FTTH 
systems. The Optical Network Units (ONUs) are placed close to the end user. 
ONUs are connected to the OLT through optical fiber without using intermediate 
active components (Fig. 1).  
 
2. Point-To-Point (P2P) 
Active Ethernet, also known as Ethernet Switched Optical Network (ESON) or 
Point to Point (P2P) network, provides a dedicated optical fiber from the outdoor 
active equipment to each end user. In the case of P2P, operation, management 
and maintenance as well as the calculation of the power budget are greatly 
simplified due to the existence of this dedicated fiber. Core switch, aggregation 
switch and the ONT are the main components of a P2P network (Fig. 1). Beyond 
the advantage of P2P that offers almost maximum capacity (100 Mbps or 1 Gbps 
signal in a 100 BaseFX or 1000 BaseLX) to each end-user, there is a main 
disadvantage: it requires the maximum invested capital since a fiber pair is 
dedicated to each user. Therefore large space for the ODFs inside LEX should be 
available such as in the case of copper networks and the trenches (especially 
closer to the LEX) are expected to be wider (more complex and costly).  
 
3. Point to Point Ethernet P2PE 
In P2PE scenario a first aggregation switch is located in the cabinet between the 
central office and the user premises. The architecture is similar to the one of 
GPON with the difference that there is active equipment in the cabinet (Fig. 1). 
This technology seems to accommodate the pros and cons of all other 
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technologies: (a) requires power in the field (b) might offer higher capacity per 
user that FTTC/VDSL and GPON but in any case lower than the maximum 
provided by the pure P2P technology. The specific technology could be the 
migration of a FTTC/VDSL network since the power could be already available or 
of a GPON network since fiber is available and only changes to outdoor cabinet 
should be performed. 
 
FIGURE 1. EXAMINED ARCHITECTURES 
  
IV. NGA REGULATORY OPTIONS 
A. The main NGA risk factor: The risk of future demand for new fiber-based 
services  
Demand and penetration are the main factors which cause risks related to NGA 
investments [9]. The higher the penetration of the potential customer base is, the 
higher the profitability of the investment becomes. Moreover, if the penetration 
does not reach the critical mass that is required for the creation of the new fiber-
based services market, the NGA investment may not even be profitable at all.  
There are three factors that influence the penetration of the new fiber-based 
services. First, the existence of competing NGA fiber network platforms, such as 
cable networks, increases the risk of both penetration and investor’s market 
share. In particular, the higher the degree of facilities-based competition is, the 
higher the risk of both penetration and investor’s market share becomes. 
Secondly, the co-existence of a remaining copper network DSL platform and a 
new fiber NGA platform increases the risk of the future demand for the new fiber-
based services. In particular, the higher the migration period from copper-based 
services towards NGA-based services, the higher the risk of the penetration of 
the new NGA-based services. Last, but not least, the risk of sufficient Willingness 
to Pay (WTP) increases the risk of future demand for new fiber-based services). 
 Although, it is expected that the WTP for the new services will be higher than the 
WTP for the existing services since the former offer improved characteristics, 
such as better quality and higher data rate, it is doubtful that this increase in 
consumers’ WTP will be sufficient for recovering the high investment cost. 
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B. Regulatory policy  
Regulator’s goal is twofold. First, it aims to encourage investments in order to 
promote innovation and market growth and, second, to foster competition in the 
retail market in order to ensure lower prices, better quality and higher social 
welfare. Taking into account that the EC recommendation sets a predetermined 
framework to follow but in any case regulatory holiday is not a desirable option, a 
European regulator has many different means in order to affect both investments 
and competition. Initially, the regulator should decide about the regulatory regime 
(e.g. access levels and corresponding wholesale access products, etc). 
According to the above decision, the regulator should then decide about specific 
parameters of the regulatory policy, such as the regulatory period (i.e. the interval 
between two reviews of the regulatory policy), the risk premium and other 
complementary regulatory options (e.g. adoption of risk sharing schemes, 
adoption of a transparent framework for the migration path from copper to fiber-
based networks, etc).  
The impact of each decision on investment and competition varies significantly. 
Some regulators are in favor on encouraging investments than fostering 
competition. Therefore, there is a trade-off between promoting investments and 
fostering competition. In any case, regulatory certainty is expected to promote 
investment in NGA. This requires regulator’s ex ante commitment for its decisions 
for a long period of the economic lifetime of an NGA investment but especially for 
the first and most crucial time period.     
In the following analysis, it has been assumed that NRAs adopt and implement 
the EC Recommendation on regulated access to NGA. Therefore, the access to 
wholesale physical network infrastructure (Market 4), as well as, the wholesale 
broadband access (Market 5) should be mandated and cost-oriented. In addition, 
NRAs should be able to calculate and include a higher risk premium to reflect any 
additional and quantifiable investment risk incurred by the investor. This risk 
premium should be incorporated into the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) calculation for setting the price of access to the unbundled copper loop.  
 
V. TECHNO-ECONOMIC MODEL 
A. Risk calculation 
The tool used in this study is the ECOSYS techno-economic tool which has been 
used in the evaluations of various wireless and wireline access technologies. The 
application of the model relies on its database, where the cost figures of the 
various network components are kept and are constantly updated from data 
gathered from the biggest European telecommunication companies. Further 
information can be found in [5]. The outputs of this model are: (a) the investments 
undertaken by the incumbent (b) the unit costs of the various retail and wholesale 
products (c) the risk premium associated to the specific investment 
In order to make the above calculations the tool creates a modeled NGA network 
in a bottom-up (BU) long run incremental cost (LRIC) approach. BU stands for the 
approach of creating the appropriate scale/footprint of the network that the 
foreseen demand requires. Therefore proper dimensioning rules are followed to 
tailor the necessary type and volume of components to the expected services’ 
demand. LRIC approach means mainly that the only the NGA increment is 
modeled and no other network that might be complement to NGA (for example 
such as a leased line core network). For the first two of the above outputs, the 
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volumes of the necessary components are calculated based on the demand and 
the unit costs of the various necessary components are used. For the last 
calculation which is the risk premium, it is necessary to account future cash flows 
according to the Recommendation. Therefore, assumptions for the revenues and 
their evolution over time, should be occurred. 
By combining the revenues and expenditures sides, namely service revenues, 
investments, operating costs and general economic inputs (e.g. discount rate, tax 
rate), the tool calculates the results necessary for Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
analysis such as cash flows, Net Present Values (NPV), Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), payback period and other economic figure of merits for the NGA investor. 
The risk factor, which is the main output parameter that will be presented in the 
following sections, is defined as the difference the standard (traditional) WACC 
minus the IRR of the NGA project following discussion in [9].  
 
Total NGA risk factor = Traditionally defined operator WACC minus the IRR of the 
NGA project 
 
This is called as total risk and it should not be misinterpreted to the risk premium 
reported in the Recommendation. The total risk refers to how much higher should 
the IRR of an NGA project be than the traditional WACC of an operator (that is 
based on all other operator’s activities which are mainly traditional ones like 
voice, access, leased lines, etc.). In the following paragraphs, the total risk that 
the operator will be exposed if made the decision to implement a NGA, will be 
calculated and discussed, for the 4 scenarios studied. 
 
B. Modeling Assumptions 
The model calculates all the necessary costs and revenues that the incumbent 
will face if it takes the decision to implement a NGA in an area that is served from 
one central office. Each area according to its density (customers/square km) is 
characterized as Dense Urban (DU), Urban (U) or Suburban (S), and for each 
area there are different assumption concerning the number of buildings and other 
geographical parameters that are presented in Table I. 
 
TABLE I: AREA CHARACTERISTICS 
Area Buildings 
per 
cabinet 
Floors 
per 
building 
Apartments 
per 
building 
Density 
threshold 
(customers/km
2
) 
DU 20 4 4 9000 
U 32 4 2 1000 
S 36 2 1 500 
 
The incumbent offers services both to retail and wholesale broadband market. 
The project’s study period is set to 20 years, beginning at 2011. For the first 10 
years of the analysis full dimensioning of costs and revenues is performed. 
However, for the next ten years the following assumptions have been used, since 
it is very difficult to make long-term estimations and prognoses. The cost of 
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investments was assumed that will remain at the same levels as in the last three 
years (7th - 10th year) of the analysis. For both revenues and running costs a 
linear estimation was performed taking into account again the last three years. 
The WACC pre tax has been assumed as 10,5% (defined as a mean value 
among European incumbent operators) and it has also been used as the discount 
factor in the DCF analysis.  
As far as the broadband products offered and the forecasted revenues the 
following assumptions has been used. Two retail products (lower and higher) 
offered by the NGA investor were modeled (30Mbps and 50Mbps for FTTC and 
75Mbps and 100Mbps  for FTTH scenarios). Two corresponding wholesale 
broadband products (wholesale broadband access, WBA or bitstream) were 
assumed to offer to the access seekers. For simplicity reasons their price was set 
at retail-minus of 20%, but it is possible to set them at cost-oriented level (with or 
without risk premium). Moreover, wholesale physical access products were 
assumed priced at cost-oriented level without premium . The mix of WBA and 
physical access products is 50%-50%. It is assumed that the NGA investor has 
an initial NGA retail market share of 90% which at the 10th year has been 
reduced to 70% due to competitive pressure by the access seekers. The revenue 
has been assumed almost constant during the time period examined. This is 
consistent to the approach followed by almost all operators and almost in all 
countries to keep the same revenue and offer higher speed to the consumers or 
make some offers over the time. A 2% tariff yearly reduction has been assumed 
due to these offers.   
 
VI. RESULTS 
As a first step in the analysis, a total number of ten geographic areas have been 
selected with 320.000 potential subscribers in total. Three of them were 
characterized as DU, five as U and the rest three as S. The model calculated the 
total risk for the case that the incumbent operator decides to deploy the same 
architecture solution to all the areas for all 4 architectures.    
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FIGURE 2. TOTAL RISK FOR ALL ARCHITECTURES 
Negative total risk means that the IRR of the NGA project itself is higher than the 
traditionally calculated WACC of the operator-investor, thus the NGA project can 
be considered as profitable as the current (traditional) investment. In other words 
negative or even small positive but close to zero values indicate that the risk of 
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the specific scenario is rather minimal. Obviously, for the 3 FTTH scenarios this 
profitability can be observed only after many years of operation, verifying all 
worldwide discussion about the risks entailed to the FTTH/NGA investment. The 
launching period of FTTH/NGA operation is the most crucial since it is 
characterized by high risks, due to all parameters already discussed and mainly 
due to low penetration, adoption or demand. Therefore, it is verified how strategic 
the role of the regulator is during this first NGA operation interval. The regulatory 
decisions taken ex-ante (i.e. during this first NGA operation interval) should be 
the optimum in order to avoid altering this risk profile and perhaps towards 
worsening it.  
As it can be seen at Fig. 2 the three FTTH architectures have more or less the 
same risk and the FTTC scenario is significantly better. It is worth mentioning that 
FTTC/VDSL2 has much less risk than the other ones due to its lower capital 
demanded to invest (mainly less trenching). Therefore, the frequent comment 
posed by incumbent operators that the FTTC/VDSL2 entails significant risks 
loses its validity especially when compared to the other technologies. It is worth 
mentioning that profitability of this FTTC/VDSL scenario is achieved a less than 5 
year time interval. This is attributed mainly to high urban nature of the selected 
mix of areas modeled. Risks of FTTC/VDSL2 investment are considerably 
reduced in dense-urban and urban areas.  
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FIGURE 3. TOTAL RISK FOR FTTH ARCHITECTURES 
Fig. 3 focuses on FTTH architectures only, while the study period is limited at 
only the first 10 years. It is worth mentioning that risk levels of the three FTTH 
technologies are more or less the same though their different pros/cons profiles. 
This indicates that a more detailed analysis should be followed and special 
attention should be paid regarding the cost assumptions for each one of the 
GPON, P2P, P2PE technologies. Beyond FTTCab/VDSL2 which has in general 
less risk, there should be careful calculation for risk associated to FTTH 
technologies. In case of any FTTH technology for a time interval of the 
investment at 10 years, a minor but positive value less that 3% is occurring (Fig 
3). This can be interpreted as profitable case within a 10-years period, even for 
those risky investments and despite the usual utility-like investments which are 
profitable beyond the time period of 20 years. However, this medium term 
profitability can be secured when a number of contributing factors hold 
cumulatively: (a) a relative revenue (i.e. ARPU-Average Revenue Per User) 
stability over time during this time interval i.e. not price war situations among 
access providers and access seekers (b) roll-out cost reduction by strategies like 
co-investment among access providers, access seekers and possibly other 
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parties, state/municipality facilitation etc. (c) regulatory stability and close 
monitoring towards relaxing in case of pertaining risk profile (d) demand 
aggregation by state-aid or even facilitation.  
Especially the regulators face a big dilemma for those FTTH cases. If they follow 
the Recommendation they have to calculate a risk factor which should be 
probably high. This factor must be used to reward the NGA investor and as a 
result this risk premium would raise the unit cost i.e. the tariffs of both retail and 
wholesale services. If these tariffs are set initially at high prices then the demand 
for these prices should face even more risk and might lead the NGA investment 
to a total sunk cost with fewer possibilities to profitability. If they don’t follow the 
Recommendation regarding the cost-orientation basis (which is not easy to prove 
to the EC) then alternative schemes should be invented. For example: (a) the 
retail tariffs can be set by the operators according to their own commercial 
policies which might accept short term losses towards gaining more customer 
base or in an anchor-pricing form [10] and (b) wholesale prices can be set in 
retail-minus basis or other alternatives that are indicated by the European 
Regulatory Framework and common practices. However, these strategies are 
easy to lead to price wars which in the end of the day might push all operators to 
limited profitability (or even negative).  
At the next step, a new scenario was created in which the incumbent implements 
a mixed roll-out scenario deploying FTTH/GPON in the three DU areas and 
FTTC/VDSL in the rest seven areas. With this solution the incumbent avoids 
using the costly FTTH technology in areas with low customer density and reuses 
part of the already installed copper network. The total risk for the incumbent-
investor was calculated and the results are presented at Fig. 4.  
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FIGURE 4. TOTAL RISK FOR GPON+VDSL SCENARIO 
As expected, the risk calculated falls between the cases of pure FTTH-GPON 
and VDSL scenarios. The risk of this investment scheme is significantly lower 
than the GPON one. The total risk seems to be close to zero in about four years 
time, indicating higher possibility to project profitability. This indicates that the 
optimum strategy by the investing operator shouldn’t follow just one technology. 
On contrary, and as expected, in areas with low expected demand and/or 
customer purchasing power risky investments should avoided. Regulators’ 
challenges in these cases are related towards ensuring access of all consumers 
and access seekers to all technologies/areas perhaps by geographical remedies.  
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Finally, in order to further clarify the parameters that affect the total risk a 
sensitivity analysis was made in the risk value of the above modeled scenario at 
the 10th year. The impact of some critical parameters (such as the revenues, the 
penetration and the cost for digging and constructing the network, not the 
equipment cost) was examined. In sensitivity analysis each parameter is changed 
in order to study the impact that the changes in each parameter have to the 
output variable (while the others remain constant). The results are presented at 
Fig. 5. Each parameter was changed within an interval of ±20% of their initially 
assumed values. The most important impact is that of the revenue followed by 
the penetration and finally the digging cost. It should be denoted that if the case 
was purely FTTH the impact of the digging cost would be significantly higher. This 
result regarding the impact of revenue to the risk confirms our previous 
discussion in Fig.3 about the important role of ARPU stability over time in an NGA 
environment. Any that could contribute towards avoidance of price war in NGA 
environment would be welcomed measure (regulatory or not, like state-aid etc.). 
Price wars have been a common practice in many sector including traditional 
telecoms; however price wars in NGA era would likely push/force every involved 
actor to market exit.       
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FIGURE 5. SENSITIVITY GRAPH FOR GPON+VDSL SCENARIO 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The risk profile of NGA investments has been quantified, analysed and discussed 
under different scenarios for the first time according to our knowledge. It seems 
that FTTC/VDSL2 has not significant risk profile due to its high re-use of 
significant portion of existing copper PSTN network. This investment is expected 
to be profitable in less than five years time interval though the claims of some 
incumbent operators for high risk of this technology as well.  
All FTTH technologies have more or less the same risk profile but further 
examination is required. The risk profile of all is very high during the launching 
period but reduces to almost zero after about a decade. This means that the NGA 
investment has lower duration than utility-like investments but its risk is high 
especially in first years of operation.    
Taking into account the above, it is crucial for all involved parties (operators, 
regulators, EC, States etc.) to understand all these risk factors of the NGA 
investment itself. The NGA risk forces all to cooperate in order to minimize it, 
otherwise there will be no NGA at all. The access seekers should not based only 
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on regulator’s remedies to keep their operations in an NGA environment. Even in 
the worst case for NGA investor regime (cost-orientation with premium) the 
access-seekers have to pay high access price. Therefore, they should not follow 
a price war policy in the retail market.  
The NGA investor should benefit from a risk premium but this premium should not 
be too high otherwise it will kill its retail price too. In a NGA environment the 
operators cannot continue their policy that they have used to in the current 
business environment. On contrary they should share their risk. The EC 
recommendation offers a number of tools but unfortunately some of these (like 
cost-orientation combined to risk-premium) possibly does not lead to risk relax, 
while some others do facilitate the risk sharing. 
Credibly the regulators should be in position to accept a long term NGA policy 
with close monitoring and perhaps other policies/tools beyond standard cost-
orientation approach (at least for a temporal/transition period). 
The EC that issued the NGA recommendation must understand there are many 
practical details resulting from what described in this recommendation. The cost-
orientation combined with premium is leading to high wholesale access prices. If 
retail prices are kept below these wholesale access prices in order to attract 
customer base then the EC should accept at least for short term period that 
predatory pricing is a temporal sacrifice towards the well understood NGA risk. 
Unfortunately, this NGA recommendation does not consider the details in such 
cases, and perhaps could deserve further review. But, fortunately the EC NGA 
recommendation depicts that risk sharing is accepted. The risk sharing via co-
investment or other schemes should be the basis for the NGA operators 
(investors and access-seekers) 
The Member States may play the most important role since they can make higher 
or lower grade interventions towards facilitation of NGA deployment. For 
example, these interventions could include: proposals for state-aid measures 
regarding NGA deployment, facilitation measures such as demand 
stimulation/subsidization, network facilitation such as relaxation on the rights of 
way, etc. Some of the above NGA risks could be waived (at least partially) after a 
successfully designed measure initiated by a State or an arm of it.  
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Abstract 
The two most significant factors that affect the deployment of Next Generation 
Access (NGA) networks are the cost of the investment and the expected demand 
for the new fibre-based services. The related literature is based on very simplified 
assumptions regarding cost and demand structures. 
In particular, the investment cost is assumed to be increasing and convex 
reflecting the fact that fibre deployment becomes marginally more expensive as it 
is extended to rural, less populated areas. In addition, the demand for the new 
fibre-based services is estimated by assuming that a certain level of NGA 
investment leads all consumers to equally increase their willingness to pay for 
such services. 
This article contributes to the emerging research on the investment in access 
infrastructures. In particular, the assumptions about cost and demand structures 
are modified in order to capture the access networks’ underlying morphology 
complexity and the consumers’ socioeconomic characteristics, respectively. 
Firstly, an empirical analysis is conducted for the 100 major municipal 
departments from urban to rural in Greece. Their street network data are 
analyzed as the basis of the NGA installation combining GIS technology and 
Graph Theory techniques and hence the main cost-drivers are derived. Using 
regression analysis a real-data-based cost function is obtained. Secondly, a novel 
model that takes into account socioeconomic characteristics affecting the impact 
of a certain level of NGA investment on consumers’ willingness to pay is 
developed. The Pareto consumer distribution is used to reflect the greater (lower) 
positive impact of NGA investments on the willingness to pay of the consumers 
who live in more (less) populated areas. 
The comparison of the existing models with the ones developed in this paper 
shows that: (i) the cost function used in the existing models always 
underestimates the investment cost of the higher populated areas and 
overestimates the investment cost of the lower populated areas; (ii) the demand 
for the new fibre-based services is higher under the proposed than the existing 
approach; and (iii) the level of NGA investment chosen by the investor is always 
much higher under the proposed than the existing approach. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, the number of internet users, as well as, the capacity they 
demand have increased dramatically. As a result, the increasing transmitted 
volume of data made the traditional access copper networks incapable of 
providing end-users with the demanded bandwidth. On the contrary, access 
networks based on optical fibre are the only future proof solution capable to 
handle the future demands (Shumate, 2008), since the transmission capabilities 
of fibre are theoretically unlimited providing high data rates, low loss and low 
distortion. Such fibre-based access networks are widely known as Next 
Generation Access (NGA) networks. According to European Commission “NGA 
networks mean wired access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical 
elements and which are capable of delivering broadband access services with 
enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those 
provided over already existing copper networks. In most cases NGA networks are 
the result of an upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial access network” 
(EC, 2010a). 
However, not only technical reasons but also economic ones make the need for 
investments in NGA networks imperative. In particular, it is found that  
investments in broadband infrastructure have an undisputable positive effect on 
economic growth and broadband diffusion (Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and 
Woessmann, 2011; Katz, Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern and Suter, 2010; Reynolds, 
2009). These results partially interpret why national governments rank among 
their top priorities the encouragement of investments in NGA networks. The US 
government’s National Broadband Plan (FCC, 2010) and the European 
Commission’s Digital Agenda for Europe (EC, 2010b) are examples of these 
perceived political priorities for the diffusion of broadband infrastructure access 
and services. According to EC (2010a): 
“The EU single market for electronic communications services, and in particular 
the development of very high-speed broadband services, is key to creating 
economic growth and achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. The 
fundamental role of telecommunications and broadband deployment in terms of 
EU investment, job creation and overall economic recovery was notably 
highlighted by the European Council in the conclusions of its March 2009 
meeting.” 
It can be thus concluded that very high-speed broadband services are widely 
accepted as strategically important not only because of their ability to accelerate 
the contribution of information and communications technology (ICT) to economic 
growth(Teppayayon and Bohlin, 2010), but also because network investments 
are potentially important targets of public investment during downturns as a way 
to increase demand and employment (Reynolds, 2009). 
However, service providers are still reluctant to invest in NGA networks mainly 
due to the high investment cost and the ambiguity about the expected demand for 
the new fibre-based services. There are several theoretical economic approaches 
that aim to model the cost structure of investing in NGA networks, as well as, the 
impact of such investments on the future demand for the new fibre-based 
services. Most of these approaches assume that the investment cost is 
increasing and convex reflecting the fact that fibre deployment becomes 
marginally more expensive as it is extended to rural, less populated areas 
(Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011; Foros, 2004). In addition, they also assume that 
the demand for the new fibre-based services is not affected by the relationship 
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between the valuation that the consumers place to such services and their 
location (i.e. the population-affected type of the area they live in). Although these 
assumptions are useful for practical reasons; they fail to take into account the 
access networks’ underlying morphology complexity and the consumers’ 
socioeconomic characteristics, respectively.  
This paper contributes to the emerging research on the investment in NGA 
networks by modifying the existing cost and demand structure assumptions in 
order to capture the access networks’ underlying morphology complexity and the 
consumers’ socioeconomic characteristics, respectively. Firstly, an empirical cost 
analysis is conducted for the 100 major municipal departments from urban to rural 
in Greece. Their street network data are analyzed as the basis of the NGA 
installation combining GIS technology and Graph Theory techniques and hence 
the main cost-drivers are derived. Using regression analysis a real-data-based 
cost function is obtained. Secondly, a novel model that takes into account 
socioeconomic characteristics affecting the impact of a certain level of NGA 
investment on consumers’ willingness to pay is developed. The Pareto consumer 
distribution is used to reflect the greater (lower) positive impact of NGA 
investments on the willingness to pay of the consumers who live in more (less) 
populated areas. 
The comparison of the existing models with the ones developed in this paper 
shows that: (i) the cost function used in the existing models always 
underestimates the investment cost of the higher populated areas and 
overestimates the investment cost of the lower populated areas; (ii) the demand 
for the new fibre-based services is higher under the proposed than the existing 
approach; and (iii) the level of NGA investment chosen by the investor is always 
much higher under the proposed than the existing approach. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the existing approach in terms of 
cost and demand functions is reviewed. Section 3 proposes a new approach to 
estimate the cost of deploying an NGA network based on real cost data from 
Greece and modifies the widely used demand model with network externalities in 
order to capture the fact that consumers who place a higher (lower) valuation to 
broadband subscription tend to live in higher (lower) populated areas. Section 4 
compares the results of the two approaches in terms of the optimal investment 
level for the investor and the subsequent levels of subscribers, investment costs, 
revenues and profits. The last section summarizes the main results of this article 
and proposes the directions for future work. 
 
2. Existing approach  
This section provides the existing cost and demand functions that are widely used 
in the literature of NGA investments in order to estimate the investment level that 
maximizes the investor’s profits.  
 
2.1 Existing cost models 
Currently, most telecom operators are reluctant to significantly upgrade their 
telecommunication access network due to the high investment cost. Upgrade to 
NGA networks is generally perceived as the Fibre to the Curb (FTTC), Fibre to 
the Building (FTTB) and, of course, Fibre to the Home (FTTH) which is the 
ultimate and most future-proof access solution. To make any profound decisions 
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on replacing some or all copper cable with optical fibre, a reasonably accurate 
cost model is needed, with enough detail on differences between deployments in 
different regions. 
The related literature on telecommunications investments (Nitsche and Wiethaus, 
2011; Foros, 2004) is based on very simplified assumptions regarding the cost 
structure. The investor in the abovementioned approaches determines the extent 
of NGA deployment, R . The investment level is considered continuous and a 
larger R  reflects a larger geographic coverage within a given market area (e.g. 
fibre to the outskirts rather than to the city centre, or to less populated cities). The 
NGA deployment is assumed to require investments of the following quadratic 
form: 
2
2
φR
C(R)=    (1) 
where φ  is an investment cost parameter. The convex form accounts for the 
assumption that deploying an NGA network becomes more expensive as the 
rollout is extended to rural, less populated areas indicated by a higher R .  
In the case of investing in NGA networks in a nationwide level, R  can be seen as 
continuous in  1, maxR  implying that  = 1R  corresponds to the highest populated 
area and  = maxR R  
corresponds to the lowest populated area. Therefore, the 
whole areas within a country have been ranked in a decreasing order according 
to their population. 
 
2.2 Existing demand models 
There are many economic models that aim to estimate the demand for a good. 
Most of them base their analysis on the market structure of the industry in order 
to derive the demanded quantity. Examples of such models are those proposed 
by Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, etc. These models are widely used in 
conventional markets in which there is a negative relationship between the 
demanded quantity for a good and its price. However, network markets, such as 
telecommunications, computers, electricity and railroads, present an innate 
characteristic that make them differ from conventional markets. In particular, the 
utility which a given user derives from the network good depends upon the 
number of other users who are in the same network. According to Katz and 
Shapiro (1985), this fact implies a positive consumption externality, which is 
widely known in the literature as network externality or network effect.1 
Economides (1996) points out that this fact seems quite counterintuitive since it 
goes against the downward-sloping market demand. Thus, he proposes that a 
positive consumption externality signifies the fact that the value of a unit of the 
good increases with the expected number of units to be sold. In this case, the 
demand slopes downward but shifts upward with increases in the number of units 
expected to be sold. Therefore, when expectations are fulfilled, the derived 
demand curve for a network good is concave. 
                                                          
1
  Some authors distinguish between direct and indirect network externalities. For a discussion on 
this issue see Economides (1996), Katz & Shapiro (1985), Page and Lopatka (1999) and Shy 
(2011). 
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Based on these observations, Shy (2011) models the demand for a network 
good. In particular, he assumes that potential subscribers can be indexed in a 
decreasing order according to the valuation (or utility) that they place on the 
network good. In particular, potential consumers are indexed by x , [0,1]x , 
where consumers that are indexed by low values of x  value the subscription 
highly, whereas consumers that are indexed by x  close to 1 place a low valuation 
on this service. Therefore, the variation in their willingness to pay for the network 
good forms a continuum of types of consumers. The (expected) utility of a 
potential subscriber indexed by x  is given by: 
e
x
(1- βx)αq - p,  if  the consumer subscribes
U =
0,  if  the consumer does not subscribe



 (2) 
where p  denotes the subscription fee, 
eq  the expected total number of 
subscribers and > 0β  captures the degree of consumer heterogeneity with 
respect to consumers’ benefit from this service. The parameter > 0α  measures 
the intensity of network effects. Higher values of α indicate that consumers place 
higher value on the ability to communicate with the eq subscribers, whereas α = 0  
implies that there are no network effects. 
A further assumption made by Shy (2011) is that the potential consumers are 
distributed uniformly in [0,1]. The uniform distribution of the consumers implies 
that in each type has been assigned a fixed number of potential consumers. 
Therefore the market demand is derived by multiplying the number of types 
whose utility is positive (i.e. buy the product or subscribe) with the fixed number 
of consumers of each type. For example, let there be N  potential subscribers of 
each type x , [0,1]x . Then, for a given subscription fee p , there is a consumer 
of type 0 1x(p)   who is indifferent between subscribing and not subscribing. 
Assuming perfect foresight, the total number of expected subscribers (or the 
demand for the network good) is = ( )
e
Nx pqu .   
However, in order to make investment costs and revenues comparable, we 
should transform the consumer type indexed by x , [0,1]x  into the range 
 1, maxR . This implies that each consumer type x  corresponds to a given 
geographic area R . Lower values of R  imply that the consumer who lives in this 
area place a higher valuation to the network good. For this purpose, the 
normalization method with transformation min
max min
R - R
x =
R - R
 is used. The notation R  
stands for the original dissimilarity and x  for the normalized dissimilarity. Hence, 
the dissimilarity index R  (respectively, x ) lies between 1 and maxR  (respectively, 
0 and 1). Applying the above normalization method yields the original dissimilarity 
as a function of the corresponding normalized dissimilarity: 
   max maxR = x R - 1 +1 , with R  1, R    (3) 
Equation 3 shows that R  is continuous in  1, maxR . In addition, = 0x  corresponds 
to = 1R  and = 1x  to maxR . This implies that the number of the potential 
consumers is maxNR , whereas the utility function of Shy (2001) becomes 
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max max max
U = (R - β(x(R - 1)+1))αN(x(R - 1)+1)- px . Then, solving for x  yields the 
indifferent consumer: 
 
 

2
max maxU
L,H
max
αNR - 2αβN αNR  - 4αβNp
=x
2αβN R - 1
 
 
(4) 
 
Therefore, the expected number of potential subscribers is given by: 
 
 
    
    
  
2
max maxU
maxL,H
max
αNR - 2αβN αNR  - 4αβNp
= N (R - 1)+1  q
2αβN R - 1
 
 
(5) 
 
Since there exist two indifferent consumers between subscribing and not 
subscribing, there also exist two consumer equilibria. At every given price p , 
either a low or a high demand level would be realized according to consumers’ 
expectations for the demand level. If all consumers correctly anticipate low 
demand, only those who value this service highly ( L0
U
 x x ) will subscribe. If all 
consumers anticipate high demand, the gain from a larger anticipated network will 
also induce consumers with lower valuations ( L H
U U xx x ) to subscribe. Note that 
U
Lq  is an unstable equilibrium in the sense that a small increase in the number of 
subscribers would induce 
U
Hq  consumers to subscribe. Therefore, the demand 
(number of subscribers) for the network good is given by:  
 
 
2
max maxU
maxH
max
αNR - 2αβN + αNR  - 4αβNp
= N (R - 1)+1  q
2αβN R - 1
  
  
    
  
 
 
(6) 
 
It should be noted that, in existing markets, maxR  denotes the urban administrative 
divisions, i.e. municipal department (MD), of a country in which the consumers 
that place the lowest valuation on the new fibre-based services live. However, in 
the case of the NGA investments, this municipal department may not be covered 
by the investor. This implies that when a potential subscriber to the NGA services 
makes its decision to subscribe or not, s/he takes into account the expected 
number of subscribers to the NGA services rather than the whole population in a 
given country. Therefore, maxR  should be replaced by invR which denotes the 
municipal department of a country that it is covered by the investor and in which 
the consumers that place the lowest valuation on the new fibre-based services 
live. In other words, invR  denotes the optimal investment level chosen by an 
investor in NGA networks. Therefore, the investor maximizes the following 
equation with respect to invR . 
inv 
2
UU
H
φR
= P -q
2
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 
inv
  
  
     
  
2
2
inv invU
αNR - 2αβN + αNR  - 4αβNp φR
= PN +1  -
2αβN 2
 
 
(7) 
 
 
3. The proposed approach 
This section provides a more realistic approach concerning the development of 
NGA networks. In particular, the proposed cost and demand functions depart 
from the existing ones since the proposed model captures the access networks’ 
underlying morphology complexity and the consumers’ socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
 
3.1 Proposed NGA investment cost  
In this case, an empirical cost analysis conducted on a nationwide NGA network 
provides insights on the cost form, so that the validity and the accuracy of the 
conventional cost form may later be explored. 
An approach is presented in this section for getting a clear estimate of expenses 
for an NGA rollout, particularly the most future-proof access solution of FTTH 
deployment, as the investment level increases from areas with large number of 
households (HH) to areas with small number of households. Calculations are 
made for the main cost-drivers using real street network data as the basis of a 
fixed NGA installation combining GIS technology and Graph Theory techniques. 
For simplicity, the focus in this study is on the most important expenses that are 
the outside plant (OSP) capital expenditures (CAPEX). Earlier studies (Colle et 
al., 2008) indeed indicate that the major part of the total investment in a 
telecommunication access network is the capital investment made in the lower 
part of the network that connects a subscriber by a physical link to its 
corresponding Central Office (CO) via intermediate network components. 
Possible expenses on the active equipment or the regional/national/global 
backbone are not considered here. 
 
The architecture 
The considered FTTH architecture is presented in Figure 1. The model consists 
of a CO where all the optical line terminals are located, the feeder part of the 
network connecting the CO with flexibility points (FP), and the distribution part 
from FP to the end-users. The FP (or splitting point or cabinet) plays a 
concentration role, allowing the merging of customer cables. There are two 
popular technologies used with FTTH. The Point to Point (P2P) technology which 
uses all active components throughout the chain and Point to Multi-Point (P2M) / 
Passive Optical Network (PON) technology which uses passive optical splitters at 
the aggregation layer. For the purposes of this study the PON technology has 
been envisaged since it has been proven that P2P technology requires a rather 
costly infrastructure (Chatzi and Tomkos, 2011).Gigabit-capable Passive Optical 
Networks (GPON) are standardized by ITU-T under the family of 
recommendations G.984 (ITU-T, 2009) and are already in use in several 
countries. Here, the deployment of GPON FTTH is considered with a centralized 
1:128 splitting ratio. This means that per group of 256 customers covered by 
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each FP, only 2 fibres are needed for the FP-CO feeder part connection. Each 
CO is assumed to cover up to 100.000 households. 
Also, a greenfield deployment is assumed and no existing infrastructure is taken 
into account. The installation closely follows one street with the cable located at 
the middle of the street and connects all households along the street. Of course, 
savings are possible if part of the network can be installed by means of aerial 
deployment, e.g. in areas with small number of households. 
 
 
Figure 1. FTTH access network architecture 
The regarded elements for the calculation of the total OSP CAPEX are the 
trenches, the ducts, the fibre cables, the splitters, the manholes, and the Y-
branches. The individual components’ costs were taken from (Chatzi and 
Tomkos, 2011). Any effects of changes in these prices to the total cost falls 
beyond the scope of this paper. The estimation of the volume of the material 
needed is described later on. 
The use of geometric models is very often in techno-economics for analyzing the 
deployment area and estimating the OSP cost (Casier, 2009). Typically, these 
geometric abstractions of the installation region assume a regular grid-like 
structure where all lines have equal length and the same number of junctions. 
However, they cannot capture the complex details of the underlying urban street 
network in order to accurately estimate the key quantities for a cost evaluation of 
a fixed access network. In fixed access networks the cables run in trenches that 
use the road system as a natural guide to reach the customers. Access network 
nodes as well as connections strongly depend on the actual geography of the 
underlying urban street network and this has been proven to have a significant 
impact on the key quantities for estimating the deployment cost (Mitcsenkov et 
al., 2010; Maniadakis and Varoutas, 2012). For this reason a recently presented 
methodology (Maniadakis and Varoutas, 2012) that uses real GIS data is 
extended and applied for the cost analysis. 
In this paper the 100 major MDs in Greece are selected in order to calculate and 
observe the form of the cumulative cost as the investment continues from the 
most populated down to the lowest populated MD in terms of households. The 
data are obtained from the collaborative project OpenStreetMap 
(OpenStreetMap, 2012) (GIS vector map) and the Hellenic Statistical Authority 
(Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2001) (number of HH, number of buildings, km2 of 
area). The constructed dataset consists of 100 1-square-kilometer samples of 
street networks selected from the abovementioned municipal departments. Their 
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data are imported in a GIS environment and are turned into spatial, weighted, 
undirected graphs using the Primal approach.  
 
 
Figure 2. In the left it is the street network of the district sample of MD Nea Smirni, while to the right is the 
corresponding Primal graph split into square serving zones with buildings placed equidistant and FPs placed 
in the optimal locations 
 
Methodology and results 
Street networks are spatial, which is a special class of complex networks whose 
nodes are embedded in a two (or three) dimensional Euclidean space and whose 
edges do not define relations in an abstract space, but are real physical 
connections (Cardillo et al., 2006). Such a street network can be represented as 
a graph, which consists of a finite set of nodes and a finite set of edges. The 
graph nodes have precise position on the planar map, while the links follow the 
footprints of real streets and are associated a set of real positive numbers 
representing the street lengths. 
A sample urban area is chosen and GIS data are collected without further GIS 
processing or analysis. The GIS data are then transformed to a spatial, weighted, 
undirected graph using the Primal approach (Porta et al., 2006) where 
intersections are turned into nodes and streets into edges, as shown in Figure 2. 
Depending on the number of buildings in the area, a new spatial network is made 
as an extension of the street network, with new nodes placed equidistance from 
neighbor nodes (inter building spacing - IBS) along the existing edges, so that the 
total number of nodes is equal to the number of buildings. In addition, depending 
on the number of HH in the area, a number of FPs is assigned at optimal 
locations applying the Closeness Centrality method. Each FP can serve a 
maximum number of households, e.g. 256, thus the total number of households is 
divided to this number to produce the required FPs. Then, the considered area 
needs to be split into serving zones, for example squares of equal size in order to 
serve approximately the same number of buildings/households. Each FP is 
associated with a serving zone such that the inscribed subnetwork that gathers all 
fibre lines between the FP and the subscribers displays a star structure that 
follows the underlying street network. The network can retain information in the 
edge weights, such as the trenching length, the size of the duct, the fibre length, 
etc. Then, the volume of the various network components may be computed with 
simple calculations on the graph weights, as described in (Maniadakis and 
Varoutas, 2012). 
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The cost is calculated for each 1-square-kilometer sample and then a cost/HH 
can be derived if the cost is divided with the number of HH in the sample, as 
shown in Figure 3 for the case of Greece. All costs are estimated for a project 
horizon of 20 years. The cost/HH per year is estimated to vary from 2,25€ to 
265€. 
 
Figure 3. Cost per HH per year for the major MDs (sorted in number of HH) of Greece 
The present study focuses on the 100 most populated MDs in terms of HH that 
vary from 301.566 HH to 5.953 HH and HH density that varies from 9.464 HH/km2 
to 24 HH/km2. However, the vast majority of these MDs belongs to the high-
dense HH MDs, as 67 out of 100 belong to the top-100 most densely populated 
MDs in HH. Thus, this means that either the investment grows from largest to 
lowest MD in terms of number of HH as described here, or from largest to lowest 
MD in terms of HH density, the cost results are similarly distributed. In total, the 
100 MDs under investigation cover 2.089.992 HH or 57% of all HH in Greece. 
Multiplying the above estimated cost per HH with the corresponding MD ’s 
number of HH gives the cost per MD. Its cumulative distribution is depicted in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. The cumulative cost per year for the major MDs (sorted in number of HH) of Greece 
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It is now convenient to derive the cost function that describes NGA investment as 
the investment level moves on greater level, covering less populated areas. 
Using regression analysis on the real cost data, the derived NGA investment cost 
function is given by: 
invinv invC( )= 920,03 +174197
2R RR  (8) 
 
3.2 Proposed NGA demand  
Although the uniformity assumption is convenient for deriving analytical results, it 
has been fiercely criticized in the literature. The reason is that uniform consumer 
distribution may not be highly satisfactory in representing actual consumer 
distributions in many markets (Ansari, Economides and Ghosh, 1994) and hence 
it is more realistic to assume non-uniform consumer distributions (Anderson, 
Goeree and Ramer, 1997).  
Indeed, in many network markets, such as telecommunications, the valuation that 
the consumers place to the network good is significantly affected by their location 
(i.e. the population-affected type of the area they live in). The related literature 
studies the determinants of broadband availability, adoption and usage 
depending on location. For example, Flamm and Chaudhuri (2007) find a positive 
urban and suburban role in stimulating both dialup and broadband adoption. They 
attribute this result to social characteristics that make the internet and broadband 
use more attractive to urban and suburb dwellers than to rural folk. A more 
conclusive study that includes the main results of the related literature is Preston, 
Cawley and Metykova (2007) which analyze the status of broadband in rural 
areas in the EU. They look at availability, adoption and use of broadband, taking 
a policy perspective drawing from the results of the BEACON research, which 
provides an analysis of the broadband situation in each of the 25 EU countries. 
Their main findings are: a geographic broadband divide; lower investment in 
infrastructure in rural areas; where broadband is available, lack of competition in 
infrastructure and services; the fact that the rural broadband divides go along with 
other traditional divides; the fact that rural areas suffer from declining and aging 
population; the fact that the rural dwellers tend to be slower adopters; the fact that 
the rural areas have less technical support; the circumstance that social factors 
that facilitate broadband use (such as education, profession, economic status and 
cultural practice) can be less favourable in rural communities. The main take-
away of the above studies is that consumers who place a higher (lower) valuation 
to broadband subscription tend to live in higher (lower) populated areas. 
This conclusion signifies the fact that uniform consumer distribution fails in 
representing the actual demand in telecommunications markets in which the 
consumers’ valuation for the good varies according to the population of the 
location (area) they live in. Thus, the aim of this section is to estimate the demand 
for the new fibre-based services when the relationship between location and 
valuation for the good is taken into account. This implies that the distribution of 
the consumers to their different types is not uniform but follows a certain non-
uniform distribution that captures the fact that consumers who place a higher 
(lower) valuation to the network good tend to live in areas with higher (lower) 
population.  
A particular type of non-uniform distribution in literature that can describe the 
population allocation in urban divisions is the power law or Pareto distribution 
(Soo, 2005). This distribution, when plotted on double logarithmic axes, shows a 
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remarkable linear pattern where the slope of the line is usually close to -1, 
corresponding to the well-known Zipf’s law distribution (Zipf, 1949). This type of 
non-uniform distribution is quite appropriate to chose since it states that a size is 
inversely proportional to its rank in a sorted order. For example, in the case of 
populations, the population size of each city in a country appears to be inversely 
proportional to the city rank. Therefore, the variation in the population of each 
area forms a continuum of areas. This fact is in full accordance with the model 
proposed by Shy (2011) and hence they can be easily compared. 
In Figure 5 there are presented the most populated municipal departments of 
Greece in terms of households. Specifically, there are included MDs until 100 HH 
(3679 MDs in total). Their HH-Rank distribution fits a power law (R2>0,99) with a 
power law exponent near -1, indicating a Zipf distribution. 
 
Figure 5. HH distribution is a Zipf distribution; the case of Greece (2001) 
As mentioned by Kyriakidou, Michalakelis and Varoutas (2011), Zipf’s law can be 
described by the following equation: 
Constant C
Rank x Population = Constant Population =   pop(R)=
Rank R
   (9) 
Let rank the MDs according to their HH number in a decreasing order. Then, 
min
R = 1  denotes the area with the highest population and maxR = R  denotes the 
area with the lowest population. Figure 6 plots the non-uniform distribution of 
consumers according to their willingness to pay.  
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Figure 6. Non-uniform distribution of consumers according to their willingness to pay 
Figure 6 reflects the fact that consumers with high willingness to pay live in areas 
with high population. However, the distribution of consumers according to their 
willingness to pay (or equivalently the rank of the areas they live in) is not 
uniform, but follows the Zipf’s law. Therefore, the maximum number of potential 
consumers is represented by the shaded region of the above figure, which is 
given by:  
   
max max
max
R R Rmax
max1
1 1
C
= pop R dR = dR =   C ln R  = Cln Rq
R

    n u      (10) 
Similar to Shy (2011), only those types of consumers whose valuation for the 
network good is positive buy the good or subscribe. Therefore, for a given 
subscription fee p , there is a consumer of type  0    1 x p  who is indifferent 
between subscribing and not subscribing. This indifferent consumer is affected by 
the expected total number of subscribers which is given by: 
 
max max
max
x(R -1)+1 x(R -1)+1
x(R -1)+1e
n-u 1
1 1
C
= pop R dR = dR = C ln R  q
R
       
 e maxn-u = Cln x(R - 1)+1q  (11) 
Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq. (2) and using Eq. (3) gives the (expected) utility of a 
potential subscriber indexed by [0,1]x  when the distribution of consumers 
according to their willingness to pay follows the Zipf’s law: 
max max max(R - β(x(R - 1)+1))αCln(x(R - 1)+1) - p,  if  the consumer subscribes
V =x
0,  if  the consumer does not subscribe



 
 
(12) 
 
Solving Eq. (12) with respect to x  yields the indifferent consumer: 
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 
 
max
V
L,H
max
αCR - αβC .  
=x
2αβC R - 1
 
 
(13) 
 
where 
     
2 2 2 2
max max
. = αβC + αCR  - 2α βC R - 4pαβC  
 
(14) 
Then, by substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (11), the expected number of potential 
subscribers is derived: 
   
  
 
max
V
L,H
αCR - αβC .  
= Cln +1q
2αβC
     (15) 
Once again, it is proven that 
V
Lq  is an unstable equilibrium in the sense that a 
small increase in the number of subscribers would induce 
V
Hq  consumers to 
subscribe. Therefore, the demand (number of subscribers) for the network good 
is given by:  
   
  
 
max
V
H
αCR - αβC + .  
= Cln +1q
2αβC
 
 
(16) 
 
which is represented by the shaded region in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  Demand with non-uniform consumer distribution 
As in the case of the existing approach, maxR  should be replaced by invR  in order 
to capture the fact that a potential subscriber to the NGA services makes its 
decision to subscribe or not based on the expected number of subscribers to the 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 258 
NGA services rather than the whole population in a given country. Therefore, the 
investor maximizes the following equation with respect to invR . 
inv 
VV 2
invH
= P - 920,03 +174197Rq R  
 
 
 
( )inv
 
 

  
 
invV 2
inv
αCR - αβC + .  
= PCln +1  - 920,03 +174197RR
2αβC
 
 
(17) 
 
where 
     
2 2 2 2
inv inv
. = αβC + αCR  - 2α βC R - 4pαβC  
 
(18) 
 
4. Comparison of the two approaches 
This section compares the outcomes of the two approaches in terms of the 
optimal investment level ( inv
i
R ) and the subsequent levels of subscribers (
i
Hq ), 
investment costs ( inv
i
C ), revenues (
i
R ) and profits (
i
Π ), where the superscript 
i =U,V  stand for the existing and the proposed approach, respectively. The main 
part of the analysis that follows is conducted via numerical simulations due to the 
complexity of closed-form solutions for the endogenous variable invR  in Eqs. (7) 
and (17). The optimal investment levels for the investor under both approaches 
are derived for 9 different scenarios concerning different values of the 
independent parameters β  and φ . These parameters are chosen because the 
sensitivity analysis conducted showed that β  and φ  have the more powerful 
impact on total profits. In order to define the other independent parameters actual 
data from Greece are used. In particular, C = 400000  denotes the most populated 
municipal department in Greece (see Figure 5) and P = 480  denotes the annual 
average price per household. In addition, the level of α  is chosen arbitrarily to 1 
since sensitivity analysis shows that α  does not significantly affect the final 
results.  
A very significant observation is that the total number of HH is the same either if 
they are uniformly or non-uniformly distributed to the different municipal 
departments. In the former case the total number of HH is maxNR , whereas in the 
latter case the total number of HH is  maxCln R . Equating the two populations and 
solving with respect to N  gives the fixed number of HH assigned by Shy (2001) to 
each municipal department: 
 max
max
ln R
N = C
R
      (19) 
In the case of Greece, 6122maxR  since there are 6122 municipal departments. 
Therefore, Shy (2001) assigns 570 HH to every of 6122 municipal departments. 
The final results can be summarized in Tables 1 and 2.  
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Table 1 
  
inv
U
R  inv
V
R  
U
Hx  
V
Hx  
U
Hq  
V
Hq  
β = 1,00  φ= 5.000  54,70 279,14 0,99 0,99 31.160 2.252.684 
β = 1,00  φ= 10.000  27,37 279,14 0,99 0,99 15.580 2.252.684 
β = 1,00  φ= 15.000  18,27 279,14 0,99 0,99 10.387 2.252.684 
β = 1,45  φ= 5.000  37,75 279,14 0,68 0,68 14.821 2.252.684 
β = 1,45  φ= 10.000  18,92 279,14 0,67 0,68 7.140 2.252.684 
β = 1,45  φ= 15.000  12,67 279,14 0,66 0,68 4.940 2.252.684 
β = 1,90  φ= 5.000  28,84 279,14 0,51 0,52 8.632 2.252.684 
β = 1,90  φ= 10.000  14,50 279,14 0,49 0,52 4.316 2.252.684 
β = 1,90  φ= 15.000  9,76 279,14 0,46 0,52 2.878 2.252.684 
 
Table 2 
  
inv
U
C  inv
V
C  
U
R  
V
R  
U
Π  
V
Π  
β = 1,00  φ= 5.000  7.482.694 120.312.585 14.956.961 1.081.288.267 7.474.267 960.975.682 
β = 1,00  φ= 10.000  3.747.679 120.312.585 7.478.489 1.081.288.267 3.730.810 960.975.682 
β = 1,00  φ= 15.000  2.505.512 120.312.585 4.985.685 1.081.288.267 2.480.173 960.975.682 
β = 1,45  φ= 5.000  3.563.062 120.312.585 7.113.898 1.009.948.067 3.550.836 889.635.482 
β = 1,45  φ= 10.000  1.790.753 120.312.585 3.556.988 1.009.948.067 1.766.235 889.635.482 
β = 1,45  φ= 15.000  1.204.186 120.312.585 2.371.439 1.009.948.067 1.167.253 889.635.482 
β = 1,90  φ= 5.000  2.079.628 120.312.585 4.143.218 958.052.323 2.063.590 837.739.738 
β = 1,90  φ= 10.000  1.051.994 120.312.585 2.071.725 958.052.323 1.019.731 837.739.738 
β = 1,90  φ= 15.000  715.171 120.312.585 1.381.484 958.052.323 666.313 837.739.738 
 
The values of β  are chosen in order to ensure that 0 1x(p)  , whereas  the 
values of φ  represent three different scenarios concerning the relationship 
between the investment cost function given by Eq. (1) and the real-cost-data-
based investment cost function given by Eq. (8). Figure 8 shows that regardless 
of the particular value of φ , Eq. (1) always underestimates the investment cost of 
the higher populated MDs and overestimates the investment cost of the lower 
populated MDs. In particular, the lower the value of φ , the more underestimated 
(overestimated) the investment cost of the higher (lower)  populated MD 
becomes. This implies that the lower the value of φ , the lower populated is the 
MD that the cost functions of Eqs. 1 and 8 result to the same deployment cost. 
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Figure 8.  Cumulative investment cost per year 
A number of observations derived by the analysis of Table 1 and 2 are instructive. 
An increase in φ  and/or β  leads inv
U
R  to decrease, whereas inv
V
R  is not affected 
by a change in φ  and/or β . The comparison between inv
U
R  and inv
V
R  shows that 
inv
V
R  is always much greater than inv
U
R . Since the indifferent subscriber is almost 
the same in both approaches, it is reasonable that the number of subscribers is 
higher under the proposed than the existing approach. This, in turn, results in 
higher revenues under the proposed than the existing approach since it is 
assumed that the price of the service is the same under both approaches. 
Concerning the deployment cost, it is shown that an increase in φ  and/or β  leads 
inv
U
C  to decrease, whereas inv
V
C  is not affected by a change in φ  and/or β . The 
comparison between inv
U
C  and inv
V
C  shows that inv
V
C  is always much greater than 
inv
U
C .  
Another very significant finding is that an increase in β  negatively affects the 
investor’s profits under both approaches. However, the investor’s profits under 
the proposed approach are much greater than the investor’s profits under the 
existing approach. The main reason for this result is that the uniformity 
assumption underestimates the number of households in the most populated 
areas where the cost per household is lower. This partially interprets the 
investor’s decision to limit its investment level under the existing approach. This, 
in turn, decreases the expected number of subscribers, which also decreases the 
actual number of subscribers.  
Therefore, the departure from the uniformity assumption allows capturing the fact 
that subscribers who place a higher valuation to broadband subscription tend to 
live in higher populated areas where the cost per household is lower. It is thus 
obvious why the proposed approach leads to much higher investment level than 
the existing approach. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was twofold; firstly to investigate whether the traditional 
quadratic convex cost form is suitable for being used in NGA investments; and 
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secondly to propose a more realistic demand model. Thus, (i) an empirical cost 
analysis was conducted for a real case of NGA deployment and a real-data-based 
cost function was obtained; and (ii) the Pareto consumer distribution was used to 
reflect the greater (lower) positive impact of NGA investments on the willingness to 
pay of the consumers who live in more (less) populated areas. 
In the case of the investment cost, the existing assumption of the quadratic 
convex cost form was found inaccurate when compared with the cost estimation 
conducted for the 100 major municipal departments in terms of HH in Greece. 
The methodology used for the cost estimation took into account the underlying 
street morphology complexity that the classic approaches ignore due to the use 
of the simple geometric models. In particular, the cost function used in the 
existing models always underestimates the investment cost of the higher 
populated areas and overestimates the investment cost of the lower populated 
areas. 
Concerning the demand for the new fibre-based services, it was found that the 
existing demand models with network externalities always underestimate such 
demand since they assume uniform consumer distribution. The reason is that the 
uniformity assumption underestimates the number of households in the most 
populated areas where the cost per household is lower. Therefore, the optimal 
investment level from an investor’s perspective is always much higher under the 
proposed approach than the traditional one. 
Although this article provided some very useful results, there are many directions 
to be extended in order to overcome its limitations. First, the derived cost 
structure is based on actual cost data from Greece and hence its robustness 
should be investigated by using cost data from other countries. Second, this 
article neglects the impact of competition on the retail price, as well as, regulatory 
issues concerning the access price that an access seeker should pay to the 
investor in order to have access to the new fibre-based infrastructure. 
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ABSTRACT 
We study the impact of the regulatory uncertainty on the incumbents’ incentives 
to invest in NGA networks under cost-based access rules. It is found that the 
incumbents underinvest unless they are compensated for the regulatory risk they 
incur in practice. The optimal risk premium that reflects the regulatory uncertainty 
is derived, as well as, its impact on the levels of NGA investment and 
competition. The main conclusion of this paper is that when the slope of the 
marginal cost function of the investment is significantly but not extremely steep, a 
cost-based access price that incorporates a markup for the demand uncertainty 
and a premium for the regulatory uncertainty leads to higher levels of both NGA 
investment and consumer surplus. Therefore, we show that, under plausible 
assumptions, the current regulatory practice in the European NGA market 
described by the EC Recommendation on regulated access to NGA can tackle 
the regulatory trade-off between encouraging efficient NGA investments and 
promoting effective competition. 
 
Keywords: access regulation, competition level, investment incentives, 
regulatory uncertainty, telecommunications 
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1. Introduction 
The migration from the traditional copper networks to the Next Generation Access 
(NGA) networks1  has induced a growing interest in access regulation and 
investment incentives. Given that the prospective investors in NGA networks are 
for large part the former incumbent operators (OPTA, 2010), the goal of 
regulators is to promote effective competition and encourage efficient and timely 
investments in NGA networks from the incumbents. 
However, the regulators’ two-fold goal is related to the common trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiencies. On the one hand, mandated access at cost-
based prices reduces the use of monopoly power over the access infrastructure 
by preventing the incumbent from foreclosing the entrant from the downstream 
(retail) market. Access regulation thus leads to sustainable service-based 
competition within one network and, hence, improves static efficiency (Valletti, 
2003; Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven, 2010). On the other hand, mandating 
the access at cost-based prices discourages both incumbents and potential 
entrants to invest in access infrastructures (Jorde, Sidak and Teece, 2000). 
According to Cave and Prosperetti (2001), the reason for this negative 
relationship between access regulation and incumbents’ incentives to invest is 
that the incumbents anticipate that they will be required to offer access to their 
rivals at cost-based prices. Therefore, potential entrants, who can free-ride on the 
incumbent’s network, will wait for the incumbent to invest in access infrastructure 
and then seek access (Valletti, 2003). The conclusion is that cost-based access 
regulation, which is limited to promote service-based competition, leads to losses 
in dynamic efficiency (Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven, 2010). 
Cambini and Jiang (2009) provide an excellent review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between broadband investment and 
regulation. They conclude that although cost-based access prices lead to the 
aforementioned regulatory trade-off, there is still an ambiguity about access 
regulation and its linkage with overall investment incentives that should be further 
investigated. In this direction, Siciliani (2010) proposes a mechanism for 
preventing regulatory failures stemming from the demand-side uncertainty. 
However, according to OPTA (2008), not only the uncertainty about future 
demand for new fibre-based services deters the incumbent from investing in NGA 
networks, but also the regulatory uncertainty related to the regulator’s limited 
ability to make ex ante credible commitments.2 Contrary to Siciliani (2010), we 
focus on the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the NGA investment level, which 
is one of the main open telecommunications policy issues worldwide.  Since the 
regulators’ goal is not only to encourage investments in NGA networks, but also 
to promote effective competition, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the 
subsequent level of consumer surplus, which is used as a measure of the 
intensity of the competition in the retail market, will also be discussed.  
 
                                                          
1
 According to EU Commission (2010) Next Generation Access (NGA) networks means wired 
access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of 
delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) 
as compared to those provided over already existing copper networks. In most cases NGAs are 
the result of an upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial access network. 
2
  For an extensive review of all the factors influencing the riskiness of an NGA investment project, 
see ERG (2009), pp. 17-18, WIK (2009), pp.1-7 and EU Commission (2010), page 18. 
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2. Regulatory uncertainty: A literature review  
The related literature provides two different approaches for studying the 
relationship between access regulation and the incumbent’s incentives to invest 
in network upgrade (e.g. in NGA networks). The first assumes that the 
incumbents decide their optimal investment level prior to the regulation of the 
access price. This implies that the regulator cannot make ex ante credible 
commitments on its future interventions and hence the incumbents invest under 
regulatory uncertainty. Based on this assumption, Foros (2004) and Katakorpi 
(2006) study the investment of an incumbent in quality anticipating that the 
regulator will set the access price to the marginal cost of providing the access 
since this policy maximizes social welfare. They conclude that cost-based access 
price provides the incumbent with disincentives to invest unless it is much more 
efficient than its rivals in the downstream market. In addition, Lewin, Williamson 
and Cave (2009) argue that a lack of clarity over how incumbents will be 
regulated, particularly in terms of price when they have significant market power 
(SMP) in NGA supply, is deterring them from investing in NGA networks.  
The second approach assumes that the regulation of the access price takes 
place prior to the incumbents’ investment decision. According to Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2010) and Valletti and Cambini (2005), this implies that there is no 
regulatory commitment problem. However, in fact, the regulator’s ex ante 
commitment bears the risk of erroneous intervention. A regulator’s commitment 
for a long regulatory period may result in either incumbents’ inability of recouping 
their investment costs or excessive prices that harm competition. Therefore, it is 
socially not optimal for the regulator to make ex ante commitments for an 
unreasonably long regulatory period (WIK, 2009). It is obvious that short-run 
regulatory policies increase the regulatory uncertainty that the incumbents incur 
when investing in NGA networks. Therefore, in providing greater regulatory 
certainty the regulator has to make another trade-off between the positive effects 
of greater certainty on investment incentives and possible negative effects of 
erroneous intervention on welfare (OPTA, 2010).  
As a result, even if the regulator sets the access price prior to the investment 
stage, the regulatory commitment problem still exists. This implies that both 
approaches make the incumbents reluctant to invest in NGA networks because of 
the regulator’s limited ability to commit to its future intervention. Therefore, 
potential investors are reluctant to invest in NGA networks unless they are 
reimbursed for the risk they incur when investing in such networks. Based on this 
conclusion, the European Commission (EC) issued a Recommendation on 
regulated access to NGA (EU Commission, 2010) in order to provide the National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) with guidelines for encouraging efficient and timely 
investments in NGA networks from the incumbents and promoting effective 
competition. 
In particular, the EU Commission (2010) endorses the opinion of OPTA (2010) 
that “from the perspective of an investor, uncertainty is only reduced when the 
regulators discloses intended regulatory intervention before the investment is 
made”. Thus, the regulation of the access price is proposed to take place prior to 
the incumbents’ investment decision. In addition the EC admits that regulatory 
certainty is a key factor to promote efficient investments by all operators. For this 
reason, the EC recommends calculating the access in a cost-based form that 
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incorporates a risk premium. This premium should reflect any additional and 
quantifiable investment risk incurred by the investor.3  
The aim of this paper is to assess the risk premium that reflects the regulatory 
uncertainty according to the rules proposed by the EU Commission (2010). This 
implies that the access price should be cost-based incorporating a risk premium 
for the demand uncertainty and a risk premium that reflects the regulatory 
uncertainty. Sarmento and Brandao (2007) assume an access price equal to the 
marginal cost of providing the access plus the average cost of the investment. 
Such an access pricing formula is cost-based and we can assume that the 
access markup aims at reimbursing the investor for the demand uncertainty of 
NGA investments. We also use the access pricing formula proposed by Sarmento 
and Brandao (2007) but we allow for a risk premium that reflects the regulatory 
uncertainty. 
The calculation of the regulatory risk premium is based on the comparison of the 
results obtained when the incumbent invests in network upgrade before and after 
the regulation of the access price. The first case has been already studied by 
Sarmento and Brandao (2007) who compare the impact of deregulation, cost-
based regulation and retail-minus regulation on foreclosure, investment level and 
consumer surplus when the incumbent decides its optimal investment level prior 
to the regulation of the access price. On the contrary, we reverse the timing of the 
game assumed by Sarmento and Brandao (2007) in order to compare the results 
of the two approaches and to derive the risk premium that reflects the regulatory 
uncertainty of the investments in NGA networks under cost-based access rules. 
For the rest of the paper, we will call the approach of Sarmento and Brandao as 
“the incumbent’s approach” and our approach as “the regulator’s approach” since 
in the former case the incumbent acts as a leader in the market, whereas in the 
latter case the regulator acts as a leader and the incumbent as a follower.  
It should be noted that, to best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first formal 
attempt to calculate the risk premium for the regulatory risks in a theoretical way.4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 gives an outline of the 
basic assumptions and definitions of the model. Section 4 briefly recalls the 
results of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) under cost-based regulation. Section 5 
studies the impact of cost-based regulation on competition and investments 
under “the regulator’s approach”, compares the results of the two approaches, 
calculates the risk premium and justifies regulatory implications. The last section 
summarizes the key findings of this paper. 
 
3. The model 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to test the results of “the 
incumbent’s approach” under the assumption that the access price is set prior to 
the incumbent’s investment decision. Second, based on the comparison of the 
obtained results, it aims to calculate the risk premium that reflects the regulatory 
uncertainty of an investment in NGA networks. Since the obtained results should 
be comparable with those of Sarmento and Brandao (2007), the model used in 
                                                          
3
  See EU Commission (2010), Annex I. 
4
  OPTA (2010) has calculated a fixed premium of 3,5% for regulatory risks. However, we 
consider that this is the result of a techno-economic analysis since OPTA (2008) use such an 
analysis for deriving its optimal policy for regulating NGA investments.  
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this paper is identical to the model used by Sarmento and Brandao (2007) except 
of the timing of the game. In particular: 
 The retail (downstream) market is characterized as an unregulated duopoly 
market in which the incumbent (the subsidiary firm of the upstream 
monopolist) acts as a Stackelberg leader and the entrant (the independent 
firm) act as a Stackelberg follower.  
 The quality of the input sold by the monopolist is the same whether it is sold to 
the incumbent or to the entrant. It is also assumed that the production of one 
unit of the retail service requires one unit of the upstream input (fixed 
coefficients technology).  
 The inverse demand function is given by 
1 2
1 ( )p I q q    , where p  is the 
retail market price, 
1
q  and 2q  are the quantities supplied by the incumbent 
and the entrant respectively, I  represents the level of the NGA investment 
undertaken by the incumbent, and   represents the impact of a marginal 
change in the investment level on the retail price (ceteris paribus). It is further 
assumed that 0  , which implies that an increase in the NGA investment 
level leads to an outward parallel shift in the demand that benefits both 
retailers. 
 The NGA deployment is continuous where a larger I  reflects a fibre 
deployment closer to the consumers’ premises. The incumbent faces a 
quadratic NGA investment cost with respect to I , given by 2( ) / 2c I I , with 
0  . The convex form reflects the fact that fibre deployment becomes 
marginally more expensive as (i) it is being laid down towards consumers’ 
premises, and/or (ii) it is extended to rural, less densely populated areas. It is 
further assumed that the NGA investment level does not have any impact on 
the (fixed) marginal cost of providing the access denoted by c , ( 1c  ). The 
access price that the entrant should pay to the incumbent in order to have 
access to the incumbent’s network is represented by w , assuming w c . The 
cost of all other inputs is equal for both retailers and normalized to zero. 
Therefore, the profits functions of the incumbent (firm 1) and the entrant (firm 
2) are given, respectively, by 
1 1
2
2
( ) ( ) / 2p c w cq q I                   (1) 
2 2
( )p w q                   (2) 
 The timing of the game presented by Sarmento and Brandao (2007) is as 
follows: 
 First, the incumbent decides the investment level I . 
 Secondly, the regulator chooses the access price w . 
 Finally, the retail price and outputs of the firms are defined by Stackelberg 
competition between downstream firms. 
This paper provides an alternative approach by reversing the first two stages. 
Therefore, the timing of the game presented by this paper is as follows: 
 First, the regulator chooses the access price w . 
 Secondly, the incumbent decides the investment level I . 
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 Finally, the retail price and outputs of the firms are defined by Stackelberg 
competition between downstream firms. 
The backward induction technique is used to find the equilibrium of the whole 
game. Therefore, the analysis begins with the computation of the retail price and 
the outputs of the firms. Then, using these results, the incumbent’s optimal 
investment level is obtained. Finally, based on the previous information, the 
optimal access price is derived. 
 
4. The incumbent’s approach 
This section briefly recalls the results of Sarmento and Brandao (2007). In 
particular, each firm’s output, total output and investment level under cost-based 
regulation are:  
1 2 2
(1 )(4 )
2(4 2 )
I c
q
  
  
  

  
               (3) 
2 2 2
(1 )(2 )
2(4 2 )
I c
q
 
  
 

  
               (4) 
2 2
(1 )(6 2 )
2(4 2 )
I c
q
  
  
  

  
               (5) 
2 2
(1 )( )
4 2
I c
I
 
  
 

  
               (6) 
Note that total output 
i
q , ( ,i I R  with I and R denote the results obtained by the 
incumbent’s and the regulator’s approach, respectively), is a measure of 
competition since consumer surplus (CS) is given by 
2
) / 2(CS q . This implies 
that since the demand function is linear, a larger 
i
q  leads to a larger CS.  
 
5. The regulator’s approach 
Contrary to “the incumbent’s approach”, this section assumes that first the 
regulator sets the access price and then the incumbent chooses its optimal NGA 
investment level. In particular, this section initially provides the results obtained 
by an access pricing scheme that does not incorporate any risk premium (i.e. 
there is no regulatory commitment problem). Then, these results are compared 
with those obtained by “the incumbent’s approach” in order to derive the risk 
premium that compensates the incumbent for the regulatory risk it incurs. Last, it 
provides the specific conditions under which the incorporation of a risk premium 
into the access price is beneficial for the consumers. If these conditions hold, the 
incorporation of such a risk premium into the access price is the optimal 
regulatory policy. If, on the contrary, these conditions do not hold, the regulatory 
policy should tackle the trade-off between encouraging NGA investments and 
promoting competition.  
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5.1. Access pricing without risk premium 
Considering Stackelberg competition, the retail price and the output of the firms 
are the following: 
1
(1 ) / 2
R
I cq                    (7) 
2
(1 2 ) / 4
R
I w cq                    (8) 
(1 2 ) / 4P I w c                   (9) 
Substituting Eqs. (7), (8) and (9) in (1) and taking the first order condition of Eq. 
(1) with respect to I ,  gives the NGA investment level that maximizes the 
incumbent’s profits: 
2
(1 2 3 ) / (4 )R w cI                   (10) 
Since w c  and 1c  , the numerator of Eq. (10) is positive. Therefore, in order to 
guarantee that 0I  , the following assumption is made: 
Assumption 1. Let 
2
4 0   . 
This assumption guarantees that   is relative high, which means that the slope of 
the marginal cost function of the investment is significantly steep. It should be 
noted that this approach requires a lower   than “the incumbent’s approach” in 
order to guarantee that the NGA investment level is positive. The implication is 
that since   and   are both exogenous factors, “the regulator’s approach” leads 
to a positive investment level for more combinations of   and   than “the 
incumbent’s approach”. However, for the rest of the paper, the assumption made 
by Sarmento and Brandao (2007) that 
2
2 0    also holds. 
Considering the value of RI , the retail price and the output of the firms are the 
following: 
2 2 2
1
[2 (1 ) ] / (4 )
R
c w cq                    (11) 
2 2 2
2
[ (1 ) 2 ] / (4 )
R
c w w cq                     (12) 
2 2
[ (1 ) 2 ] / (4 )P c w c                   (13) 
From Eqs. (10)-(13) it can be deduced that the NGA investment level, as well as, 
the output of the firms are affected by the access price w . This is an expected 
result since in “the regulator’s approach” the regulator moves first and then the 
incumbent decides its optimal investment level.  
Under cost-based regulation, the regulator defines the access price as the 
marginal cost of providing the access ( c ) plus a fraction ( a ) of the total 
investment cost, that is ( )R c aC Iw   , with 1a  . Like Sarmento and Brandao 
(2007), it is assumed that (1/ )a I , and hence, ( / 2)R c Iw   . This definition 
implies that the regulator sets an access price equal to the marginal cost of 
providing the access plus the average cost of the investment.  
Substituting ( / 2)R c Iw   in Eqs. (10)-(13) provides the final results under cost-
based regulation: 
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1 2
(1 )(4 )
2(4 )
R c
q
 
 
 

 
              (14) 
2 2
(1 )(2 )
2(4 )
R c
q
 
 
 

 
              (15) 
2
(1 )(3 )
4
R c
q
 
 
 

 
              (16) 
 
2
(1 )
4
R c
I

 


 
              (17) 
Assumption 2. Let 
2
4 0    . 
Assumption 2 is considered in order to ensure that 0RI  . In addition, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for ensuring that both firms are active in the 
market (i.e. 
1 2
, 0
R R
q q  ) is 2  . Hence, the following assumption is made: 
Assumption 3. Let 2  . 
The comparison of II and 
R
I  shows that “the incumbent’s approach” leads to 
higher investment level than “the regulator’s approach”.5 Concerning consumer 
surplus, the comparison of the “regulator’s” and the “incumbent’s” approaches 
shows that the latter leads to a higher consumer surplus than the former if 
3  .6 Therefore, the consumers prefer the incumbent to decide prior to the 
regulation of the access price when the investment cost function is increasing and 
convex but not excessively convex in relation to the impact of the investment on 
demand. If, on the contrary, 3  , consumers would prefer the regulator to set 
the access price at cost before the incumbent decides its investment level. This is 
a reasonable result because the optimal investment is higher under “the 
incumbent’s approach”. Therefore, if the slope of marginal cost of the investment 
cost function is excessively steep in relation to the impact of the investment on 
demand, the incumbent’s overinvestment is not socially desirable. Last, it is 
obvious that both approaches avoid foreclosure when the access is regulated at 
cost. 
 
5.2. Discussion 
The comparison of the results obtained by “the incumbent’s approach” with those 
obtained by “the regulator’s approach” shows that although it is ambiguous which 
approach leads to better results in terms of consumer surplus, “the incumbent’s 
approach” leads to better results than “the regulator’s approach” in terms of 
investment level. 
This is an unexpected result since the obtained NGA investment level is higher 
under regulatory uncertainty than under credible regulatory commitments. The 
reason of this striking result is that although “the incumbent’s approach” assumes 
regulatory uncertainty about the future regulatory policy, the incumbent 
undertakes such uncertainty by investing in NGA networks even if it is not 
                                                          
5
  See proof in Appendix A1. 
6
  See proof in Appendix A2. 
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reimbursed for such uncertainty. On the contrary, under no regulatory 
commitment problem, the optimal NGA investment level is lower because the 
incumbent does not undertake the regulatory uncertainty when it is not 
reimbursed for such uncertainty. It can be thus concluded that if the regulator 
announces a cost-based access price that incorporates a risk premium reflecting 
the regulatory uncertainty and then the incumbent choose its optimal NGA 
investment level, the derived level of the NGA investment will equal that of the 
“the incumbent’s approach”. We will call the former approach as “the regulator’s 
approach with risk premium” since it assumes that the regulator first announces 
an access price scheme that compensates the incumbent for the regulatory 
uncertainty, and then the incumbent makes its optimal investment decision.  
In the following section, we derive the risk premium that equates the investment 
levels obtained by “the incumbent’s approach” and “the regulator’s approach with 
risk premium” under cost-based access rules. The obtained risk premium reflects 
the regulatory uncertainty that the incumbent incurs when investing in NGA 
networks. Not surprisingly, “the regulator’s approach with risk premium” leads to a 
higher investment level than “the regulator’s approach”. However, it should also 
lead to better results in terms of consumer surplus in order to be the chosen 
regulatory policy. Otherwise, there will be another regulatory trade-off between 
encouraging investments and promoting competition. Thus, we also provide the 
specific conditions under which the incorporation of a risk premium into the 
access price is beneficial for the consumers. 
 
5.3. Access pricing with risk premium 
This section studies the impact of the incorporation of a risk premium into the 
access price on investment level and total output. The risk premium should 
compensate the incumbent for its forgoing investments due to the regulatory 
uncertainty. As noted earlier, the risk premium that the regulator incorporates into 
the access price should equate the investment levels derived by “the incumbent’s 
approach” and “the regulator’s approach with risk premium”. Or, in other words, 
the incumbent should be indifferent between investing prior or after the access 
regulation stage.  
Under cost-based regulation with risk premium, the regulator defines the access 
price as in section 5.1. plus a premium over this access price. Then, 
( / 2)(1 )RP c I yw    , where y  represents the risk premium. Substituting this 
access price into Eq. (10) gives the incumbent’s investment level as a function of 
y : 
2
(1 2 ) / (4 )RP c cy yI                     (18) 
Equating RPI  with 
I
I  and solving with respect to y  gives the level of the optimal 
risk premium: 
2
2 2 2
2 (1 )(2 )
( 8 2 5 )
c
y
c c c c

      
 

    
           (19) 
Considering Eq. (19), the final results of the cost-based regulation with risk 
premium are the following: 
1 2 2
(1 )(4 )
2(4 2 )
RP c
q
  
  
  

  
             (20) 
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2 2 2
(1 )(2 )( )
2(4 2 )
RP c
q
   
  
  

  
             (21) 
2
2 2
(1 )(3 )
(4 2 )
RP c
q
    
   
   

  
            (22)   
2 2
(1 )( )
4 2
RP c
I
 
  
 

  
             (23) 
Assumption 4. Let 
2 2
4 2 0      . 
Assumption 4 guarantees that the investment level under cost based regulation 
with risk premium is positive. Not surprisingly, this investment level is the same 
with the investment level obtained by “the incumbent’s approach”. For this 
reason, Sarmento and Brandao (2007) also make this assumption. In addition, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for ensuring that the entrant is active in the 
market is   . If, on the contrary,    the cost-based access regulation with 
risk premium forecloses the entrant from the downstream market. It is obvious 
that in this case the regulator should not incorporate into the access price such a 
high premium as y . For the rest of this section it is assumed that   . 
Therefore, the regulator should compare 
RP
q  and 
R
q  in order to decide whether 
or not the incorporation of a risk premium into the access price is the optimal 
policy. If the incorporation of risk premium leads to both higher investment level 
and total output, the regulator should set the access price at the level described 
by RPw . The comparison of  
RP
q  and 
R
q  shows that the incorporation of y  into 
the access price leads to higher total output (and then to higher competition level) 
if 
2   .7 The regulatory implications of the analysis concerning the cost-based 
regulation can be summarized in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1. Under cost-based regulation, the optimal regulatory policy is: (i) to 
set the access price at RGw  if 
2
min{ , }   ; and (ii) to set the access price at 
R
w  if 
2
min{ , }   . 
 
From Proposition 1, it is deduced that the regulator should incorporate a risk 
premium into the access price when 
2
min{ , }   . This policy leads to higher 
investment level and consumer surplus than access price regulation without risk 
premium, while it ensures that the incumbent does not foreclose the entrant from 
the market. However, if 
2    , “the regulator’s approach with risk premium” 
results in both higher investment and consumer surplus level that the “the 
regulator’s approach” but forecloses the entrant. In addition, if 
2     ,  there 
is a trade-off between encouraging investments and promoting competition. The 
reason is that a higher access price leads to a higher investment level and to 
lower consumer surplus. In these cases, a benevolent regulator whose primary 
goal is to enhance competition should set the access price at Rw . However, the 
                                                          
7
  See proof in Appendix A3. 
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benevolent regulator may also wait for the incumbent to undertake the risk of 
regulatory uncertainty if 3  . This implies that the incumbent invests before 
the regulation of the access price and such policy is optimal since it results in 
better outcomes that the “regulator’s approach” in terms of both investment level 
and consumer surplus.    
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to derive the optimal risk premium that reflects the 
regulatory uncertainty incurred by investing in NGA networks. Thus, we 
compared the NGA investment levels obtained when the incumbent invests under 
regulatory certainty and under regulatory uncertainty.  
When the incumbent chooses its optimal NGA investment level prior to the 
regulation of the access price which does not incorporate any risk premium 
reflecting the uncertainty about future regulatory intervention, it implicitly 
undertakes such risk since it chooses to invest. Therefore, although the 
incumbent invests under regulatory uncertainty, it does not take such uncertainty 
into account. Based on these assumptions, Sarmento and Brandao (2007) 
studied the impact of deregulation, cost-based regulation and retail-minus 
regulation on NGA investment level, consumer surplus and foreclosure of the 
entrant from the retail market. On the contrary, when the incumbent considers the 
regulatory uncertainty when determining its optimal NGA investment level, it 
chooses to invest after the regulation of the access price. We explored the 
robustness of the results of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) under the assumption 
that the incumbent invests in NGA networks after the regulation of the access at 
cost-based prices.  
The comparison of the two approaches showed that cost-based regulation makes 
the incumbent underinvest if it considers the regulatory uncertainty when it 
deploys an NGA network. Therefore, the incorporation of a risk premium that 
reflects the regulatory uncertainty into the access price would make the 
incumbent choose the NGA investment level derived under regulatory 
uncertainty. We derived the risk premium that equates the NGA investment levels 
obtained by the approach of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) and the approach 
presented in this paper which incorporates a risk premium. Thus, the derived risk 
premium reflects the regulatory uncertainty of the investments in NGA networks. 
However, it is widely known that the regulator’s goal is not only to encourage 
efficient and timely investments in NGA networks, but also to promote effective 
competition. Thus, we also provided the condition under which the incorporation 
of a risk premium into the access price increases both NGA investments and 
competition. In particular, when the slope of the marginal cost function of the 
investment is significantly but not extremely steep (i.e. 
2   ), then a higher 
access price benefits both the incumbent and the consumers. Therefore, the 
incorporation of a risk premium into the access pricing formula is the optimal 
regulatory policy providing that it does not foreclose the entrant form the retail 
market. 
It should be noted that the derived outcome is aligned with the current regulatory 
practice in the European NGA market since the access price reflects the cost of 
providing the access including a markup for the demand and the regulatory 
uncertainty of NGA investments. Therefore, we showed that, under plausible 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 276 
assumptions and specific conditions, cost-based access rules can tackle the 
regulatory trade-off between encouraging efficient NGA investments and 
promoting effective competition. However, the authors already study the impact of 
other regulatory instruments (such as deregulation and retail-minus regulation) on 
foreclosure, investment level and consumer surplus in order to compare their 
efficiency with that of cost-based regulation. 
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Appendix A 
We assume that regardless of the timing of the game, the investment level, the 
incumbent’s output and the entrant’s output are positive under cost-based 
regulation. Therefore: 
 
A.1 
The condition I RI I  is equivalent to 0
I R
I I  . From Eqs. (6) and (17) in the 
text, we have:  
2 2 2
(1 )( ) (1 )
0
4 2 4
c c  
     
  
  
    
 
2
2 2 2
2 (1 )(2 )
0
(4 )(4 2 )
c 
     
 

    
 
which always holds. 
 
A.2 
The condition 
I R
q q  is equivalent to 0
I R
q q  . From Eqs. (5) and (16) in the 
text, we have:  
2 2 2
(1 )(6 2 ) (1 )(3 )
0
2(4 2 ) 4
c c    
     
    
  
    
 
2
2 2 2
(1 )(2 )(3 )
0
2(4 )(4 2 )
c   
     
  

    
 
which holds for 3  . 
 
A.3 
The total output, q , is the sum of the incumbent’s and the entrant’s output, 
1
q  and 
2q , respectively. Adding Eqs. (11) and (12) gives the total output as a function of 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
277  M. Tselekounis 
the access price, i.e. 
2 2 2
(3 2 2 2 ) / (4 )
R
c w w cq            . A marginal 
increase in w  due to the incorporation of the risk premium causes a change in 
the total output by 
2
2( )  . Thus, if 
2   , the incorporation of a risk premium 
into the access prices leads to higher total output and hence to higher consumer 
surplus (competition) level. In addition, the comparison of 
R
q and leads to the 
same result. 
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Abstract—This paper surveys the broad literature of two-way interconnection. In 
particular, it discusses how different assumptions concerning retail pricing 
strategies, demand structures, network externalities and asymmetries in the 
market affect the impact of termination charges on competition and investment 
incentives. The main contribution of this paper is that it points out the cases that 
have not been fully studied yet or the related literature provides mixed results. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The deregulation of most telecommunications markets has challenged the need 
for regulatory intervention. In the case of one-way access, an unregulated 
incumbent may charge a too high access price in order to foreclose the access 
seekers (entrants) from the retail market. Therefore, the regulatory intervention in 
the access market is necessary for establishing competition, especially at the 
earlier stages of deregulation. On the contrary, in the case of two-way access, the 
operators have a mutual incentive to interconnect their networks in order to serve 
calls originated on their networks and terminated on competing networks. 
Therefore, although each operator is a monopolist over its subscribers’ access 
lines, regulators are still concerned about the need to regulate termination 
charges (or access prices or interconnection charges). 
Indeed, the economic literature on two-way interconnection provides ambiguous 
results concerning the impact of negotiated termination charges on the 
competition outcome in an unregulated access market. The seminal papers of 
this literature are those of Laffont, Rey and Tirole [1] and Armstrong [2], here-
after A-LRT. These papers show that interconnection charges between two 
unregulated competing networks can be used to facilitate collusive outcomes. In 
particular, A-LRT show that under linear retail tariffs high interconnection charges 
reduce each network’s incentives to lower retail price in order to increase market 
share.  
The reason is that if either network decreases its retail price, its subscribers will 
make more calls which triggers a net outflow of calls. Therefore, with termination 
charges above marginal cost, the incentive to decrease retail prices is reduced 
and the retail competition is softened. This implies that networks find it profitable 
to collude over the access charge in an unregulated market.  
On the contrary, two-part tariffs (i.e. introducing a fixed charge into the linear 
retail pricing formula), which is a particular pricing scheme of non-linear pricing, 
make the two networks indifferent over the termination charges (profit neutrality) 
[1]. The basic intuition of this result stems from the fact that the fixed fee provides 
the networks with an additional instrument to build their market shares. Therefore, 
when the termination charge is increased, firms will increase call prices but, at the 
same time, they will reduce the fixed component to keep market shares. This 
implies that collusion over termination charges is unsustainable since each 
network sets the usage access fee at its perceived marginal cost (in order to 
avoid an access deficit) and uses the fixed fee to build market share.  
It is thus obvious that the results are significantly sensitive to the assumption 
about the structure of the retail tariffs. However, since the benchmark A-LRT 
model is not only based on the assumption of linear retail prices, but also on 
many other assumptions, the robustness of the collusive and the profit-neutrality 
outcomes should be explored when relaxing the underlying assumptions. In 
particular, the A-LRT framework assumes that: (i) the network operators set linear 
retail prices, (ii) there are two symmetric unregulated networks which compete in 
a standard Hotelling framework (hence, full consumer participation is also 
assumed), (iii) the termination charges are uniform (i.e per-minute and usage-
based) and reciprocal (i.e. symmetric networks charge as much for terminating a 
call originated on the rival network as they pay for terminating a call on the rival 
network), (iv) the demand for calls is homogeneous (i.e. all consumers have the 
same demand for calls), (v) the retail pricing is non-discriminatory (i.e. network 
operators charge their subscribers the same retail price either if a call originated 
Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market 
M. Tselekounis 282 
on a network will be terminated on the same network ("on-net call") or on a 
competing network ("off-net call"), (vi) only callers receive utility from a call (caller-
pays principle) and (vii) there is a balanced calling pattern (i.e.  the percentage  of  
on-net  calls  is  equal  to   the fraction of consumers subscribing to this network, 
which implies that for equal marginal prices, flows in and out of a network are 
balanced even if market shares are not). 
This paper reviews the existing publications that extend the common A-LRT 
framework by relaxing some of the above benchmark assumptions. A first aim of 
this paper is to update previous reviews of the literature on two-way 
interconnection ([3], [4]) since these articles are published in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively, and as a result they only review the early publications. However, the 
main goal of this paper is to point out the cases that have not been studied yet or 
the related literature provides mixed results. Thus, each paper is classified 
according to its underlying assumptions. Table 1 classifies all the articles 
reviewed by this paper according to the way they depart from the benchmark A-
LRT framework. Since the seminal papers derive the impact of termination 
charges on competition under linear and two-part tariffs in a symmetric 
environment, there are two ways to extend this framework. The first way is to 
study the robustness of the derived results when allowing for termination-based 
discrimination (i.e. price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls), 
consumer heterogeneity or network externalities (i.e. non-full consumer 
participation) in a symmetric environment. The second way is to examine whether 
the seminal results or the extended ones are robust in an asymmetric 
environment.  
A much more significant extension is to study the impact of regulated termination 
charges on competition outcomes or to introduce an endogenous investment in 
quality. Each of these two assumptions can be combined with all the other 
assumptions that extend the A-LRT framework and hence each combination 
should be investigated separately. However, rather than presenting two more 
tables, we have italicized the papers that assume regulated termination charges 
and we have bolded the papers that introduce investment incentives. 
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TABLE I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE REVIEWD PAPERS ACCORDING TO THEIR 
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
SYMMETRIC OPERATORS (MATURE 
MARKET) 
ASYMMETRIC OPERATORS (EARLY 
STAGES OF DEREGULATION PROCESS) 
LINEAR TARIFFS 
TWO-PART 
TARIFFS 
LINEAR TARIFFS 
TWO-PART 
TARIFFS 
BENCHMARK 
ASSUMPTIONS (iii)-
(vii) 
[1], [2], [33], [34], 
[35] 
[1], [35], [37] [5] 
[6], [7], [35], [37], 
[39] 
TERMIN
ATION-
BASED 
DISCRIM
INATION 
 
ONLY 
CALLERS 
PAY 
[15] [14], [15], [16], [17]  [18], [19], [38] 
CALLERS
&RECEIV
ERS 
DERIVE 
UTILITY 
BUT 
ONLY 
CALLERS 
PAY 
[20] [21] [22] [22] 
BOTH 
DERIVE 
UTILITY-
BOTH 
PAY 
[23], [24], [25], [26], 
[30] 
[23], [24], [25], [26], 
[27], [30] 
 [28] 
CONSUMER 
HETEROGENEITY 
 
[8], [9], [10], [11], 
[12], [35] 
 [13] 
NETWORK 
EXTERNALITIES 
(PARTIAL 
PARTICIPATION) 
 [8], [31], [32]   
 
From table I it can be concluded that the impact of termination charges on 
competition has been adequately studied in the cases where two either 
symmetric or asymmetric network operators charge two-part (discriminatory) 
retail prices. In addition, although there are several papers that study the impact 
of consumer heterogeneity and network externalities on the collusive and profit-
neutrality outcomes with two-part tariffs, the related literature does not provide 
any result when asymmetries and/or linear tariffs are taken into account. Most 
significantly, the literature has not studied the impact of alternative regulatory 
settings that departs from the standard termination charges when relaxing the 
benchmark assumptions. Last, although regulators aim at not only promoting 
competition but also at encouraging investments, the relationship between 
termination charges, competition and investments has not been fully investigated. 
In particular, the related literature has studied this relationship only with two-part 
tariffs and only for one deviation from the benchmark assumptions (termination-
based discrimination when only callers receive utility from calls).  
Therefore, table I can be used as a motivation for future research on the fields 
that the related literature provides few or no results. Section II reviews the 
existing publications that extend the common A-LRT framework and examine the 
robustness of the collusive and the profit-neutrality outcomes when departure 
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from the benchmark assumptions. It is obvious that future research is also 
needed when the related literature provides mixed results. The last section 
concludes the main results of the literature of two-way interconnection.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the literature that studies the robustness of the collusive and 
the profit-neutrality outcomes when the benchmark assumptions of the A-LRT 
framework are relaxed.   
 
A. Asymmetric market structure 
A first significant extension of the A-LRT framework is to allow for asymmetry 
between the two networks. This case better corresponds to the earlier stages of 
the deregulation process of the telecommunications market where the incumbent 
has several advantages over the (potential) entrants in terms of cost and 
demand. Allowing for unequal-sized networks by providing for brand loyalty, 
shows that the ability to use interconnection charges to facilitate collusion is 
retained with asymmetry [5]. However, the profit-neutrality outcome vanishes 
when asymmetric networks charge two-part tariffs [6]. In particular, the incumbent 
prefers the reciprocal access charge to be set at the marginal cost of providing 
the local loop, whereas the entrant prefers to have below (above) cost access 
charges when it faces a net outflow (inflow) of calls. If the two networks cannot 
agree on the level of interconnection charges, the regulator should require that 
the incumbent and entrant interconnect at some reciprocal price, but leave the 
incumbent free to set this price. The reason is that cost-based interconnection 
charges achieve the welfare maximizing outcome without any need for the 
regulator to determine costs or prices. If networks set non-reciprocal 
interconnection prices, then each firm prefer to unilaterally increase their charge 
for local call interconnection. In this case, non-reciprocal interconnection 
agreements allow the incumbent to use its greater bargaining power to charge 
more for incoming calls than it pays for outgoing calls. This can act as a barrier to 
entry for competitors to the extent it is not justified by cost differentials.  
Therefore, when asymmetries call for non-reciprocal interconnection charges, the 
primary aim of access regulation should be the promotion of competition. 
According to [7], an access regulation scheme that provides the incumbent with 
cost-based termination charges and gives a positive access markup to the 
entrant has two positive effects on competition: a potential entrant is more likely 
to enter and, given entry, competition is more intense. Hence, this type of 
wholesale price regulation is effective in protecting consumers and encouraging 
entry at the same time. However, it also leads to a loss in total surplus which 
arises from a distorted per-minute price by the incumbent. It should be noted that 
this policy recommendation holds under both linear prices and two-part tariffs. 
 
B. Consumers heterogeneity 
It is shown that the profit-neutrality outcome still holds when customers are 
heterogeneous and networks engage in non-linear retail pricing1  [8]. This result 
                                                          
1
 In this section, we use the general term “non-linear pricing” because the networks also price-
discriminate among the different types of customers. 
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suggests that the optimal regulatory policy is to recommend networks set their 
access charge equal to the marginal termination cost [9]. Provided competing 
networks are symmetric, the firms have no strict incentive not to follow the 
recommendation. Then, with access charges being equal to costs the equilibrium 
tariff is a simple cost-based two-part tariff, resulting in efficient call-allocations for 
all types of consumers. On the contrary, when the A-LRT framework is modified 
in order to capture the fact that there might be a time frame after the deviation 
period where the cartel firms can react by changing the retail tariff but not by 
adjusting the termination charge, then termination fees can support collusion in 
the retail market even under two-part tariffs [10]. The reason is that with 
heterogeneous consumers, the optimum deviation strategy is usually to try to 
attract the high valuation customers since they are the ones with the highest 
profits. This strategy is made less attractive by setting termination fees above 
cost, since a deviator with a pool of high users will have more outgoing than 
incoming calls. Therefore, termination fees above marginal cost reduce the 
deviation profits and stabilize the collusion. The same outcome is reached when 
assuming that with high access prices (and so high retail prices) low demand 
users would not necessarily want to participate [11]. In particular, if there is a call 
imbalance between the two sectors, firms can set an access charge so that high 
demand customers generate an access revenue deficit. The effect of this is to 
limit competition for high demand customers and increase competition for light 
users.  
From the above analysis, it can be deduced that introducing consumer 
heterogeneity in the A-LRT model with non-linear tariffs yields different results 
depending on the underlying assumptions. This analysis becomes much more 
complex if we take into account that customer heterogeneity in outgoing volume 
demand is not only correlated with differences in incoming call volume, but also 
with differences in how customers perceive competing networks. In particular, 
different customer types are likely to perceive the substitutability of the networks 
differently as they have different switching costs, different brand loyalty or a 
differentiated access to publicity and information about the networks. When 
networks are seen as better substitutes by the heavy (light) users than by the 
light (heavy) users, networks obtain higher profits by agreeing on an access 
charge below (above) marginal cost [12]. Therefore, the standard neutrality of 
two-way access prices found in the earlier literature no longer holds. 
The only paper that discusses the impact of termination charges on competition 
between two asymmetric networks when subscribers are heterogeneous in their 
demand for calls is [13]. It shows that an increase in the incumbent’s (entrants’) 
termination charge leads the entrants to increase (decrease) their prices to all 
subscriber groups. An equal increase in both termination charges leads the 
entrants to lower their prices to low-volume users and raise their prices to high-
volume users. Hence, the difference between termination charges affects the 
average intensity of competition, while an increase in the average termination 
charge affects the relative intensity of competition for the high and low volume 
subscribers. Concerning the optimal regulatory policy, it is shown that a reciprocal 
termination charge is optimal as long as the incumbent is regulated so that it just 
breaks even. This reciprocal charge is above the incumbent’s cost of access 
whenever its retail tariff involves subsidizing low volume users. 
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C. Termination-based price discrimination 
The most important extension of the A-LRT model is to allow the networks to 
price-discriminate according to whether a call originated on one network is 
terminated on the same network (on-net) or on a rival network (off-net). The 
reason is that such a pricing strategy is widely used in the typical two-way 
markets, such as mobile communications and internet services. The related 
literature is mainly focuses on two-part tariffs since the pricing structures are non-
linear in these markets.2  Therefore, under price-discrimination and two-part 
tariffs, networks would like to agree on a reciprocal termination charge below 
marginal cost in order to relax downstream competition [14]. In such cases, off-
net calls are cheaper than on-net calls and hence networks compete less 
aggressively for market share. This result corrects the argument that termination 
charges are negotiated to equal the marginal cost of terminating a call provided 
by [15]. The conclusion of [14] that networks are interested in setting the access 
charges below cost to soften competition is not altered when generalizing to the 
multi-firm case [16]. However, when allowing for networks to choose 
competitively non-reciprocal access prices, it is shown that optimal access 
charges exceed the cost of termination [17].  
There are two papers that study the impact of termination charges on competition 
between two asymmetric networks when they can set different two-part tariffs for 
on-net and off-net calls. The first paper assumes a reciprocal access price and 
shows that departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to 
foreclose the market in a profitable way [18]. This result depends on the impact of 
switching costs on consumers’ ability to switch between networks. If the 
incumbent benefits from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the 
highest possible access markup even in the absence of actual switching costs. If 
instead the entrant benefits from customer activism, then foreclosure is profitable 
only when switching costs are large enough. The second paper shows that 
granting an access markup to the entrant reduces the probability of foreclosure 
and hence intensifies competition [19]. Therefore, non-reciprocal access prices 
that favor the entrant increase the entrant’s profits and consumer surplus but 
decrease social welfare. The reason for their positive effect on entrant’s profits 
and consumer surplus is that an increase in the access price paid by an operator 
is passed on to consumers through an increase of the per-minute price of off-net 
calls (which obviously benefits the entrant). On the contrary the reason for their 
negative impact on total surplus is that the off-net price of the strong operator is 
distorted above the socially efficient level and the market share of the strong 
operator is distorted further below the socially efficient level. 
All the above studies assume that only the caller benefits from a call and not the 
receiver. The following three papers allow both callers and receivers to receive 
utility from a call (namely call externalities). In such cases consumers care about 
being called and hence networks set higher off-net prices in order to make the 
rival network less attractive. This implies that access charges below marginal cost 
can be used as a collusion device [20]. It is also shown that the welfare 
maximizing access charge is below the one that maximizes industry profits. 
Under two-part tariffs both the collusive and the welfare maximizing access 
charges also fall below marginal cost [21]. Therefore, call externalities do not alter 
                                                          
2
  In fact, this retail pricing scheme can been seen as a three-part tariff since it consists of a fixed 
fee and two usage fees for the on-net and the off-net traffic, respectively. However, the related 
literature calls this pricing scheme as two-part tariffs. 
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the main result of termination-based price discrimination provided by [14]. In the 
case of asymmetric networks, the structure of retail pricing (i.e. linear or two-part 
tariffs) does not affect the incumbent’s incentives to set higher off-net prices. This 
implies a higher off-net/on-net differential which leads the entrant to incur a 
permanent access when the reciprocal access charge is above marginal cost. In 
addition, the incumbent can adopt an anti-competitive, predatory-pricing strategy 
aimed at foreclosing the entrant. Predatory behavior would be accompanied by 
even larger on-net/off-net differentials even if access charges are set at cost [22]. 
Therefore, the presence of call externalities can lead the incumbent to foreclose 
the entrant, whereas in the absence of call externalities the incumbent can 
foreclose the entrant when the former benefits from customer inertia [18].  
Another set of papers not only allow for call externalities and termination-based 
price discrimination but also assume that both callers and receivers share the 
cost of a call (i.e. networks charge both callers and receivers). This literature 
analyzes the effects of termination charges on retail prices when networks can 
set four separate per minute usage rates: an off-net origination rate, an off-net 
termination rate, an on-net origination rate and an on-net termination rate. The 
literature has produced two differing results concerning the effect of access 
charges on usage retail rates. The first result is widely known as “the off-net cost 
pricing principle (ONCPP)”, which argues that all on-net and off-net usage rates 
will equal the marginal cost of providing service plus (minus) access charges paid 
(received) [23], [24]. The second result concludes that on-net rates depend only 
on (efficiently allocating) the on-net costs of service, while off-net rates depend 
both on the costs of providing the service and the access rate [25]. It is shown in 
[26] that these different results depend on different assumptions regarding: (i) 
how usage rates affect consumer usage, (ii) whether subscribers to a telephone 
network both originate and receive calls, and (iii) whether some customers only 
originate calls while others only receive calls. Specifically, when customer usage 
does not depend on usage rates, and some customers originate all of the calls in 
which they engage while other customers receive all of the calls in which they 
engage, then the ONCPP will tend to describe the equilibrium. On the other hand, 
when the number of minutes of calling in which a customer engages depends on 
usage rates and customers tend to originate about the same number of minutes 
as they receive, then on-net rates tend to reflect only the cost of providing on-net 
service.   
The literature studying the impact of termination charges on retail prices when 
both callers and receivers pay for the utility they derive is based on the 
assumption that there is a fixed volume of transactions for each receiver-caller 
match and all calls deliver the same gross surplus to a given end user. Thus, the 
distinction between linear and non-linear tariffs is irrelevant. However, a much 
more general determination of the ONCPP shows that when volume is variable, 
the marginal cost perceived by each network is affected by the externalities on 
the rival network’s subscribers, and this leads networks to charge prices equal to 
off-net costs while, when volume is fixed, there are no such externalities [27].  
A significant problem emerges when the receiver of a call benefits by as much as, 
or more than, the sender. In this case, both networks set off-net call charges so 
high as to eliminate off-net calling altogether. Even when the reciprocal 
termination charge is set equal to marginal cost, equilibrium off-net call charges 
still exceed the efficient level and a connectivity breakdown emerges [27]. This 
result also holds when allow for asymmetric networks [28]. However, the 
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probability of a connectivity breakdown is reduced when calls made and received 
are complements in the information exchange [29]. 
Another problem concerns the necessity of reciprocal access prices for the 
existence of equilibrium [24]. In addition, symmetric access charges ensure the 
robustness of the ONCPP in an industry with any number of competing networks. 
Allowing for asymmetric but reciprocal access pricing in the presence of an 
arbitrary number of network operators shows that if the reciprocal access charge 
of a pair of networks departs away from a given symmetric access charge, then 
the two networks are driven out of one side of the market [30]. 
 
D. Partial consumer participation 
Another significant deviation from the basic A-LRT framework is to relax the “full 
consumer participation principle” of the Hotelling model. Therefore, the demand 
for calls is elastic, some customers choose not to subscribe and the industry 
exhibits network externalities. This implies that networks should take into account 
the market expansion effects, as well as, the business stealing effects of their 
pricing strategies.  
In particular, symmetric network operators may increase their profits by agreeing 
on an access charge below the marginal cost of access when they charge the 
callers with two-part tariffs [8]. This result removes the idea that the collusion 
concern should be associated with high access charges and confirm the results 
of [14]. Therefore, one may conclude that allowing for either partial participation 
or network-based price discrimination results in a reciprocal below cost access 
charge which vanish the profit-neutrality outcome of [1].  
However, as it is shown in [31] a fixed participation rate makes the networks 
indifferent over the level of the access charge. On the contrary, an endogenous 
participation rate is crucial for the non-neutrality of the access charge. In 
particular, the profit maximizing access charge is also below marginal cost. As in 
the full participation case, the access charge can be used to manipulate 
equilibrium per-minute prices and rentals. Below cost termination charges make 
additional consumer less attractive (i.e. softens competition), but competition in 
rentals is even more fierce because there are new customers outside the market 
to be competed for, as well as, existing customers. It can be thus deduced that 
whether the profit-neutrality outcome still holds under partial participation 
depends on the endogeneity of the participation rate.  
A very significant finding is provided by combining partial participation and 
network-based price discrimination. As it has been already mentioned in [8] and 
[14], higher than cost-based access charges induce stronger competition when 
networks can price-discriminate or there exist network externalities, respectively, 
and hence networks prefer below cost access charges. However, when both 
price discrimination and network externalities are present, network operators 
have an incentive to set the access charge above marginal costs of termination in 
order to increase joint market coverage and thereby exploiting network effects 
[32]. This strategy is in line with the maximization of social welfare and can hardly 
be called “collusion”. In fact, the welfare maximizing level of access charges is 
also above marginal costs of termination and may be higher or lower than the 
negotiated access charge.  
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E. Regulation of the access price 
So far we have mainly focused on two unregulated networks which agree on a 
reciprocal termination charge. Now, we study the optimal regulatory policy that 
reduces the networks’ incentives to collude over a reciprocal termination charge. 
Recall that in a symmetric equilibrium with linear tariffs access charge may be 
used as a collusive device if high access charges inflate retail prices [1]-[2]. 
Therefore, an efficient access pricing rule must not inflate retail prices. It is shown 
that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (GECPR)3  exhibits such a 
property, and induces a highly pro-competitive outcome for a wide range of 
parameters. The GECPR dominates the Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
(ECPR), marginal cost pricing, and any non-negative fixed access charges in 
terms of efficiency [33].  
Another regulatory alternative is to deviate from per-minute (usage) termination 
charges in order to prevent collusive outcomes and market foreclosure that harm 
consumers. Specifically, in the case of partially collusive retail market, non-linear 
access prices that are cost-based, negatively sloped and based on per-consumer 
usage result in the social optimal outcome [34]. This result holds under the 
benchmark assumptions of the A-LRT model. However, as it is shown in [35], an 
access price which is a linear function of both marginal costs and (average) retail 
prices set by both networks, can lead to the most efficient outcome under 
different assumptions concerning retail pricing, consumer heterogeneity and 
asymmetries in the market. In particular: 
(i) With linear retail prices, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey 
price outcome as an equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand 
conditions, as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability 
between networks’ services. Therefore, even if the regulator does not have any 
information about the demand structure, it can provide the social optimal outcome 
by increasing the competition level. The reason is that contrary to the results of 
[1] and [2], such an access pricing scheme promotes competition in retail prices 
since each network decreases its access payments by decreasing its retail price.  
(ii) With two-part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the 
variable price equal to the true marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose 
among these rules to pursue additional objectives, such as increasing consumer 
surplus or promoting socially optimal investment, while achieving the efficient 
outcome. The profit-neutrality outcome of [1] does not hold because a higher 
magnitude of the impact of the average retail prices on the access price 
intensifies competition in fixed fees. It should be noted  that the marginal cost 
pricing result holds even for asymmetric networks.   
(iii) Contrary to [8] and [9] which show that efficiency is achieved by making the 
case with interconnection identical to the case without interconnection (i.e. setting 
the access price equal to the marginal cost), an access price which is a linear 
function of both marginal costs and (average) retail prices can achieve efficiency 
(under a class of access pricing rules) in the presence of interconnection and 
consumer heterogeneity.  
 
                                                          
3
 The GECPR resembles the ECPR in that it also determines access charges based on the 
incumbent’s opportunity cost. But the GECPR measures the opportunity cost in terms of the 
entrants’ retail price instead of the incumbent’s retail price. 
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F. Investment incentives 
It is obvious that the primary goal of regulators is to promote effective competition 
in order to achieve static efficiency.  Indeed, the question of the impact of two-
way interconnection on static efficiency had been adequately investigated from 
the advent of the seminal works on 1998 until 2003, when it was first stated that 
there had not been developed any analysis of the linkage between access pricing 
and investment incentives [36]. The necessity of studying such linkage stems 
from the fact that the aim of regulators is not only to promote effective competition 
among network operators, which leads to lower prices and higher consumer 
surplus, but also to encourage efficient and timely investments by all networks, 
which leads to innovation and economic growth. However, the regulators’ two-fold 
goal is related to the common trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies. 
In a two-way interconnection framework, the benchmark model of A-LRT is 
extended in order to allow networks to make quality-enhancing investments. An 
obvious reason for undertaking such costly investments is that they increase the 
consumers’ willingness to pay and hence networks’ profits. However, the related 
literature also studies whether such investments can be used as an instrument of 
“tacit collusion”.  
A starting point for answering such question is to keep in mind that quality-
upgrading investments can reflect an endogenous asymmetry. The reason is that 
when competing networks choose different levels of investment, they face 
different demand and cost structures. Therefore, contrary to the results provided 
by an exogenous asymmetry under two-part tariffs [6], the networks have an 
incentive to agree to termination charges above the respective marginal cost 
since this strategy softens the competition over investments [37]. Therefore, in 
this case, the collusive outcome stems from diminishing each other’s incentives 
to invest rather than raising each other’s cost. It is obvious that this result is 
detrimental to social welfare and hence freely negotiated interconnection charges 
do not achieve the welfare maximizing outcome. This result is in stark contrast 
with the result obtained without quality-upgrading investments as provides by [6]. 
Since the above collusive outcome also holds in a symmetric equilibrium, the 
profit-neutrality outcome of two-part tariffs does not hold when quality-upgrading 
investments are taken into account.  
A further extension is to examine whether termination-based price discrimination 
affects the under-investment result when termination charges have an impact on 
networks’ investment incentives. It is found that when quality is regarded as 
exogenous factor, the results of [14] still hold even in an asymmetric environment. 
This implies that networks prefer to agree on a reciprocal termination charge 
below marginal cost in order to relax downstream competition. However, when 
quality-upgrading investments are endogenized, networks increase their profits 
by agreeing on above-cost reciprocal termination charges that diminish 
investment incentives [38]. Therefore, the under-investment result found in [37] is 
robust under termination-based price discrimination.  
The aforementioned papers that study the impact of termination charges on 
networks’ investment incentives explicitly assume that a quality-upgrading 
investment increases the consumers’ willingness to pay, but does not alter their 
calling patterns. Allowing for a quality-sensitive traffic does not affect the main 
conclusion of this literature that private and social preferences always diverge 
once investments are endogenized [39].   
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provided a review of the economic4 literature of two-way 
interconnection. The existing publications are mainly based on the seminal works 
of this literature which found that: (i) under linear retail pricing firms use above-
cost reciprocal interconnection charges as an effective tool to soften competition 
in the retail market (collusive outcome), and (ii) under two-part tariffs 
interconnection charges have no effect on network operators’ profits and hence 
collusion over termination charges is unsustainable (profit-neutrality outcome).  
However, both results are based on particular assumptions concerning retail 
pricing strategies, asymmetries in the market, demand structures and network 
externalities. The literature that followed the advent of the seminal works mainly 
focused on exploring the robustness of the two main results when relaxing these 
benchmark assumptions.  
It was found that the collusive outcome seems to be robust in asymmetric 
markets, as well as, under call externalities. However, in the latter case call 
externalities make the firms use below-cost reciprocal interconnection charges as 
an effective tool to soften competition in the retail market. Concerning the profit-
neutrality outcome, it was concluded that this outcome still holds under consumer 
heterogeneity but it vanishes either in asymmetric markets or under termination-
based discriminatory pricing.  
In many cases, the collusive outcome can be achieved even with two-part tariffs. 
The detrimental effect of a collusive outcome on competition can be exacerbated 
when asymmetries in the market call for non-reciprocal access prices. In such 
cases the incumbents can use their greater bargaining power to foreclose the 
entrants from the retail market. Although the need for regulation is imperative in 
both cases, the related literature has not adequately investigated the impact of 
termination charges on competition. In addition, there are only few papers 
proposing different regulatory settings that prevent network operators from using 
the termination charges as an effective tool for collusion.  
Most importantly, network operators can also agree on termination charges 
above marginal cost in order to soften competition over investments. This 
collusive behavior makes operators to under-invest which leads to both static and 
dynamic inefficiencies. Since private and social preferences always diverge once 
investments are endogenized, regulators should intervene in the access market 
in order to promote competition and encourage investments. Although this is a 
very interesting and challenging result, the relationship between access 
regulation, competition and investment incentives has been investigated in very 
few ways. 
It is thus obvious that this paper not only reviewed the existing literature of two-
way interconnection, but also pointed out the fields that the future research 
should focus in order to deal with the currently open issues. These fields include 
the investigation of the robustness of the two seminal results in cases where: (i) 
the existing literature provides few or no results (see table I), (ii) the existing 
literature provides mixed results, and (iii) the regulatory intervention is imperative 
                                                          
4
  We intentionally neglected technical aspects of interconnection (such as differences between 
circuit and packet switching technologies) since we aimed at discussing the impact of access 
charges on retail competition from an economic perspective. 
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in order to deal with anti-competitive practices and encourage efficient 
investments.   
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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an 
incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA and on the subsequent downstream 
competition level. Thus, it proposes a method for calculating the regulatory 
uncertainty and incorporating it into the access pricing formula. Two cases are 
discussed according to whether the regulator discloses the access pricing 
formula after the announcement of the regulatory period (maximum regulatory 
intervention) or the formula is of common knowledge (minimum regulatory 
intervention). It is found that in both cases there is a trade-off between 
encouraging NGA investments and promoting effective competition. Therefore, it 
is assumed that the regulator sets the regulatory period at the level that 
maximizes social welfare. The comparison of the derived results shows that the 
regulator should provide minimum than maximum regulatory intervention since 
the former policy leads to better results in terms of investments, competition and 
social welfare.   
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1. Introduction 
The migration from copper telecommunications networks to fibre-based next-
generation access networks (NGA) capable of providing high-speed broadband 
services has induced a growing interest in the linkage between access regulation 
and investment incentives. The related literature concludes that there is a trade-
off between encouraging investments and promoting effective competition.1 
On the one hand, cost-oriented access prices provide the entrants with significant 
incentives to enter the market. Therefore, the consumers enjoy the benefits of 
effective competition, such as lower prices and higher quality. The main 
drawback of this approach, however, is that deters the incumbents from investing 
in network upgrade (Cave and Prosperetti, 2001; Jorde et al., 2000; Ingraham 
and Sidak, 2003) and encourages entrants to deviate from socially optimal 
investment level and to delay investments in alternative infrastructures (Jorde et 
al., 2000; Bourreau and Dogan, 2005). On the other hand, higher access prices 
incentivize the incumbents to invest in network upgrade but bear the risk of 
distorting competition and providing the entrants with incentives to build inefficient 
facilities to bypass the incumbent’s network (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). 
Given that the prospective investors in NGA networks are for large part the 
former incumbent operators (OPTA, 2010), the goal of regulators is to promote 
effective competition and encourage efficient and timely investments in NGA 
networks from the incumbents.  For this reason, the European Commission (EC) 
issued a Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EC, 2010) providing the 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) with guidelines for tackling the trade-off 
between fostering competition and promoting investments with regard to NGA. In 
particular, the EC recommends calculating the access in a cost-based form that 
incorporates a risk premium. This premium should reflect any additional and 
quantifiable investment risk incurred by the investor.2 According to OPTA (2008), 
the main factors that negatively affect the incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA 
networks are: (i) the uncertainty about future demand for new fibre-based 
services; and (ii) the regulatory uncertainty related to the regulator’s limited ability 
to make ex ante credible commitments. 
This paper focuses on the regulatory uncertainty and its impact on the regulator’s 
two-fold goal to encourage NGA investments and to promote effective 
competition. Theoretically, the regulator can eliminate the regulatory risk if it fixes 
the principles of tariff regulation for the whole period of the economic lifecycle of 
an NGA investment. It is obvious that such a policy maximizes the regulatory 
certainty and provides the incumbent with significant incentives to invest in NGA 
networks. However, regulatory certainty bears the risk of erroneous intervention. 
An initial erroneous prediction for future industry profits, NGA penetration and 
technological changes may result in either incumbents’ inability of recouping their 
investment costs or excessive prices that distort competition. According to WIK 
(2009), it is socially not optimal for the regulator to make ex ante commitments for 
an unreasonably long regulatory period. Therefore, in providing greater regulatory 
certainty the regulator has to make another trade-off between the positive effects 
of greater certainty on investment incentives and possible negative effects of 
erroneous intervention on welfare (OPTA, 2010). 
                                                          
1
  For a recent and comprehensive review of the related literature, see Cambini and Jiang (2009). 
2
  For an extensive review of all the factors influencing the riskiness of an NGA investment project, 
see ERG (2009), pp. 17-18; WIK (2009), pp.1-7; and EC (2010), page 18. 
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In this paper, we use a simple method for calculating the risk premium that fully 
compensates the incumbent for the regulatory risk it incurs when investing in 
NGA, as well as, a similar method for incorporating such a risk premium into the 
access pricing formula. Then, we assess the impact of regulatory uncertainty on 
investment incentives, competition level and social welfare when: (i) the regulator 
discloses the access pricing formula after the announcement of the regulatory 
period; and (ii) the access pricing formula is of common knowledge. It is obvious 
that the first case requires “maximum regulatory intervention”, whereas the 
second case requires “minimum regulatory intervention”.   
In addition, the former case poses an additional uncertainty concerning the 
ambiguity for the access pricing formula which is not compensated by the 
regulators. Thus, it is expected that the incumbent will choose a higher NGA 
investment level when the access pricing formula is of common knowledge rather 
than when the regulator discloses the access pricing formula after the 
announcement of the regulatory period.  
The goal of this paper is to test the validity of the expectations regarding (i) the 
positive impact of a longer regulatory period; and (ii) the negative impact of an 
ambiguity for the access pricing formula, on the incumbent’s incentives to invest 
in NGA networks. Based on the obtained results, this paper also assesses the 
impact of a longer regulatory period and the ex ante knowledge of the access 
pricing formula on the levels of competition and social welfare in order to make 
implications about the optimal regulatory policy that tackles the trade-off between 
encouraging investments in NGA networks and promoting efficient competition.      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the 
basic assumptions and definitions of the model. Sections 3 and 4 present the 
results obtained by maximum and minimum, respectively, regulatory intervention. 
Section 5 compares the results of the two regulatory approaches, whereas 
Section 6 conducts a risk and a sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate the impact 
of cost uncertainty and the uncertainty for the expected regulatory period on each 
period that maximizes investments, competition and social welfare. The last 
section summarizes the key findings and justifies regulatory implications. 
 
2. The model 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of the length of the regulatory 
period on NGA investment level, competition level and social welfare. We 
assume that the retail (downstream) market is characterized as an unregulated 
duopoly market in which an incumbent (the subsidiary firm of the upstream 
monopolist) and an entrant (the independent firm) compete á la Cournot. The 
inverse demand function is given by 
1 2
( )p A X q q    , where p  is the retail 
market price, A is the reservation price when no investment has taken place, X 
reflects the extent of NGA deployment undertaken by the incumbent and 
1
q  and 
2q  are the quantities supplied by the incumbent and the entrant respectively.
3 
Therefore, an increase in the level of NGA investment leads to higher consumers’ 
willingness to pay. In other words, there is an outward parallel shift in the demand 
curve, which benefits both retailers.  
                                                          
3
  Nitsche and Wiethaus (2010) also assume Cournot competition in the retail market using the 
same inverse demand function. 
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The NGA deployment is continuous where a larger X reflects a fibre deployment 
closer to the consumers’ premises and/or a larger geographic coverage within a 
given market area. The incumbent faces a quadratic NGA investment cost with 
respect to X, given by 2( ) / 2c X X , with 0  . The convex form reflects the fact 
that fibre deployment becomes marginally more expensive as  (i) it is being laid 
down towards consumers’ premises and/or  (ii) it is extended to rural, less 
densely populated areas. It is further assumed that all the other costs of 
production and distribution are equal for both retailers and normalized to zero. 
Therefore, the profits functions of the incumbent (firm 1) and the entrant (firm 2) 
are given, respectively, by 
1 1
2
2
/ 2p wq q X                   (1) 
2 2
( )p w q                   (2) 
where w represents the access price paid by the entrant to the incumbent in order 
to have access to the local loop.  The model described by Eqs. (1) and (2) is 
widely used in the literature of access regulation and investment incentives. 
However, it neglects the fact that the regulator’s choice to provide greater 
flexibility or certainty affects both the NGA investment level and the access price. 
It is assumed that the NGA investment level X corresponds to a particular 
certainty level resulted by the incumbent’s assumption that the regulator will set 
the regulatory period at the expected (based on past experience) level. We 
denote this expected certainty level as n. Therefore, the NGA investment level X 
is obtained by the regulatory policy that sets the length of the regulatory period m 
equal to the expected one, i.e. m=n. If the regulator sets the length of the 
regulatory period m to a lower (respectively, higher) level that n, then it is 
expected that the NGA investment level will be lower (respectively, higher) than 
X. As a result, we can state that ( / )R m n XX  , where RX  represents the NGA 
investment level that takes account of the regulatory uncertainty. 
However, the regulator’s choice to provide greater flexibility or certainty does not 
only affect the NGA investment level, but also the access price. Like Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2010) we assume that the incumbent is allowed to recoup investment 
costs through the access price and it will consider this link when determining 
investments. In particular we adopt the approach of Sarmento and Brand o 
(2007) that the regulator sets an access price w  equal to the marginal cost of 
providing the access plus the average cost of the investment. In addition, we 
incorporate a risk premium into this access pricing formula that takes account of 
the regulatory uncertainty. A higher (respectively, lower) m implies a lower 
(respectively, higher) regulatory uncertainty. Since the risk premium should 
compensate the incumbent for the regulatory risk, the regulator has to set a risk 
premium positively correlated with the regulatory uncertainty. Thus, the proposed 
risk premium is given by ( / )R n m ww  , where w  represents the access pricing 
formula proposed by Sarmento and Brand o (2007). 
According to OPTA (2010) “from the perspective of an investor, uncertainty is 
only reduced (and hence certainty is provides) when the regulators discloses 
intended regulatory intervention before the investment is made”. Therefore, we 
consider the following timing of the game: 
 Firstly, the regulator discloses intended regulatory intervention. 
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 Secondly, the incumbent decides the investment level X that maximizes its 
profits. 
 Finally, the retail price and outputs of the firms are defined by Cournot 
competition between downstream firms. 
The backward induction technique is used to find the equilibrium of the whole 
game. Hence, the analysis begins with the computation of the retail price and the 
outputs of the firms. Then, using these results, the incumbent’s optimal 
investment level is obtained. Finally, based on the previous information, the 
optimal regulatory intervention is derived. In particular, we discriminate between 
two cases according to the range of the intended regulatory intervention. In the 
first case (section 3), we assume that the regulator sets the optimal regulatory 
period and then announces the access pricing formula, whereas in the second 
case (section 4), we assume that the access pricing formula is of common 
knowledge and hence the intended regulatory intervention only concerns the 
regulation of the regulatory period. The derivation of all explicit and implicit 
formulas is available from the authors upon request.    
 
3. Case A - Maximum regulatory intervention 
In this section, we assume maximum regulatory intervention which implies that 
the regulator initially sets the regulatory period and then chooses the access 
pricing formula. Based on this assumption, this section examines the impact of 
the regulatory period on NGA investment level, competition level and social 
welfare. Last, it discusses the obtained results from industrial, social and 
regulatory perspective.  
 
3.1. Retail competition outcomes 
According to the model described in section 2, the profits functions of the 
incumbent and the entrant are given, respectively, by 
1 1
2
2
/ 2RRpq qw X                   (3) 
2 2
( )Rp qw                   (4) 
Considering Cournot competition, the retail price and the output of the firms are 
the following: 
1
( ) / 3R RAq wX                   (5) 
2
( 2 ) / 3R RAq wX                  (6) 
( ) / 3R RP A wX                   (7) 
 
3.2. NGA investment level 
The incumbent decides the NGA investment level that maximizes its profits. 
Therefore, substituting Eqs. (5)-(7) into Eq. (3) and taking the first order condition 
with respect to RX  yields: 
2 5
9 2
R
R
m A w
XX
n 

 

               (8) 
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or, in other words, 
(2 5 )
(9 2)
Rn A wX
m 



                (9) 
From Eq. (8) it is deduced that an increase in the access price leads to an 
increase in the NGA investment level (ceteris paribus). In addition, note that 
0,22   ensures that the incumbent will not choose an infinite investment level.  
 
3.3. Regulatory settings 
In this section, we first derive the access pricing formula, as well as, its impact on 
competition, NGA investment level and social welfare. Based on the derived 
results, we then compute the optimal length of the regulatory period that 
maximizes social welfare. Regulatory implications concerning the obtained levels 
of NGA investment, competition and social welfare are also drawn.  
 
3.3.1. The access pricing formula 
Like Sarmento and Brandao (2007), it is assumed that the regulator sets an 
access price equal to the marginal cost of providing the access plus the average 
cost of the investment. Since the marginal cost of providing the access has been 
normalized to zero, the access price without the incorporation of any risk 
premium is equal the average cost of the investment, i.e. / 2Rw X . However, 
this paper incorporates into the access price a risk premium that takes account of 
the regulatory uncertainty. Given that ( / )R n m ww   and ( / )R m n XX  , the optimal 
access price that incorporates a risk premium is given by: 
/ 2R Xw                 (10) 
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (10) and solving with respect to Rw  gives the optimal 
access price that incorporates a risk premium as a function of the regulatory 
period m: 
2
18 4 5
R
A n
w
m m n

 

 
             (11) 
From Eq. (11) it can be concluded that there is a negative correlation between the 
length of the regulatory period and the optimal access price. Indeed, as the 
regulatory period increases, the denominator of Eq. (11) also increases as long 
as 0,22  . As a result, the optimal access price decreases with an increase in 
the regulatory period.  
 
3.3.2. The optimal regulatory period 
In order to assess the impact of an increase in the regulatory period on the NGA 
investment level, we substitute Eq. (11) into Eq. (8). Hence, we obtain the optimal 
NGA investment level as a function of the length of the regulatory period4: 
                                                          
4
 Superscript “A” characterizes an outcome derived by case A (maximum regulatory intervention), 
whereas superscript “B” characterizes an outcome derived by case B (minimum regulatory 
intervention). 
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4
18 4 5
A
R
Am
X
m m n 

 
             (12) 
Taking the partial derivative of Eq. (12) with respect to m gives the change in the 
optimal NGA investment level caused by a marginal change in the length of the 
regulatory period: 
2
20
(18 4 5 )
R A nX
m m m n

 
 

  
             (13) 
It is obvious that a marginal increase (respectively, decrease) in the regulatory 
period leads to a decrease (respectively, increase) in the optimal NGA investment 
level. This implies that regulatory certainty provides the incumbent with 
disincentives to invest in NGA networks. The interpretation of this surprising and 
unexpected result is that a higher regulatory period has a negative effect on the 
level of the access price, which leads to lower incumbent’s profits. This result 
outweighs the positive effect of a higher regulatory period on the consumers’ 
willingness to pay which positively affects the incumbent’s profits. Since the 
incumbent undertakes the NGA investment level that maximizes its profits, it is 
reasonable that it will deploy a smaller NGA network as the regulatory period 
becomes longer. 
In addition, substituting Eqs. (8) and (11) into Eqs. (5)-(7) gives the retail price 
and the output of the firms as a function of the regulatory period: 
1
(6 )
18 4 5
A m n
q
m m n

 


 
             (14) 
2
3 (2 )
18 4 5
A m n
q
m m n

 


 
             (15) 
1 2
4 (3 )
18 4 5
A A m n
qq q
m m n

 

 
 
            (16) 
(6 )
18 4 5
A m n
P
m m n

 


 
              (17) 
Assumption 1. Let 2 0m n  .  
This assumption guarantees that the optimal regulatory period is set at a level 
that does not foreclose the entrant from the retail (downstream) market. This 
implies that 0,5   is a necessary condition in order to ensure that the 
denominator of Eqs. (14)-(17) is positive when 2 0m n  . By taking the partial 
derivatives of Eqs. (14) and (15) with respect to m, we can deduce that a 
marginal increase in the regulatory period causes the incumbent’s output to 
decrease and the entrant’s output to increase. Concerning the total output, it can 
be concluded that it increases with an increase in the regulatory period if 1,33  . 
Since the level of the total output can be used as a measure of the competition 
level, we can infer that as far as 1,33   the competition level increases with an 
increase in the regulatory period.  
This implies that if 1,33   both the NGA investment level and the competition 
level decrease with an increase in the regulatory period. As a result, the optimal 
regulatory policy is to set the regulatory period at its lower feasible level, which is 
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/ 2m n . However, such a policy forecloses the entrant from the retail market. 
Therefore, we make the following assumption: 
Assumption 2. Let 1,33  .  
This assumption guarantees that there is a trade-off between encouraging 
investments in NGA networks and promoting competition. In particular, as the 
regulatory period increases, the competition level increases and the investment 
level decreases.  
We have already studied the impact of the regulatory period on the levels of NGA 
investment and competition. We have concluded that no regulatory period is 
capable of achieving the simultaneous maximization of competition and 
investments. Thus, we study the impact of regulatory period on social welfare 
since this policy provides intermediate results in terms of NGA investment level 
and on the subsequent competition level, while is widely used by regulators, 
policy makers and economists. 
Social welfare is the unweighted sum of both providers’ profits and consumer 
surplus. Given that under Cournot competition the consumer surplus is given by 
2
( ) / 2CS q , social welfare is: 
2 2 22
2
4 (36 3 2 21 )
(18 4 5 )
A mnm n mA
SW
m m n
   
 
  

 
           (18) 
Therefore, the partial derivative of Eq (18) with respect to m is the following: 
22
3
4 [ (18 64) 3 (8 )]
(18 4 5 )
SW n m nA
m m m n
 
 
   

  
           (19) 
From Eq. (19) we deduce that as the length of the regulatory period increases, 
social welfare increases until it reaches its maximum level and then decreases. 
The optimal regulatory period that maximizes social welfare is given by:   
3 (8 )
2(32 9 )
n
m





              (20) 
A longer regulatory period than the optimal one has a negative effect on both 
NGA investment level and social welfare. In addition a shorter regulatory period 
than the optimal one negatively affects social welfare and positively affects NGA 
investment level. Therefore, in the last case the regulator has to make a trade-off 
between the positive effects of greater flexibility on investment incentives and 
possible negative effects of erroneous intervention on welfare.  
Considering this optimal regulatory period, the optimal output of the firms, as well 
as, the optimal NGA investment level are the following: 
1 2
20
9 31 24
A
q



 
              (21) 
2 2
3 (3 4)
9 31 24
A
q
 



 
              (22) 
2
(9 8)
9 31 24
A
q
 



 
              (23) 
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2
3 (8 )
9 31 24
R
A
X




 
              (24) 
Assumption 3. Let 1,33 3,55  . 
As noted earlier, the lower bound of this inequality guarantees that the regulatory 
policy does not foreclose the entrant from the retail market, while it ensures that 
the denominator of Eqs. (21)-(24) is positive. The upper bound of this inequality 
guarantees that the length of the optimal regulatory period and the NGA 
investment level are both positive.  
An interesting result obtained by Eq. (20) is that the optimal regulatory period is 
positively affected by n and  . Hence, as the NGA investment becomes 
marginally more expensive, the optimal regulatory period increases. In addition, 
for relative high values of  , the optimal regulatory period increases with a 
significant increasing rate. Indeed, the derivative of Eq. (20) with respect to   is 
given by 
2
60 /(9 32)n   . As a result, as   increases, the optimal regulatory period 
increases with an increasing rate. In particular, it is proven that it is socially 
optimal for the regulator to provide a greater (respectively, lower) than expected 
certainty if the rate at which an NGA investment becomes marginally more 
expensive is higher (respectively, lower) than 2,66. 
Concerning the impact of the optimal regulatory period on the total output, it can 
be deduced that if 2,46  , a higher   leads to a higher total output, or in other 
words, to a higher competition level. On the contrary, if 2,46   a lower   leads 
to a higher competition level. 
Concerning the impact of   on social welfare, it is deduced that as   and m 
increase, social welfare decreases. The same result is obtained by examining the 
relationship between   and RX . In particular, as the NGA investment becomes 
marginally more expensive, the regulator sets a longer regulatory period which 
leads the incumbent to deploy a smaller NGA network. The rationale of this 
surprising result is that the access price derived by the optimal regulatory policy 
concerning the regulatory period is negatively affected by an increase in  . The 
reason is that as   increases, m increases as well, which implies that the access 
price decreases. The combination of an increasing marginal investment cost and 
a high regulatory period leads the incumbent to deploy a smaller network. 
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
The study of the impact of regulatory period on investment incentives, 
competition level and social welfare provides some very significant results 
concerning the regulatory dilemma between providing greater certainty or greater 
flexibility. The main conclusion is that there is a trade-off between encouraging 
investments in NGA networks and fostering efficient competition. Another 
significant and unexpected result is that greater regulatory certainty leads to 
lower NGA investment levels and to higher competition levels.  
In the following section we discuss the impact of the regulatory period on 
investment incentives, competition level and social welfare assuming minimum 
regulatory intervention, which implies that the regulator only sets the regulatory 
period since the access pricing formula is of common knowledge. The 
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comparison of the results of the two approaches (maximum and minimum 
regulatory intervention) will disclose the impact of the uncertainty incurred due to 
the ambiguity for the access pricing formula, which is not usually compensated by 
the regulators, on the levels of NGA investments, competition and social welfare. 
 
4. Case B - Minimum regulatory intervention 
This section examines the impact of the regulatory period on NGA investment 
level, competition level and social welfare assuming minimum regulatory 
intervention. This implies that the access pricing formula is of common knowledge 
and hence the profits functions of the incumbent and the entrant are given, 
respectively, by: 
1 1
2
2
( ) / 2Rp Xq q X                  (25) 
2 2
( / 2)p X q                 (26) 
Equations (25) and (26) have been derived by substituting Eq. (10) in Eqs. (3) 
and (4), respectively. 
 
4.1. Retail competition outcomes 
Considering Cournot competition, the retail price and the output of the firms are 
the following: 
1
( / 2) / 3RA Xq X                 (27) 
2
( ) / 3RA Xq X                 (28) 
( / 2) / 3RP A XX                 (29) 
 
4.2. NGA investment level 
The incumbent decides the NGA investment level that maximizes its profits. 
Therefore, substituting Eqs. (27)-(29) into Eq. (25) and taking the first order 
condition with respect to X  yields: 
2
2 2 2 2
5 4
5 18 10 4
A Amnn
X
A mnn m m

 


  
            (30) 
Therefore, 
2
2 2 2 2
5 4
[ ]
5 18 10 4
B
R
m m A Amnn
XX
n n A mnn m m

 

 
  
          (31) 
By taking the first derivative of Eq. (31) with respect to m, it can be deduced that 
RX  is a concave function of m. In particular, as m increases, RX  increases until it 
reaches its maximum level and then decreases. The maximum level of the NGA 
investment is given by5: 
[4 3 2(5 2)] / (18 4)
RX
n nm                   (32) 
                                                          
5
 The second root of the first derivate of Eq. (31) with respect to m is rejected since it leads to a 
negative regulatory period.  
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Taking the first derivative of Eq. (32) with respect to   shows that as  increases, 
RXm  increases too. This implies that as the cost of the investment becomes 
marginally more expensive, the regulator provides greater regulatory certainty in 
order to maximize investments by the incumbent.  
 
4.3. Regulatory settings 
We have already mentioned above that the regulator’s goal is not only to 
maximize investments, but also to maximize competition. Therefore, we also 
discuss the impact of the regulatory period in total output (and hence on 
consumer surplus). Substituting Eq. (31) into Eqs. (27) and (28) gives the output 
of the incumbent and the entrant, respectively, as a function of m:  
2 2
1 2 2 2 2
(12 2 5 )
2(5 18 10 4 )
A mnm n
q
mnn m m
 
 
 

  
           (33) 
2 2 2 2 2
3 (2 )
5 18 10 4
A m m n
q
mnn m m

 


  
            (34) 
Therefore, the total output is given by: 
2 2
2 2 2 2
(24 8 5 )
2(5 18 10 4 )
B A mnm n
q
mnn m m
 
 
 

  
           (35) 
By taking the first derivative of Eq. (35) with respect to m, it can be deduced that 
q  is a concave function of m. In particular, as m increases, q  increases until it 
reaches its maximum level and then decreases. The maximum level of the total 
output is given by6: 
2 2
[15 10 3 5(5 12 4)] / (48 16)q n n nm                    (36) 
Taking the first derivative of Eq. (36) with respect to   shows that as  increases, 
qm  increases too. This implies that as the cost of the investment becomes 
marginally more expensive, the regulator provides greater regulatory certainty in 
order to maximize the competition level.  
The comparison of qm  and RXm  shows that Rq Xm m  for all admissible values of 
 .7 This implies that the minimum regulatory period that the regulator should set 
is 
RXm  and the maximum is qm . The rationale of this implication is that as long as 
RXm m
8, an increase in m causes both levels of NGA investment and 
competition to increase, whereas when qm m , a further increase in m causes 
both levels of NGA investment and competition to decrease. Another very 
significant result is that there is a trade-off between encouraging investments and 
                                                          
6
 The second root of the first derivate of Eq. (35) with respect to m is rejected since it leads to a 
negative regulatory period. 
7
 0,5   is sufficient to ensure that the denominator of Eqs. (30) and (33)-(35) is positive when m 
reaches its minimum level, that is / 2m n . However, we assume that 1,33 3,55   in order to 
make the results of sections 3 and 4 comparable.  
8
  It is proven that / 2
RX
nm   for 0,5   and hence the regulator can set  ( , )
2
RX
n
m m . 
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promoting competition as long as 
R qX
mm m  . In this case, an increase in the 
regulatory period causes the NGA investment level to decrease and the 
competition level to increase. Therefore, we conclude that the regulator cannot 
achieve the maximization of both investments and competition unless it sets the 
regulatory period at the level that forecloses the entrant, i.e. / 2m n , since in this 
case  
Rq Xm m .  
In addition, it is found that the regulatory period that maximizes competition is 
higher than the expected period as long as assumption 3 holds, whereas the 
regulatory period that maximizes investments is higher than the expected one as 
long as 2,341  . This implies that for relative high values of  , the optimal 
regulatory policy is to set m at a higher level than the expected one since the 
minimum level of regulatory period is 
RXm . 
However, qm  and RXm  are extremely biased towards either competition or 
investments, respectively. Thus, we discuss the impact of regulatory period on 
social welfare which provides intermediate outcomes and can be used as a 
measure of comparison of the results obtained by different regulatory 
approaches. Social welfare is given by: 
3 2 24 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 42
22 2 2 2
(75 500 180 1152 832 96 64 )
8(5 18 10 4 )
B m nn m n n m m m n mA
SW
mnn m m
     
 
     

  
       (37) 
It is obvious that it is not possible to derive closed-form solutions for the optimal 
values of m that maximize social welfare due to the high complexity. Thus, we 
use numerical simulations in order to derive the optimal regulatory period that 
maximizes social welfare, as well as, the subsequent levels of NGA investment 
and competition.  
The following table shows the regulatory period that maximizes: (i) the NGA 
investment level; (ii) the competition level (total output); and (iii) social welfare, for 
different values of   (1,33 3,55  ). It also shows the subsequent levels of NGA 
investment and competition derived by the regulatory policy that maximizes social 
welfare.9   
 
Table 1 The effect of   on the optimal regulatory period and on the subsequent outcomes 
(minimum regulatory intervention) 
  
RXm  qm  swm  
SW
RX  
SW
q  SW  
1,4 3,2 4,58 4,32 31,47 47,52 2049 
1,8 3,57 5,65 5,28 22,46 43,21 1743 
2,2 3,89 6,69 6,24 17,56 40,91 1588 
2,6 4,18 7,73 7,20 14,45 39,49 1494 
3,0 4,44 8,76 8,17 12,29 38,52 1431 
3,4 4,69 9,78 9,15 10,70 37,81 1385 
                                                          
9
 The assumed parameters are 50A   and 4n  . These values are used in every numerical example 
presented in this paper in order to make the results comparable.  
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A number of observations derived by the analysis of Table 1 are instructive. First, 
the above table confirms that an increase in   causes both qm  and RXm  to 
increase. Second, it can be concluded that as   increases, the optimal regulatory 
period that maximizes social welfare ( swm )increases too. This implies that 
regardless of the particular value of  , social welfare increases with an increase 
in m until it reaches its maximum level and then decreases. Not surprisingly, 
although 
R sw qXm m m  , the regulatory period that maximizes social welfare is 
biased towards consumer surplus. Last, the subsequent levels of NGA 
investments ( SWRX ), total output (
SW
q ) and social welfare ( SW ) resulted by the 
regulatory policy that maximizes social welfare, decrease with an increase in  . 
In the following section, we compare the results obtained by the two approaches 
(maximum and minimum regulatory intervention) in order to assess the impact of 
the ambiguity for the access pricing formula on NGA investments, competition 
and social welfare. 
 
5. Comparison of the two regulatory approaches  
Initially, we examine the impact of the ambiguity for the access pricing formula on 
the incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA networks. Therefore, the comparison 
of Eqs. (12) and (31) shows that BRX  is higher than 
A
RX  for all admissible values of 
 and m. This implies that the ambiguity for the access pricing formula increases 
the regulatory uncertainty which negatively affects the incumbent’s investment 
incentives. Figure 1 presents graphically the impact of the regulatory period on 
NGA investment level for each of the two regulatory approaches studied in this 
paper. 
 
Figure 1 The impact of the regulatory period on NGA investment level ( 2  ) 
Figure 1 shows that when the access pricing formula is of common knowledge, 
the NGA investment level is higher that the respective level of NGA investment 
derived when the regulator discloses the access pricing formula after the 
announcement of the regulatory period. In addition, the two levels of NGA 
investment are the same when / 2m n , which implies that the regulatory policy 
forecloses that entrant from the retail market. Not surprisingly, an increase in the 
regulatory period causes the NGA investment level to decrease under maximum 
regulatory intervention, whereas under minimum regulatory intervention the NGA 
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investment curve initially increases with an increase in m, reaches its maximum 
level and then decreases. 
Concerning, the impact of the ambiguity for the access pricing formula on the 
total output, the comparison of Eqs. (16) and (35) shows that 
A
q =
B
q  for 1 / 2nm   
and 2 / 4nm  . This implies that when 2  , 
B A
q q . If on the contrary, 2  , 
B A
q q  for 2m m  and 
B A
q q  for 1 2mm m  . Figure 2 presents graphically the 
impact of the regulatory period on total output for each of the two regulatory 
approaches studied in this paper. 
                       
                     Figure 2a The impact of the regulatory period on  
total output ( 1,5  ) 
 
Figure 2b The impact of the regulatory period on total 
output ( 3,4  ) 
It is obvious that in the first case of figure 2, the total output derived by minimum 
regulatory intervention is higher that the respective level of total output derived by 
maximum regulatory intervention. This implies that the optimal policy for the 
regulator is to provide a stable regulatory environment in which the access pricing 
formula would be of common knowledge. On the contrary, when 2   the 
regulator should set 2m m in order to avoid another trade-off between disclosing 
the access pricing formula after the regulation of the regulatory period (a policy 
that fosters competition) and providing a stable regulatory environment (a policy 
that encourages investments in NGA networks).  
Last, we discuss the impact of the ambiguity for the access pricing formula on 
social welfare. The comparison of Eqs. (18) and (37) shows that there is a high 
complexity for concluding either that B ASW SW  or 
B A
SW SW . For this reason 
we use numerical simulations by substituting the values of   used in Table 1 into 
Eq. (20) in order to calculate the optimal regulatory period under maximum 
regulatory intervention. Therefore, we focus on the comparison of the levels of 
social welfare derived by the regulatory policy that aims at maximizing social 
welfare rather than on the comparison of the levels of social welfare for every 
admissible value of m and  .The obtained results are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2 The effect of   on the optimal regulatory period and on the subsequent outcomes 
(maximum regulatory intervention) 
  swm  
SW
RX  
SW
q  SW  
1,4 2,04 26,72 38,93 1729 
1,8 2,35 15,25 35,72 1483 
2,2 2,85 9,91 34,84 1372 
2,6 3,76 6,89 34,75 1311 
3,0 6,00 5,00 35,00 1275 
3,4 19,71 3,72 35,38 1251 
 
From Table 2 it is deduced that as  increases the optimal regulatory period that 
maximizes social welfare ( swm ) increases, whereas the subsequent levels of NGA 
investments ( SWRX ) and social welfare ( SW ) decrease. Concerning the impact of 
an increase in   on 
SW
q , recall from section 3.3.2. that total output increases with 
an increase in as long as 2,46   and decreases with an increase in  as long 
as 2,46  .  
The comparison of the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 shows that the optimal 
regulatory period that maximizes social welfare is higher under minimum than 
maximum regulatory intervention except from very high values of the rate at 
which the investment cost becomes marginally more expensive. However, the 
derived results in terms of NGA investment level, total output and social welfare 
are always higher under minimum regulatory intervention than under maximum 
regulatory intervention. In other words, the ambiguity for the access pricing 
formula has a negative effect on NGA investment level, competition level and 
social welfare as long as the regulator sets the regulatory period at the level that 
maximizes social welfare.  
 
Proposition 1. As long as the regulator chooses the regulatory policy that 
maximizes social welfare, it should provide minimum regulatory intervention.  
 
Proposition 1 states that the regulatory policy that maximizes social welfare is to 
make the access pricing formula be of common knowledge. Such a policy not 
only maximizes social welfare but also leads to better results in terms of both 
NGA investments and competition. However, it is obvious that the final outcome 
is biased towards competition since swm  is much closer to qm  than to RXm .  
 
6. Risk and sensitivity analysis  
The main conclusion of the previous section is that the optimal regulatory policy is 
to provide minimum regulatory intervention. In other words, a stable regulatory 
environment positively affects both NGA investments and competition. However, 
the analysis concerning the regulatory policy that provides minimum intervention 
was based on the assumption that the exact values of   and n are known to the 
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incumbent and the regulator. Therefore, it was assumed that the incumbent and 
the regulator have perfect information about the investment cost and the 
expected regulatory period. Unfortunately, in fact the exact values of   and  n  
are not of common knowledge and hence the regulator, as well as, industry firms 
make their optimal decision under uncertainty.  
This section provides a risk analysis in order to assess the impact of the 
uncertainty for the exact values of   and  n on the optimal levels of regulatory 
periods that maximize NGA investments and total output as described in Eqs. 
(32) and (36). This section also conducts a sensitivity analysis in order to 
evaluate the significance of   and  n on the aforementioned levels of regulatory 
periods. The results obtained by the risk analysis are presented in Figure 3, 
whereas the results obtained by the sensitivity analysis are presented in Figure 
4.10 
                          
                      Figure 3a The results of risk analysis on 
RXm  
 
       Figure 3b The results of risk analysis on qm  
Figure 3a shows that the probability of setting the regulatory period that 
maximizes NGA investments at a higher level than the mean value of the 
expected one (i.e. n=4) is almost 50%. On the contrary, Figure 3b shows that the 
regulator is expected to set the regulatory period that maximizes competition at a 
higher level than the mean value of the expected one.  
Sensitivity analysis helps us to interpret the results of risk analysis. In particular, 
Figure 4 shows the impact of each uncertain parameter (   and  n) on the optimal 
levels of regulatory periods that maximize NGA investments and total output. It is 
obvious that n rather than   has a more significant impact on qm  and RXm . In 
addition, a marginal change in n causes almost the same deviation in qm  and 
RXm .  On the contrary, although the effect of  on qm  and RXm  is lower than the 
respective impact of n on qm and RXm , a marginal change in   has a greater 
impact on qm  rather than on RXm .   
                                                          
10
  We have assigned a uniform distribution to the uncertain parameter  and a normal distribution 
to the uncertain parameter n (mean value: 4; standard deviation: 1,4). 
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Figure 4a The results of sensitivity analysis on 
RXm  
                        
 
              Figure 4b The results of sensitivity analysis 
on qm  
Since we have already proved that swm  is much closer to qm  than to RXm , it is 
expected that the overall uncertainty will have a significant impact on the optimal 
regulatory period that maximizes social welfare.  
 
7. Conclusions  
The aim of this paper was to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an 
incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA networks and on the subsequent 
downstream competition level. Thus, it proposed a method for calculating the risk 
premium which compensates the investor for the regulatory risk it incurs when 
investing in NGA networks. The proposed method is based on the comparison of 
the regulated period with the expected one. A longer (respectively, shorter) period 
than expected leads to a lower (respectively, higher) risk premium. We 
discriminated between two cases according to whether the regulator discloses 
the access pricing formula (maximum regulatory intervention) after the regulation 
of the regulatory period or this formula is of common knowledge (minimum 
regulatory intervention).  
In the former case, a longer regulatory period (greater regulatory certainty), leads 
the incumbent to deploy a smaller NGA network, which in turn results to a higher 
competition level. Therefore, there is always a trade-off between encouraging 
NGA investments and promoting effective competition. The rationale of this 
surprising and unexpected result concerning the NGA investment level is that a 
longer regulatory period leads to a lower access price, which in turn leads to a 
decrease in the incumbent’s profits. The impact of a lower access price on the 
incumbent’s profits outweighs the positive impact of higher regulatory certainty on 
consumers’ willingness to pay. Therefore, the incumbent is better off by deploying 
a smaller NGA network as the regulator provides a longer regulatory period in 
order to offset the higher marginal investment cost. 
In the latter case, an increase in the regulatory period causes the levels of both 
NGA investment and competition to increase until they reach their maximum 
levels and then to decrease. It is found that the regulatory period that maximizes 
competition is always higher than the respective level of regulatory period that 
maximizes NGA investment. This implies that the former period is the highest 
period that a regulator should set, whereas the latter period is the lowest period 
that a regulator should set. However, there is also a trade-off between 
encouraging investments in NGA networks and promoting effective competition 
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since a marginal increase from the lowest to the highest regulatory period causes 
the investment level to decrease and the competition level to increase.  
The deduction from the two regulatory approaches is that although providing 
minimum than maximum regulatory intervention leads to more expected results 
and higher investment level, both approaches fail to tackle the trade-off between 
encouraging investments and promoting competition. For this reason, we 
assumed that the regulator sets the optimal regulatory period at the level that 
maximizes social welfare. The comparison of the results derived by the two 
approaches showed that the regulator should provide minimum than maximum 
intervention since this policy leads to better results in terms of NGA investments, 
competition and social welfare.  
However, the conclusions presented in this section were based on the 
assumption that there is perfect information about the investment cost and the 
expected regulatory period. In reality, the incumbent and the regulator may not 
have perfect information about the investment cost and the expected regulatory 
period. For this reason, we also conducted a risk and a sensitivity analysis in 
order to evaluate the significance of these uncertain parameters on the optimal 
regulatory periods that maximize investment, competition and social welfare, as 
well as, the probability of success of every feasible regulatory period. The main 
conclusion was that the uncertainty about the expected period has a more 
significant impact on the optimal regulatory periods than cost uncertainty. In 
addition, it was found that the regulatory period that maximizes competition is 
more vulnerable to cost uncertainty than the regulatory period that maximizes 
investments. Therefore, it is expected that the overall uncertainty will have a 
significant impact on the optimal regulatory period that maximizes social welfare 
since this period is biased towards the period that maximizes competition than 
the respective period that maximizes investments.  
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Abstract— This paper discusses the impact of the first-mover advantage on the 
optimal access price that maximizes social welfare. Thus, it compares the results 
derived when (a) the incumbent; and (b) the entrant, is the Stackelberg leader in 
the downstream market. It proves that regardless of which firm is the leader, the 
optimal regulatory policy is to set the access price to the marginal cost of 
providing the access (first best) since this policy provides zero profits for both 
firms. Any deviation from this policy leads either the incumbent or the entrant to 
make a loss and hence to exit the market. 
 
Index Terms—Access pricing, Local loop, Competition, Social welfare 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The deregulation of network industries, such as telecommunications, raises 
several questions about the conditions of access to incumbent firm’s network. 
Without access price regulation, when the incumbent firm is a monopolist in the 
provision of an essential input (network access) and also a supplier of final 
products, there is an obvious danger that this integrated firm will seek to exclude 
competing final product suppliers by setting high access prices, thereby raising 
rivals’ costs [1], [13]. This strategy is known as price squeeze. 
Suppose that a new Internet Service Provider (ISP) wants to enter a market 
monopolized by an incumbent. In this case, the new ISP (the new entrant) can 
either lease incumbent’s facilities or create its own network in order to supply its 
services to its consumers. Figure 1 depicts graphically the framework that we are 
presenting.  
 
Fig. 1.   The framework of access pricing 
The monopolist owns all the links between points A1, A2, A3, etc and B that 
represent the local loop. All of the local consumers A1, A2, A3 , etc  must use the 
monopolist’s local loop to communicate with point C, which may be a website or 
another switch. The same firm that provides access to local loop also provides 
service from points A1, A2, A3, etc., through switch B to point C.  
Therefore, the new entrant can lease the incumbent’s backbone facilities between 
BC (drawn in bold) and the links A1B, A2B, etc. in order to supply its consumers 
with the "through" service ABC (and CBA). In this case, the new entrant pays an 
access price for leasing the facilities. Alternatively, the new entrant can invest in 
its own network. However, that rival owns only facilities between BC since the 
local loop is still monopolized by incumbent due to its high fixed cost. As a result, 
the new entrant requires access to (through) the switch in order to provide the A1, 
A2, A3, etc., customers with the "through" service ABC (and CBA). In this case, 
each provider pays an interconnection charge for having its traffic terminated on 
the rival network but the new entrant also pays an access price for having access 
to the local loop.  
The above access issues can be categorized into the two broader categories of 
access pricing problem: one-way access and two-way access. One-way access 
(or the access model) concerns the provision of bottleneck inputs by an 
incumbent network provider to new entrants, while two-way access (or the 
interconnection model) concerns reciprocal access between two networks that 
have to rely upon each other to terminate traffic [16]. In each case, policy makers 
intervene in the market in order to ensure that access price encourages the right 
amount of entry, efficient network investment and network utilization, while being 
manageable. The optimal access price in cases of  one-way access has been 
discussed in [4], [6], [7], whereas the optimal access price in cases of two-way 
access has been discussed in [8], [9], [11], [12]. 
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Our work is related to the literature on one-way access pricing under Stackelberg 
competition. Stackelberg model is an oligopoly model in which firms choose 
quantities sequentially. In our model there are only two firms and as a result it is 
described by Stackelberg duopoly: a model of duopolies under which two firms 
choose the quantity to produce with one firm (the leader) choosing before the 
other (the follower) in an observable manner. Stackelberg competition is widely 
applied to telecommunication market since: 
i. incumbent has already developed network facilities that cover the whole 
market whereas new entrants invest mainly in profitable areas. 
ii. incumbent was the only provider in the market before entry occurs. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that incumbent will have the largest market share 
due to the existence of switching costs.   
As a result, incumbent supplies its consumers and then provide the unused 
network facilities to new entrants in order to supply their consumers. For the 
above reasons, the incumbent is thought to be the Stackelberg leader. 
However, Ji-Ho Joo, Hyeon-Mo Ku & Jae-Cheol Kim [6] support that in view of 
the recent regulatory trend that the incumbent, when requested, is obligated to 
provide its own bottleneck facilities to entrants, it is more reasonable to take the 
entrant than the incumbent as the one who plays a leader role. In other words, 
the incumbent’s decision is dependent on the entrant’s access request, which is 
taken into account by the entrant in making its decision on facility lease. 
Previous works examine a certain instrument of setting the access price under a 
certain type of competition. In our paper, we examine the effect of each type of 
Stackelberg competition (when the incumbent is leader and when the new entrant 
is leader) on the social welfare. Then, we compare the results in order to draw 
regulatory implications. As a result the regulator has a broader knowledge about 
the possible outcomes that result from the competition between incumbent and 
new entrant. Hence, regulator can take the necessary measures in order to 
maximize social welfare and encourage the right amount of entry based on an 
elaborate analysis of the possible scenarios. 
We have to note that our work also differs from previous works in another point:  
Related works focus their attention on telephone services. They suppose that the 
incumbent supplies services in an upstream (local telephone service) market, 
while both the incumbent and the new entrant supply services in a downstream 
(long-distance telephone service) market. In the downstream market, new entrant 
needs access to upstream networks in order to supply services. Thus, it pays an 
access price for leasing the facilities. In this case, links A1B, A2B, etc. represent 
the upstream market whereas BC represents the downstream market. As a 
result, demand for long-distance services is independent to that of local services. 
On the contrary, our work focuses on broadband services and especially on 
charging the access to the local loop.  Both incumbent and new entrant supply 
broadband services, but the new entrant needs access to the local loop, which is 
monopolized by the incumbent.  In this case, there is a unique service (the 
broadband service) with its own demand. 
The sections of the paper will assume the following: 
• Each provider has its own network in order to supply internet services in 
the market. However, the entrant pays an access price α to the incumbent for 
having access to the local loop, which is monopolized by the incumbent.  
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• The regulator sets the optimal access price that maximizes social welfare 
W and then the providers determine their production levels that maximize their 
profits. 
• One unit of the facilities is required to supply one unit of the final product. 
• There is no outward parallel shift in demand due to an increase in the level 
of investment. 
• The price of the through service ABC (and CBA) is not subject to direct 
price regulation. 
• Since we focus on the access problem, the interconnections among peers 
are governed by "bill-and keep" arrangements; that is, they do not pay 
termination charges to each other [9].  
• The final services supplied by the providers are homogeneous. 
• We set up a linear model in order to derive intuitive implications of this 
game. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows: In section II, we set up a basic model. In 
section III, we present the model of Stackelberg competition of an entry game 
when the incumbent is leader and when the new entrant is leader. In section IV, 
we analyze the outcomes under each type of competition. In section V, we draw 
regulatory implications from the interpretation of the results presented in section 
IV. The final section summarizes the above implications from regulatory point of 
view. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
Let ,i eq q be the quantity supplied by the incumbent and the new entrant 
respectively.  The total quantity supplied by the providers is then i eq q q  . The 
demand function is given by ( )P P q . The cost function of the incumbent is 
( , )i i eC q q , whereas the cost function of the entrant is ( )e eC q . Incumbent’s profit is 
given by 
( ) ( , )i i e i i eP q q aq C q q    (1) 
and new entrant’s profit is given by 
( ) ( )e e e e eP q q aq C q     (2) 
According to the linear model, demand function is 
i eP A Bq A Bq Bq      (3) 
where all parameters are strictly positive and cost functions are  
i b i a i a eC c q q qc c    (4) 
e b eC c q  (5) 
where bc  is the marginal cost of providing the complementary component and ac  
is the marginal cost of the access itself, and all are strictly positive. Note that 
since we focus on the effect of access price ( a ≥0 )  and the type of competition 
on the decisions of the providers, we have supposed that the providers have 
identical marginal cost of providing the complementary component.  
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We assume that regulator sets the optimal access price that maximizes social 
welfare W defined as the unweighted sum of profits and consumer surplus.  
We then consider two cases according to the type of competition between 
incumbent and new entrant after knowing the optimal access price. In the first 
case, the incumbent is Stackelberg leader and the new entrant is Stackelberg 
follower, while in the second case the new entrant is Stackelberg leader and the 
incumbent is Stackelberg follower. The Stackelberg leader moves first (decide its 
optimal capacity/output) and then the follower provider moves sequentially.  
 
III. COMPETITION BETWEEN THE TWO ISPS 
A. The incumbent is Stackelberg leader 
Substituting (3) and (4) in (1) gives the incumbent’s profit function  
2
i i i e e b i a i a ei
Aq B Bq q aq c q q qq c c                 (6) 
The first-order condition is  
0
2 2 2
i b a
bi
i
A c
B cq
q
a c a
     

 
 (7)( 
which gives the level of output (
iq ) that maximizes profits for the incumbent, the 
leader.  
2
b a
i
A c
q
B
c 
  (8) 
The incumbent supposes that the entrant will follow its best response and hence 
subtract it away from the market demand to find its residual demand curve. Using 
this residual demand curve, the incumbent defines the price P .  
4
3 2b aA cP
c 

  
 
(9) 
 
Total output q  is the quantity that gives rise to price P  using the market demand 
curve D. 
3 3 2
4
b aA cq
B
c   
  (10) 
The entrant (the follower) produces the difference between total output ( q ) and 
the output produced by the leader.  
2
4
b a
e
A c
q
B
c  


 (11) 
Substituting (8), (9) and (11) in (1) gives the incumbent’s profits i , whereas 
substituting (8), (9) and (11) in (2) gives the new entrant’s profits e . 
2 2 22 2 6 4 4
8
6 4 4b a a b b a b a
i
Ac A c c c A c aA
B
c c a a ac

   

      (12) 
2 2 22 2 2 4 4
16
2 4 4b a a b b a b a
e
Ac A c c c A c aA
B
c c a a ac

   

      (13) 
The function that gives the consumer surplus (CS) for every access price is given 
by: 
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2 22 218 6 9 12 49
32
6 12 4b a a b b a b aAc A c c c A cA aCS
B
c c a a ac  

       (14) 
We have already mentioned that social welfare is defined as the unweighted sum 
of profits and consumer surplus. As a result, social welfare is the sum of (12), 
(13) and (14). Moreover, the change in social welfare caused by a marginal 
change in the access price is the sum of the changes in incumbent’s profits, new 
entrant’s profits and consumer surplus caused by a marginal change in the 
access price. The change in social welfare caused by a marginal change in the 
access price is given by: 
2
8
3b aA cW
B
c a
a
 


 
 (15) 
The first order condition is 0
W
a



 which gives the level of access price that 
maximizes social welfare. 
*
2
3b aA c c



 
   (16) 
Substituting (16) in (8) and (11) gives the optimal capacity decision of incumbent 
and new entrant respectively. 
*
2
b a
i
A c
q
B
c 
  (17) 
*
2
b a
e
A c
q
B
c 
  (18) 
The sum of (17) and (18) gives the optimal level of total output which gives rise to 
the price in the market. 
* b aA cq
B
c 
  (19) 
*
b acP c   (20) 
Then, substituting (16) in (12), (13) and (14) gives the incumbent’s profits, new 
entrant’s profits and consumer surplus when the access price is set to its optimal 
level. 
2 22
* 2 2
4
2b a a b b a
i
Ac A c c cA
B
c c

  

 
 (21) 
2 22
* 2 2
4
2b a a b b a
e
Ac A c c cA
B
c c

 

  
 (22) 
2 22
* 2 2
2
2b a a b b aAc A c c cA
CS
B
c c 

  
 (23) 
 
B. The new entrant is Stackelberg leader 
Substituting (3) and (5) in (2) gives the new entrant’s profit function  
2
e e i e e b ee
Aq B Bq q aq c qq       (24) 
The first-order condition is  
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0
2
e b a
be
e
A c
B cq
q
c
a

    

 
 (25) 
which gives the level of output (
eq ) that maximizes profits for the new entrant, the 
leader.  
2
2
b a
e
A c
q
B
c  


 (26) 
The new entrant supposes that the incumbent will follow its best response and 
hence subtract it away from the market demand to find its residual demand curve. 
Using this residual demand curve, the new entrant defines the price P . 
4
3 2b aA c
P
c 

  
 (27) 
Total output q  is the quantity that gives rise to price P  using the market demand 
curve D. 
3 3 2
4
b aA cq
B
c   
  (28) 
The incumbent (the follower) produces the difference between total output ( q ) 
and the output produced by the leader.  
3 2
4
b a
i
A c
q
B
c  


 (29) 
Substituting (26), (27) and (29) in (1) gives the incumbent’s profits i , whereas 
substituting (26), (27) and (29)  in (2) gives the new entrant’s profits e . 
2 2 22 2 14 12 12
16
14 12 12b a a b b a b a
i
Ac A c c c A c aA
B
c c a a ac

   

      (30) 
2 2 22 2 2 4 4
8
2 4 4b a a b b a b a
e
Ac A c c c A c aA
B
c c a a ac

   

        (31) 
The function that gives the consumer surplus (CS) for every access price is given 
by: 
2 22 218 6 9 12 49
32
6 12 4b a a b b a b aAc A c c c A cA aCS
B
c c a a ac  

            (32) 
Once again, the level of access price that maximizes social welfare is given by 
*
2
3b aA c c



 
     (33) 
Substituting (33) in (29) and (26) gives the optimal capacity decision of incumbent 
and new entrant respectively. 
*
0
iq   (34) 
* b a
e
A c
q
B
c 
  (35) 
The sum of (34) and (35) gives the optimal level of total output which gives rise to 
the price in the market. 
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* b aA cq
B
c 
  (36) 
*
b acP c   (37) 
Then, substituting (33) in (30), (31) and (32) gives the incumbent’s profits, new 
entrant’s profits and consumer surplus when the access price is set to its optimal 
level. 
2 22
* 2 2
2
2b a a b b a
i
Ac A c c cA
B
c c

  

 
 (38) 
2 22
* 2 2
2
2b a a b b a
e
Ac A c c cA
B
c c

 

  
 (39) 
2 22
* 2 2
2
2b a a b b aAc A c c cA
CS
B
c c 

  
 (40) 
 
IV. RESULTS INTERPRETATION 
The analysis of the outcomes 
*
iq ,
*
eq ,
*
q , *P ,
*
i ,
*
e , 
*
CS  and 
*
W that stem from 
the access price that maximizes social welfare  gives us the opportunity to draw 
the following propositions:   
 
Proposition 1. The type of competition between the providers does not affect 
the optimal level of the total output, the price of the service, the total profits and 
the consumer surplus. As a result, it does not affect the social welfare.  
 
Equations (19) and (36) give the total output when social welfare is maximized 
under each type of Stackelberg competition. It is obvious that the type of 
competition does not affect the total output. 
Comparing (20) and (37) we infer that the type of competition does not affect the 
price of the service. 
As a result, it is reasonable to assume that the consumer surplus would be the 
same under each type of competition. Comparing (23) and (40) we conclude that 
the previous assumption is true. 
Last but not least, we note that the total profits are zero under each type of 
competition.  
Since social welfare is the sum of profits and consumer surplus, we infer that the 
social welfare is the same regardless of the type of competition between the 
providers. The implication is that the regulator and the consumers are indifferent 
to the type of competition between the providers. 
 
  Proposition 2. The profits of each provider, which stem from the optimal 
access price, are affected by the difference between the access price and the 
marginal cost of providing the access. 
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We have already proven that under each type of competition the price of the 
broadband service that maximizes social welfare is given by *
b acP c  . As a 
result, incumbent’s profits are also given by * *( )i a eqa c    and new entrant’s 
profits are also given by * *( )e a eqac   . It is obvious that if incumbent’s profits are 
positive (negative), new entrant’s profits are negative (positive), unless both 
providers’ profits are zero.  
We have to note that when the optimal access price is equal to zero ( * 0a  ) or 
the optimal access price is negative ( * 0a  ), incumbent’s profits are negative 
( * 0i  ) and new entrant’s profits are positive (
* 0e  ).  However, when the 
optimal access price is positive ( * 0a  ) we have to discriminate between three 
cases: 
i. The level of the access price is higher than the marginal cost of providing the 
access, i.e. * aa c  . As a result, 
* 0a b ac A P Aa c c      . In this case 
the price is above the point that the demand curve intersects the price axis 
and as a result no one consumer is willing to buy the broadband service. 
ii. The level of the access price is equal to the marginal cost of providing the 
access, i.e. * aa c . As a result, 
* 0a b ac A P Aa c c      . In this case 
the price is equal to the point that the demand curve intersects the price axis 
and as a result the total quantity is zero. Of course, each provider’s output 
and each provider’s profits are zero. Furthermore, consumer surplus and 
social welfare are zero, too. Once again, no one consumer is willing to buy 
the broadband service. 
iii. The level of the access price is lower than the marginal cost of providing the 
access, i.e. * aa c . As a result, 
* 0a b ac A P Aa c c      . In this case 
the price is below the point that the demand curve intersects the price axis 
and as a result incumbent’s profits are negative and new entrant’s profits are 
positive. As we have already mentioned, the total profits are zero. In this case 
the social welfare is equal to the consumer surplus which is positive. The total 
output is positive as well. Moreover, when the new entrant is considered as 
leader, the new entrant serves the whole market, whereas when the 
incumbent is Stackelberg leader, the two providers have gained the same 
market share. 
 
Proposition 3. The incumbent’s loss is minimized when the optimal access 
price is positive and the incumbent is Stackelberg leader. 
 
It is obvious that when * 0a  , incumbent’s loss is lower than when 
* 0a   or 
* 0a  . The reason is that when 
* 0a  , the difference between the access price 
and the marginal cost of providing the access is minimized.  
However, from (21) and (38) we infer that the incumbent’s loss is lower when the 
incumbent is the Stackelberg leader. 
The reason is that when the incumbent is leader, it accepts an additional marginal 
cost of α/2 in order to continue to produce the same level of output regardless of 
the level of access price (see equation 8). By accepting this additional marginal 
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cost, the incumbent achieves not only to minimize its loss but also to minimize 
new entrant’s profits. In addition, it achieves to have the same market share with 
the new entrant, whereas under the other type of Stackelberg competition the 
incumbent produces nothing.  
 
V. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis of the above propositions leads to some very significant regulatory 
implications.  
First of all, the regulator is interesting in maximizing the social welfare. However, 
we have proven that the optimal access price causes the total profits to be zero 
and the consumer surplus to its maximum level. Since, this level of consumer 
surplus is the same under each type of Stackelberg competition, we infer that the 
social welfare is the same under each type of Stackelberg competition, as well. 
Hence, the regulator is indifferent to the type of competition between the 
providers, since each type leads to the same level of social welfare. In addition, 
consumers are also indifferent to the type of competition because the optimal 
price and the optimal total output are the same under each type of competition.  
Secondly, regulator intervenes in the market by setting the access price in order 
to prevent the incumbent from excluding the new entrant. It is obvious, that 
regulator aims at encouraging the right amount of entry that, in turn, increases the 
level of competition and the social welfare. However, from proposition 2 we infer 
that there are three cases in which the optimal price leads to a positive quantity 
demanded (there are consumers that are willing to buy the service): i) when 
* 0a  , ii) when 
* 0a   and iii) when 
* 0a   and 
*
aa c .  In all these cases the 
incumbent’s profits are negative and as a result the incumbent exits the market. 
Hence, the new entrant is only one provider to supply the market. It is reasonable 
that the monopolist produces its profit maximizing quantity (monopoly quantity). In 
this case, the total output decreases, price increases and social welfare 
decreases. In conclusion, the final result is exactly the opposite of the initial aim 
of regulator. We have to note that this conclusion applies to all types of 
competition. As a result, the access price that maximizes social welfare fails to 
achieve an equilibrium point at which consumers are willing to buy the service 
and both providers’ profits are positive.  
In conclusion, the unconstrained maximization of social welfare is proved to be an 
inefficient instrument of setting the access price regardless of the type of 
competition between the providers. As a result, we have explained why regulators 
do not apply the unconstrained maximization of social welfare in order to set the 
access price that encourages the right amount of entry.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The role of regulator in telecommunication industry is versatile. Among several 
problems that it has to regulate is the choice of the optimal charge for access to 
incumbent firm’s network and especially to the local loop. The optimal access 
price should be the result of an elaborate analysis of the market structure, the 
type of competition, the objectives of regulator, the available instruments of 
setting the access price and their attributes. Usually, regulator sets the access 
price that encourages the right amount of entry, efficient network investment and 
network utilization, while being manageable and increases social welfare. 
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However, none of the available instruments fulfill all the above objectives. Hence, 
regulator has to assess the possible outcomes of applying different instruments 
under different market conditions in order to choose the optimal access price.  
In this paper we proved that the access price that maximizes social welfare is the 
same under each type of Stackelberg competition. This optimal level of access 
price causes the social welfare to be the same under each type. However, the 
unconstrained maximization of social welfare is an ineffective instrument of 
setting the access price since it leads the incumbent to have loss and as a result 
to exit the market. Therefore, the regulator should apply alternative instruments 
for setting the access price that fulfill its aims.   
We have to note that this paper should be regarded as a complement to the 
existing ones that focus on other types of competition between the providers, 
such as Cournot and Bertrand competition, and other available instruments, such 
as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and retail minus. 
The authors already work on modifying the assumption that the providers have 
identical marginal costs of providing the complementary component. Then, the 
results will be compared to the results of the application of alternative instruments 
under different types of competition.  
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